

2021 AHI Conference: Patriotism Ancient and Modern

June 11-13, 2021
Treasure Valley Classical Academy
Fruitland, Idaho

Friday, June 11

- 8:30-9:45 Breakfast
- 10:00-11:45 Session 1: Ancient Patriotism
(Discussion Leader: Timothy Burns)
Readings:
• Herodotus IX.1-11
• Thucydides: Theseus' Athens and the Funeral Oration (2.14-17, 34-47)
• Speech of the Plataeans (3.51-68);
• First speech of Nicias (6.9-14)
• Speech of Alcibiades at Sparta (6.88-93)
• Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2; 3.1-9
• Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.46-77; 1.157-160; 2.15-18, 2.74-77; 3.14-18, 27-8.
- 12:00-12:45 Lunch
- 1:00-2:45 Session 2: The Rise of Modern Patriotism
(Discussion Leader: Scott Yenor)
Readings:
• Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Chapters 3, 6-7, 17-19.
• Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Book 3, Chapter 1.
- 2:45-3:15 Break
- 3:15-5:00 Session 3: Self-Interest and Modern Patriotism
(Discussion Leader: Scott Yenor)
Readings:
• Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, "Author's Introduction" and 1.2.6
• Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2.6; 1.2.6
- 5:00 Dinner

Saturday, June 12

- 8:30-9:45 Breakfast
- 10:00-11:45 Session 4: The Problem of Modern Patriotism
(Discussion Leader: Arthur Milikh)
• *Letter to D'Alembert, on the Theatre* (Bloom trans) first half
- 12:00-12:45 Lunch
- 1:00-2:45 Session 5: Rousseauian Patriotism
(Discussion Leader: Arthur Milikh)
• *Letter to D'Alembert, on the Theatre* (Bloom trans) second half

Session 1

Passages from the works of modern political philosophers bearing on patriotism

Thomas Hobbes:

Leviathan [1651], edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994).

17.1 (106) “The final cause or end for which human beings establish a commonwealth, is the foresight of their own preservation, and a more contented life thereby.”

John Locke:

Second Treatise of Government [1688], in *Two Treatises of Government*, Peter Laslett, editor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

§3. “POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

§42. “the increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government...

§ 44. “ From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labor of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.”

§ 45. “Thus labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labor and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretenses to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.

Jean Jacques Rousseau:

Discourse on the Arts and Sciences [1750], R. Masters and J. Masters, translators (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 50-51.

“[T]hese vain and futile declaimers go everywhere armed with their deadly paradoxes, undermining the foundations of faith, and annihilating virtue. They smile disdainfully at the old-fashioned words of fatherland and religion, and devote their talents and philosophy to destroying and debasing all that is sacred among men...

Ancient politicians incessantly talked about morals and virtue, those of our time talk only of business and money.”

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing:

Ernst and Falk: dialogues for Freemasons [1778], in Lessing, *Philosophical and Theological Writings*, H.B. Nisbet, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 191.

Falk: “States unite human beings so that each individual may enjoy his share of happiness better and more securely through and within this union. —The sum of the individual happiness of all its members is the happiness of the state. There is none at all apart from this. Every other happiness of the state whereby even the smallest number of individual members suffer, and must suffer, is a cloak for tyranny. Nothing else!”

Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune:

“Letter to Dr. Richard Price, 22 March 1778.” (Published in *Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, and the Means of Making it a Benefit to the World*, by Richard Price, D. D. L. L. D, and Fellow of the Royal Society of London, and of the Academy of Arts and Sciences in New England. Printed in London in 1784. Re-printed in Boston in 1784, by Powars and Willis.)

(75): “The knot is untied in regard to America. Lo she is independent irrecoverably! Will she be free and happy? Will this new people, situated so advantageously to give to the world the example of a constitution wherein man may enjoy all his rights, exercise freely his whole faculties and be governed only by nature, by reason, and by justice, know how to form such a constitution? know how to fix it upon everlasting foundations, by guarding against all the causes of division and corruption which would sap it by degrees and overturn it?”

(76): I am not satisfied, I own, with any constitutions which have as yet been framed by the different American States... (77): I do not perceive that there has been sufficient cause to reduce to the lowest possible number the kinds of business which the government of each State is to manage...

Nor do I perceive that due attention has been paid to the great distinction, and the only one founded in nature, between two classes of men; I mean those who are proprietors in lands and those who are not; —to their (78) interests and consequently to their different rights, with respect to legislation, to the administration of justice and of the police, to the contribution for public expenses and to their employments.

No fixed principle is established in regard to imposts. Each State is supposed to be at liberty to tax itself at pleasure, and to lay its taxes upon persons, consumptions, or importations, that is to say, to erect an interest contrary to that of the other States. They suppose in all the States that they have a right to regulate commerce. They even authorize the executive bodies or the governors to prohibit the exportation of certain products upon particular occasions; so far are they from seeing that the law of entire liberty of all commerce is a corollary of the right of property; so far are they still involved in the mists of European illusions.

In the general union of the States with one another, I do not see a coalition, a melting of all the parts together, so as to make the body *one* and homogeneous. It is only an aggregate of parts, always too separate, and which have a continual tendency to divide themselves, from the diversity of their laws, their manners, and their opinions; from the inequality of their present strength, but more still from the inequality of their future progress.

(79) ... This whole edifice has been supported until now upon the false basis of very ancient and very vulgar policy; upon the prejudice which nations, which provinces may have concerning interests as a province or a nation, different from those which

individuals have of being free and defending their properties against robbers and conquerors: —a pretended interest in carrying on more commerce than others, in not buying merchandize of foreigners, but in forcing these to consume our productions and the works of our manufacturers:—a pretended interest in having more extensive territory, in acquiring such and such a province, such and such an island, such and such a town— an interest in inspiring other nations with dread:—an interest in excelling them in the glory of arms or that of arts and sciences.

Each of these prejudices is cherished in Europe, because the ancient rivalry of nations and the ambition of princes obliges all States to be in arms for defense against their armed neighbors, and to regard a military force as the principal object of government. Such is the good fortune of America that she cannot have for a long time an external enemy to fear, if she does not become self-divided; therefore she may and ought to estimate, at their true value, those pretended interests, those (80) grounds of discord which are all that can endanger her liberty. The sacred principle of freedom of commerce being considered as the necessary consequence of the right of property, all the pretended interests of trade vanish before it. The pretended interest of possessing more or less territory vanishes also when the territory is justly considered as not belonging to nations but to the individual proprietors of the soil; and when the question whether such a canton or such a village ought to belong to such a province or such a state is not decided by the pretended interest of that province or that state, but by the interest which the inhabitants of the canton or village have in assembling themselves to transact their affairs in places the most convenient of access; when that interest, being measured by the length or shortness of the way which a man can go to manage his most important, without too much injury to his common, concerns, becomes the natural and physical measure of the extent of the jurisdiction of States, and establishes, throughout, an equilibrium of extent and power which annihilates all the danger of inequality and all pretensions of superiority.

(81) The interest of being dreaded becomes null when we make no *demands*, and when we are in a situation not to be attacked even by a considerable force with any hope of success.

The glory of arms cannot compare with the felicity of living in peace. The glory of arts and sciences belongs to every one who has spirit to acquire it. There is an harvest of this kind abundantly sufficient for every body; the field of discoveries cannot be overtilled, and ALL profit by the discoveries of ALL.

I imagine that the Americans have not felt these truths so strongly as they ought to be felt by them for the security of the happiness of their posterity.”

Alexander Hamilton:

The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Signet Classic, 2003).

Federalist 8 (pp. 68-69): “It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered

disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.”

Federalist 12 (p. 86): “The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer, —all orders of men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils.”

Alexis de Tocqueville:

Democracy in America [1835], Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, translators and editors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Volume I, part ii, ch.6, p. 235.

“...if, finally, the principal object of a government, according to you, is not to give the most force or the most glory possible to the entire body of the nation, but to procure the most well-being for each of the individuals who compose it and to have each avoid the most misery, then equalize conditions and constitute the government of a democracy.”

Karl Marx:

The Communist Manifesto [1848], in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, second edition, Richard Tuck, ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 475-76.

“The bourgeoisie, whenever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors,’ and that has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment.’ It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers.”

The History

Herodotus



TRANSLATED BY
David Grene



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Book Nine

1. Mardonius, when Alexander came back and told him what the Athenians had said to him, set out from Thessaly and with great eagerness led his army against Athens.¹ To whatever people he came, he drafted them. The chief men of Thessaly had no repentance for what they had already done—indeed, they urged on the Persian all the more—and Thorax of Larissa, who had escorted Xerxes on his flight, now manifestly opened a passage for Mardonius into Greece.

2. When in the course of its march the army was in Boeotia, the Thebans tried to hold Mardonius there; they gave him as their counsel that there was no place more suitable for him to make his encampment. They would have him go no further but sit down there and, they said, take measures such that he would conquer all Greece without a fight. To beat the Greeks by sheer force, if these Greeks were really united, as they had been before, was very difficult for all the people on earth. "But," said the Thebans, "if you do as we advise, you will overcome all their strong plans without trouble on your part. Send money to the leading men in the cities, and in so sending you will split Greece apart. From then on you will easily, with the aid of those of *your* party, master those who are of the other."

3. That was their advice, but he did not fall in with it. A terrible longing had seeped into his heart to take Athens a second time. It was partly arrogant pride and partly that he saw himself proving to the King (who was in Sardis), through beacon fires across the islands, that he had taken Athens. Yet, when he came to Attica, he again found no Athenians there. Most of them, he learned, were in Salamis with the fleet, and the city he took was empty of men. Between Xerxes' first capture of Athens and this later capture by Mardonius was just ten months' space.

1. In the summer of 479 B. C.

4. When Mardonius was in Athens, he sent to Salamis one Murychides, a Hellespontian, with the same offers that Alexander of Macedon had transmitted to the Athenians before. He sent this second time, although he knew that the Athenians had no friendly sentiments toward him, because he thought they would give up their stiff-neckedness to some extent, seeing that Attica was the captive of his spear and entirely subject to him.

5. For these reasons he sent Murychides to Salamis, and the man came and went before the Council and put to them the offers of Mardonius. One of the councillors, Lycidas, gave as his opinion that it seemed best, once they themselves had received the proposition that Murychides brought, to submit it to the people. This then was the judgment he openly declared, either because he was in receipt of money from Mardonius or perhaps out of his personal conviction. But the Athenians, both those of the Council and those outside, when they learned of this, raised a very storm about it. They surrounded Lycidas and stoned him to death, though they sent Murychides, the Hellespontian, away unscathed. There was a tumult in Salamis about this business of Lycidas; and when the Athenian women heard what was happening, one woman summoned another and came and took her along, and they went of their own prompting to the house of Lycidas, where they stoned to death his wife and his children.

6. This is how the Athenians had crossed over into Salamis: so long as they expected the army from the Peloponnese to come to their help, they waited in Attica; but when what the Peloponnesians did took ever longer and grew ever slower, and when now the invader was said already to be in Boeotia—faced with this, the Athenians conveyed away all their goods and themselves went across to Salamis. They also sent messengers to Lacedaemon, both to declare their anger against the Lacedaemonians for standing by and watching the barbarian invade Attica instead of, with the Athenians, meeting him in Boeotia, and to remind them of the offers the Persian had made them if they should change sides and to warn them that, unless they came to the help of the Athenians, they, the Athenians, would themselves find some sort of escape from their danger.

7. For the Lacedaemonians were at this time celebrating a festival; it was the Hyacinthia, and they made a great matter of giving

the god his due. Besides, the fortification they were building at the Isthmus was right now having the battlements put on it. When the messengers from the Athenians came to Lacedaemon, bringing with them messengers as well from the Megarians and the Plataeans, they came before the ephors and addressed them: "The Athenians have sent us to tell you that the King of the Medes is giving us back our country; that he is willing to make us his allies on fair and equal terms, without fraud or deceit; he is willing, moreover, to give us other territory in addition to our own—such territory as we shall choose. Out of shame before the God of the Hellenes and thinking it a dreadful thing to betray Greece, we did not consent, but refused, though we are being unjustly treated by the Greeks and left in the lurch, and though we know full well that it would be more to our profit to come to an agreement with the Persian than to make war. But indeed, we will not, insofar as our willingness goes, make terms with him. So, in our dealings with the Greeks, we have passed no false coin. But what of you? Some time ago, in utter terror you came to us to beg us not to make terms with the Persian; but after that you came to understand the Athenian mind thoroughly—that we would never betray Greece. Besides, that wall of yours that you are building across the Isthmus is now finished; and so now you make no account at all of the Athenians! You made a bargain with us to go into Boeotia to meet the Persian there, and you broke your word; you have stood by and watched the barbarian invade Attica. As of this moment, the Athenians are wroth against you, for you have acted contrary to all decency. But now they bid you with the utmost speed send out an army with us, that we may meet the barbarian in Attica. For, since we have lost Boeotia, the Thriasian plain, in our country, is the most suitable place for us to fight."

8. When the ephors heard that, they postponed making their answer until the day following, and on that next day to the next, and so on for ten days, always postponing the decision from one day to the next. During this time all the Peloponnesians were working with might and main, building their fortification of the Isthmus; they had the work almost done. I cannot myself say why it was that when Alexander of Macedon came to Athens they took such trouble to plead against the Athenians' taking the Persian side while now they did not care about that at all—except that the Isthmus was

now fortified and they thought they had no further need of the Athenians, but, when Alexander had come to Attica, the fortifications were not complete, and they were working on them, in great dread of the Persians.

9. But the final settlement of what answer was to be given, and the decision to send out the Spartan army, came about like this: on the day before what was to be the last meeting, a man of Tegea called Chileus, who had more influence in Sparta than any other foreigner, learned from the ephors all that the Athenians had said. When Chileus heard this, he said to the ephors, "Ephors, this is how the matter stands. If the Athenians are not going to be on our side but are to be allies of the barbarian, you may draw whatever strong walls you please across the Isthmus; there will still be huge gates wide open for the Persian into the Peloponnese. Listen, you, before the Athenians come to a different decision—one that will bring all Greece to the ground."

10. That was his counsel; and the ephors, when they had grasped what he had said, straightway, while it was still night, sent off five thousand Spartiates and assigned seven helots to each one, with Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, entrusted with the command for leading them out for the expedition. (They told nothing whatever to the messengers who had come to them from the cities.) The leadership indeed belonged to Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas, but he was still a child, and Pausanias was his guardian and cousin. For Cleombrotus, the father of Pausanias and the son of Anaxandrides, was no longer living; he had brought the army out of the Isthmus—the army that had built the wall—and lived only a short space thereafter and then died. (The reason Cleombrotus drew off the army from the Isthmus is this: as he was sacrificing for triumph over the Persian, the sun failed in the heaven.)² Pausanias coopted, to join him in the command, Euryanax, the son of Dorieus, a man of his own house.

11. So this force with Pausanias had marched out of Sparta; and at daybreak the messengers, who knew nothing of the marching-out, came before the ephors, having in mind to go off home, each to his own country. And when they came, they said this: "You men of

2. There was an eclipse.

Lacedaemon, stay right here and celebrate your Hyacinthia in playful spirit, now that you have betrayed your allies. The Athenians, being wronged by you, and for lack of allies, will make their terms with the Persian as best they may. It is quite clear that we will become allies of the King, and, once we have made our terms with him, we will campaign against whatever land he may lead us to. From then on you will find out what will happen to you as a result of what you have now done." That was what the messengers said; but the ephors told them, upon oath, that as far as they knew the Spartans were even then in Orestheum, marching against "the foreigners." (They always called the barbarians "the foreigners.") The spokesmen for the allies, being unable to understand this, asked them again for the meaning of what they said, and in response to their questions they learned the whole truth. So, being much amazed, they set out in hot pursuit. And with them on the same tack went five thousand chosen hoplites of the Lacedaemonian "Dwellers Around."³

12. On they hastened to the Isthmus. But the Argives, as soon as they learned that Pausanias and this expedition had set out from Sparta, picked the best of the day-runners⁴ they could find as their herald and sent him off to Attica; for they had earlier, and of their own will, promised Mardonius to prevent the Spartans from getting out of Sparta to the war. So this man came to Athens and said, "Mardonius, the Argives have sent me to inform you that the youth of Sparta has marched out of Lacedaemon and that the Argives are unable to stay them from going out. So lay your best plans in the face of this circumstance."

13. Having given his message, he went off home. But Mardonius, when he heard the news, was no longer anxious to remain in Attica. Now, before he knew this, he had hung back, wanting to know what the Athenians would do; and during this time he did no damage nor devastated the land of Attica, because he kept expecting that the Athenians would come to terms with him. But when he failed to persuade them, and learned everything, he withdrew before

3. This is the technical term (*perioikoi*) for the Lacedaemonians who lived in the territory around Sparta but were not possessed of full Spartan citizenship.

4. Long-distance runners.

Pausanias and his troops had entered the Isthmus. First, however, he burned Athens, and whatever walls or houses or temples were still upright he cast down and destroyed. He withdrew because Attica is not cavalry country, and, if he engaged and lost, he would have no retreat except through a narrow defile, where a few men could hold the Persians back. His plan, then, was to retire to Thebes and fight near a city that was friendly and in country suitable for cavalry action.

14. As Mardonius retreated and was already on his way, there came to him a message that another army, an advance body of troops—one thousand Lacedaemonians—had arrived in Megara. On this information he laid his plans, for he wanted to destroy these first if he could. He turned his army round and led for Megara. His cavalry went in advance and overran the country about Megara. This is the furthest, in the western direction, that the Persian army came in Europe.

15. After this, a message came to Mardonius that the Greeks were gathered at the Isthmus. So he marched back through Decerea; for the Boeotarchs⁵ sent for those Asopians who were neighbors of their country, and these men were his guides to Sphendalae and, from there, to Tanagra. He bivouacked for the night in Tanagra and next day turned toward Scolus, where he was in Theban country. There, for all that the Thebans were committed to the Persian side, he ravaged their lands by cutting down their trees, not out of any enmity against them but because, being in the grip of hard necessity, he must make a strong fortress for his army, so that if the results of the engagement were other than he would have them, he might have this for a refuge. His army reached from Erythrae past Hysiae and into the land of Plataea, along the river Asopus. I do not mean that the fortress was so large; each side of that was at most some ten stades long.

16. While the barbarians were busy with this work, Attaginus, the son of Phrynon, a Theban, having made great preparations for a banquet, invited to it Mardonius himself and fifty of the most distinguished Persians, and those who were invited came. The banquet was given in Thebes. What follows I heard myself from Thersander

5. The technical name for the aristocrats who ruled Boeotia.

THUCYDIDES

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BOOKS I AND II

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
CHARLES FORSTER SMITH



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BOOK II

took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus sought to encourage them; and as to heavy-armed infantry, he told them that there were thirteen thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they were composed of the oldest and the youngest¹ citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed. For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty-three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that between the Long Wall and the Phalerian); and the Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, of which only the outside one was guarded; and the whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including mounted archers, the bow-men sixteen hundred, and the triremes that were seaworthy three hundred. For these were the forces, and not less than these in each branch, which the Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the Peloponnesians was impending and they found themselves involved in the war. And Pericles used still other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they would be victorious in the war.

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words they were won to his view, and they began to bring in from the fields their children and wives, and also

BOOK II

their household furniture, pulling down even the woodwork of the houses themselves; but sheep and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard thing for them to accept, because most of them had always been used to live in the country.

XV. And this kind of life had been the characteristic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hellenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, Attica had been divided into separate towns, each with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as they had nothing to fear they did not come together to consult with the king, but separately administered their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, he not only re-organized the country in other respects, but abolished the councils and magistracies of the minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into union with what is now the city, establishing a single council and town hall, and compelled them, while continuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, since all were now paying their taxes to it,¹ and was such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. And from his time even to this day the Athenians have celebrated at the public expense a festival called the Synoecia,² in honour of the goddess.

Before this³ what is now the Acropolis was the

BOOK II

city, together with the region at the foot of the Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of this is as follows: On the Acropolis itself are the sanctuaries¹ of the other gods as well as of Athena,² and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acropolis are situated more in that quarter of the city, namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia³ the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the fountain now called Enneacrunus,⁴ from the fashion given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was used by people of those days, because it was close by, for the most important ceremonials; and even now, in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And, finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had there in early times a place of habitation, is still to this day called by them Polis or city.

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of independence in the country districts, most of the Athenians of early times and of their descendants down to the time of this war, from force of habit, even after their political union with the city, continued

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to reside, with their households, in the country where they had been born; and so they did not find it easy to move away, especially since they had only recently finished restoring their establishments after the Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at having to leave their homes and the temples which had always been theirs,—relics, inherited from their fathers, of their original form of government—and at the prospect of changing their mode of life, and facing what was nothing less for each of them than forsaking his own town.

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a few of them were provided with dwellings or places of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them took up their abode in the vacant places of the city and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any other precinct that could be securely closed. And the Pelargicum,¹ as it was called, at the foot of the Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following effect:

“The Pelargicum unoccupied is better,”

nevertheless under stress of the emergency was completely filled with buildings. And the oracle, as it seems to me, came true, but in a sense quite the opposite of what was expected; for it was not on account of the unlawful occupation of the place that the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on

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account of the war that there was the necessity of its occupation, and the oracle, although it did not mention the war, yet foresaw that the place would never be occupied for any good. Many also established themselves in the towers of the city walls, and where-each one could find a place; for the city did not have room for them when they were all there together. But afterwards they distributed into lots and occupied the space between the Long Walls and the greater part of the Peiraeus. And while all this was going on, the Athenians applied themselves to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out an expedition of one hundred ships against the Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this stage of their preparations.

XVIII. Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing and the first point it reached in Attica was Oenoe, where they intended to begin the invasion. And while they were establishing their camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise; for Oenoe, which was on the border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians went on with their preparations to assault the place, and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely censured, though it was thought that in the levying of the war, too, he had been slack and had played into the hands of the Athenians when he did not advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour.¹ Again, when the army was being collected, he was criticized for the delay which occurred at the Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in

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the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power, and for this purpose he himself hired some mercenaries. The commanders of the expedition were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They did in fact sail over and restore him; and wishing to acquire some other places along the seaboard of Acarnania they made the attempt but failed, and thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the coast they touched at Cephallenia, where they made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians; here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort of agreement they lost a few of their men by an unexpected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty, managed to get back home.

XXXIV. In the course of the same winter the Athenians, following the custom of their fathers, celebrated at the public expense the funeral rites of the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony is as follows. The bones of the departed lie in state for the space of three days in a tent erected for that purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any offering he desires. On the day of the funeral coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a pall, is carried in the procession for the missing whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may take part in the funeral procession, and the women who are related to the deceased are present at the

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burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most beautiful suburb¹ of the city; there they always bury those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at Marathon; for their valour the Athenians judged to be preëminent and they buried them on the spot where they fell. But when the remains have been laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state, who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In this manner they bury; and throughout the war, whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom. Now over these, the first victims of the war, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when the proper time came, he advanced from the sepulchre and took his stand upon a platform which had been built high in order that his voice might reach as far as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows:

XXXV. “Most of those who have spoken here in the past have commended the law-giver who added this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet and right that it should be spoken at their burial over those who have fallen in war. To me, however, it would have seemed sufficient, when men have proved themselves brave by valiant acts, by act only to make manifest the honours we render them—such honours as to-day you have witnessed in connection with these funeral ceremonies solemnized by the state—and not that the valour of many men should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard matter to speak in just measure on an occasion where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker’s

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accuracy is established. For the hearer who is cognizant of the facts and partial to the dead will perhaps think that scant justice has been done in comparison with his own wishes and his own knowledge, while he who is not so informed, whenever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond his own capacity, will be led by envy to think there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies of other men are tolerable only in so far as each hearer thinks that he too has the ability to perform any of the exploits of which he hears; but whatever goes beyond that at once excites envy and unbelief. However, since our forefathers approved of this practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedience to the law, must endeavour to the best of my ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of you.

XXXVI. "I shall speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion like this, to give them this place of honour in recalling what they did. For this land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an unbroken line of successive generations, they by their valour transmitted to our times a free state. And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our fathers still more; for they, adding to the inheritance which they received, acquired the empire we now possess and bequeathed it, not without toil, to us who are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled, who are now for the most part still in the prime of life, have further strengthened the empire in most respects, and have provided our city with all resources,¹ so that it is sufficient for itself both in peace and in war. The military exploits whereby

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our several possessions were acquired, whether in any case it were we ourselves or our fathers that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Barbarian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no desire to speak at length among those who know. But I shall first set forth by what sort of training we have come to our present position, and with what political institutions and as the result of what manner of life our empire became great, and afterwards proceed to the praise of these men; for I think that on the present occasion such a recital will be not inappropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it.

XXXVII. "We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbours¹; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some² follow, rather than the imitators of other peoples. It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour

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if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succour of the oppressed and those which, though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognize.

XXXVIII. “Moreover, we have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games¹ and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance; and the delight we each day find in these things drives away sadness. And our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands.²

XXXIX. “We are also superior to our opponents in our system of training for warfare, and this in the following respects. In the first place, we throw our city open to all the world and we never by exclusion acts debar any one from learning or seeing anything which an enemy might profit by observing if it were not kept from his sight; for we place our dependence, not so much upon prearranged devices to

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deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our own souls when we are called to action. And again, in the matter of education, whereas they from early childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life are none the less ready to meet any equality of hazard.¹ And here is the proof: When the Lacedaemonians invade our territory they do not come alone but bring all their confederates with them, whereas we, going by ourselves against our neighbours' territory, generally have no difficulty, though fighting on foreign soil against men who are defending their own homes, in overcoming them in battle. And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet met, not only because we are constantly attending to the needs of our navy, but also because on land we send our troops on many enterprises; but if they by chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease rather than by laborious training and depending on a courage which springs more from manner of life than compulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and when we come to the test we show ourselves fully as brave as those who are always toiling; and so our city is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well as in others.

XL. "For we are lovers of beauty yet with no extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an opportunity for action than as a subject for boasting;

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and with us it is not a shame for a man to acknowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for him not to do his best to avoid it. And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves¹ or at least endeavour to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action. For in truth we have this point also of superiority over other men, to be most daring in action and yet at the same time most given to reflection upon the ventures we mean to undertake; with other men, on the contrary, boldness means ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they would rightly be adjudged most courageous who, realizing most clearly the pains no less than the pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand in sharp contrast to most men; for it is not by receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we acquire our friends. Now he who confers the favour is a firmer friend, in that he is disposed, by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to keep the feeling of obligation alive in him²; but he who owes it is more listless in his friendship, knowing that when he repays the kindness it will count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt

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repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits without fear of consequences, not upon a calculation of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence in the spirit of liberality which actuates us.

XLI. "In a word, then, I say that our city as a whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to me, each individual amongst us could in his own person, with the utmost grace and versatility, prove himself self-sufficient in the most varied forms of activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very power of our city, a power which we have acquired in consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is superior to the report of her, and she alone neither affords to the enemy who comes against her cause for irritation at the character of the foe by whom he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for complaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are the proofs which we have given of our power and assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and therefore we shall be the wonder not only of the men of to-day but of after times; we shall need no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment but whose presentation of the facts will be discredited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled every sea and every land to grant access to our daring, and have everywhere planted¹ everlasting memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends. Such, then, is the city for which these men nobly fought and died, deeming it their duty not to let her

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be taken from them; and it is fitting that every man who is left behind should suffer willingly for her sake.

XLII. "It is for this reason that I have dwelt upon the greatness of our city; for I have desired to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who do not enjoy such privileges in like degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these men in whose honour I am now speaking be made manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of their praise has already been spoken; for when I lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith the brave deeds of these men and men like them have already adorned her; and there are not many Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs, evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to me that such a death as these men died gives proof enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in the case of those who in other ways fell short of goodness, it is but right that the valour with which they fought for their country should be set before all else; for they have blotted out evil with good and have bestowed a greater benefit by their service to the state than they have done harm by their private lives. And no one of these men either so set his heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yielding to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he could but escape it he might yet become rich; but, deeming the punishment of the foe to be more desirable than these things, and at the same time regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged

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upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things, trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of success, but in action, as to the issue that was before their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And then when the moment of combat came, thinking it better to defend themselves and suffer death rather than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed, from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment not of fear but of glory, they passed away.

XLIII. "And so these men then bore themselves after a manner that befits our city; but you who survive, though you may pray that it be with less hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to meet the foe which is no whit less courageous; and you must estimate the advantage of such a spirit not alone by a speaker's words, for he could make a long story in telling you—what you yourselves know as well as he—all the advantages that are to be gained by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must daily fix your gaze upon the power of Athens and become lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness has inspired you, reflect that all this has been acquired by men of courage who knew their duty and in the hour of conflict were moved by a high sense of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enterprise, were resolved that at least their country should not find herself deserted by their valour, but freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering¹ it was in

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their power to give. For they gave their lives for the common weal, and in so doing won for themselves the praise which grows not old and the most distinguished of all sepulchres—not that in which they lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occasion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments set up in their own land that alone commemorates them, but also in lands not their own there abides in each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted in the heart rather than graven on stone. Do you, therefore, now make these men your examples, and judging freedom to be happiness and courage to be freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who have the best excuse for being unsparing of their lives, for they have no hope of better days, but rather those who run the risk, if they continue to live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is humiliation associated with cowardice than death when it comes unperceived in close company with stalwart deeds and public hopes.

XLIV. “Wherefore, I do not commiserate the parents of these men, as many of you as are present here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they know that their lives have been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and it is to be accounted good fortune when men win, even as these now, a most glorious death—and you a like grief—and when life has been meted out to them to be happy in no less than to

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die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoyment of blessings in which you too once took delight; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of the good things which a man has never known, but for what is taken away from him after he has once become accustomed to it. But those of you who are still of an age to have offspring should bear up in the hope of other children; for not only to many of you individually will the children that are born hereafter be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, but the state also will reap a double advantage—it will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel who, having no children to hazard,¹ do not have an equal part in the risk. But as for you who have passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion of your life during which you were fortunate and remember that the remainder will be short; and be comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not 'gain' as some say,² that gives the greater satisfaction, but honour.

XLV. "But for such of you here present as are sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of the conflict that awaits you—for the dead are always praised—and even were you to attain to surpassing virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say

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their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that which has been removed from our path is honoured with a good-will that knows no antagonism.

“If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, referring to those of you who will henceforth be in widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition: Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard which nature has set for your sex, and great also is hers of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or in blame.

XLVI. “I have now spoken, in obedience to the law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those whom we are burying have already in part also received their tribute in our deeds;¹ besides, the state will henceforth maintain their children at the public expense until they grow to manhood, thus offering both to the dead and to their survivors a crown of substantial worth as their prize in such contests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are greatest, there are found the best citizens. And now, when you have made due lament, each for his own dead, depart.”

XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took place during this winter, the close of which brought the first year of this war to an end. At the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before,² invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and establishing themselves proceeded to ravage the country. And before they had been many days in

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Attica the plague¹ began for the first time to show itself among the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on record anywhere. For neither were physicians able to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat it without knowing its nature, the mortality among them being greatest because they were most exposed to it, nor did any other human art avail. And the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men desisted from them, overcome by the calamity.

XLVIII. The disease began, it is said, in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, and then descended into Egypt and Libya and spread over the greater part of the King's territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants of the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns; for there were as yet no public fountains there. But afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from that time the mortality became much greater. Now any one, whether physician or layman, may, each according to his personal opinion, speak about its probable origin and state the causes which, in his view, were sufficient to have produced so great a departure from normal conditions; but I shall describe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, from the study of which a person should be best able,

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and so they wondered that the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them caught sight of the ships and said, "Yonder are ships sailing up" Then they too retreated—for it was already getting dark; whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and broke off the action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed down to the camp not long after they were sighted. And the Corcyraeans—for it was night—were afraid they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized them and the ships came to anchor.

LII. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, although they put out from shore and drew up in line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves were involved in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the captives whom they had in their ships and the impossibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were more concerned about was the voyage home, how they should get back, for they were afraid that the Athenians would consider that the treaty had been broken, since they had come to blows, and would not let them sail away.

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some

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men, without a herald's wand,¹ into a boat and send them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. And these men bore the following message: "You do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a treaty; for by taking up arms against us you interfere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here and treat us as enemies." Thus they spoke; and all the host of the Corcyraeans that was within hearing shouted: "Take them and kill them!" But the Athenians made answer as follows: "We are not beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you; but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to prevent it."

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the mainland; and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies² that had been carried in their direction by the current and by the wind, which had arisen in the night and scattered them in every direction, and set up, as being the victors, a rival trophy at Sybota on the island. Each side claimed the victory on the following grounds: The Corinthians set up a trophy because they had prevailed in

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the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy ships; and the Corcyraeans, because they had destroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the day before had backed water and retreated at sight of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came would not sail out from Sybota and give battle—for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side claimed the victory.

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcyraeans and themselves in common, and establishing there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody and treated them with much consideration, their motive being that when they returned to Corcyra they might win it over to their side;¹ and it so happened that most of these were among the most influential men of the city. In this way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians withdrew from it. And this was the first ground which the Corinthians had for the war against the Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcyraeans against them in time of truce.

LVI Immediately after this the following events

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also occurred, which caused differences between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the war. While the Corinthians were devising how they should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans (who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the Athenians), to pull down their wall on the side of Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send away and not receive in the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send every year. For they were afraid that the Potidaeans, persuaded by Perdiccas¹ and the Corinthians, would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in Thrace to revolt with them.

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea-fight at Corcyra; for the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had before been an ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he had become hostile because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were making common cause against himself. Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lace-daemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of Potidaea; and, furthermore, he made overtures to the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these countries, which bordered on his own, it would be

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easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the war. But the Athenians became aware of these designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since they happened to be sending against the country of Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them from revolting.

LVIII. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade them not to take any harsh measures with reference to themselves; but envoys of theirs went also to Lacedaemon in the company of the Corinthians, with the object of having assistance ready to hand in case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail against themselves as well, whereas the magistrates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to invade Attica if the Athenians went against Potidaea; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians¹ and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war

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with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for war.

LIX. But when the thirty ships of the Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found Potidaea and the other places already in revolt. Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas and the places which had revolted, turned their attention to Macedonia, which was their destination at the start, and when they had got a foothold carried on war in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Macedonia from the interior with an army.

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed about the place and thinking that the danger came home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own and such other Peloponnesians as they induced by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops. The general in command was Aristeus son of Adimantus; and it was chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for he had always been on friendly terms with the Potidaeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea.

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly reached the Athenians also; and when they learned that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to support the rebels, they sent against the places in revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other generals. These first came to Macedonia and found

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that the former thousand had just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they concluded an agreement and an alliance with Perdiccas, being forced thereto by the situation of Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled them to hasten, and then they withdrew from Macedonia. On their way they came to Beroea and thence to Strepsa,¹ and after an unsuccessful attempt upon this place proceeded overland to Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and with many of their allies besides, and with six hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the command of Philip and Pausanias; and at the same time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the third day at Gigonus, and went into camp.

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, encamped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and they had established a market outside of the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry; for Perdiccas had immediately deserted the Athenians again² and was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus as his administrator at home. The plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the other allies from outside of the isthmus³ and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to

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remain at Olynthus; then when the Athenians should move against the forces of Aristeus, the others were to come up and attack them in the rear, and thus place the enemy between their two divisions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid from that quarter, while they themselves broke camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they took up their position facing them; and soon the two sides joined battle. And the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the forces opposed to them and pressed on a long distance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of Potidaea.

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He determined, however, to bring his own troops together into as compact a body as possible and to force his way into Potidaea on a run. And he succeeded in getting in by way of the breakwater through the sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles; but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater number of them. Now when the battle began and the standards had been raised,¹ the auxiliaries of

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the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea—advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Macedonian cavalry drew up in line against them to prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon proving the victors and the standards were pulled down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action on either side.¹ After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians alone² about a hundred and fifty, and also their general Callias.

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side³ the Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene was not shut off.⁴ For they thought their numbers were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen hundred of their own hoplites under the command of Phormio son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging

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the country at the same time. And as no one came out against him to give battle he built a wall to blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidaea was at length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, where a fleet blockaded it.

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidaea was cut off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or something else should happen beyond his expectation, he advised all the garrison except five hundred men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, that the food might hold out longer, and he himself was ready to be one of those who should remain. But since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do the next best thing and to provide that their affairs outside should be put into the best possible condition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian guard. He then remained among the Chalcidians, whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, and especially by destroying a large force of Sermylians, whom he ambushed near their city; and meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Peloponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidaea was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice; and he also captured some towns.

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, then, these additional grounds of complaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieging Potidaea, a colony of theirs with men in it from

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Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans against themselves. As yet, however, the war had not openly broken out, but there was still a truce for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on their own authority.

LXVII. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians were in the town, but also because they were in fear about the place; and they immediately summoned the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they proceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the ground that they had broken the treaty and were wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also sent delegates—not openly, to be sure, for they feared the Athenians, but secretly—and, acting with the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting the war, saying that they were not autonomous as stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians sent out a summons to all the other allies who claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands of the Athenians, and calling their own customary assembly bade them speak. Others came forward and stated their several complaints, and particularly the Megarians, who presented a great many other grievances, and chiefly this, that they were excluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lacedaemonians, spoke as follows:—

LXVIII. “That spirit of trust which marks your domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations

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with one another, renders you more mistrustful if we bring any charge against others, and thus while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing with affairs abroad. For example, although we warned you time and again of the injury the Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to accept the information we kept giving you, but preferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, feeling that they were actuated by their own private interests. And this is the reason why you did not act before we got into trouble, but it is only when we are in the midst of it that you have summoned these allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accusations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might have needed additional information on the ground of your ignorance; but as the case stands, what need is there of a long harangue, when you see that they have enslaved some of us¹ and are plotting against others, notably against your own allies, and that they have long been making their preparations with a view to the contingency of war? For otherwise they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieging Potidaea—one of these being a most strategic point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the other would have furnished a very large fleet to the Peloponnesians.

LXIX. “And the blame for all this belongs to you, for you permitted them in the first instance to

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strengthen their city after the Persian war,¹ and afterwards to build their Long Walls,² while up to this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their freedom not only those who have been enslaved by them, but now even your own allies also. For the state which has reduced others to slavery does not in a more real fashion enslave them than the state which has power to prevent it, and yet looks carelessly on, although claiming as its preëminent distinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now at last we have with difficulty managed to come together, though even now without a clearly defined purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is with resolved plans against those who have come to no decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they advance. We know too by what method the Athenians move against their neighbours—that it is here a little and there a little. And as long as they think that, owing to your want of perception, they are undetected, they are less bold; but once let them learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they will press on with vigour. For indeed, O Lacedaemonians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not by the use of your power, but by your intention to use it; and you alone propose to destroy your enemies' power, not at its inception, but when it is doubling itself.³ And yet you had the reputation of running no risks; but with you, it would seem, repute goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went

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forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your power; and now you regard with indifference the Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but near at hand, and instead of attacking them yourselves, you prefer to ward them off when they attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle with opponents who have become far more powerful. Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by his own fault, and that in our struggles with the Athenians themselves we have so far often owed our successes rather to their own errors than to any aid received from you; indeed, it is the hopes they have placed in you that have already ruined more than one state¹ that was unprepared just because of trust in you. And let no one of you think that these things are said more out of hostile feeling than by way of complaint; for complaint is against friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have inflicted an injury.

LXX. "And besides, we have the right, we think, if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, especially since the interests at stake for us are important. To these interests it seems to us at least that you are insensible, and that you have never even fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how utterly, different they are from you. For they are given to innovation and quick to form plans and to put their decisions into execution, whereas you are disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to carry to completion even what is indispensable.

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Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venturesome beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in the face of dangers; while your way is to do less than your strength warrants, to distrust even what your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are prompt in decision, while you are dilatory; they stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes; for they expect by absence from home to gain something, while you are afraid that, if you go out after something, you may imperil even what you have. If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their advantage to the utmost; if beaten, they fall back as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodies in the service of their country as though they were the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as though they were wholly their own, so as to accomplish anything on her behalf. And whenever they have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfilment, they think themselves robbed of a possession of their own; and whenever they go after a thing and obtain it, they consider that they have accomplished but little in comparison with what the future has in store for them; but if it so happens that they try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it the same thing to hope for and to attain when once they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly undertake whatever they determine upon. In this way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they have because they are always seeking more, because they think their only holiday is to do their duty, and because they regard untroubled peace as a far

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greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore if a man should sum up and say that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to let other men have it, he would simply speak the truth.

LXXI. “And yet, although you have such a state ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices long only for those who, while they employ their military strength only for just ends, yet by their spirit show plainly that they will not put up with it if they are treated with injustice; whereas you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury in self-defence.¹ But it would be difficult to carry out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour a state just like yourselves; whereas now, as we have just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the new must always prevail over the old. It is true that when a state is at peace the established practices are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled to enter into many undertakings there is need of much improvement in method. It is for this reason that the government of the Athenians, because they have undertaken many things, has undergone greater change than yours.

“Here, then, let your dilatoriness end; at this moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest of your allies, as you promised to do, by invading Attica without delay, that you may not betray your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other

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alliance. If we took such a course we should be committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods we have sworn by or of men of understanding; for treaties are broken not by those who when left unsupported join others, but by those who fail to succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you mean to be zealous allies we will stay; for in that case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed our friends, nor should we find others more congenial. In view of these things, be well advised, and make it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall be no weaker under your leadership than when you inherited it from your fathers.”

LXXII. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy of the Athenians that had come on other business, and when they heard the various speeches they deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedaemonians, not indeed to make any defence on the charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with regard to the whole question at issue that the Lacedaemonians should not decide it hastily but should take more time to consider it. At the same time they wished to show how great was the power of their own city, reminding the older men of what they already knew, and recounting to the younger things of which they were ignorant, in the belief that under the influence of their arguments the Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather than war. Accordingly they approached the Lacedaemonians and said that they also wished, if there was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows:

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LXXIII. "Our embassy did not come here to enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, however, that no small outcry is being made against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or we are addressing you as judges), but in order that you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters of great importance. And at the same time we wish, as regards the whole outcry that has been raised against us, to show that we are rightfully in possession of what we have acquired, and that our city is not to be despised.

"Now, what need is there to speak about matters quite remote,¹ whose only witnesses are the stories men hear rather than the eyes of those who will hear them told? But concerning the Persian War and all the other events of which you have personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even though it will be rather irksome to mention them, since they are always being paraded. For when we were performing those deeds the risk was taken for a common benefit, and since you got a share of the actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that. And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence with what sort of city you will be involved in war if you are not well advised.

"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that

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when he came again, not being able to defend ourselves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.

LXXIV. "Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. Of the four hundred¹ ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds. The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation; and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you.² And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to

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honoured above all. Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them. But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will find it more, difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink; and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him. For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a

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plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.

CXXI. “And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience; secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command; and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia.¹ For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors; for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.² If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and as soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior. For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas

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the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice. And as to the money we need to accomplish all this, we shall provide it by contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very wealth and withal have it used to our destruction.

CXXII. “But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over it¹ makes more blunders.

“And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne; but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided. And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it

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be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery. That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states. We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdain¹ which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.

CXXIII “With regard, however, to what is past and done, what need is there to find fault at length, except in so far as that is profitable for what is present? But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand—for to win virtue² by toils is our heritage—and make no change of custom because you now have a slight superiority in wealth and power; for it is not right that attributes which have been won through poverty should be lost through prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with confidence, and for many reasons: the god has spoken through his oracle and promised that he

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himself will help you; all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in bidding you go to war, considers it to have been transgressed already, but you will be going to the defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it is not those who fight in self-defence that break a treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.

CXXIV. “So then, since from every quarter a favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to war, and since we recommend this course in the common interest—if it be true that identity of interest¹ is the surest policy for states and individuals to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the rest; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when some are already being injured, and others, if it shall become known that we have had a meeting and dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the same time that this proposal is for the best; and vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, but coveting the more enduring peace which will result from the war. For peace is more firmly established when it follows war, but to refuse to go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and

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designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set free those Hellenes who are already enslaved.”

CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied states which were present, both great and small; and the majority voted for war. But though the decision was made it was impossible for them to take up arms at once, as they were unprepared; it was determined, however, that the several states should make the fitting preparations and that there should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing themselves with what was needed there was spent, not indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they invaded Attica and took up the war openly.

CXXVI. During this interval they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, that they might have as good a pretext as possible for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian envoys bade the Athenians drive out the “curse of the goddess.” The curse was as follows: There was an Athenian in days of old named Cylon, a victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful; and he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens “at the greatest festival of Zeus.” So he obtained a force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus came on he seized the Acropolis with a view to making himself tyrant; for he thought that the

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their power to give. For they gave their lives for the common weal, and in so doing won for themselves the praise which grows not old and the most distinguished of all sepulchres—not that in which they lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occasion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments set up in their own land that alone commemorates them, but also in lands not their own there abides in each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted in the heart rather than graven on stone. Do you, therefore, now make these men your examples, and judging freedom to be happiness and courage to be freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who have the best excuse for being unsparing of their lives, for they have no hope of better days, but rather those who run the risk, if they continue to live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is humiliation associated with cowardice than death when it comes unperceived in close company with stalwart deeds and public hopes.

XLIV. “Wherefore, I do not commiserate the parents of these men, as many of you as are present here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they know that their lives have been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and it is to be accounted good fortune when men win, even as these now, a most glorious death—and you a like grief—and when life has been meted out to them to be happy in no less than to

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die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoyment of blessings in which you too once took delight; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of the good things which a man has never known, but for what is taken away from him after he has once become accustomed to it. But those of you who are still of an age to have offspring should bear up in the hope of other children; for not only to many of you individually will the children that are born hereafter be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, but the state also will reap a double advantage—it will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel who, having no children to hazard,¹ do not have an equal part in the risk. But as for you who have passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion of your life during which you were fortunate and remember that the remainder will be short; and be comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not 'gain' as some say,² that gives the greater satisfaction, but honour.

XLV. "But for such of you here present as are sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of the conflict that awaits you—for the dead are always praised—and even were you to attain to surpassing virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say

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their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that which has been removed from our path is honoured with a good-will that knows no antagonism.

“If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, referring to those of you who will henceforth be in widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition: Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard which nature has set for your sex, and great also is hers of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or in blame.

XLVI. “I have now spoken, in obedience to the law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those whom we are burying have already in part also received their tribute in our deeds;¹ besides, the state will henceforth maintain their children at the public expense until they grow to manhood, thus offering both to the dead and to their survivors a crown of substantial worth as their prize in such contests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are greatest, there are found the best citizens. And now, when you have made due lament, each for his own dead, depart.”

XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took place during this winter, the close of which brought the first year of this war to an end. At the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before,² invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and establishing themselves proceeded to ravage the country. And before they had been many days in

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Attica the plague¹ began for the first time to show itself among the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on record anywhere. For neither were physicians able to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat it without knowing its nature, the mortality among them being greatest because they were most exposed to it, nor did any other human art avail. And the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men desisted from them, overcome by the calamity.

XLVIII. The disease began, it is said, in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, and then descended into Egypt and Libya and spread over the greater part of the King's territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants of the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns; for there were as yet no public fountains there. But afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from that time the mortality became much greater. Now any one, whether physician or layman, may, each according to his personal opinion, speak about its probable origin and state the causes which, in his view, were sufficient to have produced so great a departure from normal conditions; but I shall describe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, from the study of which a person should be best able,

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having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it if it should ever break out again. For I had the disease myself and saw others sick of it.

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the other maladies; but if anyone was already ill of any disease all terminated in this. In other cases from no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good health, men were seized first with intense heat of the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short time the disorder descended to the chest, attended by severe coughing. And when it settled in the stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended by great distress; and in most cases ineffectual retching followed producing violent convulsions, which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not so very warm to the touch; it was not pale, but reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a heat that the patients could not bear to have on them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked best to throw themselves into cold water—indeed many of those who were not looked after did throw themselves into cisterns—so tormented were they by thirst which could not be quenched; and it was all the same whether they drank much or little.

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They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness which never abated. And the body was not wasted while the disease was at its height, but resisted surprisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the disease went down into the bowels, producing there a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of them perished through weakness caused by it. For the malady, starting from the head where it was first seated, passed down until it spread through the whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized upon the extremities at least and left its marks there; for it attacked the privates and fingers and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though some lost their eyes also.¹ In some cases the sufferer was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of memory, which extended to every object alike, so that they failed to recognize either themselves or their friends.

L. Indeed the character of the disease proved such that it baffles description, the violence of the attack being in each case too great for human nature to endure, while in one way in particular it showed plainly that it was different from any of the familiar diseases: the birds, namely, and the fourfooted animals, which usually feed upon human bodies, either would not now come near them, though many lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The evidence for this is that birds of this kind became

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noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to observe what happened, because they live with man.

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the disease; for I pass over many of the unusual symptoms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as compared with another. And while the plague lasted there were none of the usual complaints, though if any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found, I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those applying it—for what helped one man hurt another—and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself sufficient against it, whether as regards physical strength or weakness,¹ but it carried off all without distinction, even those tended with all medical care. And the most dreadful thing about the whole malady was not only the despondency of the victims, when they once became aware that they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded to despair and they gave themselves up for lost instead of resisting, but also the fact that they became infected by nursing one another and died like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mortality; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished uncared for, so that many houses were left empty through lack of anyone to do the nursing; or if, on the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished,

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especially those who made any pretensions to goodness. For these made it a point of honour to visit their friends without sparing themselves at a time when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing weary even of making their lamentations. But still it was more often those who had recovered who had pity for the dying and the sick, because they had learnt what it meant and were themselves by this time confident of immunity; for the disease never attacked the same man a second time, at least not with fatal results. And they were not only congratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that they would never be carried off by any other disease.

LII. But in addition to the trouble under which they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the people from the country districts; and this affected the new arrivals especially. For since no houses were available for them and they had to live in huts that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead people rolled about in the streets and, in their longing for water, near all the fountains. The temples, too, in which they had quartered themselves were full of the corpses of those who had died in them; for the calamity which weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, not knowing what was to become of them, became careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And the customs which they had hitherto observed regarding burial were all thrown into confusion, and

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they buried their dead each one as he could. And many resorted to shameless modes of burial because so many members of their households had already died that they lacked the proper funeral materials. Resorting to other people's pyres, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would put on their own dead and kindle the fire; others would throw the body they were carrying upon one which was already burning and go away.

LIII. In other respects also the plague first introduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For where men hitherto practised concealment, that they were not acting purely after their pleasure,¹ they now showed a more careless daring. They saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the case both of those who were prosperous and suddenly died, and of those who before had nothing but in a moment were in possession of the property of the others. And so they resolved to get out of life the pleasures which could be had speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect of what was esteemed honour,² because everyone thought that it was doubtful whether he would live to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No fear of gods or law of men restrained; for, on the one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that piety and impiety came to the same thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he

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would live to be called to account and pay the penalty of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that the penalty already decreed against them, and now hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and that before this fell it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment out of life.

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen them by which the Athenians were sore pressed, their people dying within the walls and their land being ravaged without. And in their distress they recalled, as was natural, the following verse which their older men said had long ago been uttered:

“A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it.”


A dispute arose, however, among the people, some contending that the word used in the verse by the ancients was not *λοιμός*, “pestilence,” but *λιμός*, “famine,” and the view prevailed at the time that “pestilence” was the original word; and quite naturally, for men’s recollections conformed to their sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should visit them after the present war and a famine happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy, recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry whether they should go to war, the god responded that if they “warred with all their might victory would be theirs,” adding that he himself would assist them.¹ Now so far as the oracle is concerned, they surmised that what was then happening was its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica; and though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next

ARISTOTLE'S *Politics*



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TRANSLATED AND WITH
AN INTRODUCTION,
NOTES, AND GLOSSARY BY
CARNES LORD



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Book 1

CHAPTER 1

[1252a] (1) Since we see that every city is some sort of community, and that every community is constituted for the sake of some good (for everyone does every thing for the sake of what is held to be good), it is clear that all communities aim at some good, and that the community that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others does so particularly, and aims at the most authoritative good of all. This is what is called the city or the political community.

(2) Those who suppose that the same person is expert in political rule, kingly rule, managing the household, and being a master of slaves do not argue finely.¹ For they consider that each of these differs in the number or fewness of those ruled and not in kind—for example, the ruler of a few is a master, of more a household manager, and of still more a political or kingly ruler—the assumption being that there is no difference between a large household and a small city; and as for the political and kingly rulers, they consider a kingly ruler one who has charge himself, and a political ruler one who, on the basis of the precepts of this sort of science, rules and is ruled in turn.² But these things are not true. (3) This will be clear to those investigating in accordance with our normal sort of inquiry.³ For just as it is necessary elsewhere to divide a compound into its un-compounded elements (for these are the smallest parts of the whole), so too by investigating what the city is composed of we shall gain a better view concerning these kinds of rulers as well, both as to how they differ from one another and as to whether there is some artful expertise⁴ that can be acquired in connection with each of those mentioned.

CHAPTER 2

(1) Now in these matters as elsewhere it is by looking at how things develop naturally from the beginning that one may best study them. (2) First, then, there must of necessity be a conjoining of persons who cannot exist without one another: on the one hand, male and female, for the sake of reproduction (which occurs not from intentional choice but—as is also the case with the other animals and plants—from a natural striving to leave behind another that is like oneself);

on the other, the naturally ruling and ruled, on account of preservation. For that which can foresee with the mind is the naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, while that which can do these things with the body is the naturally ruled and slave; hence the same [1252b] thing is advantageous for the master and slave. (3) Now the female is distinguished by nature from the slave. For nature makes nothing in an economizing spirit, as smiths make the Delphic knife,⁵ but one thing with a view to one thing; and each instrument would perform most finely if it served one task rather than many. (4) The barbarians, though, have the same arrangement for female and slave. The reason for this is that they have no naturally ruling element; with them, the community of man and woman is that of female slave and male slave. This is why the poets say “it is fitting for Greeks to rule barbarians”⁶—the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature the same thing.

(5) From these two communities, then, the household first arose, and Hesiod’s verse is rightly spoken: “first a house, and woman, and ox for ploughing”⁷—for poor persons have an ox instead of a servant. The household is the community constituted by nature for the needs of daily life; Charondas calls its members “mess-mates,” Epimenides of Crete “stable-mates.”⁸ The first community arising from several households and for the sake of non-daily needs is the village. (6) By nature the village seems to be above all an extension of the household. Its members some call “milk-mates”; they are “the children and the children’s children.”⁹ This is why cities were at first under kings, and nations are even now.¹⁰ For those who joined together were already under kings: every household is under the eldest as king, and so also were the extensions [of the household making up the village] as a result of kinship. (7) This is what Homer meant when he says that “each acts as law to his children and wives”; for men were scattered and used to dwell in this manner in ancient times.¹¹ And it is for this reason that all assert that the gods are under a king—because they themselves are under kings now, or were in ancient times. For human beings assimilate not only the looks of the gods to themselves, but their ways of life as well.

(8) The complete community,¹² arising from several villages, is the city. It reaches a level of full self-sufficiency, so to speak; and while coming into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well. Every city, therefore, exists by nature, if such also are the first communities. For the city is their end, and nature is an end: what each thing is—for example, a human being, a horse, or a household—when its coming into being is complete is, we assert, the nature of that thing. (9) Again, that for the sake of which a thing exists, or the end, is

what is best; and self-sufficiency is an end and what is best.¹³

[1253a] From these things it is evident, then, that the city belongs among the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. He who is without a city through nature rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man; he is “without clan, without law, without hearth,” like the person reproved by Homer; (10) for the one who is such by nature has by this fact a desire for war, as if he were an isolated piece in a game of backgammon.¹⁴ That man is much more a political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal is clear.¹⁵ For, as we assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone among the animals has speech. (11) The voice indeed indicates the painful or pleasant, and hence is present in other animals as well; for their nature has come this far, that they have a perception of the painful and pleasant and signal these things to each other. But speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust. (12) For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and the other things of this sort; and community in these things is what makes a household and a city.¹⁶

The city is thus prior by nature to the household and to each of us. (13) For the whole must of necessity be prior to the part; for if the whole body is destroyed there will not be a foot or a hand, unless in the sense that the term is similar (as when one speaks of a hand made of stone), but the thing itself will be defective. Everything is defined by its function and its capacity, and if it is no longer the same in these respects it should not be spoken of in the same way, but only as something similarly termed. (14) That the city is both by nature and prior to each individual, then, is clear. For if the individual when separated from it is not self-sufficient, he will be in a condition similar to that of the other parts in relation to the whole. One who is incapable of sharing¹⁷ or who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.

(15) Accordingly, there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of community. And yet he who first founded one is responsible for the greatest of goods. For just as man is the best of the animals when completed, when separated from law and adjudication he is the worst of all. (16) For injustice is harshest when it is furnished with arms; and man is born naturally possessing arms for [the use of] prudence and virtue which are nevertheless very susceptible to being used for their opposites. This is why, without virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of the animals, and the worst with regard to sex and food.¹⁸ Justice is a thing belonging to the city. For adjudication is an arrangement of the political community, and justice is judgment as to what is

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CHAPTER 1

(1) For one investigating the regime—what each sort is and what its quality—virtually the first investigation concerns the city, to see what the city actually is. For as it is, there are disputes, some arguing that the city performed an action, others that it was not the city but the oligarchy or the tyrant. We see that the entire activity of the political ruler and the legislator is concerned with the city, and the regime is a certain arrangement of those who inhabit the city. (2) But since the city belongs among composite things, and like other composite wholes is made up of many parts, it is clear that the first thing that must [1275a] be sought is the citizen; for the city is a certain multitude of citizens. Thus who ought to be called a citizen and what the citizen is must be investigated.

There is often much dispute about the citizen, for not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen. Someone who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy. (3) Those who happen to be so designated but in some other sense—for example, honorary citizens—must be disregarded; nor is the citizen a citizen by inhabiting a place, for aliens and slaves share in the habitation; (4) nor are those partaking in matters of justice to the extent of being subject to lawsuits and adjudication, for this exists even for those who share as a result of contractual agreements, since these things exist for them as well. For that matter, in many places not even aliens partake completely in these things, but they must necessarily find a patron, so that they take part in this sort of community in an incomplete sense. (5) Like children who are not yet enrolled because of age and elderly persons who have been relieved,¹ they must be admitted to be citizens in a sense, but not unqualifiedly, but rather with the addition of “incomplete” or “superannuated” or something else of this sort—it makes no difference, as what has been said is clear. We are seeking the citizen in an unqualified sense, one who has no defect of this sort requiring correction, since questions may be raised and resolved concerning such things in the case of those who have been deprived of their prerogatives or exiled as well.² (6) The citizen in an unqualified sense is defined by no other thing so much as by partaking in decision and office. Now some offices are differentiated by time, so that in some cases the same person is not permitted to hold them twice, or only after some definite period of time has

passed; but other offices are indefinite, such as that of juror or assemblyman. (7) Perhaps someone might say that the latter are not rulers and do not take part in office on account of these things; yet it would be ridiculous to deprive those with greatest authority of the title of office. But it should make no difference: the argument is over a term, for what is common to juror and assemblyman lacks a name that could apply to both. For the sake of definition, then, let it be “indefinite office.” (8) We set it down, then, that citizens are those who take part in this way.

The definition of citizen that fits best with all those who are called citizens is, therefore, something of this sort. But it should not be overlooked that of things where the constituent elements differ in kind—one of them being primary, one secondary, another derivative—the common element either is not present at all insofar as they are such, or only slightly. (9) We see that regimes differ from one another in kind, and that some are prior and [1275b] some posterior; for those that are errant and deviant must necessarily be posterior to those that are without error. (In what sense we are speaking of deviant regimes will be evident later.³) Hence the citizen must necessarily differ in the case of each sort of regime. (10) Accordingly, the citizen that was spoken of is a citizen above all in a democracy; he may, but will not necessarily, be a citizen in the others. In some regimes there is no people, nor is an assembly recognized in law, but [only a consultative meeting of specially] summoned persons,⁴ and cases are adjudicated by groups of officials. In Sparta, for example, different overseers try different cases involving agreements, the senators those involving murder, and another office perhaps others; (11) and it is the same in the case of Carthage, where certain offices try all cases.⁵ But our definition of the citizen [can stand, as it] admits of correction. In the other regimes, it is not the indefinite ruler who is assemblyman or juror, but one whose office is definite. For of these either all or some are assigned to deliberate and adjudicate, either concerning all matters or concerning some.

(12) Who the citizen is, then, is evident from these things. Whoever is entitled to share in an office involving deliberation or decision is, we can now say, a citizen in this city; and the city is the multitude of such persons that is adequate with a view to a self-sufficient life, to speak simply.

CHAPTER 2

(1) As a matter of usage, however, a citizen is defined as a person from parents who are both citizens, and not just one, whether the father or the mother; and some go even further back, seeking two or three or more generations of citizen

forebears. But these being political and off hand definitions, some raise the question of how that third or fourth generation ancestor will have been a citizen. (2) Gorgias of Leontini therefore, perhaps partly by way of raising a question and partly in irony, said that just as mortars are made by mortar makers, so Larisaeans are made by craftsmen, since some of them are “Larisa makers.”⁶ (3) The matter is simple. If they took part in the regime according to the definition that has been given, they were citizens; for, at any rate, it is impossible that the definition from citizen father or mother should fit in the case of the first inhabitants or founders.

But perhaps more of a question is involved in the case of those who came to take part in the regime after a revolution—for example, the citizens created in Athens by Cleisthenes after the expulsion of the tyrants; for he enrolled in the tribes many foreigners and alien slaves.⁷ The dispute about these is not over who is a citizen, but whether they are so justly or unjustly. (4) And [1276a] yet a further question might be raised as to whether one who is not justly a citizen is a citizen at all, the assumption being that “unjust” and “false” amount to the same thing. (5) But since we also see certain unjust rulers, whom we assert do rule but unjustly, and since the citizen is defined by a kind of office (for someone who shares in that sort of office is a citizen, as we said), it is clear that these too must be admitted to be citizens.

CHAPTER 3

(1) The question of whether some are citizens justly or unjustly touches on the dispute mentioned previously. For some raise the question of when the city performed an action and when it did not—for example, at the time when a democracy replaces an oligarchy or a tyranny. (2) At these times, some do not want to fulfill contractual agreements on the grounds that it was not the city but the tyrant who entered into them, or many other things of this sort, the assumption being that some regimes exist through domination and not because they are to the common advantage. However, if some are run democratically in this same fashion, the actions of this regime must then be admitted to belong to the city in just the same way as the actions of the oligarchy or the tyranny.

(3) This argument seems related to the question of the sense in which the city ought to be spoken of as the same, or as not the same but different. Now the most superficial way of examining this question concerns the location and the human beings constituting it; for the location and the human beings can be disjoined, with some inhabiting one location and others another, and it will still be a city. (4) The question in this form is to be regarded as a slight one, for the

fact that the city is spoken of in several senses makes the examination of such cases easy.⁸ And similarly in the case of human beings inhabiting the same location, if one asks when the city should be considered one. (5) For it is surely not by the fact of its walls—it would be possible to build a single wall around the Peloponnese. Babylon is perhaps a city of this sort, or any that has the dimensions of a nation rather than a city; at any rate, they say that its capture was not noticed in a certain part of the city for three days.⁹ (6) But the investigation of this question will be useful on another occasion.¹⁰ For the size of the city—as regards both quantity and whether it is advantageous to have one or several [locations]¹¹—should not be overlooked by the political ruler. But where the same persons inhabit the same location, must it be asserted that the city is the same as long as the stock of inhabitants remains the same, even though some are always passing away and some being born (as we are accustomed to speaking of rivers and springs as the same even though more water is always coming and flowing away)? Or must it be asserted that the human beings are the same for this sort of reason, [1276b] but that the city differs? (7) For if the city is a type of community, and if it is a community of citizens in a regime, if the regime becomes and remains different in kind, it might be held that the city as well is necessarily not the same. At any rate, just as we assert that a chorus which is at one time comic and at another tragic is different even though the human beings in it are often the same, (8) it is similar with any other community and any compound, when the compound takes a different form—for example, we would say that the mode is different even when the notes are the same, if it is at one time Dorian and at another Phrygian.¹² (9) If this is indeed the case, it is evident that it is looking to the regime above all that the city must be said to be the same; the name¹³ one calls it can be different or the same no matter whether the same human beings inhabit it or altogether different ones. As to whether it is just to fulfill or not to fulfill contractual agreements when the city undergoes revolution into another regime, that is another argument.

CHAPTER 4

(1) Connected with what has been said is the investigation of whether the virtue of the good man and the excellent citizen¹⁴ is to be regarded as the same or as not the same. If we are indeed to examine this, however, the virtue of the citizen must first be grasped in some sort of outline. Now just as a sailor is one of a number of sharers, so, we assert, is the citizen. (2) Although sailors are

dissimilar in their capacities (one is a rower, another a pilot, another a lookout, and others have similar sorts of designations), it is clear that the most precise account of their virtue will be that peculiar to each sort individually, but that a common account will in a similar way fit all. For the safety of the ship in its voyage is the task of all of them, and each of the sailors strives for this. (3) Similarly, although citizens are dissimilar, preservation of the community is their task, and the regime is this community; hence the virtue of the citizen must necessarily be with a view to the regime. If, then, there are indeed several forms of regime, it is clear that it is not possible for the virtue of the excellent citizen to be single, or complete virtue. (4) But the good man we assert is so in accordance with a single kind—complete virtue.¹⁵ That it is possible for a citizen to be excellent yet not possess the virtue in accordance with which he is an excellent man, therefore, is evident.

By raising questions in a different manner, the same argument can be made concerning the best regime. (5) For if it is impossible for a city to consist entirely of excellent persons, yet if each should perform his own task well, and this [means] out of virtue, since it is impossible for all the citizens to be [1277a] similar, there would still not be a single virtue of the citizen and the good man. The virtue of the excellent citizen must exist in all, for it is necessarily in this way that the city is excellent, but this is impossible in the case of the virtue of the good man, unless all the citizens of an excellent city are necessarily good men. (6) Further, since the city is made up of dissimilar persons—as an animal is made up of soul and body, for instance, soul of reason and appetite, and a household of man and woman and master and slave,¹⁶ in the same way a city is made up of all of these, and in addition to these it consists of other dissimilar kinds of persons—the virtue of all the citizens is necessarily not single, just as that of a head and a file leader in a chorus is not single. (7) That it is not the same in an unqualified sense, therefore, is evident from these things. But will there be some case, then, in which the virtue of the excellent citizen and the excellent man is the same? We assert that the excellent ruler is good and prudent, while the excellent citizen is not necessarily prudent.¹⁷ (8) Indeed, some say that the very education of a ruler is different, as is manifestly the case with the sons of kings who are educated to be expert in riding and in war; and when Euripides says “no subtleties for me, but what is needed for the city,”¹⁸ the assumption is that there is a certain education of a ruler. (9) If the virtue of the good ruler and the good man is the same, and if one who is ruled is also a citizen, the virtue of citizen and man would not be the same unqualifiedly, but only in the case of a certain sort of citizen. For the virtue of ruler and citizen is not the same, and it

was perhaps for this reason that Jason said he was hungry except when he was tyrant, as one who did not know how to be a private individual.¹⁹

(10) At the same time, the capacity to rule and be ruled is praised, and the virtue of a citizen of reputation is held²⁰ to be the capacity to rule and be ruled finely. Now if we regard the virtue of the good man as being of a ruling sort, while that of the citizen is both of a ruling and a ruled sort, they would not be praiseworthy to a similar extent. (11) Since both views are sometimes held—that the ruler and the ruled ought to learn different things and not the same, and that the citizen must know both sorts of things and partake in both—the next step becomes visible. There is rule of a master, by which we mean that connected with the necessary things. It is not necessary for the ruler to know how to perform these, but only to use those who do; the other [sort of knowledge] is servile (by the other I mean the capacity to perform the subordinate tasks of a servant). (12) Now we speak of several forms of slave; for the sorts of work are several. One sort is that done by menials: [1277b] as the term itself indicates, these are persons who live by their hands; the manufacturing artisan belongs among them. Hence among some peoples the craftsmen did not partake in offices in former times, prior to the emergence of rule of the people in its extreme form.²¹ (13) Now the tasks of those ruled in this way should not be learned by the good man or the political ruler or the good citizen, unless he does it for himself out of some need of his own (for then it does not result in one person becoming master and another slave).

But there is also a sort of rule in accordance with which one rules those who are similar in stock and free. (14) For this is what we speak of as political rule, and the ruler learns it by being ruled—just as the cavalry commander learns by being commanded, the general by being led, and similarly in the case of the leader of a regiment or company. Hence this too has been finely said—that it is not possible to rule well without having been ruled.²² (15) Virtue in each of these cases is different, but the good citizen should know and have the capacity both to be ruled and to rule, and this very thing is the virtue of a citizen—knowledge of rule over free persons from both points of view. (16) Both belong to the good man too, as well as whatever kind of moderation and justice is characteristic of ruling. For it is clear that a virtue—of justice, for example—would not be a single thing for [a ruler and for²³] a ruled but free person who is good, but has different kinds in accordance with which one will rule or be ruled, just as moderation and courage differ in a man and a woman. (17) For a man would be held a coward if he were as courageous as a courageous woman, and a woman talkative if she were as modest as the good man; and household management

differs for a man and a woman as well, for it is the work of the man to acquire and of the woman to guard. But prudence is the only virtue peculiar to the ruler. The others, it would seem, must necessarily be common to both rulers and ruled, (18) but prudence is not a virtue of one ruled, but rather true opinion; for the one ruled is like a flute maker, while the ruler is like a flute player, the user [of what the other makes].²⁴ Whether the virtue of the good man and the excellent citizen is the same or different, then, and in what sense it is the same and in what sense different, is evident from these things.

CHAPTER 5

(1) One of the questions concerning the citizen still remains. Is he only truly a citizen to whom it is open to share in office, or are workers also to be regarded as citizens?²⁵ For if those too are to be so regarded who have no part in offices, then the virtue we have discussed cannot belong to every citizen, as this sort is then a citizen. On the other hand, if none of these sorts is a citizen, in which class is each sort to be placed?²⁶ For he is neither a resident alien nor a foreigner. [1278a] (2) Or shall we assert that there is nothing odd about this, at least on the basis of this argument? Neither slaves nor freedmen belong to those just mentioned. And this is true: not all those are to be regarded as citizens without whom there would not be a city, since children are not citizens in the same sense that men are; the latter are unqualifiedly, but the former only by way of a presupposition—they are citizens, but incomplete ones. (3) Now in ancient times among some peoples the working element was slave or foreign, and for this reason many are such even now; but the best city will not make a worker a citizen. But if this sort is a citizen, the virtue of a citizen, as we have been discussing it at any rate, cannot be spoken of as belonging to everyone or even to every free person, but only to those who have been relieved of necessary sorts of work. (4) Those who perform necessary services for one person are slaves; those who do so for the community are workers and laborers.²⁷

If we investigate a bit further from this point it will be evident how matters stand concerning them. What has already been said will itself make this clear, once it is recalled.²⁸ (5) Since there are several regimes, there must necessarily be several kinds of citizen, and particularly of the citizen who is ruled. Thus in one sort of regime the worker and the laborer must necessarily be citizens, while in others this is impossible—for example, in any of the sort they call aristocratic, in which prerogatives are granted in accordance with virtue and merit; for it is impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life of a worker or a laborer. (6) In oligarchies, on the other hand, it is not possible for a laborer to be

a citizen, for taking part in offices is on the basis of large assessments, but it is possible for a worker, since many artisans become wealthy. (7) In Thebes there used to be a law that one who had not abstained from the market for ten years could not take part in office. But in many regimes the law pulls in even some foreigners; for one descended from a citizen mother is a citizen in some democracies, and it is the same way with bastards in many regimes. (8) Nevertheless, since it is because of a lack of genuine citizens that they make for themselves citizens of this sort (for they use such laws on account of a shortage of manpower), when they are well off as regards numbers they gradually disqualify first those with a slave as father or mother, then those with citizen mothers [but foreign fathers], and finally they make citizens only those with two native parents.

(9) That there are several kinds of citizens, therefore, is evident from these things, as is the fact that one who takes part in prerogatives is particularly spoken of as a citizen—thus, for example, Homer’s line “like some vagabond without honor.”²⁹ For one who does not take part in prerogatives is like an alien. But wherever this sort of thing is kept concealed, it is for the sake of deceiving the [excluded] inhabitants.

(10) As to whether the virtue that constitutes the good man and the excellent [1278b] citizen is to be regarded as the same or different, then, it is clear from what has been said that in one sort of city this person is the same and in another different, and that even in the former sort it is not everyone but the political ruler and the one having authority or capable of having authority, either by himself or together with others, over the superintendence of common matters.

CHAPTER 6

(1) Since these things have been discussed, what comes after them must be investigated—whether we are to regard there as being one regime or many, and if many, which and how many there are and what the differences are between them. The regime is an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices, particularly the one that has authority over all matters.³⁰ For what has authority in the city is everywhere the governing body, and the governing body is the regime.³¹ (2) I mean, for example, that in democratic regimes the people have authority, while by contrast it is the few in oligarchies. The regime too, we say, is different in these cases; and we shall speak in the same way concerning the others as well.

First, then, we must lay down by way of a basic premise what it is for the sake of which the city is established, and how many kinds of rule are connected with

man and the community in life. (3) It was said in our initial discourses, where household management and mastery were discussed, that man is by nature a political animal. Hence even when they have no need of assistance from one another, they no less yearn to live together—not but that the common advantage too brings them together, to the extent that it falls to each to live finely. It is this above all, then, which is the end for all both in common and separately; but they also join together, and maintain the political community, for the sake of living itself. For there is perhaps something fine in living just by itself, provided there is no great excess of hardships. It is clear that most men will endure much harsh treatment in their longing for life, the assumption being that there is a kind of joy inherent in it and a natural sweetness.

As for the modes of rule that are spoken of, it is easy to distinguish them, and we discuss them frequently in the external discourses.³² Mastery, in spite of the same thing being in truth advantageous both to the slave by nature and to the master by nature, is still rule with a view to the advantage of the master primarily, and with a view to that of the slave accidentally (for mastery cannot be preserved if the slave is destroyed). Rule over children and wife and the household as a whole, which we call household management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for the sake of something common to both—in itself it is for the sake of the ruled, as we see in the case of the other arts [1279a] such as medicine and gymnastic, but accidentally it may be for the sake of the rulers themselves. For nothing prevents the trainer from being on occasion one of those engaging in gymnastic, just as the pilot is always one of the sailors: the trainer or pilot looks out for the good of the ruled, and when he becomes one of them himself, he shares accidentally in the benefit; for the one is a sailor, and the other becomes one of those engaging in gymnastic, though still a trainer. Hence with respect to political offices too, when the regime is established in accordance with equality and similarity among the citizens, they claim to merit ruling in turn. Previously, as accords with nature, they claimed to merit doing public service by turns and having someone look to their good, just as when ruling previously they looked to his advantage. Now, however, because of the benefits to be derived from common things and from office, they wish to rule continuously, as if they were sick persons who were always made healthy by ruling; at any rate, these would perhaps pursue office in a similar fashion.³³

It is evident, then, that those regimes which look to the common advantage are correct regimes according to what is unqualifiedly just, while those which look only to the advantage of the rulers are errant, and are all deviations from the correct regimes; for they involve mastery, but the city is a community of free

persons.

CHAPTER 7

(1) These things having been determined, the next thing is to investigate regimes—how many in number and which sorts there are, and first of all the correct ones; for the deviations will be evident once these have been determined. (2) Since “regime” and “governing body” signify the same thing,³⁴ since the governing body is the authoritative element in cities, and since it is necessary that the authoritative element be either one or a few or the many, when the one or the few or the many rule with a view to the common advantage, these regimes are necessarily correct, while those with a view to the private advantage of the one or the few or the multitude are deviations. For either it must be denied that persons taking part in the regime are citizens, or they must share in its advantages. (3) Now of monarchies, that form which looks toward the common advantage we are accustomed to call kingship; rule of the few (but of more than one person) we are accustomed to call aristocracy—either because the best persons are ruling, or because they are ruling with a view to what is best for the city and for those sharing in it; and when the multitude governs with a view to the common advantage, it is called by the term common to all regimes, polity.³⁵ (4) This happens reasonably. It is possible for one or a few to be outstanding in virtue, but where [1279b] more are concerned it is difficult for them to be proficient with a view to virtue as a whole, but some level of proficiency is possible particularly regarding military virtue, as this arises in a multitude; hence in this regime the warrior element is the most authoritative, and it is those possessing heavy arms who take part in it. (5) Deviations from those mentioned are tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, democracy from polity. Tyranny is monarchy with a view to the advantage of the monarch, oligarchy rule with a view to the advantage of the well off, democracy rule with a view to the advantage of those who are poor; none of them is with a view to the common gain.

CHAPTER 8

(1) It is necessary to speak at somewhat greater length of what each of these regimes is. For certain questions³⁶ are involved, and it belongs to one philosophizing in connection with each sort of inquiry and not merely looking toward action not to overlook or omit anything, but to make clear the truth concerning each thing. (2) Tyranny, as was said, is monarchic rule of a master

over the political community; oligarchy is when those with property have authority in the regime; and democracy is the opposite, when those have authority who do not possess a great amount of property but are poor. (3) The first question has to do with the definition. If a well-off majority has authority, and similarly in the other case, if it somewhere happened that the poor were a minority with respect to the well off but were superior and had authority in the regime, although when a small number has authority it is called oligarchy, this definition of the regimes would not be held to be a fine one. (4) But even if one were to combine fewness with being well off and number with being poor and described the regimes accordingly (oligarchy being that in which those who are well off and few in number have the offices, and democracy that in which those who are poor and many in number have them), another question is involved. (5) What shall we say of the regimes that were just mentioned—those in which the majority is well off and the poor are few and each has authority in the regime—if there is no other regime beside those we spoke of? (6) The argument seems to make clear, therefore, that it is accidental that few or many have authority in oligarchies on the one hand and democracies on the other, and that this is because the well off are everywhere few and the poor many. Hence it also turns out that the causes of the differences are not what was mentioned. (7) What makes democracy [1280a] and oligarchy differ is poverty and wealth: wherever some rule on account of wealth, whether a minority or a majority, this is necessarily an oligarchy, and wherever those who are poor, a democracy. (8) But it turns out, as we said, that the former are few and the latter many; for few are well off, but all share in freedom—which are the causes of both disputing over the regime.

CHAPTER 9

(1) It is necessary first to grasp what they speak of as the defining principles of oligarchy and democracy and what justice³⁷ is [from] both oligarchic and democratic [points of view]. For all fasten on a certain sort of justice, but proceed only to a certain point, and do not speak of the whole of justice in its authoritative sense. For example, justice is held to be equality, and it is, but for equals and not for all; (2) and inequality is held to be just and is indeed, but for unequals and not for all; but they disregard this element of persons and judge badly. The cause of this is that the judgment concerns themselves, and most people are bad judges concerning their own things. (3) And so since justice is for certain persons, and is distinguished in the same manner with respect to objects and for persons, as was said previously in the discourses on ethics,³⁸ they agree

as to the equality of the object, but dispute about it for persons. They do this particularly because of what was just spoken of, that they judge badly with respect to what concerns themselves, but also because both, by speaking to a point of a kind of justice, consider themselves to be speaking of justice simply. (4) For the ones, if they are unequal in a certain thing, such as goods, suppose they are unequal generally, while the others suppose that if they are equal in a certain thing, such as freedom, they are equal generally. (5) But of the most authoritative thing they say nothing. For if it were for the sake of possessions that they shared and joined together, they would take part in the city just to the extent that they did in property, so that the argument of the oligarchs might be held a strong one; for [they would say] it is not just for one who has contributed one mina to share equally in a hundred minas with the one giving all the rest, whether he comes from those who were there originally or the later arrivals.³⁹ (6) But if the city exists not only for the sake of living but rather primarily for the sake of living well (for otherwise there could be a city of slaves or of animals—as things are, there is not, since they do not partake in happiness or in living in accordance with intentional choice), and if it does not exist for the sake of an alliance to prevent their suffering injustice from anyone, nor for purposes of exchanges and use of one another—for otherwise the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all who have agreements with one another, would be as citizens of one city—(7) at any rate, there are compacts between them concerning imports, agreements to abstain from injustice, and treaties of alliance. But no offices common to all have been established to deal with these [1280b] things, but different ones in each city; nor do those of one city take thought that the others should be of a certain quality [in their character], or that none of those coming under the compacts should be unjust or depraved in any way, but only that they should not act unjustly toward one another. (8) Whoever takes thought for good governance,⁴⁰ however, gives careful attention to political virtue and vice. It is thus evident that virtue must be a care for every city, or at least every one to which the term applies truly and not merely in a manner of speaking. For otherwise the community becomes an alliance which differs from others—from alliances of remote allies—only by location, and law becomes a compact and, as the sophist Lycophron said, a guarantor among one another of the just things, but not the sort of thing to make the citizens good and just.⁴¹ (9) But that the matter stands thus is evident. For even if one were to bring the locations together into one, so that the city of the Megarians were fastened to that of the Corinthians by walls,⁴² it would still not be a single city. (10) Nor would it be if they practiced intermarriage with one another, although this is one

of the shared things that are peculiar to cities. Nor, similarly, if certain persons dwelled in separate places, yet were not so distant as to have nothing in common, but had laws not to commit injustice toward one another in their transactions—for example, if one were a carpenter, one a farmer, one a shoemaker, one something else of this sort, and they were ten thousand in number, yet had nothing in common except things of this sort, exchange and alliance; not even in this way would there be a city. (11) What, then, is the reason for this? It is surely not on account of a lack of proximity of the community. For even if they joined together while sharing in this way, but each nevertheless treated his own household as a city and each other as if there were a defensive alliance merely for assistance against those committing injustice, it would not by this fact be held a city by those studying the matter precisely—if, that is, they shared in a similar way when joined together as they had when separated. (12) It is evident, therefore, that the city is not a community sharing a location and for the sake of not committing injustice against each other and conducting trade. These things must necessarily be present if there is to be a city, but not even when all of them are present is it yet a city, but the city is the community in living well both of households and families⁴³ for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life. (13) This will not be possible, however, unless they inhabit one and the same location and make use of intermarriage. It was on this account that marriage connections arose in cities, as well as clans, festivals, and the pastimes of living together.⁴⁴ This sort of thing is the work of affection; for affection is the intentional choice of living together. Living well, then, is the end of the city, and these things are for the sake of this end. (14) A city is the community of [1281a] families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life. This, we assert, is living happily and finely. The political community must be regarded, therefore, as being for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. (15) Hence those who contribute most to a community of this sort have a greater part in the city than those who are equal or greater in freedom and descent⁴⁵ but unequal in political virtue, or those who outdo them in wealth but are outdone in virtue.

That all who dispute about regimes speak of some part of justice, then, is evident from what has been said.

CHAPTER 10

(1) There is a question as to what the authoritative element of the city should be. It is either the multitude, the wealthy, the respectable, the one who is best of all, or the tyrant; but all of these appear to involve difficulties. How could they not?

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the hands of strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for nothing is generous, if it is not at the same time just.

44 The second point for the exercise of caution was that our beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults: first, they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to strangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a passion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply the means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many people do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of ostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really generous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show of being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to generosity or moral goodness. (2

45 The third rule laid down was that in acts of kindness we should weigh with discrimination the worthiness of the object of our benevolence; we should take into consideration his moral character, his attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relations to us, and our common social ties, as well as the services he has hitherto rendered in our interest. It is to be desired that all these considerations should be combined in the same person; if they are not, then the more numerous and the more important considerations must have the greater weight. (3) ε

46 XV. Now, the men we live with are not perfect

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and ideally wise, but men who do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of virtue. I therefore think that this is to be taken for granted, that no one should be entirely neglected who shows any trace of virtue; but the more a man is endowed with these finer virtues—temperance, self-control, and that very justice about which so much has already been said—the more he deserves to be favoured. I do not mention fortitude, for a courageous spirit in a man who has not attained perfection and ideal wisdom is generally too impetuous; it is those other virtues that seem more particularly to mark the good man.

So much in regard to the character of the object of our beneficence.

⁴⁷ But as to the affection which anyone may have for us, it is the first demand of duty that we do most for him who loves us most; but we should measure affection, not like youngsters, by the ardour of its passion, but rather by its strength and constancy. But if there shall be obligations already incurred, so that kindness is not to begin with us, but to be requited, still greater diligence, it seems, is called for; for no duty is more imperative than that of proving one's gratitude.

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⁴⁸ But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with interest, if possible, what one has borrowed in time of need, what, pray, ought we to do when challenged by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate the fruitful fields, which return more than they receive? For if we do not hesitate to confer favours upon those who we hope will be of help to us, how ought we to deal with those who have already helped us? For generosity is of two kinds: doing

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a kindness and requiting one. Whether we do the kindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite one is not allowable to a good man, provided he can make the requital without violating the rights of others.

49 Furthermore, we must make some discrimination between favours received; for, as a matter of course, the greater the favour, the greater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection, that prompted the favour. For many people often do favours impulsively for everybody without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a sudden impulse of the heart, shifting as the wind. Such acts of generosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration.

But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making a requital, the first rule of duty requires us—other things being equal—to lend assistance preferably to people in proportion to their individual need. Most people adopt the contrary course: they put themselves most eagerly at the service of the one from whom they hope to receive the greatest favours, even though he has no need of their help. (3):

50 XVI. The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of his relationship. (4):

But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established among men. The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race; The }
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and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason or speech.

⁵¹ This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common."^a Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the sort defined by Ennius; and, though restricted by him to one instance, the principle may be applied very generally:

"Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way
Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his:
No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit."

In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a
⁵² stranger what it costs us nothing to give. On this principle we have the following maxims:

"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;"

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for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss. We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of Ennius—"No less shines his"—in order that we may continue to have the means for being generous to our friends.

⁵³ XVII. Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together; it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for fellow-citizens have much in common—forum, temples, colonnades, streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many.

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But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception is now
⁵⁴ confined to a small and narrow circle. For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they go out into other

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homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these, in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have their beginnings.

⁵⁵ The bonds of common blood hold men fast through good-will and affection; for it means much to share in common the same family traditions, the same forms of domestic worship, and the same ancestral tombs.

But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none more noble, none more powerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in intimate friendship; for really, if we discover in another that moral goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts us and makes us friends to ⁵⁶ the one in whose character it seems to dwell. And while every virtue attracts us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, still justice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, moreover, is more conducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of character in good men; for when two people have the same ideals and the same tastes, it is a natural consequence that each loves the other as himself; and the result is, as Pythagoras requires of ideal friendship, that several are united in one.

Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of kind services; and as long as these kindnesses are mutual and acceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united by the ties of an enduring intimacy.

⁵⁷ But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, (4) lo there is no social relation among them all more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents

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are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; but one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and who are^a and have been^b engaged in compassing her utter destruction.

58 Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation; next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is one.

All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living, counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest which is cemented by congeniality of character.

59 XVIII. But in the performance of all these duties we shall have to consider what is most needful in each individual case and what each individual person can or cannot procure without our help. In this way we shall find that the claims of social relationship, in its various degrees, are not identical with the dictates of circumstances; for there are obligations that are due to one individual rather than to another: for example, one would sooner assist a neighbour in gathering his harvest than either

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a brother or a friend; but should it be a case in court, one would defend a kinsman and a friend rather than a neighbour. Such questions as these must, therefore, be taken into consideration in every act of moral duty [and we must acquire the habit and keep it up], in order to become good calculators of duty, able by adding and subtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is due to each individual.

⁶⁰ But as neither physicians nor generals nor orators can achieve any signal success without experience and practice, no matter how well they may understand the theory of their profession, so the rules for the discharge of duty are formulated, it is true, as I am doing now, but a matter of such importance requires experience also and practice.

This must close our discussion of the ways in which moral goodness, on which duty depends, is developed from those principles which hold good in human society.

⁶¹ We must realize, however, that while we have set down four cardinal virtues from which as sources moral rectitude and moral duty emanate, that achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the world which is won with a spirit great, exalted, and superior to the vicissitudes of earthly life. And so, when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to rise to our lips is, if possible, something like this:

“For ye, young men, show a womanish soul, yon maiden^a a man’s;”

and this:

“Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor sweat nor blood.”

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When, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compliment, we somehow or other praise in more eloquent strain the brave and noble work of some great soul. Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra, and hence our own Cocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and countless others, and, above all, the Roman People as a nation are celebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory, moreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in soldier's garb.

⁶² XIX. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times of danger and toil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead of for the common good, it is a vice; for not only has it no element of virtue, but its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings. The Stoics, therefore, correctly define courage as "that virtue which champions the cause of right." Accordingly, no one has attained to true glory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.

Fortitude

⁶³ This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: "Not only must all knowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than wisdom," he says, "but even the courage that is prompt to face danger, if it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes, should have the name of effrontery rather than of courage." And so we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice.

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⁶⁴ But the mischief is that from this exaltation and greatness of spirit spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for power. For just as Plato tells us that the whole national character of the Spartans was on fire with passion for victory, so, in the same way, the more notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the more ambitious he is to be the foremost citizen, or, I should say rather, to be sole ruler. But when one begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely essential to justice. The result is that such men do not allow themselves to be constrained either by argument or by any public and lawful authority; but they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators in public life, seeking to obtain supreme power and to be superiors through force rather than equals through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can excuse a man for being guilty of injustice.

⁶⁵ So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which Nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for glory as a reward for his achievements.

True great

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66 XX. The soul that is altogether courageous and great is marked above all by two characteristics: one of these is indifference to outward circumstances; for such a person cherishes the conviction that nothing but moral goodness and propriety deserves to be either admired or wished for or striven after, and that he ought not to be subject to any man or any passion or any accident of fortune. The second characteristic is that, when the soul is disciplined in the way above mentioned, one should do deeds not only great and in the highest degree useful, but extremely arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both to life and to many things that make life worth living.

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67 All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the usefulness of these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the rational cause that makes men great, in the former. For it is the former that contains the element that makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account moral rectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be free from all passion. For we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so unflinchingly as not to be

68 shaken in the least from one's natural state of the dignity of a philosopher. Moreover, it would be inconsistent for the man who is not overcome by fear to be overcome by desire, or for the man who has shown himself invincible to toil to be conquered by pleasure. We

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must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also beware of ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so characteristic of narrowness and littleness of soul as the love of riches; and there is nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if one does not possess it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality, if one does possess it.

As I said before, we must also beware of ambition for glory; for it robs us of liberty, and in defence of liberty a high-souled man should stake everything. And one ought not to seek military authority; nay, rather it ought sometimes to be declined,^a sometimes to be resigned.^b

⁶⁹ Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion, not only from desire and fear, but from also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of character. But there have been many and still are many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I speak, have withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers^c and certain other^d earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived in the country and found their pleasure in the

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⁷⁰ management of their private estates. Such men have had the same aims as kings—to suffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty, that is, in its essence, to live just as they please.

XXI. So, while this desire is common to men of political ambitions and men of retirement, of whom I have just spoken, the one class think they can

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attain their end if they secure large means; the other, if they are content with the little they have. And, in this matter, neither way of thinking is altogether to be condemned; but the life of retirement is easier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to others, while the career of those who apply themselves to statecraft and to conducting great enterprises is more profitable to mankind and contributes more to their own greatness and renown.

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service

⁷¹ So perhaps those men of extraordinary genius who have devoted themselves to learning must be excused for not taking part in public affairs; likewise, those who from ill-health or for some still more valid reason have retired from the service of the state and left to others the opportunity and the glory of its administration. But if those who have no such excuse profess a scorn for civil and military offices, which most people admire, I think that this should be set down not to their credit but to their discredit; for in so far as they care little, as they say, for glory and count it as naught, it is difficult not to sympathize with their attitude; in reality, however, they seem to dread the toil and trouble and also, perhaps, the discredit and humiliation of political failure and defeat. For there are people who in opposite circumstances do not act consistently: they have the utmost contempt for pleasure, but in pain they are too sensitive; they are indifferent to glory, but they are crushed by disgrace; and even in their inconsistency they show no great consistency.

⁷² But those whom Nature has endowed with the capacity for administering public affairs should put

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aside all hesitation, enter the race for public office, and take a hand in directing the government; for in no other way can a government be administered or greatness of spirit be made manifest. Statesmen, too, no less than philosophers—perhaps even more so—should carry with them that greatness of spirit and indifference to outward circumstances to which I so often refer, together with calm of soul and freedom from care, if they⁷³ are to be free from worries and lead a dignified and self-consistent life. This is easier for the philosophers; as their life is less exposed to the assaults of fortune, their wants are fewer; and, if any misfortune overtakes them, their fall is not so disastrous. Not without reason, therefore, are stronger emotions aroused in those who engage in public life than in those who live in retirement, and greater is their ambition for success; the more, therefore, do they need to enjoy greatness of spirit and freedom from annoying cares.

If anyone is entering public life, let him beware of thinking only of the honour that it brings; but let him be sure also that he has the ability to succeed. At the same time, let him take care not to lose heart too readily through discouragement nor yet to be over-confident through ambition. In a word, before undertaking any enterprise, careful preparation must be made.

⁷⁴ XXII. Most people think that the achievements of war are more important than those of peace; but this opinion needs to be corrected. For many men have sought occasions for war from the mere ambition for fame. This is notably the case with men of great spirit and natural ability, and it is the more likely to happen, if they are adapted to a soldier's

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life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the facts, we shall find that there have been many instances of achievement in peace more important and no less renowned than in war.

⁷⁵ However highly Themistocles, for example, may be extolled—and deservedly—and however much more illustrious his name may be than Solon’s, and however much Salamis may be cited as witness of his most glorious victory—a victory glorified above Solon’s statesmanship in instituting the Areopagus—yet Solon’s achievement is not to be accounted less illustrious than his. For Themistocles’s victory served the state once and only once; while Solon’s work will be of service for ever. For through his legislation the laws of the Athenians and the institutions of their fathers are maintained. And while Themistocles could not readily point to any instance in which he himself had rendered assistance to the Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert that Themistocles had received assistance from it; for the war was directed by the counsels of that senate which Solon had created.

Themistoc

⁷⁶ The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Although it is thought that it was by their achievements that Sparta gained her supremacy, yet these are not even remotely to be compared with the legislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather, it was due to these that Pausanias and Lysander had armies so brave and so well disciplined. For my own part, I do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior to Gaius Marius, when I was a lad, or Quintus Catulus to Gnaeus Pompey, when I was engaged in public life. For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too,

Pausanias

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Africanus, though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater service to the state by destroying Numantia than was done at the same time by Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with official authority, by removing Tiberius Gracchus. This deed does not, to be sure, belong wholly to the domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of war also, since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that, executed as a political measure without the help of an army.

⁷⁷ The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against which, I am told, the malicious and envious are wont to rail:

Cicero's

“Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises,^a ye laurels.”^b

Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I was at the helm of state? For never was the republic in more serious peril, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsels and my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the most desperate traitors—dropped to the ground of their own accord! What ⁷⁸ achievement in war, then, was ever so great? What triumph can be compared with that? For I may boast to you, my son Marcus; for to you belong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating my deeds. And it was to me, too, that Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with the honours of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many, when he said that his third triumph would have been gained in vain, if he were not to have through my services to the state a place in which to celebrate it.

There are, therefore, instances of civic courage

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memorials of their learning they continue the same service after they are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing upon laws, customs, or political science; in fact, they seem to have devoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in public business. The principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of the pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical wisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And for that reason also much speaking (if only it contain wisdom) is better than speculation never so profound without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred, while speech extends its benefits to those with whom we are united by the bonds of society.

¹⁵⁷ And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for the sake of making honeycomb but make the honeycomb because they are gregarious by nature, so human beings—and to a much higher degree—exercise their skill together in action and thought because they are naturally gregarious. And so, if that virtue [Justice] which centres in the safeguarding of human interests, that is, in the maintenance of human society, were not to accompany the pursuit of knowledge, that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of results. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if unrestrained by the uniting bonds of society, would be but a sort of brutality and savagery. Hence it follows that the claims of human society and the bonds that unite men together take precedence of the pursuit of speculative knowledge.

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¹⁵⁸ And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of union in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs of daily life; for, they say, without the aid of others we could not

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secure for ourselves or supply to others the things that Nature requires; but if all that is essential to our wants and comfort were supplied by some magic wand, as in the stories, then every man of first-rate ability could drop all other responsibility and devote himself exclusively to learning and study. Not at all. For he would seek to escape from his loneliness and to find someone to share his studies; he would wish to teach, as well as to learn; to hear, as well as to speak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and safeguard human society should be given the preference over that duty which arises from speculation and science alone.

¹⁵⁹ XLV. The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether this social instinct, which is the Temperance. deepest feeling in our nature, is always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man, therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But the problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot arise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do any of those things.

Justice vs.

¹⁶⁰ This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing between conflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the interests of human society. [And this is the natural sequence; for discreet action will presuppose learning and practical

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wisdom; it follows, therefore, that discreet action is of more value than wise (but inactive) speculation.]

So much must suffice for this topic. For, in its essence, it has been made so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not difficult to see which duty is to be preferred to any other. Moreover, even in the social relations themselves there are gradations of duty so well defined that it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of any other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to country; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest.

¹⁶¹ From this brief discussion, then, it can be understood that people are often in doubt not only whether an action is morally right or wrong, but also, when a choice is offered between two moral actions, which one is morally better. This point, as I remarked above, has been overlooked by Panaetius. But let us now pass on to what remains.

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¹³ fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. Then, too, there would surely be no exportation of our superfluous commodities or importation of those we lack, did not men perform these services. By the same process of reasoning, without the labour of man's hands, the stone needful for our use would not be quarried from the earth, nor would "iron, copper, gold, and silver, hidden far within," be mined.

IV. And how could houses ever have been provided in the first place for the human race, to keep out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the discomforts of the heat; or how could the ravages of furious tempest or of earthquake or of time upon them afterward have been repaired, had not ¹⁴ the bonds of social life taught men in such events to look to their fellow-men for help? Think of the aqueducts, canals, irrigation works, breakwaters, artificial harbours; how should we have these without the work of man? From these and many other illustrations it is obvious that we could not in any way, without the work of man's hands, have received the profits and the benefits accruing from inanimate things.

Finally, of what profit or service could animals be, without the co-operation of man? For it was men who were the foremost in discovering what use could be made of each beast; and to-day, if it were not for man's labour, we could neither feed them nor break them in nor take care of them nor yet secure the profits from them in due season. By man, too, noxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be of use are captured.

¹⁵ Why should I recount the multitude of arts without which life would not be worth living at all? For

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how would the sick be healed? What pleasure would the hale enjoy? What comforts should we have, if there were not so many arts to minister to our wants? In all these respects the civilized life of man is far removed from the standard of the comforts and wants of the lower animals. And, without the association of men, cities could not have been built or peopled. In consequence of city life, laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable distribution of private rights and a definite social system. Upon these institutions followed a more humane spirit and consideration for others, with the result that life was better supplied with all it requires, and by giving and receiving, by mutual exchange of commodities and conveniences, we succeeded in meeting all our wants.

¹⁶ V. I have dwelt longer on this point than was necessary. For who is there to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are not self-evident—namely, that no one, either as a general in war or as a statesman at home, could have accomplished great things for the benefit of the state, without the hearty co-operation of other men? He cites the deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he says, could not have achieved so great success without the support of other men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does not need, to prove a fact that no one questions.

And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the sympathetic co-operation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is no curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a book by Dicaearchus on “The Destruction of Human Life.” He was a famous

Man's I

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and eloquent Peripatetic, and he gathered together all the other causes of destruction—floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of wild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes of men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of comparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of men—that is, by wars or revolutions—than by any and all other sorts of calamity.

¹⁷ Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and to attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human life derives from inanimate objects and from the employment and use of animals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the co-operation of men, on the other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests, is ¹⁸ secured through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior ability]. And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties: the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call *πάθη*) and make the impulses (*ὀρμαί*) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their co-operation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward off any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to

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injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit.

¹⁹ VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the ability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say a few words by way of preface.

Who fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal and for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to the wished-for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to destruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual calamities, arising, first, from inanimate Nature—hurricanes, storms, shipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild beasts—kicks,
²⁰ bites, and attacks. But these, as I have said, are comparatively rare. But think, on the one side, of the destruction of armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the loss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil and military honours, and the victories;—though all these contain an element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good or for ill, without the influence and the co-operation of our fellow-men.

With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to explain how we can win the affectionate co-operation of our fellows and enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly prolonged, let the length be compared

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the commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to the citizens and to the state.

⁷³ The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that “there were not in the state two thousand people who owned any property.” That speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured. For, although it was by Nature’s guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities.

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⁷⁴ The administration should also put forth every effort to prevent the levying of a property tax, and to this end precautions should be taken long in advance. Such a tax was often levied in the times of our forefathers on account of the depleted state of their treasury and their incessant wars. But, if any state (I say “any,” for I would rather speak in general terms than forebode evils to our own; however, I am not discussing our own state but states in general)—if any state ever has to face a crisis requiring the

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imposition of such a burden, every effort must be made to let all the people realize that they must bow to the inevitable, if they wish to be saved. And it will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs of the state to take measures that there shall be an abundance of the necessities of life. It is needless to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the duty is self-evident; it is necessary only to mention the matter. (3) n

⁷⁵ But the chief thing in all public administration and public service is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking. "I would," says Gaius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had withheld my appearance until a time when the Romans began to accept bribes, and that I had been born in those days! I should then have suffered them to hold their supremacy no longer." Aye, but he would have had many generations to wait; for this plague has only recently infected our nation. And so I rejoice that Pontius lived then instead of now, seeing that he was so mighty a man! It is not yet a hundred and ten years since the enactment of Lucius Piso's bill to punish extortion; there had been no such law before. But afterward came so many laws, each more stringent than the other, so many men were accused and so many convicted, so horrible a war^a was stirred up on account of the fear of what our courts would do to still others, so frightful was the pillaging and plundering of the allies when the laws and courts were suppressed,^b that how we find ourselves strong not in our own strength but in the weakness of others. (4) off

⁷⁶ XXII. Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity in public life. Why should he not? But Africanus

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had other and greater virtues. The boast of official integrity belongs not to that man alone but also to his times. When Paulus got possession of all the wealth of Macedon—and it was enormous—he brought into our treasury so much money^a that the spoils of a single general did away with the need for a tax on property in Rome for all time to come. But to his own house he brought nothing save the glory of an immortal name. Africanus emulated his father's example and was none the richer for his overthrow of Carthage. And what shall we say of Lucius Mummius, his colleague in the censorship? Was he one penny the richer when he had destroyed to its foundations the richest of cities? He preferred to adorn Italy rather than his own house. And yet by the adornment of Italy his own house was, as it seems to me, still more splendidly adorned.

⁷⁷ There is, then, to bring the discussion back to the point from which it digressed, no vice more offensive avarice. than avarice, especially in men who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the state for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, infamous. And so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that "Sparta should not fall from any other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy not to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well. They who direct the affairs of state, then, can win the good-will of the masses by no other means more easily than by self-restraint and self-denial.

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⁷⁸ But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason either attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants may be driven out of their homes, or propose that money

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expedient, and if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient.

¹² But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is worth cultivating only because it is productive of advantage, as do certain philosophers who measure the desirableness of things by the standard of pleasure or of absence of pain, he might argue that expediency sometimes clashes with moral rectitude. But since he is a man who judges that the morally right is the only good, and that those things which come in conflict with it have only the appearance of expediency and cannot make life any better by their presence nor any worse by their absence, it follows that he ought not to have raised a question involving the weighing of what seems

¹³ expedient against what is morally right. Furthermore, when the Stoics speak of the supreme good as “living conformably to Nature,” they mean, as I take it, something like this: that we are always to be in accord with virtue, and from all other things that may be in harmony with Nature to choose only such as are not incompatible with virtue. This being so, some people are of the opinion that it was not right to introduce this counterbalancing of right and expediency and that no practical instruction should have been given on this question at all.

And yet moral goodness, in the true and proper sense of the term, is the exclusive possession of the wise and can never be separated from virtue; but those who have not perfect wisdom cannot possibly have

¹⁴ perfect moral goodness, but only a semblance of it. And indeed these duties under discussion in these books the Stoics call “mean duties”;^a they are a common possession and have wide application; and

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many people attain to the knowledge of them through natural goodness of heart and through advancement in learning. But that duty which those same Stoics call “right” is perfect and absolute and “satisfies all the
 15 numbers,”^a as that same school says, and is attainable by none except the wise man. On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see “mean” duties manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion.

IV. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness,
 16 not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all mankind. Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as “brave men” or Fabricius [or Aristides] is called “the just,” it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal “wise man.” For no one of them was wise in

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the sense in which we wish to have “wise” understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed “the wise.” Not even the famous Seven were “wise.” But because of their constant observance of “mean” duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men.

- 17 For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable; but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue.

So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their careful observance of duty.

- 18 Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of profits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by considerations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any question, to weigh the morally right against what they think the expedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated that people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant precisely what he said—merely that “such was their custom,” not that such was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral to think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally right, or even to set

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a pretext for wrong-doing. But, thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so fond of dwelling.

- ³² As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill;—nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper measures; for, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity.

Of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances.

- ³³ VII. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided for the reason that it is not immoral at all.

We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which is unfinished, to be sure, but still almost completed; and, as mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition, but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily to explain their meaning, so, my

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dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake except what is morally right. But if Cratippus^a does not permit this assumption, you will still grant this at least—that what is morally right is the object most worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more probable; and, besides these, there is no other alternative that seems probable at all.^b

Moral I
good or t

³⁴ In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on this point; for he has said, not that truly expedient could under certain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not have said that conscientiously^c), but only that what *seemed* expedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that nothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right, and nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he says that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the doctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the end that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient preference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in each other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This part, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to completion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the saying is. For, of all that has been worked out on this line since the time of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all satisfactory to me.

Panaetius
be expedie

Romulus and by the other prudent princes than was reasonable and necessary to maintain their free way of life. Thus came this external⁵ beating, so that all the orders of the city might be regained and that it might be shown to that people that it was necessary not only to maintain religion and justice but also to ensure its good citizens and to take more account of their virtue than of those advantages that it appeared to them they lacked through their works. This, our men succeeded exactly; for as soon as Rome was retaken, they renewed all the orders of their ancient religion, they punished the Fabii who had engaged in combat "against the law of nations,"⁶ and next they so much esteemed the virtue and goodness of Camillus that they put aside all envy—the Senate and the others—and they again placed all the weight of that republic on him.⁷ It is thus necessary, as was said, that men who live together in any order whatever often examine themselves either through these extrinsic accidents or through intrinsic ones. As to the latter, it must arise either from a law that often looks over the account for the men who are in that body or indeed from a good man who arises among them, who with his examples and his virtuous works produces the same effect in the order.

3 Thus this good emerges in republics either through the virtue of a man or through the virtue of an order. As to this last, the orders that drew the Roman republic back toward its beginning were the tribunes of the plebs, the censors, and all the other laws that went against the ambition and the insolence of men. Such orders have need of being brought to life by the virtue of a citizen who rushes spiritedly to execute them against the power of those who transgress them. Notable among such executions, before the taking of Rome by the French,⁸ were the death of the sons of Brutus,⁹ the death of the ten citizens,¹⁰ and that of Maelius the grain dealer;¹¹ after the taking of Rome it was the death of Manlius Capitolinus,¹² the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus,¹³ the execution of Papirius Cursor against his master of the cavalrymen Fabius,¹⁴ and the accusation of the Scipios.¹⁵ Because they were excessive and notable, such things made men draw back toward the mark whenever one of them arose; and when they began to be more rare, they also began to give more space to men to corrupt themselves and to behave with greater danger and more tumult. For one should

5. Lit.: "extrinsic."
 7. Livy, V 39–41, 46.
 9. Livy, II 3–5.
 10. According to Livy, III 56–58, two killed themselves in prison and eight were executed.
 11. Livy, IV 13–16.
 13. Livy, VIII 7–8.
 15. Livy, XXXVIII 50–60: Scipio Africanus and his brother Scipio Asiaticus.

6. Quoted in Latin from Livy, V 36.
 8. Livy, V 32–50.

12. Livy, VI 11–20.
 14. Livy, VIII 30–36.

not wish ten years at most to pass from one to another of such executions; for when this time is past, men begin to vary in their customs and to transgress the law. Unless something arises by which punishment is brought back to their memory and fear is renewed in their spirits, soon so many delinquents join together that they can no longer be punished without danger. Those who governed the state of Florence from 1434 up to 1494 used to say, to this purpose, that it was necessary to regain the state every five years; otherwise, it was difficult to sustain it.¹⁶ They called regaining the state putting that terror and that fear in men that had been put there in taking it, since at that time they had beaten down those who, according to that mode of life, had worked for ill. But as the memory of that beating is eliminated, men began to dare to try new things and to say not and so it is necessary to provide for it, drawing [the state] back toward its beginnings. This drawing back of republics toward their beginning arises also from the simple virtue of one man, without depending on any law that stimulates men to any execution; nonetheless, they are of such reputation and so much example that good men desire to imitate them and the wicked are ashamed to hold a life contrary to them. In Rome those who particularly produced these good effects were Horatius Coculus,¹⁷ Scaevola,¹⁸ Fabricius,¹⁹ the two Decii,²⁰ Regulus and others,²¹ and some others who with their rare and virtuous examples produced in Rome almost the same effect that laws and orders produced. If the executions were above, together with these particular examples, had continued at least every ten years in that city, it follows of necessity that it would never have been corrupt; but as both of these two things began to diminish, corruptions began to multiply. For after Marcus Regulus no like example may be seen there, and although the two Caros emerged in Rome, there was so much distance from him to them and between them from one to the other, and they remained so alone, that with their good examples they were not able to do any good work—and especially the last Cato, who, finding the city in good part corrupt, was not able to make the citizens become better with his example.²² Let this be enough as to republics.

4 But as to sects, these renewals are also seen to be necessary by the example of our religion, which would be altogether eliminated if it had not been drawn back toward its beginning by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick. For with poverty and with the example of the life of Christ they brought back into the minds

16. See *HF* V.1. 4. The Medici governed Florence during this period.
 17. Livy, II 10.
 18. Plutarch, *Pyrrhus*, 20.
 20. Livy, VIII 9–10; X 26–29.
 21. Livy *Summaries*, XXVIII.
 22. Plutarch, *Cato the Younger*, 4, 18, 21, 78.