Alexander Hamilton Institute
for the Study of
Western Civilization
Clinton, New York

THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN STATESMANSHIP

June 20-21, 2016

David Clinton
Discussion leader

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Monday, June 20

9:30 Breakfast at the Alexander Hamilton Institute

10:45 Welcome and Introduction – Robert Paquette and Mary Nichols

11:00-12:30

Session 1:
Origins of the Cold War: What Is at Stake?

Readings:

George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, pp. 292-295, 298-301

George Kennan, "The Long Telegram" (1947)

George Kennan, "The Soviet Way of Thought and Its Effect on Foreign Policy" (1947), in Gilis Hadow and George Maer, eds., *Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-47*, pp. 111-128

George Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (1954), pp. 63-90

12:30-1:30 Lunch, Alexander Hamilton Institute

1:30-3:00 **Session 2:**

Origins of the Cold War: What Should Be the American Response?

Readings:

George Kennan, “Diplomacy in the Modern World,” in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (1951), pp. 78-89

George Kennan, “America and the Russian Future,” in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (1951), pp. 106-127

George Kennan, “The Unifying Factor,” in *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (1954), pp. 91-120

3:30-5:00 **Session 3:**

Evolution of the Cold War: What Intellectual Resources Does the United States Bring to Its Response?

Readings:

Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (1954), pp. 1-6, 315-332

Henry Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy” (1966), pp. 503-529

Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (1979), “The Convictions of an Apprentice Statesman” (pp. 54-70; “The Enduring Philosophical Problem of US-Soviet Relations” (pp. 114-130)

6:30 – **Picnic at Hatch Lake**, hosted by the Nichols and sponsored by the Alexander Hamilton Institute

Tuesday, June 21

9:30 Breakfast at the Alexander Hamilton Institute

11:00-12:30 **Session 4:**

Evolution of the Cold War: What Should Be the American Response?

Readings:

Henry Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy” (1968), pp. 58-97

Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (1979), “Conclusion” (pp. 158-159)

Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (1982), pp. 159-160

Richard Nixon, “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s” (February 18, 1970)

Richard Nixon, “Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy; Part 1: The Nixon Doctrine” (February 25, 1971)

Richard Nixon, “Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy; The Administration’s Approach” (May 3, 1973)

12:30-1:30 Lunch, Alexander Hamilton Institute

1:30-3:00 **Session 5:**

Conclusion of the Cold War: The Role of Statesmanship?

Readings:

Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (1981)

Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (1990), pp. 266-268, 557-561, 564, 566-573

Ronald Reagan, “Evil Empire Speech” (1983)

Ronald Reagan, Second Inaugural Address (1985)

Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (1989)

George Keenan, *Memoirs* 1925-1950, pp 292-295, 298-301

In mid-February 1946 I was taken with cold, fever, sinus, tooth trouble, and finally the aftereffects of the sulpha drugs administered for the relief of these other miseries. The ambassador was again absent; he was, in fact, now in process of leaving his post for good. I was therefore in charge. Bedridden by these various *douleurs,* I suffered the daily take of telegrams and other office business to be brought currently up to my bedroom, and coped as best I could with the responsibilities that flowed from it all.

Among the messages brought up on one of these unhappy days was one that reduced us all to a new level of despair — despair not with the Soviet government but with our own. It was a telegram informing us that the Russians were evidencing an unwillingness to adhere to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The message, it appeared, had been inspired by the Treasury Department. It should be remembered that nowhere in Washington had the hopes entertained for postwar collaboration with Russia been more elaborate, more naïve, or more tenaciously (one might almost say ferociously) pursued than in the Treasury Department. Now, at long last, with the incomprehensible unwillingness of Moscow to adhere to the Bank and the Fund, the dream seemed to be shattered, and the Department of State passed on to the embassy, in tones of bland innocence, the anguished cry of bewilderment that had floated over the roof of the White House from the Treasury Department on the other side. How did one explain such behavior on the part of the Soviet government? What lay behind it?

The more I thought about this message, the more it seemed to be obvious that this was "it." For eighteen long months I had done little else but pluck people's sleeves, trying to make them understand the nature of the phenomenon with which we in the Moscow embassy were daily confronted and which our government and people had to learn to understand if they were to have any chance of coping successfully with the problems of the postwar world. So far as official Washington was concerned, it had been to all intents and purposes like talking to a stone. The Russian desk in the State Department had understood; but it had generally been as helpless as we were, and beyond it all had been an unechoing silence. Now, suddenly, my opinion was being asked. The occasion, to be sure, was a trivial one, but the implications of the query were not. It was no good trying to brush the question off with a couple of routine sentences describing Soviet views on such things as world banks and international monetary funds. It would not do to give them just a fragment of the truth. Here was a case where nothing but the whole truth would do. They had asked for it. Now, by God, they would have it.

I reached, figuratively, for my pen (figuratively, for the pen was in this case my long suffering and able secretary, Miss Dorothy Hessman, who was destined to endure thereafter a further fifteen years studded with just such bouts of abuse) and composed a telegram of some eight thousand words — all neatly divided, like an eighteenth-century Protestant sermon, into five separate parts. (I thought that if it went in five sections, each could pass as a separate telegram and it would not look so outrageously long.) These sections dealt respectively with:

the basic features of the Soviet postwar outlook;
the background of that outlook;
its projection on the level of official policy;
its projection on the level of unofficial policy, i.e., policy implemented through "front" organizations and stooges of all sorts;
the implications of all this for American policy.

I justified this outrageous encumberment of the telegraphic process by saying the department's query involved "questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to the analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress the answers into a single brief message without yielding to . . . a dangerous degree of oversimplification."

The text of this document is reproduced in the Annex. I shall not attempt to summarize it here. I read it over today with a horrified amusement. Much of it reads exactly like one of those primers put out by alarmed congressional committees or by the Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to arouse the citizenry to the dangers of the Communist conspiracy. The fact that this is so demands its explanation but — again — not at this point in the narrative.

The effect produced in Washington by this elaborate pedagogical effort was nothing less than sensational. It was one that changed my career and my life in very basic ways. If none of my previous literary efforts had seemed to evoke even the faintest tinkle from the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to my astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating with a resonance that was not to die down for many months. It was one of those moments when official Washington, whose states of receptivity or the opposite are determined by subjective emotional currents as intricately imbedded in the subconscious as those of the most complicated of Sigmund Freud's erstwhile patients, was ready to receive a given message. Exactly what happened to the telegram, once it entered into the maw of the communications system of the capital, I do not know. To say the least, it went "the rounds." The President, I believe, read it. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. James Forrestal, had it reproduced and evidently made it required reading for hundreds, if not thousands, of higher officers in the armed services. The Department of State, not at all disturbed by the reckless use of the telegraphic channel, responded with a message of commendation. With the receipt in Washington, on Washington's Birthday 1946, of this telegraphic dissertation from Moscow, my official loneliness came in fact to an end — at least for a period of two to three years. My reputation was made. My voice now carried.

Six months earlier this message would probably have been received in the Department of State with raised eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have sounded redundant, a sort of preaching to the convinced. This was true despite the fact that the realities which it described were ones that had existed, substantially unchanged, for about a decade, and would continue to exist for more than a half-decade longer. All this only goes to show that more important than the observable nature of external reality, when it comes to the determination of Washington's view of the world, is the subjective state of readiness on the part of Washington officialdom to recognize this or that feature of it. This is certainly natural; perhaps it is unavoidable. But it does raise the question — and it is a question which was to plague me increasingly over the course of the ensuing years — whether a government so constituted should deceive itself into believing that it is capable of conducting a mature, consistent, and discriminating foreign policy. Increasingly, with the years, my answer would tend to be in the negative.

12

The National War College

THE success of the long telegram from Moscow changed my life. My name was now known in Washington. I became qualified, in people's minds, as a candidate for a different order of position than the ones I had previously occupied. In April 1946 I was transferred to Washington and assigned as the first "deputy for foreign affairs" at the newly established National War College. This institution, conceived as the senior of the various midcareer educational establishments of the armed services, was scheduled to open its door in the fall of that year to the first batch of officer-students. My status was to be in effect that of one of the three deputy commandants. My particular function would be to devise and direct the more strictly political portions of the combined military-political course of instruction.

We arrived in Washington in late May. Most of June and July was taken up with the working out of a curriculum for the college. In late July and early August, I undertook, at the request of the Department of State, a speaking tour to the Middle West and the West Coast — more specifically, to Chicago, Milwaukee, Seattle, Portland, the San Francisco area, and Los Angeles.

This was my first extensive experience with public speaking. (It was, alas, far from being the last.) I had lectured on Russian history to my fellow internees at Bad Nauheim. I had spoken once or twice, nervously and fumblingly, before private audiences at this or that foreign post. But never had I involved myself in anything of

such dimensions. It was a mark of my inexperience that I prepared no written texts for these appearances, relying for the substance of my statements on a few scribbled notes, on the resources of memory, and on the inspiration of the moment. Having failed to preserve the notes, I have no clear idea of what I did say. Whatever it was, it must have been marked by more enthusiasm and spontaneity than coherence. But audiences, however much or little edified, seemed to be attentive and appreciative. Their reactions, in fact, sometimes startled me. On the second of these occasions — some sort of a League of Women Voters luncheon in my native city of Milwaukee — a clergyman at the speaker's table, who had sat staring at me with a disconcerting smile throughout my presentation, approached me afterwards, shook my hand, and said, enigmatically: "Boy, you missed your calling."

In their readiness or ability to understand what I was talking about, the audiences varied markedly. The best were the stag groups of businessmen: skeptical, critical, but hardheaded, thoughtful, schooled in the sort of dialectical approach that permitted you to oppose a competitor without finding it necessary, or even desirable, to destroy him, and therefore capable of understanding that the Soviet-American antagonism might be serious without having to be resolved by war. The most difficult, not in the sense that they were hostile but rather that they were unprepared for, and troubled by, what I had to say, were the academic ones. I discussed this in an account of the tour which I submitted, upon its completion, to one of the officials of the Department of State who had inspired it. There hung over these academic audiences, I wrote,

> something of the intellectual snobbery and pretense, the jealousies and inhibitions, and the cautious herd-instinct which have a habit of creeping into college faculties, whether liberal or conservative. . . . But added to this were two other elements which made things difficult. One of these was a bias against the State Department as such. The other was a geographic inferiority complex, if I may call it that: a feeling that the East, including the State Department, was haughty and supercilious and neglectful of the wisdom and vision that flourished in centers of learning on the West Coast. . . . There was a certain

> neurosis there: a resentment of the fact that things are still centered in the East; a desire to see the Pacific area just as important — and recognized as being as important — as the Atlantic. This played a particularly noticeable role in the discussion of Russian questions, for I could see that many of my listeners viewed the development of "collaboration" with Russia as one of the things that were going to increase the activity and importance of their particular area. They had set high hopes on the development of relations across the Pacific between our West Coast . . . and Siberia. Their noses were out of joint over the failure of these hopes to materialize, and they were inclined to put the blame on the State Department.

I could not help but gain the impression, incidentally, that these West Coast academic audiences included a sizable number of people who, if not themselves Communist Party members, had been strongly influenced from that side. I suppose it was the recent residence in Moscow that made me sensitive to this situation; in any case, accustomed as I was to a concern for governmental security, I was disturbed by it. I had no doubt, I wrote to the State Department,

> that every word I said was being dutifully reported to the Soviet consul before the day was out. There is no great harm in this; and I did not alter what I said for that reason; but if the department has people going out there to talk on subjects more confidential in character, it had better exercise some check on who is admitted to the meetings.

The atomic scientists included in the group at Berkeley had puzzled me particularly. "The exact nature of their views," I wrote,

> is still nebulous to me; they seemed to combine a grudging approval of Mr. Baruch's proposals for an International Atomic Energy Authority with an unshakable faith that if they could only get some Soviet scientists by the buttonhole and enlighten them about the nature of atomic weapons, all would be well. I don't think it ever occurred to them that a realization of the tremendous destructive possibilities of atomic energy might be less inclined to scare the Russians into international collaboration than to whet their desire to find a way of using it without danger to themselves. Politically these people are as innocent as six-year-old maidens. In trying to explain things to them I felt like one who shatters the pure ideals of tender youth. Fortunately for them, they didn't believe much of what I said and left, I am sure, unshaken in the comfortable conviction that such evil as exists in the world has its seat in the State Department, which doesn't want to understand. . . .

On rereading these passages, I recognize that they might suggest I was headed for a job as staff consultant to the late Senator Joe McCarthy or to the House Un-American Affairs Committee. To offset this impression, and to make it clear that this was not my only reaction to the problem of communism in our own society, I ought perhaps to include the following remarks, of which I find record in the notes for a talk which I gave at the University of Virginia, some six months later:

> In particular, I deplore the hysterical sort of anticommunism which, it seems to me, is gaining currency in our country: the failure to distinguish what is indeed progressive social doctrine from the rivalry of a foreign political machine which has appropriated and abused the slogans of socialism. I am far from being a Communist; but I recognize in the theory of Soviet communism (in the theory, mark you, not the practice) certain elements which I think are probably really the ideas of the future. I hate to see us reject the good with the bad — throw out the baby with the bath — and place ourselves in that way on the wrong side of history.
>
> . . . So here, again, I return to the need for greater coolness, greater sophistication, greater maturity and self-confidence in our approach to this whole problem of Russia and communism.

George Kennan, "The Long Telegram" (1947)

861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram

The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.

(2) Background of this outlook

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows

Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine

Are as Follows:

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

"In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."

(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom

Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final *Coup de grace* by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [)]

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi* that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will

profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

KENNAN

800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram

January 24, 1947

THE SOVIET WAY OF THOUGHT AND ITS EFFECT ON FOREIGN POLICY

Editors' Note: *This paper was found among the lecture manuscripts in the War College archives. It was neither delivered as a lecture nor published in this form (see Introduction, pages xix–xx). However, it is most likely the origin of Kennan's analysis that was published as the "X" article in* Foreign Affairs.

THE PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN WAY OF THOUGHT IS AS COMPLEX and as illusive as the over-all problem of human psychology itself. Here there are no sharp outlines, no clear lines of division, no finite pattern susceptible of a two-dimensional approach. There is no national psychology more subtle, more variegated and more contradictory than that of the Russians. In the pattern of Russian thought there is no single trait which does not seem to be balanced by its own opposite. All the extremes are represented. Every rule is proved by a multitude of exceptions. And every general statement is open to challenge.

This being the case, it is idle to attempt to compress into a paper of this scope anything which purports to be a full or exact portrayal of the Soviet "way of thought." The most that can be attempted is to approach the problem from certain points on the periphery which seem to be the source of particular confusion in the public mind and to see whether here, at least, a modicum of clarity cannot be introduced.

The points which suggest themselves most readily for such analysis, and which in their aggregate undoubtedly cut deeply into the whole question of the Soviet way of thought in its bearing on foreign affairs, are the following:

(a) The role of ideology in the official Soviet mind;

(b) The importance of Russian history and traditional habits of thought;

(c) The effect of the internal circumstances of Soviet power on the Soviet mental outlook; and

(d) The psychological effect of the disciplinary principles of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

If these points are examined with care, it may be possible to arrive at certain general conclusions on the over-all question which is the subject of this paper.

IDEOLOGY

> The materialistic conception of history ... did away with two of the principal deficiencies of former historical theories. These latter had taken as the object of their study at best only the

> ideological motives of the historical actions of men without examining what had evoked these motives . . .
>
> V.I. Lenin, *Karl Marx: An Introduction to Marxism*

There is no single question that causes more confusion with respect to the Soviet way of thought than the part played therein by the factor of ideology. There are some who deny that ideology plays any part at all in Soviet thought and who insist on viewing the Soviet leaders simply as cynical and hardboiled realists for whom ideology is only an insincere pretense. This view is incorrect, and those who hold it are clearly a minority among the circle of observers who have had contact with the Soviet world. But even in the majority who are prepared to recognize that the Soviet leaders are fanatics there is a wide variety of opinion as to the part that ideology plays. And there are many who are inclined to go to the opposite extreme, to conclude that ideology is the sole motive power and program of action for the men in the Kremlin and consequently to read the future in the implications of what these people accept as official Soviet dogma.

I think it may be postulated at the outset that ideology is neither the real driving force nor the real program of Soviet action. It cannot be the real driving force, for—as we shall see later—the main preoccupations of the Soviet Government have always been ones arising predominantly from the internal necessities of Soviet power and ones which were not, and could not possibly have been, foreseen by the classical fathers of Soviet thought, including even Lenin. For the same reason, ideology could hardly have provided an adequate program of action for the Soviet leaders. Clearly, Marxism could not provide a program for the execution of purposes which were utterly foreign to its world of thought. As a matter of fact, even if the Soviet leaders today were animated exclusively—which they are not—by a desire to put into effect the precepts of Marxism as they inherited them, they would find this difficult to do. Their own problems and the situation in which they find themselves today were never envisaged in Marxist philosophy. Marx's teachings related mainly to the means by which the change was to be effected from one set of what he called the "conditions of production," namely the capitalist pattern, to another set of the "conditions of production," namely the socialist pattern. He did not try to envisage in detail the administration and development of the socialist state of the future. He certainly did not envisage that the test of his ideas would come in one of the least advanced of the great nations and that it would be imposed from above by a dictatorial minority, imposing its will over the majority of the people. And even Lenin, who slowly and regretfully came to the conclusion that it would all have to be this way temporarily, never dreamed that the ''dictatorship of the proletariat'' was going to become a permanent institution, lasting in Russia for decades, while the economic organization of society elsewhere in the world continued to evolve in accordance with its own peculiar laws.

Thus the teachings of Marx and Lenin could not possibly provide a detailed working plan for the men in the Kremlin today, and these men are obviously obliged to play it by ear and to use their own judgment in advancing their ultimate objective.

But if ideology is neither a motive power nor a program of action for the Soviet leaders, there are certain other functions which it clearly fulfills.

In the first place, it is in the light of ideology, and in the language of ideology, that Soviet leaders become aware of what transpires in this world. They think of it, and can think of it, only in the terms of Marxist philosophy. Their own education knows no other terms. And the people on whom they are dependent for their reports of the outside world have no other terms in which to describe to them what they see. Ideology, we must remember, provides the jargon of official Soviet life. And in that sense, it pervades all understanding and discussion of objective reality. It is clear, then, that it functions in effect as a prism through which the world is viewed; or to take a more precise metaphor, as a sort of television set through which the mental eye receives and registers the impressions of objective reality.

Secondly, ideology plainly dictates the form in which Soviet decisions must be clothed and presented to the Soviet public and to the world at large. This is of vital and compelling importance. It must never be forgotten that the whole trend of Soviet policy over the past 15 years would be indefensible in the eyes of world opinion—would be indistinguishable, in fact, from many of the most disagreeable forms of fascism—if it were stripped of its claim to ideological significance. Therefore, all Soviet decisions and actions must appear to serve the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, whether they do or not. This sets severe limitations on the freedom of expression and the outward behavior of the Soviet Government. In all its words and deeds in the field of foreign affairs, it must do lip service to the interests of the working classes of the world. It must never for a moment drop the pose of the protector of the universal underdog. By the same token, it must not be too polite or cordial in its references to other governments. It can never say or do anything to imply complete approval or acceptance of the legitimacy of governments elsewhere in the world which do not share its ideology. This means that the outward expression of Soviet foreign policy must move in a narrow and rather artificial path; and it goes far to explain the general reticence of the Soviet Government in explaining its own attitude in international affairs as well as the stilted and highly laconic form in which it phrases such grudging expressions of policy as it cannot avoid.

Thirdly, ideology has an important effect on Soviet method. Many Westerners who have lived in Moscow and pondered Soviet society from that vantage point have come to feel that the most important and fateful element in the Soviet way of thought is the theory that the ends justify the means. There is little evidence that this theory had any place in the mental world of Karl Marx. It was something born out of the dark and pagan recesses of the Russian soul itself, with its uninhibited and desperate plunges into the extremes of good and evil. It has constituted for a century the central political philosophy in the Russian revolutionary movement. In my opinion it has not yet been accepted by the mass of the Russian people, and never will be. But it *was* taken over into the Leninist philosophy and it has become official for the Soviet Government. Its effect is of course to give that government an absence of scruple and restraint in method which is probably unparalleled in history. As a result of this theory, the personal ethics of a host of Soviet officials and followers have reached a state where they are often distinguishable from plain criminality only by their theoretical subordination to the central discipline of an ideological movement.

In summary, then, the role of ideology in Soviet political psychology, while of tremendous importance, is not primarily that of a basic determinant of political action. It is rather a prism through which Soviet eyes must view the world, and an indispensable vehicle for the translation into words and actions of impulses and aspirations which have their origin deeper still. It colors what the Russians see and what they do. Its function is to distort and embellish reality, both objective and subjective. Within the limit of this function, its influence is enormous. It has a profound effect on the mental background against which decisions are taken, on the forms in which those decisions are put forward, and on the methods by which they are executed. To the extent that form may really be more important than content—methods more important than motives—in determining the end product of human conduct, ideology may be considered to be a paramount component of Soviet behaviorism. But it is important to remember that its bearing is on coloration of background, on form of expression, and on method of execution, rather than on basic aim.

NATIONAL TRADITION

> There is a strong anti-foreign party in Russia whose policy would exclude all foreigners, except for mere purposes of transient commerce. ... No nation has more need of foreigners and none is so jealous of them. ... A strange superstition prevails among the Russians that they are destined to conquer the world.
>
> from American diplomatic dispatches from the
> Court of Tsar Nicholas I in the years 1850–54

The importance of the element of national habit and tradition in Soviet thought has been generally under-rated in this country. This is particularly true with relation to the Soviet attitude toward the outside world: the Soviet analysis of its nature and significance and the Soviet concept of the basic relationship between Russia and the remainder of world society.

It has often been pointed out that the early history of the Soviet state (and states, like people, are most deeply impressionable in their early childhood) knew no instance of a friendly and peaceful neighbor. Russia found herself obliged to fight wars periodically with every political entity which touched the fringes of her power. It is idle to speculate whether this was Russia's fault or the fault of the others. Human nature being what it is, it was undoubtedly the fault of both. The fact remains that the outside world came to be generally viewed in Russia with suspicion and antagonism as a hostile force with which there could be no possibility of peaceful co-existence.

Intertwined with this concept was the strong vein of official xenophobia which runs through all of Russian history. It is characteristic of the contradictory quality of all Russian reality that this official resentment of the foreigner existed side by side with, and doubtless constituted a reaction to, the most slavish curiosity and admiration for foreign things among the people. This detracted nothing from its validity. You will find it all through Russian literature. You find traces of it in Griboyedov, in Lermontev, in Gogol, in Turgenyev, in Leskov, and above all in modern Soviet literature. You find it in the attitude toward Moscow's "German Village" of the 17th century, in the lynching of the Frenchman in Moscow during Napoleon's invasion, in the mob attack on the German Embassy in St. Petersburg during the First World War, and again in incidents which have occurred during the Soviet era. It still plays its part in the love-hate complex which obviously dominates the heart and mind of the Russian intellectual in his attitude toward the cultural life of the West.

Finally, the whole messianic quality of the Russian conception of the relations between Russia and the world outside Russia's borders is as old as the Russian state itself. The original concept of "Holy Russia" was an ideological concept, not a territorial one. It extended as far as Russian Orthodoxy extended. It stopped where the infidel began. This was a constantly shifting, moving line. There was no permanence about it. There was no definiteness about it. There were no visible geographic barriers: no mountains, no seas, no fast-flowing rivers, to mark it. It was as limitless as the horizon of the Russian plain itself. And it is no wonder then that Russians saw no final limit to the possible extension of their power. It is no wonder that as far back as the days of Ivan III and Ivan IV people in Moscow liked to think of their capital as "the third Rome." And it is no wonder that even in the 19th century an American envoy was constrained to report from St. Petersburg that "these people are obsessed with a strange superstition that they are destined to conquer the world."

Now it will be noted that all of these points are ones which dovetail very neatly with Soviet ideology of today. The view that the outside world is a hostile force finds ready confirmation in the communist insistence that there is an inevitable conflict between the socialist state and its capitalist environment and that the great countries of the West are united in an evil conspiracy to overthrow the socialist state and to enslave the Russian people. The traditional xenophobia of Russian officialdom finds natural expression in the Soviet view of the foreigner as a dangerous "spy, wrecker, and diversionist." And the conception of the Russian state as an ideological entity destined eventually to spread to the utmost limits of the earth is reflected with almost baffling fidelity in the communist belief in the ultimate triumph of world revolution and in the resulting tendency of the Kremlin to the quiet infiltration into, and domination of, outside centers of military and political power beyond the borders of Russia itself.

Thus there is a highly intimate and subtle connection between traditional Russian habits of thought and the ideology which has now become official for the Soviet regime. And this is important to remember. For it means that when people speak in terms of overcoming or altering these ideological convictions which animate Soviet thought, they are in reality speaking of overcoming or altering some of the most basic and deep-seated traits of traditional Russian psychology.

THE INTERNAL NECESSITIES OF POWER

> The organs of suppression, the army and the other organizations, are necessary today, in the period of reconstruction, just as they were in the period of the civil war. Without the presence of these organs no halfway secure construction work of the dictatorship is possible. It should not be forgotten that the revolution has thus far been victorious only in one country. It should not be forgotten that as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention, with all the consequences which flow from that danger.
>
> J.V. Stalin, *Questions of Leninism*, 1924

The objective student of psychology must question whether, even in the years before 1917, when Russian revolution (to say nothing of world revolution) was still a distant and uncertain dream of the future and when the members of the Bolshevik faction plainly pictured themselves as the devoted prophets and servants of the tenets of Marxism, ideology was really the force by which most of them were animated. It must be asked whether it was not rather the negative imprint of individual experience: the personal insults and restrictions and the frustrations of personal life under a semi-feudal despotism, which drove so many Russian intellectuals into the revolutionary camp. Only the greatest of these intellectuals, such as Lenin himself, were men of such great mental and spiritual power that they could be said to have become the genuine servants of an ideal. For the rest, that ideal was a convenient rationalization and cover for the pursuit of impulses which had their origin in the normal workings of the good old human ego.

But whatever the motivation of the revolutionists in the tsarist era, their advent to power produced a new set of compulsions which came to determine to an important extent their actual political behavior. The victory of the revolution in Russia and the failure of communist revolutionary efforts in the other great countries at the close of the last war created for the Russian communist leaders an unexpected and somewhat puzzling situation. They realized that Russia was not yet economically or politically ready for socialism in the Marxist sense. It became evident to them at a relatively early date that socialism could be imposed upon Russian society only by dictatorial, strong-arm methods carried out by a highly disciplined and conspiratorial minority movement. It is doubtful that Lenin wished to see it done this way. He was perhaps the only of the communist leaders in the early 20s whose integrity as an international socialist was complete and the sincerity of whose beliefs in socialist principles rose above petty egotism. It was part of this same pattern that it was principally Lenin who appeared to doubt the efficacy of a program of socialism forced onto Russia by dictatorial means. It is questionable whether, if Lenin had lived, the New Economic Policy, which he had put into effect before his illness and death, would not have been retained for many years afterward, with a corresponding moderation and democratization of Soviet power. But in any case, his death and Stalin's accession to power brought a complete renunciation of this line. Stalin and his associates not only shared the quality of all Soviet power as a parvenu force on the national and international scene, but were themselves to a large extent parvenus within the Communist Party and the revolutionary movement. For this reason their sense of insecurity was doubly strong. They could not accept the risk of sharing power with any other elements in Russia or of tolerating the free activity of people who might oppose them, either within or without the Party. Further delay in the rapid and forced socialization of Russia would have meant the continued existence of a whole sector of Russian economy, namely the capitalist sector, which was unamenable to the authority of the Stalin regime. For this reason, Stalin set about at an early date to liquidate this sector and to achieve unchallenged power over the economic life of the country. This also entailed collectivization of the peasantry. And in order that he and his regime might be economically independent of foreign, as well as domestic, influences, he also set about to build a war industry.

Now it will be observed that these basic measures all arose from a feeling of insecurity in the regime itself and from a desire to secure its independence from all forms of outside pressure. But they carried with them very important implications for the future development of Soviet power. Since they could be carried out only in opposition to the wishes of the mass of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union, they implied the continued existence of a strong internal opposition to the regime: an internal enemy which could be held in check only by an elaborate and skillfully operated police apparatus, and by all the other paraphernalia of totalitarianism.

In time the entire nature of the regime became shaped to the end of internal security. Organs of power and administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine and had a tendency to become atrophied. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly overdeveloped and swollen. The whole character and personality of the Soviet regime were thus gradually conditioned by the existence of this internal danger. And today the most important features of the regime are ones whose basic function is to assure the security of its internal power and the validity of its dictatorial authority.

Now this is a fact—and a very basic fact—which the Soviet Government cannot for a moment admit. Men whose entire claim to virtue and greatness lies in their pretense to be the only government truly devoted to the interests and prosperity of the masses cannot possibly admit there can be any serious and widespread opposition to them among those masses in their own direct sphere of authority and that the basic function of their apparatus of power is to secure them against this danger. For this reason, the real internal danger which they face, and with which they are so preoccupied, has always been officially portrayed by them not for what it is but as a reflection of something outside of Russia: a reflection of a hostile external force, namely the "capitalist encirclement," by which Soviet society is threatened. The people who oppose Stalin within Russia are never—you will note—portrayed as acting in their own name. In the light of government propaganda they are always the agents of foreign powers. There has not been a single important phase of the purges over the past 15 years in which hostile foreign forces have not figured as the real *deus ex machina*. The external enemy is thus the official pretext and explanation for the measures taken against the internal one.

Now what about the reality of this external enemy: the real danger of the "capitalist encirclement"?

This is a very important point and one on which it is essential to avoid confusion. Sometimes, as in the case of the Germans and the Japanese during the 1930s, the external enemy has been real. At times, Russia has indeed been threatened, whether or not this justified the preservation of an internal state of terror. At other times, there has actually been no organized and serious hostility to the Soviet Government abroad which could have caused legitimate worry to any objective person in Moscow—at least nothing which could not easily have been countered and offset by the most elementary evidences of a conciliatory attitude and of good faith from the Russian side. But the important thing to note is that these real changes and variations in the degree of the foreign menace have never had any effect on the aspect which that menace has assumed in official Soviet propaganda. This aspect has been uniformly horrific, regardless of changes in the real situation abroad. In the "Promparty" and Metropolitan-Vickers Trials of 1930 and 1933, respectively, the French and British appeared as no less sinister threats to Soviet security than the Nazis were later to appear in the major purge trials of 1936–37. It is clear from this that it is not the real degree of foreign hostility with which the Russians are concerned when they talk about the "capitalist encirclement." What we are dealing with here is a logical element of the Soviet system of thought: something that has been constructed in those times and conditions when it did not exist—a thesis indispensable to the structure of Soviet power. And from that standpoint it is immaterial to the people in Moscow whether it is, objectively speaking, a fiction or a reality. Subjectively, it is for them a reality, and must remain a reality.

Let me point out that what I have just said relates not only to the Soviet leaders. Since the character of the Soviet state has been shaped toward the function of assuring its own internal security, and since this phenomenon can be explained and justified only in terms of the foreign menace, the concept of this foreign menace has become an essential to every minor official of the whole great Soviet bureaucracy. If this factor loses its validity, then so does he. Training, habit, and political choice have fitted him only for this role that he is playing. If the outside world is not hostile, he has, as a political phenomenon, no excuse for existence. Thus Soviet officialdom has become one great vested interest committed to the principle of a hostile outside world. And the closer you get to the center of power, the more influential the individual concerned, the keener his appreciation of this state of affairs, and the more violent his attachment to this concept of international life.

It will be seen, therefore, that the basic motive power of Soviet policy lies in the assurance of the internal security of the regime itself and particularly in the fact that the Soviet leaders have seen fit to seek such assurance through the maintenance of a vast apparatus of repression rather than through an effort to attune themselves to popular will and to compromise with its various manifestations. And it is further apparent that this in turn necessitates the maintenance of a fiction, namely the fiction of a hostile capitalist encirclement, which again dovetails neatly with basic ideology and makes it impossible for the Kremlin to speak officially in terms other than those of ideology.

The real tactical aims of the Kremlin leaders may vary from one period to another. At one time they may run toward aggressive military action. At another time they may be directed solely toward the preservation of the Soviet state from outside attack. At one time they may be concerned with countries which are the declared enemies of the security of the Russian people. At other times they may be concerned with countries which are in alliance with the Soviet Government and fighting side by side as allies with the armed forces of the Soviet Union. But for the basic orientation of the Soviet Government toward the outside world, all this can make no real difference. The theory of the outside world as a hostile force must at all events be preserved and must underlie all other outward manifestations of Soviet foreign policy.

We have in this fact a brilliant demonstration of the truth of the thesis that ideology is a product and not a determinant of social and political reality. The last people who should challenge this thesis are those who cling today with such religious fervor to what they call the doctrines of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. For Karl Marx, in his "Introduction Concerning the Criticisms of Political Economy," had the following statements to make:

> With the change of the economic foundation, the whole enormous superstructure changes sooner or later. In studying such changes one must always distinguish between the material change in the economic conditions of production which can be accurately observed in the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the juridical, political, religious, artistic, or philosophical forms, in short the ideological forms, through which people become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

Thus the father of Soviet ideology gave in advance his blessing to our realization that the Soviet ideology of today flows with iron logic and with irresistible force from the inner necessities of Soviet power.

PARTY DISCIPLINE

> There are moments when a party or an army has to retreat because it has suffered defeat. In such cases the army or party retreats in order to preserve itself and to preserve its personnel for new battles. But there are moments when a victorious party or army reaches too far forward in its offensive and fails to secure its own rear base. This creates a serious danger. In such cases the experienced party or army usually finds it necessary . . . to retreat a little nearer to its base in order to strengthen the connection with its rear, to assure its supply and in order then to renew the offensive with greater assurance and with the guarantee of success.
>
> *History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks),*
> Chapter IX, Part 2

We now come to the last of the four factors selected for discussion: the internal discipline of the Communist Party.

While the responsibilities of administration are often laid on the shoulders of the individual government official, the responsibility for the formulation of policy lies solely with the Party, not with the Government, and is a collective, not an individual, responsibility. Policy is determined by the Party committees or bureaus, on the various levels of the Party hierarchy, depending upon the nature of the question involved and the scope of the policy decision. With respect to foreign affairs, most decisions of any importance are taken either in the Politburo itself or in some sort of a sub-committee of the Central Committee of the Party, the exact designation of which and character of which is not known.

Before a decision is taken on any particular question of policy in a Party body, the individual member of that body is at liberty to state his views freely on the subject under consideration. If the decision of the committee later runs counter to the views which he has expressed, he is not penalized for that fact, provided that he accepts in good faith the committee's final decision and drops every vestige of opposition to it.

But in stating his views to the committee in advance to the taking of a decision, the committee member must be careful about the motivation of his arguments. He must take care to see that his arguments are based solely on the interests of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. No other motivation of any sort can be admitted. Above all, he must not say anything which would indicate that he was swayed in his thoughts in any way by a predilection for any foreign state or for any of its representatives or by any sympathy for their point of view. Here ideology steps in to do its part. A Soviet committee member must at all times do lip service to the principle that the outside world is hostile to the Soviet Union. He is not at liberty to impute to any foreign government or to any individual representative of a foreign government any natural generosity or honesty or good will.

It is important to remember at this point that the internal discipline of the Communist Party is based on a cruel and ruthless system of playing individuals off against each other. Thus within the Party everyone is in a sense everyone else's enemy. The advancement of one member is usually the ruin of another. Yet to struggle for advancement is something that everyone must do: for not to struggle means to acquiesce passively in one's own ruin. The internal life of the Party is therefore characterized by a curiously impersonal but deadly sort of individual rivalry, in which everyone must be on his guard lest he provide openings for the other fellow. Not to depart, therefore, from the posture of utter devotion to the interests of the Party and utter cynicism as to the worthiness and good faith of every other political force in the world is a compelling obligation of every Party member, and the proceedings of Party bodies which deal with questions of foreign affairs faithfully reflect this basic situation.

This means, in turn, that such Party bodies can be impelled in the direction of caution and restraint in dealings with the outside world only when it can be demonstrated by individual members that any other course would be contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union. (By which are meant, in reality, the interests of the Party.) If it can be shown that Soviet power would stand to suffer by an arrogant or aggressive policy in a question of foreign affairs, then, and only then, would the committee feel itself justified in observing a degree of restraint and moderation. Thus foreign representatives who wish to see the Soviet Government take action along lines agreeable to the interests of their countries must make sure that it can be argued in the Party councils that action along these lines would be in accordance with the most cynical and hardboiled interpretation of Soviet interests. For no other arguments could be effective.

Once the committee has made its decision, it is incumbent upon the individual member to support that decision with every evidence of conviction and enthusiasm, no matter what may have been his feelings before the decision was taken. As a matter of fact, if he has opposed the decision prior to its adoption, it is better for him to forget forevermore that he did so oppose it. For him, from that moment on, the decision was right; and it must acquire in his thoughts and in his words all the attributes and all the validity of truth itself. Above all, if it brings results which are not entirely desirable, the last thing he must ever do is to say, "I told you so." As a member of the committee, he bears collective responsibility for the decision taken, whether or not he opposed it before its adoption. In the form that it finally emerges from the resolution of the committee, it must enter into his psychology and it must replace any feelings he may previously have held on the subject in question. It may seem difficult for Western minds to envisage this mental evolution. But they may rest assured that it is not a difficult one for the Russian to encompass. In most cases, he finds it relatively easy to assume that the wisdom of the committee was greater than his own wisdom—particularly because he usually suspects that the final decision of the committee may have been the result of mysterious suggestions from on high of which he himself was not entirely aware. That would apply everywhere up to the inner circle of the Politburo itself. And it is not certain that even the men in the immediate environment of Stalin are always sure that they know exactly why Stalin favored one decision or another and that there was not some mysterious reason beyond their ken which impelled him to such a position. It is part of Stalin's technique to keep everyone guessing as to the real background of his decisions.

But with this heavy responsibility which the individual Party committee member bears to the decision of his collective body, there goes a corresponding privilege for which he may be sincerely envied by anyone who works in the more individualistic atmosphere of Western government. This is the happy—and psychologically healthy—privilege of feeling no worry about that which has been done, and of being free to direct attention solely to the problems of the future. If the decision, collectively taken, turns out to be unfortunate, even though the individual may have supported it prior to its adoption, he bears no greater individual responsibility than anyone else if it turns out to have unfortunate consequences. The collective principle absolves his political conscience as a confession might absolve the personal conscience. If his is a subordinate Party body and if the decision is later found by higher authority to have been unwise, then there is indeed a possibility that the collective body as a whole may be made to answer for what is declared to be an error. But most decisions on foreign affairs are taken in the Political Bureau itself, and here, in the highest organ of Soviet power, no mistakes are ever made. The Politburo is infallible. The men who participate in its deliberations may sleep the sleep of the just and upright. No decision which they take will ever turn out to have been wrong.

Now, this is of course not to say that the members of the Politburo do not in reality make mistakes, and very serious mistakes at that. The principle that "to err is human" applies in the olympian spheres of the Kremlin in only slightly less degree—if any at all—than elsewhere. But such mistakes are never recognized for what they are. If things go wrong, the worst that can happen is that the members of the Politburo may have to face the fact that "the situation has changed" and that a new directive is in order. They may then proceed to evolve the new directive in a spirit of complacent good conscience. The fact that unfortunate events have followed their previous decision need not be to them a source of personal embarrassment or humiliation. This is important to remember, for it goes far to explain how Soviet policy, after a long spell of almost ferocious insistence on a certain line of policy, can suddenly, without explanation and with no apparent ill humor, depart from such insistence and strike out on a new and much more conciliatory line, even when this appears to involve an outward loss of face for the Soviet Government. We see here a reflection of the mechanical impersonality which pervades the whole Soviet regime and the fact that personal dignity and personal prestige play by no means the same part in important decisions of policy as they do elsewhere.

In consequence, then, of the internal disciplinary rules of the Communist Party, we have a situation in which Soviet officials find themselves obliged to defend with fanatical obstinacy and loyalty any policy position which has been evolved by the competent collective organs of the Communist Party. Their views on the subjects covered by these decisions cannot be altered by the reasoned arguments or personal persuasiveness of individual representatives of other states; and in no event would the Soviet statesman be at liberty to cite such arguments or such persuasiveness in support of a more moderate and reasonable policy on the part of his government. The only argument with which a change of policy may be invoked in the councils of the Communist Party is an argument based squarely on the interests of the Party and of the Soviet Union, in the most narrow interpretation. But on the other hand, we see that when it can be demonstrated within the Party that a given line of policy has proved unfavorable to the interests of the Soviet Union, the disciplinary rules of the Party permit the organization to adjust itself to that situation with relative ease and good cheer and without personal embarrassment or humiliation to any of its members. In this way we obtain that curious mixture of outward obstinacy and inward flexibility which characterizes the Soviet approach to international affairs and understanding of which is basic to an appreciation of Soviet diplomacy and its significance for the future.

CONCLUSION

> I am perhaps the most guilty of all; I have perhaps treated you too harshly from the beginning; perhaps I have, by my excessive suspiciousness, repelled those who sincerely wished to be useful to me. But if these latter really loved justice and the good of their country, they should not have taken offense even at the arrogance of my treatment of them, they should have conquered their own vanity and sacrificed their own egoes. I could not have failed to notice their self-sacrifice and their high devotion to all

> that is good, and I could not have failed to accept in the end their useful and intelligent advice.
>
> Gogol, *Dead Souls*

The factors discussed above do not exhaust the list of those which bear on the psychology of the Soviet Government as a member of the world community of nations. But their importance in this respect is so great that from them there emerges a reasonably clear pattern of the foreign political personality of the Soviet regime. We are dealing here with a political entity animated primarily by the desire to assure the security of its own internal political power. History and environment impel it to seek such security in the pursuit of military-industrial autarchy and in the maintenance of a great internal apparatus of repression. The impossibility of admitting the real reason for the maintenance of this apparatus of repression and the necessity of justifying its inevitable excesses by references to evil forces beyond the scope of Soviet power compel the Kremlin to cling desperately to certain basic features of the ideology which is described in Moscow as Marxism-Leninism.

This is an ideology which coincides closely with deep-seated national traditions of thought. It requires that the relations between Russia and the outside world be treated rather as the relations between hostile powers which are in a state of armistice than as the relations between friendly international neighbors. It affects strongly—and must continue to affect—the vision, the language, and the method of Russian Communism. It means that the pressure of Russia on the outside world, in the sense of militant and persistent efforts toward the acquisition of a maximum of power with a minimum of responsibility, must be expected to continue for a long time to come. By the same token, the outward aspects of Russia's relations with other countries cannot be expected to attain during this period anything resembling even that modicum of cordiality and ease of association which usually prevails in the relations between great states. Relations will continue to be marked by a series of disturbing and irritating features which flow inevitably from such a philosophy of basic antagonism and intolerance. But all this should not blind us to the fact that the functioning of the Soviet system allows, in its impersonal and mechanical way, a wide latitude of basic flexibility—a flexibility little hampered by the usual strictures of personal vanity and prestige.

Where the cautious eye of the Kremlin sees itself confronted with superior force it records this fact realistically and without indignation and sets about to adjust its tactics and, if necessary, its strategy to this new state of affairs. In such a situation, the dictates of Soviet conscience are satisfied and the men who bear the responsibility of decision can truthfully say to themselves and to their skeptical associates that they have gone as far as the interests of the Soviet cause permitted them to go at that particular juncture. But the vigilance of their own consciences and—more important still—of their jealous rivals within the Party is there to assure that they do not stop short of that point; and foreigners who urge them to do so are wasting their breath.

The problem of meeting the Kremlin in international affairs therefore boils down to this: Its inherent expansive tendencies must be firmly contained at all times by counter-pressure which makes it constantly evident that attempts to break through this containment would be detrimental to *Soviet* interests. The irritating by-products of an ideology indispensable to the Soviet regime for internal reasons must not be allowed to become the cause of hysterical alarm or of tragic despair among those abroad who are working toward a happier association of the Russian people with the world community of nations. The United States, in particular, must demonstrate by its own self-confidence and patience, but particularly by the integrity and dignity of its example, that the true glory of Russian national effort can find its expression only in peaceful and friendly association with other peoples and not in attempts to subjugate and dominate those peoples. Such an attitude on the part of this country would have with it the deepest logic of history; and in the long run it could not fail to carry conviction and to find reflection in the development of Russia's internal political life and, accordingly, in the Soviet concept of Russia's place in international affairs.

George Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* ***(1954), pp. 63-70***

III. The Problem of Soviet Power

We now come to the second of those planes of international reality which I mentioned in the first of these lectures. In doing so we find ourselves face to face with something which is not only the greatest and most urgent and most complex of our present problems of national policy but represents unquestionably the greatest test of statesmanship that our country has ever faced. I am referring here to the problem of Soviet power.

This is too vast a subject for any comprehensive and reasoned analysis in a single evening. All I can hope to do is to remind you of some facts about the problem that seem to me worth bearing in mind, and then to make a few general comments on the most widely discussed concepts as to how we might deal with it.

The first fact to which I should like to invite attention is a geopolitical one, important to all thinking about the Soviet problem. It is this. In a day when large-scale warfare has become a matter of highly complicated and expensive weapons and of central control over great masses of manpower, military strength on a major scale, and particularly strength of an amphibious nature, capable of reaching our homeland and disputing our power within it, can be produced only in a limited number of parts of the globe: in those regions where major industrial power, enjoying adequate access to raw materials, is combined with large reserves of educated and technically skilled manpower. Our own North American community constitutes one such center of military-industrial strength. There are only four others in the world. They are all in the Northern Hemisphere. Two of them, England and Japan, lie off the shores of the Eurasian land mass and belong to the insular and maritime portion of the globe, of which we Americans are also a part. The other two have their seat in the interior of the Eurasian land mass. One of these last two is made up of Germany and the industrial regions immediately contiguous to Germany—the Rhineland, Silesia, Bohemia, and Austria. It is dependent largely on the metallurgical resources of the Rhine Valley, Silesia, and the Alps. The other is represented by the Soviet Union proper, and is similarly dependent on the association of the coal of the Donets Basin and western Siberia with the iron ore and light metals of the Urals and the energetics resources of the Volga-Caspian Basin. I repeat, nowhere outside these five areas can military-industrial strength be produced in this world today on what we might call the grand scale.

One of the happy circumstances of our life is that whatever may be our differences with Britain, her people are thoroughly conscious, I am sure, of the

manner in which fate has bound their security with ours. What we are concerned with here, fortunately, is not just Britain as an island, but Britain as the nucleus of a great political and economic system, worldwide in its ramifications, and sharing in overwhelming degree our own world interests. Surely, with any reasonable degree of good will and understanding, we need never fear that Britain will be our enemy. I earnestly hope that a similar situation now prevails with respect to the Japanese, whose geographic situation in the Pacific is analogous to that of the British in the Atlantic. I think we have grounds for such a hope.

That leaves the relationship between Germany and Russia at the heart of our security problem, in the physical sense.

This, I repeat, is a crude concept. There are many qualifying elements in any such simple breakdown of our world security problem. It does not mean that other parts of the world are not important. They are, for various weighty reasons. But it does mean that the danger of Soviet expansionism is not always the same everywhere, regardless of geographic locale. China, for example, is not one of these five key areas; her resources do not nearly come up to this class. And it means that the heart of our problem is to prevent the gathering together of the military-industrial potential of the entire Eurasian land mass under a single power threatening to the interests of the insular and maritime portions of the globe.

The second fact I wish to note has to do with the physical and military power of the Soviet regime. Prior to 1939 the military strength of Russia, while formidable in certain areas and for certain purposes, was not of such a nature that it appeared as any great immediate threat to the security of central and western Europe. If today that can no longer be said, this is something that must be attributed primarily to the fact that the Soviets have come into control of the physical and technical and manpower resources of the Baltic states, of eastern Germany, and of the satellite countries of eastern Europe.

This development has altered the relationship of Russian strength to central and western European strength in two ways. In the positive sense it has directly enhanced, and quite considerably so, the technological and industrial foundations of Soviet military strength, by adding to it many of the resources of these other countries. In the negative sense it has made more difficult the restoration of any countervailing strength in western and central Europe. These military and political positions in the heart of central Europe and in the Manchurian-Korean area, gained by the Russians through their military advance at the end of the war, gave the Kremlin actual control over a portion of the resources required for any full restoration of German and Japanese power, and thus placed it in a favorable position to hamper and delay the re-growth of that power. In addition—and this is a fact of greatest importance—the occupation of eastern Germany has given to the Soviet Union an area of

military deployment in the heart of Europe that serves to overcome the barrier of communications-poor territory from Narva to Bessarabia behind which the main Russian forces were confined before 1939, and which constituted one of the main defenses of central and western Europe.

The result has been that the balance of power in Europe and Asia in conventional weapons has been greatly and seriously altered to Russia's advantage. How much China has affected this, I do not know. For that reason I have not included China in the calculation. Naturally, her political association with the Soviet Union has brought many advantages to the Kremlin. The use of the Chinese as puppet forces to assume the burden of opposing us on the Korean Peninsula was only the most conspicuous of these. But it also has brought many disadvantages. China is distinctly a resources-poor country. In the long run she will be in many ways a drain on the industrial resources of the Soviet Union. How the pluses and minuses will finally tot up, I simply do not know. I would warn against all sweeping assumptions on this score.

This leaves us with the conclusion that so far as military potential is concerned, the inordinate position of relative strength recently enjoyed by Russia has been largely the result of the temporary prostration of Germany and Japan in consequence of the recent World War, and the accretions to the Soviet military orbit which came about through the course of military operations in the final phases of the war.

The next fact we must note is the congenital and deep-seated hostility of the Soviet regime to the older and larger countries of the western world, and particularly to the United States. There has been much argument as to what caused this hostility: whether it was a preconception of the communist movement or whether it was something provoked by western policies toward the Soviet regime in the years of its infancy. Actually, both factors enter in, but the more important of the two has been by far the ideological prejudice entertained by the Soviet leaders long before they seized power in Petrograd in 1917. If there is anyone who doubts the accuracy of this judgment, I would suggest he read the pronouncements of the Soviet leaders during the period just before and after their accession to power in 1917.

Later the responsibilities of power began to render it convenient for the Soviet leaders to have an external enemy by whose menacing presence their own excesses and cruelties could be explained and justified. In the 'thirties they actually had such an enemy—two of them, in fact: the Germans and the Japanese—both quite genuine, so genuine that they served with some degree of plausibility as excuses for the bloody purges that marked the middle of that decade. But when World War II eliminated these real enemies, a fictitious one had to be found, and we were it.

We had every qualification for being cast in such a role. By our insistence on remaining in Germany and Austria and controlling Japan, by stiffening Europe

with Marshall Plan aid, and by defending the political integrity of South Korea, we prevented that complete sweep of dominant Soviet influence over Europe and Asia which was Stalin's initial postwar hope. By keeping freedom alive in the immediate proximity of the Soviet-occupied areas, we complicated the consolidation of communist control there and maintained, in effect, a constant threat to the security of Soviet power. For there is no influence more dangerous and disruptive to the totalitarian state than the knowledge on the part of its subjects that somewhere else in the world there still is such a thing as freedom, and the faint, stubborn hope that they, too, might some day enjoy it.

For all these reasons we must recognize Soviet hostility as something reflecting a deep historical and political logic; and we must not be moved by the silly suggestions, recurring from time to time in western opinion, that this hostility might easily be made to disappear if some of our statesmen were to make themselves personally agreeable to the Soviet leaders. This is a hostility that will not be caused to disappear by either the cocktail or the vodka glass.

The existence of this hostility often leads people to hasty and erroneous conclusions as to Soviet intentions. Here we must be careful to avoid confusion. Hostility is one thing; intentions another.

As many of you already know, I have never seen any evidence that the Soviet leaders have at any time since World War II (or before, for that matter) desired a general war between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist powers, or looked to such a war as a likely means of achieving their objectives. I believe they have considered that a general war of this sort, even if successful in the initial military stages, would be too risky, too expensive, and would involve too much in the way of sudden assumption of inordinate political responsibility over conquered areas to be a hopeful device of Soviet policy. The Soviet leaders are not like many of us; they do not suppose that military victory solves all problems; they know that it is only a beginning and not an end.

Their ideology *does* tell them, however, that the capitalist powers, and above all the United States, will eventually be inclined to seek a war with the Soviet Union as a way out of the political frustrations and difficulties to which capitalism is supposed to be subjected in ever-increasing degree. They think, in other words, that we will be driven by the logic of our social system to *want* a war with them, and to seek it to the best of our ability, within the limits of normal political and military prudence.

But they comfort themselves with two reflections. So far as the nightmarish possibilities of atomic weapons are concerned, they believe these can be, and may well be, cancelled out by the prospect of retaliation. In other words, they doubt that these weapons will ever be used. Secondly, they feel that before we can arrive at the point where a preventive war would be a realistic possibility for us, we will be decisively weakened by what they call the "contradictions" of the capitalistic world. By this they mean every sort of internal division and difference within the western family itself. These internal difficulties will, they hope, make it impossible in practice for us to launch the war we might abstractedly desire. And these difficulties can, they feel, be intensified by clever tactics and propaganda from the communist side.

Of all the hopes in the Soviet breast, the most businesslike and serious ones, the ones most formidable to us, center around this prospect for sowing disunity everywhere in the western camp, and particularly in every relationship that has anything to do with western strength. That means disunity within our own country as between classes, and races, and outlooks. It means disunity between ourselves and our allies. It means the disruption of the confidence of others in us, of our confidence in others. It means, above all, the disruption of our confidence in ourselves. Here—not in elaborate blueprints and timetables of military conquest, but in hopes for the demoralization and disintegration of our world—lies the thing that we are really entitled to describe as the major Soviet design.

It is here, of course, that the foreign communist parties come in. I think it important to recognize and to bear in mind their allotted role in the Soviet scheme of things. Ever since its inception, the Soviet regime has had, in the form of the communist parties and communist stooge groups in various other countries, an arsenal of political weapons which it could use as supplementary instruments for the achievement of its policy aims. It is important to note that in no instance did the Soviet leaders themselves actually create the basic circumstances that made possible the existence and effectiveness of these weapons. It may be said of the non-communist world, in Asia as in Europe, that it was in part ripe to be abused and exploited in the way that Moscow abuses and exploits it. It had illnesses which provided the opportunities for the bacilli of communist destruction. In Europe the illness consisted of the weariness and bewilderment of the peoples following two phenomenally destructive world wars, of the unsettling effects of technological change on a mellow and tradition-bound civilization, and finally of the fact that modern democracy is by nature vulnerable to having exploited against it the very liberties and privileges by which it lives. In Asia the illness lay in the development of the colonial problem, in the general social unrest, and above all in the receptiveness of millions of people to ideological clichés that promised them, at one and the same time, an alternative to the acceptance of the hated ideologies of the western capitalist powers and a sort of a magic short-cut to the coveted emoluments of industrial and material progress. Everywhere, and at all times, communist success has been mainly a function, almost an automatic function, of weakness, illness, and irrealism elsewhere.

Fortunately there seem to have been limits almost everywhere to the sort of weakness that did constitute an invitation to communism. One of the most striking things about the whole phenomenon of international,

Moscow-controlled communism has been the minor degree of political success it has generally enjoyed. I know of no country in the world where the communists have ever been supported by a real electoral majority. I believe the highest vote they ever got was a 38 percent vote in Czechoslovakia. In most countries with any reasonable degree of political health, the number of their followers generally rarely exceeds five or six percent. This percentage undoubtedly represents in large part a certain margin of human nature, so constituted that it lends itself congenitally to exploitation by outside forces against the society of which it is a part. Where communism has assumed larger dimensions, as today in France and Italy, this has been the result of deep-seated internal maladjustments from which the communists have simply been able to profit, mostly through their ruthless and effective organizational talents. It has not been, or at least it has been in only very minor degree, the reflection of any success of communist ideas *per se*. The belief, frequently expressed in this country, that there has been in recent years some sort of a triumph of Soviet propaganda is simply devoid of substance. The fact is that the ideological attraction of Soviet communism has declined generally since the mid-'thirties. Its ideas have been increasingly exposed as the postulates of an extremely crude and rigid pseudo-science, outdated in its terms of reference, plainly wrong in its most important assumptions, overtaken everywhere by the real course of events. The prestige of Soviet power has come increasingly to rest simply on its ruthless organizational efficiency, its rigid discipline, and the impressive quality of its military posture. But these are not the same thing as ideas.

In addition to this, we must remember that in many instances the preservation of the disciplinary bonds by which these groups of foreign communists have been held in subjection by Moscow has depended precisely on their remaining what they were: weak opposition groups, with very little real indigenous support, extensively dependent on inspiration, encouragement, and disciplinary stiffening from without. Moscow has long recognized this, and has realized that if these parties were to grow into majority parties, or anything like it, and then actually to come into power in their respective countries, their dependence on Moscow would be greatly reduced and Tito-ism, in one form or another, would become a virtual inevitability everywhere except under the direct shadow of Soviet military power.

For this reason it is quite erroneous to assume that what Moscow is after is to have all these foreign communist parties seize power at the earliest possible moment. The effect of this would probably be only to see many of them lost as political instruments of the Kremlin. But Moscow desires to retain them as instruments. It wants to use them for the reduction of competing political strength, for the sowing of discord and distrust among other countries, for the weakening of political

and military potential elsewhere, for the sabotaging of resistance to the Kremlin's own foreign policies.

In the light of this fact it is interesting to note that, with the single exception of China, nowhere in the world has there actually been any spread of communist power in the last thirty years, other than in areas where it was installed by Soviet bayonets and where the Soviet military power could continue, with ease and convenience, to breathe down its neck. The one exception, as I say, was China. And that is precisely why the relationship of China to the Kremlin today, despite all outward appearances, is an uneasy and unstable one, not fully clarified, not fully comfortable.

These, then, are the facts about Soviet power I thought we should note by way of introduction to this discussion. With these facts in mind, let us turn again to the problems of our own national policy.

You have all followed, to one degree or another, the great debate about policy toward the Soviet Union that has dominated our public discussions in these recent years. Let me attempt to summarize the nature of this debate.

We all recognize, I think, that the present bloated state of the Soviet empire represents, primarily for the geopolitical reasons I have already outlined, an unhealthy situation and a danger to everyone concerned. We all recognize that any further expansion of Soviet power would represent a still greater danger. Our differences relate only to what it is that we ought to do in the light of these two recognitions.

First, there is the difference of opinion as to where we should place our hopes for an actual reduction of Soviet power and influence: whether on the operation of natural forces within the Soviet Union or on the application of pressure from outside. That is the question of *liberation*. Secondly, there is the question as to how to prevent the process of Soviet expansion from going further. That is the question of *containment*.

Let me emphasize: these concepts are *not* alternatives, and the argument is *not* about whether one or the other is most desirable. I know of no one in our ranks, including myself, who would not like to see the area of Soviet power and influence reduced. Therefore, we are all in favor of "liberation." Conversely, I know of no one in our ranks who thinks it would be desirable that Soviet power should expand still farther. Therefore, we are all in favor of "containment." Our differences concern only the means by which each of these objectives is to be sought.

Let me turn first to the one that seems to me to afford the most dangerous possibilities for error and misjudgment—namely, liberation. And let me make myself quite plain.

The retraction of Soviet power from its present bloated and unhealthy limits is essential to the stability of world relationships. To bring it about must be a cardinal aim of western policy. But the term "liberation" can mean many things. It is one of those vague clichés

the very currency of which depends on their imprecision. And as the term is most frequently used in this country, and particularly by those who regard themselves as its strongest protagonists, it seems to me to have two main implications. First, it implies the violent overthrow of Soviet power in either all or a portion of the present Soviet orbit. Second, it implies that this overthrow should constitute an active aim of western, and particularly American, policy—that the main impulse to it, in other words, should come from without and from us, rather than from within the Soviet orbit itself.

Now I think we must recognize, first of all, that if this is what we have in mind, and if we mean it seriously—that is, if we are not just indulging in fine phrases—then we are talking about a path of policy which, if pushed far enough, would by every law of probability lead ultimately to war. The Soviet leaders are not going to dismantle their power in eastern Europe for the love of our beautiful eyes, or because we set out to huff and to puff and to blow their house in. Their power does not rest on the consent of the governed; and it is not of the sort that would be easily shaken by propaganda to the subject peoples, even if there were effective things that we could say. The very attempt to shake it by external action is exactly the thing that would make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to yield any portion of it except under the pressure of war.

You cannot expect a group of totalitarian rulers to step down from the scene of world history and to acquiesce in the destruction of their political system for the sake of the preservation of peace. These people have no future outside of their own political power. There is no place for them to go. Their chances for personal survival would be minimal if that power were really weakened. Let no one think that they could give up a portion of it by way of submission to some foreign ultimatum, and still retain the remainder, unaffected. One of the great realities of political life is the cumulative nature of all political change, the factor of momentum in human affairs, the dynamic character of all alterations in political prestige. The Soviet leaders know this; and it explains why they are sensitive about yielding anything under pressure, even at the remotest ends of their empire.

I can conceive that Soviet power will some day recede from its present exposed positions, just as it has already receded in Finland and Yugoslavia and northern Iran. But I can conceive of this happening only precisely in the event that the vital prestige of Soviet power is not too drastically and abruptly engaged in the process, in the event that the change is permitted to come gradually and inconspicuously and as the result of compulsions resident within the structure of Soviet power itself, not created externally in the form of threats or ultimata or patent intrigues from outside.

If the transition cannot be eased over in this way, then I see little likelihood of its occurring at all without leading ultimately to a general armed conflict. And I would like to emphasize that any war that might appear to be the consequence of our own policies would proceed under the gravest of disadvantages. It would bring dismay and despair to people all over the world who would like to think of themselves as our friends and to look to us for world leadership. It would almost certainly disrupt our alliances and jeopardize the enjoyment of the advantages of them, an extremely important consideration from the standpoint of the prospects for sheer military success. It would come to the Russian people, and possibly to those other peoples for whose liberation some of us are so concerned, as an appalling and unjustified injury—an injury not just to the communist leaders but to the subject peoples themselves—arousing every spark of patriotism of which they are capable, and establishing the communist authorities in the most favorable possible political position as leaders in the defense of the peoples against aggressive attack. Millions of Americans, I am sure, could take part in such a war only at the expense of the most tortured doubts as to whether this new calamity to civilization had really been necessary, whether there was really no other way to work out the problem. And all of this would be aside from the question of the destruction that might be wrought on our own American territory in the use of atomic weapons.

In addition to this, I think it necessary and pertinent to recognize that any war fought in the name of liberation could not and would not be fully successful, either militarily or politically, precisely for the reason that its aims would be too sweeping, too ambitious, and too total. People have become accustomed to saying that the day of limited wars is over. I would submit that the truth is exactly the opposite: that the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose.

Russia, let us remember, cannot be wholly occupied. No matter how successful military operations might be, there would presumably always come a point at which you would have to enter into communication with your communist adversaries again and to arrive at some sort of realistic arrangement with them. There could be no expectation, here, of "unconditional surrender" along the lines of the precedents of the last two world wars.

Even in those areas that might be "liberated," there would be the question of civil affairs, the question of some new political authority to replace the old. Are we prepared for that? Do we have such alternatives in our pocket in all conceivable cases? In the case of the Soviet Union, at any rate, I doubt that we do. And I shudder at the responsibility we would have assumed, if we were to occupy such areas, and yet had no vigorous indigenous political movement to support us. That is the position in which we found ourselves during the intervention in Russia and Siberia in 1917–18, and if there is anyone who doubts the reality of these reflections, let him read the sorry history of those ill-

conceived ventures. It is extraordinary how rarely it seems to occur to Americans that every victory is a responsibility, and that there are limits to the responsibilities we should invite upon ourselves.

The upshot of what I am saying is that in my view this Soviet problem, while a great one, is not suitably to be resolved by war. I do not mean to argue this point tonight, but I think you would all find on reflection that there is a deep general reality involved in this, and that major war, deliberately undertaken, cannot by its very nature serve effectively to promote positive and constructive aims of society. Major war can be at best the lesser of two evils, a terrible and heavy price paid in order to avoid the necessity of paying one still more terrible and still more heavy; but then it must be a defensive war, forced upon us, accepted reluctantly and with heavy heart.

I would like to be able to leave the question of war at this point, for it is a prospect from which we must learn to look away if we are to discover the true avenues for the alleviation of our problems with the Russians, but I am afraid that it cannot be left without a further word, addressed to those people who have a tendency to say: How can you stand there and talk quietly about all these things when you know that the Russians have the Bomb, and that they may at this very moment have the capacity for destroying our cities? Is there, these people ask, anything else that counts, anything else worth talking about, in this whole Soviet problem?

There is no use arguing with the premises of these people. They may exaggerate many details, but even that does not affect the main issue. Of course the day of absolute security is gone, if it was ever here. Of course other people either have it in their power today, or will have it soon, to lay waste to our cities, if the devil possesses them. I still find in all this no reason for any morbid excitement. Is there anything surprising in any of it? Did people really suppose that in a world of atomic realities we Americans could live forever in the sole possession of a sort of sorcerer's charm by which everyone else would always be inferior to us militarily and bound to defer to our will in a pinch?

The question is not what people *could* conceivably do. We are all of us, in personal life, at the mercy of crackpots, maniacs, even of wild drivers on the highways. Such security as we have in personal life rests on what people actually do, in the law of averages, rather than on what they could do. Fortunately a push-button attack on this country actually makes little more sense from the standpoint of our adversaries than would a similar attack by ourselves on someone else. It would serve no sound political purpose. It would not really assure to them the sort of quiet and cautious expansion of power that they are seeking. It would only mess things up badly in this world, for everyone concerned, themselves included.

Besides, there is always the factor of retaliation. If we retain a prudent measure of the capacity to retaliate and a reasonable dispersal of the facilities requisite thereto, there is no reason to suppose that anyone is going to find it in his interest to destroy our country out of a blue sky.

People will say: yes, but we cannot depend on this; we cannot depend on others to be sane and rational. To some small extent, of course, this is true. But I think great political regimes are apt to have quite a rational comprehension of their own most vital and immediate military interests. In the Soviet regime, in particular, I have never detected any suicidal tendencies; and I will do its leaders the justice to say that while I think them very misguided people and have no high opinion of their intentions with regard to this country, I do not suspect them of any desire to wreak upon others some fearful measure of destruction just for destruction's own sake, apart from any coherent political or social purpose. These people are not ogres; they are just badly misguided and twisted human beings, deeply involved in the predicaments that invariably attend the exercise of great power.

Of course there is danger in our contemporary world, but when has human life ever been without danger? The sort of jitters apparent in a portion of our press and public is not only unworthy of the traditions of our country, it does not even do justice to the way most of us would behave if danger were to become a reality. And the worst thing about it is that it actually increases the seriousness of our situation. If we all sit quietly in our little boat and address ourselves to the process of navigation, I doubt that it will tip over; but if we all leap up from our seats and go rushing around grabbing each other by the lapel and screaming, "Why don't you *do* something about it?" we will be on the surest way to making it capsize.

The weapons of mass destruction have to be borne in mind as one of the great and sorry realities of our day. We cannot rule out the possibility of war, for wars can arise from many constellations of circumstance; and similarly we cannot rule out the possibility that these horrible weapons may some day be used. For this contingency we must make the most realistic dispositions we can, but we must not be carried away by these dispositions to the point where we neglect the cultivation of the other possibilities. There is also the possibility that there will be no general war. And there is always the further possibility that even if there is a war, it may prove the part of prudence for us all to restrict ourselves either to the more conventional weapons or to a more conventional use of the unconventional ones. For this, too, we must be prepared. It is for this reason that I would fail to comprehend any policy that did not preserve a balance between conventional weapons and the weapons of mass destruction, and especially one that staked our world position on the power of weapons we ourselves, in the final event, might or might not find it prudent to use. The sooner we can learn to cultivate the weapons of mass destruction solely for their deterrent value, the sooner we can get away from what is called the principle of

"first use" of such weapons, the sooner we can free ourselves from the false mathematics involved in the assumption that security is a matter of the number of people you can kill with a single weapon, the better off, in my opinion, we will be.

So much for liberation, for preventative war, and for the atomic bomb. We are left, as usual, with the other side of our problem, the old and familiar side which many people find it so distasteful to talk about: the side of "containment." There seems to be a theory, especially since the Korean war, that this is a matter of preventing armies from crossing frontiers for aggressive purposes. I find little to substantiate this view. Certainly in every immediate sense it is a matter of preventing other peoples from committing the naive and fateful folly of permitting the reins of government to be seized within their respective countries by elements that accept the disciplinary authority of Moscow. And this, as you will readily perceive, is not primarily a matter of Soviet policy but a matter of policy for the non-communist peoples themselves.

I recognize that what I am saying is precisely the opposite of another view which would hold Moscow formally responsible for all communist activity everywhere, and punishable for every attempt of a communist minority to seize power. I am sorry to have to say that I do not think that things are quite this simple. I pointed out earlier that communist penetration in the non-communist world is not solely a matter of Soviet initiative or support, but contains a very important component of local origin, in the weaknesses and illnesses of a given society. Moreover, Soviet officials have a point when they remind us that they do not challenge the right of any other government to deal as it will with its communist minority, and do not protest diplomatically when such minorities are treated sternly and rendered ineffective through police action. The literal physical destruction of the German communist party by Hitler in the 'thirties was not only *not* the subject of any diplomatic protests from Moscow to Berlin, but was actually accompanied by a series of diplomatic approaches from the Soviet side that led eventually to the amiable arrangement of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Thus Moscow does not dispute the right of others to take whatever steps they wish to take in order to control their own communist elements. But where they are unwilling to take those steps, Moscow is not prepared to do it for them. Nor can the Moscow leaders properly be expected to see to it that their views never, by any chance, commend themselves to people elsewhere.

I realize full well that this is not all there is to it: that there are training schools for subversion behind the Iron Curtain, that there is conspiracy, that there are secret agents and spies, and all of this to no good purpose. But underlying all this, and making it all possible, is the fact that there are great areas of softness and vulnerability in the non-communist world, areas which it lies wholly in the competence of non-communist authority to remove. If certain of these areas

could be removed, there would be, I think, no further expansion of Soviet power. If they are not removed, our fortunes—the fortunes of all people who look for a continued unfolding of the process of civilization and for a continued growth in the dignity of the human spirit—are unquestionably going to suffer. But we cannot look to Moscow, which did not create these soft spots, to remove them. Our problem is not that simple. We will have to continue to search for other solutions.

Thus the problem of containment is basically a problem of the reactions of people within the non-communist world. It is true that this condition depends upon the maintenance by ourselves and our allies, at all times, of an adequate defense posture, designed to guard against misunderstandings and to give confidence and encouragement to the weak and the fainthearted. But so long as that posture is maintained, the things that need most to be done to prevent the further expansion of Soviet power are not, so far as we are concerned, things we can do directly in our relations with the Soviet Government; they are things we must do in our relations with the peoples of the non-communist world.

On the other hand—and this is the final thought I would like to leave in your minds this evening—it is my belief that these very same things are precisely the most useful things we can do in the interest of the eventual greater freedom of the peoples now behind the Curtain. Whatever we do that serves to bring hope and encouragement and self-confidence to peoples outside the Soviet orbit has a similar effect on the peoples inside, and constitutes the most potent sort of argument for prudence and reasonableness on the part of the Soviet leaders. To the extent we are able to realize this, we will understand that containment and liberation are only two sides of the same coin, and both part of a greater problem—the problem of how the behavior of this nation is to be so shaped as to command the hope and confidence of all those who wish us well and the respect of all those who do not, whichever side of the Curtain they may be on.

Permit me now to say a few words in conclusion. I fear that the points I have touched on this evening may have seemed disjointed and without relation to each other, but I think that if stacked up side by side they do constitute a way of looking at the Soviet problem, and one which is not quite so depressing as some of the others now current in our country. Let me recapitulate them.

Soviet hostility to us is bitter and deep, but it does not mean that the Soviet leaders want war.

The communist parties in the free countries are a nuisance and an impertinence, but they are largely a reflection of weakness within those countries themselves and they need not represent a mortal danger to any country that wishes to keep its own house in order.

The weapons of mass destruction are a sad and dangerous fact of our contemporary life, but they need not necessarily ever be used.

The geographic over-extension of Soviet power is a serious and unhealthy anomaly, and needs desperately to be remedied, but there is no sudden and drastic and direct way of seeking to remedy it that would not draw down upon us all, friends, enemies, and Americans alike, new miseries and confusions far worse than those we would be concerned to overcome.

In all of this I see no reason for jitters, for panic, or for melodramatic actions. I do see reasons for hard work, for sober thinking, for a great deliberateness of statesmanship, for a high degree of national self-discipline, and for the cultivation of an atmosphere of unity and mutual confidence among our own people.

The greatest danger presented to us by Soviet policy is still its attempt to promote internecine division and conflict within our system of alliances and within our own body politic. But this is something we have it in our power to counteract by the quality of our leadership and the tone of our own national life generally. If these were what they should be, they would radiate themselves to the world at large, and the warmth of that radiation would not only represent the best means of frustrating the design for further Soviet expansion—it would also be the best means of helping the peoples behind the Iron Curtain to recover their freedom. For you will all recall the Aesopian fable about the competition between the Sun and the North Wind to see which of them could make the traveler remove his cloak. Well, the traveler is the phenomenon of Soviet power. The cloak is that zone of inordinate power and influence in eastern Europe and elsewhere with which it has tried to shelter its own inner sanctum. And you will all recall that it was not by the direct huffing and puffing of the North Wind, but by the gentle indirection of the Sun that the stubborn traveler was at last induced to remove his cloak.

George Kennan, "Diplomacy in the Modern World," in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (1951), pp. 78-89

VI

DIPLOMACY IN THE MODERN WORLD

THESE lectures were designed as historical exercises, as contributions to the analysis of past events in the field of American diplomacy; and normally they might have been permitted to stand as such. But the background of current events against which they have been given has been so absorbing, and your own preoccupation with these events so obvious and understandable, that I know you will feel that what I have said has not been given its maximum usefulness if I do not add a word about its relevance to our problems of today.

Before I do this, there is one more thing I would like to say about the past. I fear that the impression I have given you of our past performance in the diplomatic field may have been a darker and gloomier one than is really in my mind. I ought to record, I think, my own recognition that the annals of American diplomacy in this half-century contain many positive aspects as well as negative ones. Let us remember that for us this has been a period of tremendous and most trying transition. We entered upon it with the concepts and methods of a small neutral nation. I know this approach well. I have seen it in some of the foreign offices of other countries where I have been privileged to do business on behalf of our government. It is an approach which I like and respect, and for which I must confess a certain nostalgia. It can have in it, and usually does, great quality and dignity. The Department of State as it existed at the turn of the century, and as it still was in large measure in the 1920's when I entered it, was a quaint old place, with its law-office atmosphere, its cool dark corridors, its swinging doors, its brass cuspidors, its black leather rocking chairs, and the grandfather's clock in the Secretary of State's office. There was a real old-fashioned dignity and simplicity about it. It was staffed in those earlier days by professional personnel some of whom were men of great experience and competence. And it was headed more often than otherwise by Americans of genuine stature and quality.

I should be most unhappy if anything said in these lectures should seem a mark of disrespect for such men as John Hay, Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes, or Henry Stimson. These men embodied that pattern of integrity of mind and spirit, moderation and delicacy of character, irreproachable loyalty in personal relations, modesty of person combined with dignity of office, and kindliness and generosity in the approach to all who were weaker and more dependent, which constitutes, it seems to me, our finest contribution to the variety of the human species in this world and comes closest to embodying our national ideal and genius. They were men so measured and prudent in their judgment of others, so careful to reserve that judgment until they felt they had the facts, so well aware of the danger of inadequate evidence and hasty conclusion, that we would be making ourselves ridiculous if we were to attend their memories and the evidences of their handiwork in any other spirit.

We are another generation, and we cannot be fully the judges either of the demands which faced our elders or of the adequacy of their responses. For the performance of these men in public office I can feel only the sort of sympathy and admiration which one felt for the struggles and works of one's own father, coupled with the invariable conviction of children everywhere that there were features of the modern world which Father understood very poorly and we children understood much better. And if, today, we think we see blind spots or weak spots in their approaches to foreign policy, we would do well to remember what Gibbon said of the great Byzantine general, Belisarius: "His imperfections flowed from the contagion of the times: his virtues were his own."

But, notwithstanding all this, it is clear that there has been in the past a very significant gap between challenge and response in our conduct of foreign policy; that this gap still exists; and that, whereas fifty years ago it was not very dangerous to us, today it puts us in grave peril. We can afford no complacency about these things in the year 1951, and we have no choice but to face up unsparingly to our weaknesses.

I think you have seen quite clearly from the earlier lectures what I hold these weaknesses to be. I do not need to recapitulate them in any great detail. They are ones which relate both to machinery and to concept—both to means and to objectives.

On the question of the machinery of government, we have seen that a good deal of our trouble seems to have stemmed from the extent to which the executive has felt itself beholden to short-term trends of public opinion in the country and from what we might call the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions. I would like to emphasize that I do not consider public reaction to foreign-policy questions to be erratic and undependable over the long term; but I think the record indicates that in the short term our public opinion, or what passes for our public opinion in the thinking of official Washington, can be easily led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make it a poor and inadequate guide for national action.

What can we do about this?

As one who has occupied himself professionally with foreign affairs for a quarter of a century, I cannot refrain from saying that I firmly believe that we could make much more effective use of the principle of professionalism in the conduct of foreign policy; that we could, if we wished, develop a corps of professional officers superior to anything that exists or ever has existed in this field; and that, by treating these men with respect and drawing on their insight and experience, we could help ourselves considerably. However, I am quite prepared to recognize that this runs counter to strong prejudices and preconceptions in sections of our public mind, particularly in Congress and the press, and that for this reason we are probably condemned to continue relying almost exclusively on what we might call "diplomacy by dilettantism."

That being the case, we still have with us, in what is obviously a very acute form, the problem of the machinery for decision-making and for the implementation of policy in our government. Whatever else may be said about these facilities to date, it can hardly be said that they are distinguished by such things as privacy, deliberateness, or the long-term approach. The difficulties we encounter here are so plain to all of you at this moment that I shall not attempt to adumbrate them. The subject of their correction is an extremely complex one, involving many facets of governmental organization and method. There are those who feel that these difficulties can be satisfactorily disposed of within our present constitutional framework and that they are simply a question of proper personal leadership in government. There are others who doubt that the problem is soluble without constitutional reform—reform which would give us a parliamentary system more nearly like that which exists in England and most other parliamentary countries, a system in which a government falls if it loses the confidence of its parliament, and in which there is opportunity to consult the people on the great issues and at the crucial moments and to adjust governmental responsibilities in accordance with the people's decision.

I must say that if I had any doubts before as to whether it is this that our country requires, those doubts have been pretty well resolved in my mind by the events of the past weeks and months. I find it hard to see how we can live up to our responsibilities as a great power unless we are able to resolve, in a manner better than we have done recently, the great challenges to the soundness of government policy and to the claim of an administration to speak for the mass of the people in foreign affairs.

Here again, I am afraid, the chances of change in the direction I have indicated are so slight that we must dismiss the possibility as one that might have any particular relevance to our present problems.

This leaves us substantially with the question of concept. This is the field in which the scholar's voice can be most useful, and for which it seems to me that this examination of the past yields the most instructive results.

As you have no doubt surmised, I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years. It has in it something of the old emphasis on arbitration treaties, something of the Hague Conferences and schemes for universal disarmament, something of the more ambitious American concepts of the role of international law, something of the League of Nations and the United Nations, something of the Kellogg Pact, something of the idea of a universal "Article 51" past, something of the belief in World Law and World Government. But it is none of these, entirely. Let me try to describe it.

It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. This belief undoubtedly represents in part an attempt to transpose the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual law into the international field and to make it applicable to governments as it is applicable here at home to individuals. It must also stem in part from the memory of the origin of our own political system—from the recollection that we were able, through acceptance of a common institutional and juridical framework, to reduce to harmless dimensions the conflicts of interest and aspiration among the original thirteen colonies and to bring them all into an ordered and peaceful relationship with one another. Remembering this, people are unable to understand that what might have been possible for the thirteen colonies in a given set of circumstances might not be possible in the wider international field.

It is the essence of this belief that, instead of taking the awkward conflicts of national interest and dealing with them on their merits with a view to finding the solutions least unsettling to the stability of international life, it would be better to find some formal criteria of a juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of states could be defined. There would then be judicial entities competent to measure the actions of governments against these criteria and to decide when their behavior was acceptable and when unacceptable. Behind all this, of course, lies the American assumption that the things for which other peoples in this world are apt to contend are for the most part neither creditable nor important and might justly be expected to take second place behind the desirability of an orderly world, untroubled by international violence. To the American mind, it is implausible that people should have positive aspirations, and ones that they regard as legitimate, more important to them than the peacefulness and orderliness of international life. From this standpoint, it is not apparent why other people should not join us in accepting the rules of the game in international politics, just as we accept such rules in the competition of sport in order that the game may not become too cruel and too destructive and may not assume an importance we did not mean it to have.

If they were to do this, the reasoning runs, then the troublesome and chaotic manifestations of the national ego could be contained and rendered either unsubstantial or subject to easy disposal by some method familiar and comprehensible to our American usage. Departing from this background, the mind of American statesmanship, stemming as it does in so large a part from the legal profession in our country, gropes with unfailing persistence for some institutional framework which would be capable of fulfilling this function.

I cannot undertake in this short lecture to deal exhaustively with this thesis or to point out all the elements of unsoundness which I feel it contains. But some of its more outstanding weaknesses are worthy of mention.

In the first place, the idea of the subordination of a large number of states to an international juridical regime, limiting their possibilities for aggression and injury to other states, implies that these are all states like our own, reasonably content with their international borders and status, at least to the extent that they would be willing to refrain from pressing for change without international agreement. Actually, this has generally been true only of a portion of international society. We tend to underestimate the violence of national maladjustments and discontents elsewhere in the world if we think that they would always appear to other people as less important than the preservation of the juridical tidiness of international life.

Second, while this concept is often associated with a revolt against nationalism, it is a curious thing that it actually tends to confer upon the concept of nationality and national sovereignty an absolute value it did not have before. The very principle of "one government, one vote," regardless of physical or political differences between states, glorifies the concept of national sovereignty and makes it the exclusive form of participation in international life. It envisages a world composed exclusively of sovereign national states with a full equality of status. In doing this, it ignores the tremendous variations in the firmness and soundness of national divisions: the fact that the origins of state borders and national personalities were in many instances fortuitous or at least poorly related to realities. It also ignores the law of change. The national state pattern is not, should not be, and cannot be a fixed and static thing. By nature, it is an unstable phenomenon in a constant state of change and flux. History has shown that the will and the capacity of individual peoples to contribute to their world environment is constantly changing. It is only logical that the organizational forms (and what else are such things as borders and governments?) should change with them. The function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit this process of change by imposing a legal strait jacket upon it but rather to facilitate it; to ease its transitions, to temper the asperities to which it often leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which it gives rise, and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for international life in general. But this is a task for diplomacy, in the most old-fashioned sense of the term. For this, law is too abstract, too inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the unpredictable and the unexpected.

By the same token, the American concept of world law ignores those means of international offense—those means of the projection of power and coercion over other peoples—which by-pass institutional forms entirely or even exploit them against themselves: such things as ideological attack, intimidation, penetration, and disguised seizure of the institutional paraphernalia of national sovereignty. It ignores, in other words, the device of the puppet state and the set of techniques by which states can be converted into puppets with no formal violation of, or challenge to, the outward attributes of their sovereignty and their independence.

This is one of the things that have caused the peoples of the satellite countries of eastern Europe to look with a certain tinge of bitterness on the United Nations. The organization failed so completely to save them from domination by a great neighboring country, a domination no less invidious by virtue of the fact that it came into being by processes we could not call "aggression." And there is indeed some justification for their feeling, because the legalistic approach to international affairs ignores in general the international significance of political problems and the deeper sources of international instability. It assumes that civil wars will remain civil and not grow into international wars. It assumes the ability of each people to solve its own internal political problems in a manner not provocative of its international environment. It assumes that each nation will always be able to construct a government qualified to speak for it and cast its vote in the international arena and that this government will be acceptable to the rest of the international community in this capacity. It assumes, in other words, that domestic issues will not become international issues and that the world community will not be put in the position of having to make choices between rival claimants for power within the confines of the individual state.

Finally, this legalistic approach to international relations is faulty in its assumptions concerning the possibility of sanctions against offenses and violations. In general, it looks to collective action to provide such sanction against the bad behavior of states. In doing so, it forgets the limitations on the effectiveness of military coalition. It forgets that, as a circle of military associates widens in any conceivable political-military venture, the theoretical total of available military strength may increase, but only at the cost of compactness and ease of control. And the wider a coalition becomes, the more difficult it becomes to retain political unity and general agreement on the purposes and effects of what is being done. As we are seeing in the case of Korea, joint military operations against an aggressor have a different meaning for each participant and raise specific political issues for each one which are extraneous to the action in question and affect many other facets of international life. The wider the circle of military associates, the more cumbersome the problem of political control over their actions, and the more circumscribed the least common denominator of agreement. This law of diminishing returns lies so heavily on the possibilities for multilateral military action that it makes it doubtful whether the participation of smaller states can really add very much to the ability of the great powers to assure stability of international life. And this is tremendously important, for it brings us back to the realization that even under a system of world law the sanction against destructive international behavior might continue to rest basically, as it has in the past, on the alliances and relationships among the great powers themselves. There might be a state, or perhaps more than one state, which all the rest of the world community together could not successfully coerce into following a line of action to which it was violently averse. And if this is true, where are we? It seems to me that we are right back in the realm of the forgotten art of diplomacy from which we have spent fifty years trying to escape.

These, then, are some of the theoretical deficiencies that appear to me to be inherent in the legalistic approach to international affairs. But there is a greater deficiency still that I should like to mention before I close. That is the inevitable association of legalistic ideas with moralistic ones: the carrying-over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment. Whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the law-breaker and feel a moral superiority to him. And when such indignation spills over into military contest, it knows no bounds short of the reduction of the law-breaker to the point of complete submissiveness—namely, unconditional surrender. It is a curious thing, but it is true, that the legalistic approach to world affairs, rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political stability than did the older motives of national interest. A war fought in the name of high moral principle finds no early end short of some form of total domination.

In this way, we see that the legalistic approach to international problems is closely identified with the concept of total war and total victory, and the manifestations of the one spill over only too easily into the manifestations of the other. And the concept of total war is something we would all do well to think about a little in these troubled times. This is a relatively new concept, in Western civilization at any rate. It did not really appear on the scene until World War I. It characterized both of these great world wars, and both of them—as I have pointed out—were followed by great instability and disillusionment. But it is not only a question now of the desirability of this concept; it is a question of its feasibility. Actually, I wonder whether even in the past total victory was not really an illusion from the standpoint of the victors. In a sense, there is no total victory short of genocide, unless it be a victory over the minds of men. But the total military victories are rarely victories over the minds of men. And we now face the fact that it is very questionable whether in a new global conflict there could ever be any such thing as total *military* victory. I personally do not believe that there could. There might be a great weakening of the armed forces of one side or another, but I think it out of the question that there should be such a thing as a general and formal submission of the national will on either side. The attempt to achieve this unattainable goal, however, could wreak upon civilization another set of injuries fully as serious as those caused by World War I or World War II, and I leave it to you to answer the question as to how civilization could survive them.

It was asserted not long ago by a prominent American that "war's very object is victory" and that "in war there can be no substitute for victory." Perhaps the confusion here lies in what is meant by the term "victory." Perhaps the term is actually misplaced. Perhaps there can be such a thing as "victory" in a battle, whereas in war there can be only the achievement or nonachievement of your objectives. In the old days, wartime objectives were generally limited and practical ones, and it was common to measure the success of your military operations by the extent to which they brought you closer to your objectives. But where your objectives are moral and ideological ones and run to changing the attitudes and traditions of an entire people or the personality of a regime, then victory is probably something not to be achieved entirely by military means or indeed in any short space of time at all; and perhaps that is the source of our confusion.

In any case, I am frank to say that I think there is no more dangerous delusion, none that has done us a greater disservice in the past or that threatens to do us a greater disservice in the future, than the concept of total victory. And I fear that it springs in large measure from the basic faults in the approach to international affairs which I have been discussing here. If we are to get away from it, this will not mean that we shall have to abandon our respect for international law, or our hopes for its future usefulness as the gentle civilizer of events which I mentioned in one of the earlier lectures. Nor will it mean that we have to go in for anything that can properly be termed "appeasement"—if one may use a word so cheapened and deflated by the abuse to which it has been recently subjected. But it will mean the emergence of a new attitude among us toward many things outside our borders that are irritating and unpleasant today—an attitude more like that of the doctor toward those physical phenomena in the human body that are neither pleasing nor fortunate—an attitude of detachment and soberness and readiness to reserve judgment. It will mean that we will have the modesty to admit that our own national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and understanding—and the courage to recognize that if our purposes and undertakings here at home are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national interest can never fail to be conducive to a better world. This concept is less ambitious and less inviting in its immediate prospects than those to which we have so often inclined, and

less pleasing to our image of ourselves. To many it may seem to smack of cynicism and reaction. I cannot share these doubts. Whatever is realistic in concept, and founded in an endeavor to see both ourselves and others as we really are, cannot be illiberal.

George Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (1951), pp. 106-127

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE*

I

THE very virulence with which Americans reject the outlook and practice of those who now hold power in the Kremlin implies in the strongest possible way the belief in, and desire for, an alternative—for some other Russian outlook and some other set of practices in Russia to take the place of those we know today. Yet we may be permitted to ask whether there is any clear image in our minds of what that outlook and those practices might be, and of the ways by which Americans might promote progress toward them. At the present time, in particular, when the coexistence of the two systems on the same planet has led to such immense strains and anxieties everywhere, and to so much despair of its successful continuation, there is a tendency on the part of many people to permit the image of a different and more acceptable Russia to become eclipsed by, or even identified with, the question of victory or defeat in a future war. Some Americans are already reverting, merely in contemplation of a possible war, to the American bad habit of assuming that there is something final and positive about a military decision—that it is the ending of something, and the happy ending, rather than a beginning.

There could, of course, be no greater error than this, quite apart from any consideration of the blood and sacrifice which was involved. A war against Soviet power which could be said to be relatively successful militarily (and we would do well to remember that no such war could be more than relatively successful) would in itself assure little or nothing in the way of progress toward the achievement of the sort of alternative we might wish; at the most it would only make more immediate various aspects of a problem which already exists and which every American who objects to Soviet behavior must, in consistency, have in mind anyway, war or no war. That is the problem of the kind of Russia which we would prefer to see; the kind with which we ourselves could, let us say, live easily; the kind which would permit the existence of a much more stable world order; the kind to which it would be both realistic and suitable for us to aspire.

This problem of the possibility of a different and preferable Russia is not really a question of war or peace. War in itself will not bring about such a Russia. Indeed it would be most unlikely to lead in that direction unless accompanied by many wise and strenuous efforts besides the military one. And a continued absence of major war will not preclude the coming of a different Russia. All of that depends upon a great many other things which would have to be done by a great many people, either in war or in peace. Not all of these things can be done by Americans. So far as direct action is concerned, the bulk of them cannot be. But our possibilities for influencing the outcome are significant; and we must remember that there may be times when our efforts may be capable of swinging the balance one way or the other. For that reason our own relationship to the Russian future is something worth our most strenuous thought and attention. And in our efforts to determine it, two things are of major importance: (1) that we should know what we want; and (2) that we should know how to conduct ourselves in order to facilitate, rather than to impede, the coming into being of what we want. The word "facilitate" is used advisedly; for we are dealing here with a foreign country, and our role can be at best a marginal one, supplementary to a far more important role which others must play.

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II

What sort of Russia would we like to see before us, as our partner in the world community?

Perhaps the first thing to get straight here is the sort of Russia there is no use looking for. And such a Russia—the kind we may *not* look for—is easy to describe and envisage, for it would be a capitalistic and liberal-democratic one, with institutions closely resembling those of our own republic.

If we look first at the question of the economic system, we see at once that Russia has scarcely known private enterprise as we are familiar with it in this country. Even in pre-Revolutionary times the Russian government always had a close hold on a number of economic activities, notably transportation and the armament industry, which in our country have traditionally, or at least normally, been private. There were, to be sure, in the earlier period of Russian history, distinguised families of private Russian entrepreneurs, famous for their bold commercial pioneering in the undeveloped areas of the realm. But by and large indigenous private capital remained more conspicuous in the exchange than in the production of commodities. The great domestic business was trade, rather than manufacture. And business did not stand in so high repute as in the West. There was a traditional, and deeply Russian, merchant class; but it was not generally noted or respected for breadth of outlook or for any enlightened concept of its own responsibility to society. The portrayals of it in Russian literature are generally negative and depressing. The members of the landed gentry, whose tastes and prejudices were authoritative in the social field, often looked down on business, and themselves tended to avoid participation in it. The Russian language, in fact, never acquired a word comparable to our expression "businessman"; it had only the word for "merchant," and this term did not always have a pleasant connotation.

As Russia became industrialized, in a sudden rush of activity which took place around the turn of the century, there were clearly apparent the absence of an adequate tradition of responsibility and restraint, on the part of the state and of society generally, to cope with the new strains. This industrial development, proceeding largely on a basis of individual enterprise rather than of widely distributed corporative ownership, was marked by sudden accumulations of fortunes in the hands of individuals and families not always well prepared for such affluence. Often the mode of expenditure of wealth appeared to other people as little creditable as the means by which it had been accumulated. Individual capitalists and workers lived in close proximity—indeed, many of the factory owners lived in the compounds of their factories. Such conditions often bore greater resemblance to the pattern of early Industrial-Revolution capitalism, as Marx had described it, than to conditions in advanced Western countries. This fact may well have had something to do with the success of Marxism in Russia. The Russian industrial capitalist was generally visible in the flesh, and as often as not he had the rotundity, and sometimes (not always) the vulgarity and callousness, of the capitalist of the early-Communist caricature.

All these things go to show that whatever private enterprise may have been in Tsarist Russia, it had not yet come to hold anything resembling the respect and significance in the eyes of the people that it had acquired in the older mercantile countries by the beginning of this century. Perhaps with time it would have. The prospects were steadily improving. Examples of efficient and progressive industrial management existed in Russia before the Revolution, and were increasing.

But all this, it must be remembered, was a long time ago. Thirty-three years have elapsed since the Revolution. Those years, in the strenuous conditions of Soviet life, have witnessed the passing of a full generation. Of the people capable of influencing the course of events in Russia today only an insignificant minority recall the pre-Revolutionary days at all. The younger generation has no comprehension or concept of anything but the state capitalism that the Soviet regime has enforced. And what we are talking about here is something not even in the present but in the indefinite future.

Bearing all this in mind, we see that there is no Russian national understanding which would permit the early establishment in Russia of anything resembling the private enterprise system as we know it. This is not to say that some such understanding will not some day develop. It may, if circumstances are favorable. But it will never be a system identical to our own. And no one will usefully be able to force the pace, particularly no one from outside.

It is true that the term "Socialism" has been used for so many years in close intimacy with the term "Soviet" that it is now hateful to many people, both within and without the borders of the Soviet Union. But it is easy to draw wrong conclusions from this phenomenon. It is conceivable that retail trade and the performance of the small individual services which have so much to do with the pleasantness of daily life may some day return in large measure to private hands in Russia. In agriculture, as we shall see presently, there will certainly be an extensive return to private ownership and initiative. There is a further possibility that the system of mutual production-cooperation by groups of artisans (*artels*)—a system peculiarly rooted in Russian tradition and understanding—may some day point the way to economic institutions which could represent a highly important and promising innovation in the approach to modern problems of labor and capital. But large sections of economic life known to us as the normal provinces of private enterprise will almost certainly remain in national hands for a long time to come in Russia, regardless of the identity of the political authority. This should surprise no American, nor should it offend any. There is no reason why the form of Russian economic life, beyond certain major exception that will be mentioned below, should be considered a matter of vital concern to the outside world.

Agriculture deserves a special place in our thinking on this subject. Agricultural enterprise is the Achilles heel of the Soviet system. Left in private hands, it constitutes a concession to human freedom and individual initiative—a concession which the true Bolshevik finds abhorrent. Forcibly collectivized, it requires an elaborate apparatus of restraint if the farmer is to be made to stay on his land and to produce. The forced collectivization of the farming population is probably today the greatest single cause of discontent in the Soviet Union, except possibly the excessive cruelty of the police, with which it is intimately connected. It may be taken for granted that one of the first acts of any future progressive authority in Russia would be to abolish this hated system of agricultural serfdom and to restore to the farmers the pride and incentives of private land ownership and free disposal of agricultural commodities. Collective farms may continue to exist; and they probably will, for the most abhorrent feature of the present system is not the concept of producer-cooperation itself but the element of restraint that underlies its application. The collectives of the future will be voluntary cooperatives, however, not shotgun marriages.

Turning to the political side, it was said above that we could not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia along American patterns. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. It does not mean that future Russian regimes will necessarily be unliberal. There is no liberal tradition finer than the strain which has existed in the Russia of the past. Many Russian individuals and groups of this day are deeply imbued with that tradition, and will do all in their power to make it the dominant element in the Russian future. In that effort, we may wish them well without reservation. But we will be doing them no favor if we permit ourselves to expect too much to happen too fast, or look to them to produce anything resembling our own institutions. These Russian liberals will have no easy road to walk. They will find in their country a young generation that has known nothing but Soviet power and has been trained to think subconsciously in the terms of that power even when it has resented and hated it. Many features of the Soviet system will stick, if only for the reason that everything has been destroyed which might seem to have constituted an alternative to them. And some features will deserve to stick, for no system that lasts over decades is entirely without merits. Any program of government for a future Russia will have to adjust itself to the fact that there has been this Soviet interlude, and that it has left its positive marks as well as its negative ones. And no members of future Russian governments will be aided by doctrinaire and impatient well-wishers in the West who look to them, just because they are seeking a decent alternative to what we know today as Bolshevism, to produce in short order a replica of the Western democratic dream.

Above all, it behooves us Americans, in this connection, to repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves. In our relations with the people of Russia it is important, as it has never been important before, for us to recognize that our institutions may not have relevance for people living in other climes and conditions and that there can be social structures and forms of government in no way resembling our own and yet not deserving of censure. There is no reason why this realization should shock us. In 1831 de Tocqueville, writing from the United States, correctly observed: "The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that their efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people to whom they are applied."

Forms of government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. They respond to national character and to national realities. There is great good in the Russian national character, and the realities of that country scream out today for a form of administration more considerate of that good. Let us hope that it will come. But when Soviet power has run its course, or when its personalities and spirits begin to change (for the ultimate outcome could be of one or the other), let us not hover nervously over the people who come after, applying litmus papers daily to their political complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of "democratic." Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good. There are, as we shall see presently, certain features of the future Russian state that *are* of genuine concern to the outside world. But these do not include the form of government itself, provided only that it keep within certain well-defined limits, beyond which lies totalitarianism.

III

What, then, do they include? To what kind of a Russia may we reasonably and justly look forward? What attributes are we, as responsible members of the world community, entitled to look for in the personality of a foreign state, and of Russia in particular?

We may look, in the first place, for a Russian government which, in contrast to the one we know today, would be tolerant, communicative and forthright in its relations with other states and peoples. It would not take the ideological position that its own purposes cannot finally prosper unless all systems of government not under its control are subverted and eventually destroyed. It would dispense with this paranoiac suspiciousness we know so well, and consent to view the outside world, ourselves included, as it really is and always has been: neither entirely good nor entirely bad, neither entirely to be trusted nor entirely to be mistrusted (if only for the simple reason that "trust" has only a relative significance in foreign affairs). It would consent to recognize that this outside world is not really preoccupied with diabolical plots to invade Russia and inflict injuries on the Russian people. Viewing the outside world in this way, the statesmen of a future Russia could approach it with tolerance and forbearance and practical good humor, defending their national interests as statesmen must, but not assuming that these can be furthered only at the expense of the interests of others, and vice versa.

No one asks for a naive and childlike confidence; no one asks for a fatuous enthusiasm for all that is foreign; no one asks that the genuine and legitimate differences of interest which have always marked, and will always continue to mark, the relations between peoples be ignored. We must expect Russian national interest not only to continue to exist but to be vigorously and confidently asserted. But in a regime that we could recognize as an improvement over what we know today we would expect that this would be done in an atmosphere of emotional sanity and moderation: that the foreign representative would not continue to be viewed and treated as one possessed of the devil; that it would be conceded that there might be such a thing as innocent and legitimate curiosity about a foreign country, which could be permitted to be gratified without fatal detriment to that country's national life; that it would be recognized that there might be individual foreign business aspirations which did not aim at the destruction of the Russian state; that it would be admitted, finally, that persons desirous of travelling across international borders might have, and are even apt to have, motives other than "espionage, sabotage and diversion"—such trivial motives, in fact, as the enjoyment of travel or the peculiar impulses that move people to wish to visit relatives from time to time. In short, we may ask that the grotesque system of anachronisms known as the Iron Curtain be lifted from the world, and that the Russian people, who have so much to give and so much to receive as mature members of the world community, cease to be insulted by a policy that treats them as children, too immature to have normal contact with the adult world, too undependable to be let out alone.

Secondly, while recognizing that the internal system of government is in all essential respects Russia's own business and may well depart drastically from our own, we are entitled to expect that the exercise of governmental authority will stop short of that fairly plain line beyond which lies totalitarianism. Specifically, we may expect that any regime which claims to contrast favorably with that which we have before us today will refrain from enslaving its own labor—industrial and agricultural. There is a reason for this: a reason even more solid than the shock we experience at witnessing the sickening details of this type of oppression. When a regime sets out to enslave its own working population in this way, it requires for the maintenance of the arrangement so vast an apparatus of coercion that the imposition of the Iron Curtain follows almost automatically. No ruling group likes to admit that it can govern its people only by regarding and treating them as criminals. For this reason there is always a tendency to justify internal oppression by pointing to the menacing iniquity of the outside world. And the outside world must be portrayed, in these circumstances, as very iniquitous indeed—iniquitous to the point of caricature. Nothing short of this will do. Carefully hiding the realities behind the Iron Curtain, the regime depicts "abroad" to its own people in every lurid hue of hideousness, as anxious mothers attempt to intimidate their children and fortify their own authority by embroidering the image of that sinister "something" which "will get you if you don't watch out."

In this way, excess of internal authority leads inevitably to unsocial and aggressive conduct as a government among governments, and is a matter of concern to the international community. The world is not only heartily sick of this comedy by reason of the endless and wearisome falsehoods it involves, but it has learned to recognize it as something so irresponsible and dangerous that, maintained for any length of time, it easily becomes a major hazard for world peace and stability. It is for this reason that we, while recognizing that all distinctions as between freedom and authority are relative and admitting that 90 per cent of them are no business of ours when they affect a foreign country, still insist that there is an area here in which no government of a great country can move without creating the most grievous and weighty problems for its neighbors. That is precisely the area in which the regime of Hitler found itself at home, and in which the Soviet government has moved for at least these past fifteen years. We may state bluntly that we can recognize no future Russian regime as one with which we could have a satisfactory relationship unless it keeps out of this danger area.

The third thing we may hope from a new Russia is that it will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion. In mentioning this matter, we are entering upon a delicate subject. There is no more difficult and treacherous one in the entire lexicon of political issues. In the relationships between the Great-Russian people and nearby peoples outside the confines of the old Tsarist Empire, as well as non-Russian national groups that were included within that empire, there is no conceivable pattern of borders or institutional arrangements which, measured against the concepts prevailing to date, would not arouse violent resentments and involve genuine injustices in many quarters. If people in that part of the world are going to go on thinking of national borders and minority problems in the way that they have thought of them in the past and continue to think of them today, Americans would do well to avoid incurring any responsibility for views or positions on these subjects; for any specific solutions they may advocate will some day become a source of great bitterness against them, and they will find themselves drawn into controversies that have little or nothing to do with the issue of human freedom.

What is plainly necessary, and the only solution worthy of American encouragement, is the rise of such a spirit among all the peoples concerned as would give to border and institutional arrangements in that troubled area an entirely new, and greatly reduced, significance. Whether that spirit will actually arise, we cannot tell. And precisely because we cannot tell this, Americans should be extremely careful in committing their support or encouragement to any specific arrangements in this sphere; for we cannot know what they mean until there is clarity as to the spirit which will underlie them. How can we know whether a given national group will require an independent status, or a federal status, some special brand of local self-government, or no special status at all, until we know something about the psychological climate in which these arrangements would operate? There are peoples of non-Russian ethnological character on the borders of the Great-Russian family whose economic existence is intimately bound up with that of the Great-Russians. The future should see a minimum of disruption of these economic ties, and that in itself would normally warrant a close political connection. But its nature would always have to depend on what sort of attitudes prevailed on both sides of the line: on the degree of tolerance and insight which the peoples involved (and not only the Russian people) might be able to bring to the establishment of these relationships.

We are all agreed, for example, that the Baltic countries should never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples into any relationship whatsoever with a Russian state; but they would themselves be foolish to reject close and cooperative arrangements with a tolerant, nonimperialistic Russia, which genuinely wished to overcome the unhappy memories of the past and to place her relations to the Baltic peoples on a basis of real respect and disinterestedness. The Ukraine, again, deserves full recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and for the requirements and possibilities of its development as a linguistic and cultural entity; but the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the adjustment will have to be made? As for the satellite states: they must, and will, recover their full independence; but they will not assure themselves of a stable and promising future if they make the mistake of proceeding from feelings of revenge and hatred toward the Russian people who have shared their tragedy, and if they try to base that future on the exploitation of the initial difficulties of a well-intentioned Russian regime struggling to overcome the legacy of Bolshevism.

There is no use underestimating the bitterness of these territorial problems, even assuming the utmost of good-will and relaxed tolerance on the part of the peoples concerned. Some of the dispositions taken at the close of the Second World War (made even worse today by the deliberate policy on the part of certain governments to turn the provisional prematurely into the permanent) represent distinctly unhealthy situations, not conducive to a peaceful future. Some day these dispositions must be changed; and it will admittedly require tact on the part of all concerned, and forbearance bordering on the miraculous, if these changes are to be effected without a further compounding of violence and bitterness. For that unhappy situation the peoples of Europe have to thank the calculating cynicism of the Bolshevik leaders and the amiable indulgence of the Western Powers.

But one of the greatest of the German oppositionists in the time of Hitler, writing at the risk of his life to a friend in England during the recent war, said: "For us Europe after the war is less a problem of frontiers and soldiers, of top-heavy organizations and grand plans than . . . a question of how the picture of man can be restored in the breasts of our fellow-citizens."[1]

Would that the Nazi gallows had spared this man for the present and the future; he was both right and courageous, and such people will be desperately needed if the future of the region from the Elbe to Bering Strait is ever to be happier than it has been in the past. An American who wishes his influence to be beneficial in that part of the world would do well to impress on any friends he may have from the Iron Curtain countries the folly of a continuation, by them or anyone else, of these dreary and profitless manipulations with so-called national boundaries and with the naive loyalties of bewildered linguistic groups which have passed for statesmanship in that area in the past. There are more important things than where the border runs, and the first of these is that on both sides of it there should be tolerance and maturity, humility in the face of sufferings of the past and the problems of the future, and a realization that none of the important problems of the future for any of the peoples of Europe is going to be solved entirely, or even primarily, within the country's national boundaries.

These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal authority of government, and that she abandon, as ruinous and unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppression. If she is not prepared to do these things, she will hardly be distinguishable from what we have before us today, and to hasten the arrival of such a Russia would not be worth the care or thought of a single American. If she is prepared to do these things, then Americans will not need to concern themselves more deeply with her nature and purposes; the basic demands of a more stable world order will then have been met, and the area in which a foreign people can usefully have thoughts and suggestions will have been filled.

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[1] *A German of the Resistance: The Last Letters of Count Helmuth James von Moltke* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948).

IV

So much, then, for the kind of Russia we would like to see. How should we, as Americans, conduct ourselves in order to promote the realization of, or at least an advance toward, such a Russia?

In our thinking on this subject we must be careful to distinguish between direct action, i.e., action on our part directly affecting persons and events behind what is now the Iron Curtain, and indirect action, by which we mean action taken with respect to other things—with respect, let us say, to ourselves or to our relations with other people—and affecting the Soviet world only obliquely and incidentally.

Most regrettably, as the world is today, the possibility for direct action by Americans toward the ends discussed above must be examined both in terms of a possible war and in terms of the continuation of the present state of "no major war." The first of these contingencies must unfortunately be discussed first, for it has become the dominant prospect in the minds of many people.

If war comes, what can we do directly to promote the emergence of a more desirable Russia? We can hold steadily and clearly in mind the image of the kind of Russia we would like to see and assure that military operations are shaped in such a way as to permit it to come into existence.

The first part of this task is a negative one: not to let ourselves be diverted by irrelevant or confusing concepts of war aims. We can avoid, this time, the tyranny of slogans. We can avoid confusing ourselves with grandiose and unrealistic, or even meaningless, phrases designed simply to make us feel better about the bloody and terrible business in which we are engaged. We can remember that war—a matter of destruction, brutalization and sacrifice, of separations, domestic disintegration, and the weakening of the deeper

fabrics of society—is a process which of itself can achieve no positive aims: that even military victory is only the prerequisite for some further and more positive achievement which it makes possible but by no means assures. We can have the moral courage, this time, to remind ourselves that major international violence is, in terms of the values of our civilization, a form of bankruptcy for us all—even for those who are confident that they are right; that all of us, victors and vanquished alike, must emerge from it poorer than we began it and farther from the goals we had in mind; and that, since victory or defeat can signify only relative degrees of misfortune, even the most glorious military victory would give us no right to face the future in any spirit other than one of sorrow and humbleness for what has happened and of realization that the road ahead, toward a better world, is long and hard—longer and harder, in fact, than it would have been had it been possible to avoid a military cataclysm altogether.

Remembering these things, we will be less inclined to view military operations as ends in themselves, and should find it easier to conduct them in a manner harmonious with our political purposes. If it should fall to us to take up arms against those who today dispose over the Russian people, we can try not to give that people the impression that we are their enemies, or consider them ours. We can try to make them understand the necessity of such hardships as we cannot avoid inflicting on them. We can endeavor to hold constantly before them the evidences of a sympathetic understanding for their past and interest in their future. We can give them the feeling that we are on their side, and that our victory, if it comes, will be used to provide them with a chance to shape their own destiny in the future to a pattern happier than that which they have known in the past. For all of this it is important that we bear in mind what Russia has been, and can be, and not permit political differences to becloud that picture.

National greatness is a difficult thing to define. Every nation is made up of individuals; and among individuals, as is known, there is no uniformity. Some are charming, others irritating; some are honest, others not exactly so; some are strong, others weak; some command admiration, others, by general agreement, are anything but admirable. This is true in our own country; it is true in Russia. Just what, in these circumstances, national greatness consists of, is hard to say. Certainly it rarely consists of those qualities in which a people thinks itself great; for in nations, as in individuals, the outstanding virtues are generally not the ones for which we fancy ourselves distinguished.

Yet that there *is* such a thing as national greatness is clear; and that the Russian people possess it in high degree is beyond question. They are a people whose progress out of darkness and squalor has been a painful one, marked by enormous sufferings and punctuated by heart-rending setbacks. Nowhere on the face of the globe has the tiny flame of faith in the dignity and charity of man flickered more precariously under the winds that tore at it. Yet it has never gone out; it is not extinguished today even in the heart of the Russian land and whoever studies the struggle of the Russian spirit through the ages can only bare his head in admiration, before those Russian people who kept it alight through their sacrifices and sufferings.

The record of Russian culture to date has proven that this struggle has a significance far wider than the confines of the traditional Russian territory; it is a part, and an extremely important part, of the general cultural progress of mankind. We have only to look at the people of Russian birth or origin living and working in our midst—the engineers, the scientists, the writers, the artists—to know that this is true. It would be tragic if our indignation over Soviet outlooks and policies led us to make ourselves the accomplices of Russian despotism by forgetting the greatness of the Russian people, losing our confidence in their genius and their potential for good, and placing ourselves in opposition to their national feelings. The vital importance of this becomes even clearer when we reflect that we in the outside world who believe in the cause of freedom will never prevail in any struggle against the destructive working of Soviet power unless the Russian people are our willing allies. That goes for peace, and it goes for war. The Germans, though not fighting at that time in the cause of freedom, learned to their sorrow the impossibility of combatting simultaneously both the Russian people and the Soviet government.

The greatest difficulty here, of course, lies in the mute and helpless position in which the Russian people find themselves as subjects of a totalitarian regime. Our experiences with Germany have demonstrated that we have not succeeded very well, as a nation, in understanding the position of the man who lives under the yoke of modern despotism. Totalitarianism is not a national phenomenon; it is a disease to which all humanity is in some degree vulnerable. To live under such a regime is a misfortune that can befall a nation by virtue of reasons purely historic and not really traceable to any particular guilt on the part of the nation as a whole. Where circumstances weaken the powers of resistance, to a certain crucial degree, the virus triumphs. If individual life is to go on at all within the totalitarian framework it must go on by arrangement with the regime, and to some extent in connivance with its purposes. Furthermore, there will always be areas in which the totalitarian government will succeed in identifying itself with popular feelings and aspirations. The relationship between citizen and political authority under totalitarianism is therefore inevitably complicated: it is never pat and simple. Who does not understand these things cannot understand what is at stake in our relations with the peoples of such countries. These realities leave no room for our favored conviction that the people of a totalitarian state can be neatly divided into collaborators and martyrs and that there will be none left over. People do not emerge from this relationship unscathed: when they do emerge they need help, guidance and understanding, not scoldings and sermons.

We will get nowhere with an attitude of emotional indignation directed toward an entire people. Let us rise above these easy and childish reactions and consent to view the tragedy of Russia as partly our own tragedy, and the people of Russia as our comrades in the long hard battle for a happier system of man's coexistence with himself and with nature on this troubled planet.

V

So much for what we do if, contrary to our hopes and our wishes, a war so much talked about should prove impossible to avoid. But supposing we are faced with a continuation of the present state of absence of major warfare? What should our course of action be then?

First of all, have we any grounds to hope, in these circumstances, that there might be changes in Russia of the kind that we are here envisaging? There are no objective criteria for the answer to this question. There is no "proof" one way or another. The answer rests on something which is partly a matter of opinion and judgment, but partly, admittedly, an act of faith. The writer believes the answer to be a positive one: that we are indeed justified in hoping, and holding it possible, that there may be such changes. But in substantiation of this view it is possible to say only the following.

There can be no genuine stability in any system which is based on the evil and weakness in man's nature—which attempts to live by man's degradation, feeding like a vulture on his anxieties, his capacity for hatred, his susceptibility to error, and his vulnerability to psychological manipulation. Such a system can represent no more than the particular frustrations and bitterness of the generation of men who created it, and the cold terror of those who have been weak or unwise enough to become its agents.

I am not speaking here of the Russian Revolution as such. That was a more complicated phenomenon, with deeper roots in the logic of history. I am speaking of the process by which something claiming to be a hopeful turn in human events, claiming to lead toward a decrease rather than an increase in the sum total of human injustice and oppression, evolved into the shabby purgatory of the police state. Only men with a profound sense of personal failure could find satisfaction in doing to others those things which are always involved in such a system; and whoever has had occasion to look deeply into the eyes of a Communist police officer will have found there, in that dark well of disciplined hatred and suspicion, the tiny gleam of despairing fright which is the proof of this statement. Those who begin by clothing a personal lust for power and revenge with the staggering deceits and oversimplifications of totalitarianism end up by fighting themselves—in a dreary, hopeless encounter which projects itself onto the subject peoples and makes of their happiness and their faith its battlefield.

Men of this sort can bequeath something of the passion of the struggle to those of their close associates who inherit their power. But the process of inheritance cannot be carried much further. People can move along, themselves, as by some force of habit, on the strength of an emotional drive acquired at second hand; but it is no longer theirs to transmit to others. The impulses that thrust men of one generation into so despairing an attitude toward themselves and toward the popular masses in whom they like to see themselves reflected become progressively uninteresting to succeeding generations. The cruelties, the untruths, the endless deriding of man's nature practised in the concentration camps: all these institutions of the police state, though they may first have something of the lurid fascination that manifestations of danger and anarchy always exert in a well-regulated and composed society, sooner or later end up—like some stale and repetitious pornography—by boring everybody, including those who practise them.

Many of the servants of totalitarian power, it is true, having debased themselves more than their victims and knowing that they have barred themselves from any better future, may cling despairingly to their unhappy offices. But despotism can never live just by the fears of the jailers and hangmen alone; it must have behind it a driving political will. In the day when despotic power could be closely associated with a dynasty or an inherited oligarchy, such a political will could be more enduring. But then, by the same token, it had to take a more benevolent and constructive interest in the people over whom it ruled and from whose labors it fed. It could not afford to live by their total intimidation and degradation. Dynastic continuity compelled it to recognize an obligation to the future, as well as to the present and the past.

The modern police state does not have these qualities. It represents only a fearful convulsion of society, springing from the stimulus of a given historical moment. Society may be grievously, agonizingly ill from it. But society—being something organic, marked by change and renewal and adjustment—will not remain this way indefinitely. The violent maladjustments which caused the convulsion will eventually begin to lose their actuality, and the instinct for a healthier, less morbid, more interesting life will begin to assert itself.

These, then, are the reflections which give the writer, for one, faith that if the necessary alternatives are kept before the Russian people, in the form of the existence elsewhere on this planet of a civilization which is decent, hopeful and purposeful, the day must come—soon or late, and whether by gradual process or otherwise—when that terrible system of power which has set a great people's progress back for decades and has lain like a shadow over the aspirations of all civilization will be distinguishable no longer as a living reality, but only as something surviving partly in recorded history and partly in the sediment of constructive, organic change which every great human upheaval, however unhappy its other manifestations, manages to deposit on the shelf of time.

But how those changes are to come about is something which cannot be foreseen. If there are, indeed, such things as laws of political development, they will surely play a part here; but then they would be the laws of development peculiar to the phenomenon of modern totalitarianism, and these have not yet been adequately studied and understood. Whether such laws exist or not, developments will be modified both by national character and by the tremendous part which the fortuitous unquestionably plays in the shaping of human events.

These things being so, we must admit with respect to the future of government in Russia, we see "as through a glass, darkly." Superficial evidences would not seem to leave much room for hope that the changes we would wish to see in the attitudes and practices of government in Moscow could come about without violent breaks in the continuity of power, that is, without the overthrow of the system. But we cannot be sure of this. Stranger things have happened—though not much stranger. And, in any case, it is not our business to prejudge the question. It is not necessary for us, merely in order to shape our own conduct in a way conducive to our own interests, to decide what we admittedly cannot really know. We should allow, here, for all possibilities, and should exclude none. The main thing is that we keep clearly in mind the image of what we would like to see in the personality of Russia as an actor on the world stage, and let that be our guide in all our dealings with Russian political factions, including both that which is in power and those which are in opposition to it. And if it should turn out to be the will of fate that freedom should come to Russia by erosion from despotism rather than by the violent upthrust of liberty, let us be able to say that our policy was such as to favor it, and that we did not hamper it by preconception or impatience or despair.

Of one thing we may be sure: no great end enduring change in the spirit and practice of government in Russia will ever come about primarily through foreign inspiration or advice. To be genuine, to be enduring and to be worth the hopeful welcome of other peoples such a change would have to flow from the initiatives and efforts of the Russians themselves. It is a shallow view of the workings of history which looks to such things as foreign propaganda and agitation to bring about fundamental changes in the lives of a great nation. Those who talk of overthrowing the Soviet system by propaganda point, by way of justification of their thesis, to the intensive workings of the Soviet propaganda machine and to the various facets of subversive activity conducted, inspired or encouraged by the Kremlin throughout the world. They forget that the outstanding fact about such activities, on the record of the thirty-three years over which they have been assiduously conducted, has been their general failure. In the end, military intimidation or invasion has been generally necessary for the actual spread of the Soviet system. It may be argued that China is an exception to this statement; but to what extent China can really be said to be part of the Soviet system we do not know, and to attribute the revolution which has taken place in China in these recent years primarily to Soviet propaganda or instigation is to underestimate grievously, to say the least, a number of other highly important factors.

Any attempt at direct talking by one nation to another about the latter's political affairs is a questionable procedure, replete with possibilities for misunderstanding and resentment. That is particularly true where spirit and tradition differ and the political terminology is not really translatable. This appreciation in no way weakens the importance of the "Voice of America," the function of which with respect to Russia, is to reflect as faithfully as possible the atmosphere and attitudes of this country, in order that the Soviet citizen may form a fair judgment of them. But this is an entirely different thing from urgings toward this or that political action. We may have our own hopes or ideas as to the implications for the Soviet citizen of the view of American realities which is apparent in the broadcasts of the "Voice" and in such other evidences of American life as reach his consciousness; we may think we know what we would do in the light of this evidence; but it would be a mistake for us to be too explicit and to make these things the basis of suggestions and promptings to him about what he should do in the internal political life of his own country. We are too apt to talk in our terms rather than his, and from an imperfect understanding of his problems and possibilities. And our words, accordingly, are apt to convey meanings entirely different from those which we meant them to convey.

For these reasons, the most important influence that the United States can bring to bear upon internal developments in Russia will continue to be the influence of example: the influence of what it is, and not only what it is to others but what it is to itself. This is not to say that many of those things which are now preoccupying the public mind are not of unquestioned importance: such things as physical strength, armaments, determination and solidarity with other free nations. It is not to deny the urgent and overriding necessity for a wise and adroit foreign policy, designed to release and make effective all those forces in the world which, together with our own, can serve to convince the masters of the Kremlin that their grand design is a futile and unachievable one, persistence in which promises no solution of their own predicaments and dilemmas. In fact, there can be no question but that these must remain major preoccupations if war is to be avoided and time is to be gained for the working of more hopeful forces. But they can only remain sterile and negative if they are not given meaning and substance by something which goes deeper and looks further ahead than the mere prevention of war or the frustration of imperialistic expansion. To this, there is general agreement; but what is this "something"? Many people think it only a question of what we urge upon others, in other words, a question of external propaganda. I would submit that it is primarily a question of what we urge upon ourselves. It is a question of the spirit and purpose of American national life itself. Any message we may try to bring to others will be effective only if it is in accord with what we are to ourselves, and if this is something sufficiently impressive to compel the respect and confidence of a world which, despite all its material difficulties, is still more ready to recognize and respect spiritual distinction than material opulence.

Our first and main concern must still be to achieve this state of national character. We need worry less about convincing others that we have done so. In the lives of nations the really worthwhile things cannot and will not be hidden. Thoreau wrote: "There is no ill which may not be dissipated, like the dark, if you let in a stronger light upon it. . . . If the light we use is but a paltry and narrow taper, most objects will cast a shadow wider than themselves." Conversely, if our taper is a strong one we may be sure that its rays will penetrate to the Russian room and eventually play their part in dissipating the gloom which prevails there. No iron curtain could suppress, even in the innermost depths of Siberia, the news that America had shed the shackles of disunity, confusion and doubt, had taken a new lease of hope and determination, and was setting about her tasks with enthusiasm and clarity of purpose.

George Kennan, "The Unifying Factor," in
Realities of American Foreign Policy (1954), pp. 91-120

IV. The Unifying Factor

I AM AFRAID THAT in the last two of these lectures I found it necessary to speak primarily about things we ought *not* to do rather than about things we *ought* to do in our foreign relations. I hope tonight to correct in some measure the resulting deficiency and to indicate to you certain of what seem to me to be the more hopeful and constructive possibilities of American foreign policy. But before I enter on this task, there are one or two things I would like to add, by way of afterthought, to what I said last night with regard to the problem of Soviet power. I am afraid that if I do not do this there will be certain serious gaps in the pattern of the Soviet problem I left in your minds.

You will recall that I hinted at the possibility that the changes in the Soviet order which we would like to see occur—above all, the retraction of the limits of Soviet power and influence to something more normal and more compatible with the peace of the world—might conceivably come as the result of the workings of internal forces within the structure of Soviet power, with only an indirect encouragement from ourselves and the rest of the outside world. I know that this intimation will be challenged by some people who do not believe in the possibility of such change, or who fear that it will not occur soon enough to be of any significance to us. It is about this attitude that I would like to say a few words.

It seems to me that in the field of international affairs one should never be so sure of his analysis of the future as to permit it to become a source of complete despair. The greatest law of human history is its unpredictability. Here, in this Soviet problem, we have the greatest possible need for the broad historical perspective. There has never been a country that was not susceptible to change. Evolution occurs everywhere, if only as a response to change in physical conditions—alterations in population and resources and technology. Does anyone really suppose that a nation could undergo so violent a process of technological change as has marked the Soviet Union in these past decades and yet remain unaffected in its social and political life? Or is it held that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought into being a political system so far-sighted, so comprehensive, so well-designed, that it can bear without modification, indefinitely, the weight of any conceivable degree of physical and technological change? It would be an ill omen for us all if we were obliged to admit this. For certainly, only a political system magnificently attuned to the inner needs of man could meet this supreme test.

Actually, history has already belied this fear. There has already been change in the Soviet orbit. There was a great change from Leninism to Stalinism. There is a change in process today from Stalinism to something else; and the fact that this "something else" is not fully

clear to us is not a proof that it does not exist, or that it will not be something closer to the requirements of international stability than what we have known hitherto in the Soviet system. It is my impression that there must already be in progress, in the relations between Moscow and the various satellite governments, a certain subtle evolution, the effects of which may as yet be in no way visible, but which may nevertheless be of greatest importance for the development of the Soviet program as a whole.

If there is any great lesson we Americans need to learn with regard to the methodology of foreign policy, it is that we must be gardeners and not mechanics in our approach to world affairs. We must come to think of the development of international life as an organic and not a mechanical process. We must realize that we did not create the forces by which this process operates. We must learn to take these forces for what they are and to induce them to work with us and for us by influencing the environmental stimuli to which they are subjected, but to do this gently and patiently, with understanding and sympathy, not trying to force growth by mechanical means, not tearing the plants up by the roots when they fail to behave as we wish them to. The forces of nature will generally be on the side of him who understands them best and respects them most scrupulously. We do not need to insist, as the communists do, that change in the camp of *our* adversaries can come only by violence. Our concept of the possibility of improvement in the condition of mankind is not predicated, as is that of the communists, on the employment of violence as a means to its realization. If our outlook on life is, as we believe it to be, more closely attuned to the real nature of man than that of our communist adversaries, then we can afford to be patient and even occasionally to suffer reverses, placing our confidence in the longer and deeper workings of history.

I would also like to add a few words of reinforcement to what I said at the conclusion of last night's lecture about the effects on the Soviet orbit of our own behavior here at home and in our relations generally with the non-communist countries. There seems to be an assumption among some of our people that the Russian communists and their people take note of us only when we do something that affects them directly. I would like to warn strongly against this assumption. Don't think that we are not watched at all times with most careful and anxious eyes from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Don't think that the resulting observations do not have the most far-reaching repercussions on the hopes and fears and calculations both of the rulers and the ruled in the Soviet camp, and consequently on the entire trend of the political relationship between them. When we make fools of ourselves and mess up our own affairs and bring dismay and anxiety into the hearts of those who would like to be our friends and our allies, this is reflected at once by a new birth of false hopes and arrogance in the minds of those who rule the roost in Moscow. When, on the other hand, we speak with a voice—or better, act with a voice—that carries courage and determination and inner conviction to the world at large, believe me, it is heard by millions and millions of people, and every heart that cares anything for freedom thrills to it, and those who hear it do not ask by what precise military calculations we propose to bring Soviet power to an end or on what day this is supposed to happen. They are wiser than many of us in this respect; and they know that just because one cannot predict the precise steps by which courage and faith earn their victories in this world, the power of these qualities is nonetheless formidable for that fact.

Finally, while I am still dealing in after-thoughts, I would like to say a few words about the particular problem we have in those specific areas that are today most threatened by indigenous communist pressures; for it is there that the attention of our people and the world is riveted just at this moment, and I fear that any presentation that did not contain a specific reference to them would be incomplete.

So far as Indo-China itself is concerned, which is eighty percent of the problem today in the immediate sense, I think there is little to be gained at this moment by any attempt to master-mind our government's actions, day by day, from the outside. This is an incredibly complex and baffling situation. We are now in it up to the hilt. The time has passed when any back seat driving can do any good. Our government is obviously making a concentrated and determined effort to come to grips with the problem. We can only wish them well and give them our confidence and support. There are times when, having elected a government, we will be best advised to let it govern and to let it speak for us as it will in the councils of the nations.

But there are a few considerations with regard to the general problem of communism in Asia which might be worth noting at this point. It is here, above all, that we must avoid the fallacy that we are dealing with some threat of military aggression comparable to that which faced the world when Hitler put his demands on the Poles in 1939. Military aggression can never be ruled out entirely as a possibility, but it is not the most urgent and likely of the possibilities with which we have to reckon. We are dealing here in large measure with tendencies and states of mind which, however misguided and however befuddled by deceptions practiced from outside, are nevertheless basically the reflections of wholly real and even profound indigenous conditions, and would not be caused to disappear even in the unthinkable event that Moscow could be threatened or bludgeoned into telling them to do so. We are dealing here with great emotional forces, and not with rational reactions.

We could perhaps exploit these forces with relative ease, as the communists do, if we had the cynicism and the shamelessness and the heartlessness to do it. We, too, could promise men things we know to be illusory. We, too, could hold out short-term advantages as baits for a long-term enslavement. We, too, could incite

hatreds and fan suspicions and try to strike profit from the workings of bitterness and blind fury.

But we Americans are not set up for this type of exploitation, either morally or politically. This being the case, there are limits to what we can expect to accomplish; and I would be foolish to encourage you to believe that there are any simple or sure solutions to these baffling problems. There is no certain means by which other people can be prevented from following the Pied Piper to their destruction if their childishness and lack of realism are of this extraordinary order.

Some of these troublesome situations have existed for a long time. I can conceive that they may have to exist for a long time still. We would do well to remind ourselves here, again, that just because the solutions of problems are not visible at any particular time does not mean that those problems will never be alleviated or confined to tolerable dimensions. History has a way of changing the very terms in which problems operate and of leaving them, in the end, unsolved to be sure, yet strangely deflated of their original meaning and their importance.

I do not mean to say that we have no possibilities at all for influencing the situation in these uncertain areas, or that we should not make the effort. But I would like to point out that this does not mean many of the things that Americans seem to think it means. It does not mean that we should breathe down the necks of these peoples and smother them with our influence and attention. It does not mean that we should give them the impression that they have to choose between the Russians and ourselves. It does not mean that we should deluge them with words and with great numbers of American officials and visitors. None of these things is necessarily useful; all of them can, on occasion, be harmful.

We must remember that many people in these countries have, for various reasons, a pathological fear of what they have come to *think* of as being dominated by the United States. If they are told that they have to choose between the Russians and ourselves, this fills them only with frustration and despair, and paralyzes whatever action they might otherwise be capable of in their own interests. Our propaganda often fails to carry to them because their problems are deep and painful and highly personal, and sometimes there is really nothing we can say to them about themselves, or very little, that comes with tact and good grace from a nation so wealthy and successful as our own. The presence of American officials in large numbers is not always useful, because people in general, and Americans in particular, do not always appear at their best when transplanted to a foreign environment. And the material comforts to which most Americans have become accustomed and to which they cling so tenaciously even when they live abroad, have a tendency to invite envy and contempt rather than admiration when they are sported in the midst of people who do not themselves enjoy them.

Instead of all these things, and instead of the attempt

to appear eager for intimacy and full of helpful suggestions, I think it would be better, as things stand today, if we were to display toward the peoples of these unsettled areas an American personality marked by a very special reserve and dignity, fully prepared to admit that we probably do not have all the answers to their problems, not necessarily demanding that the values of our own civilization should be fully understood and appreciated by others, prepared to recognize the experimental and tentative nature of our own national institutions, requiring of others not that we be liked, or imitated, or admired, but only that we be respected for our seriousness of purpose, our belief in ourselves, and the fundamental reasonableness of our approach. I would hope that there might come a time, as I shall have occasion to explain later this evening, when we would have more than this to say to peoples in Asia and elsewhere. But as things stand today, and as we Americans *are* today, I think we should do well to lay this sort of restraint upon ourselves.

So much for the after-thoughts. Now for the burden of what I should like to say by way of conclusion.

It seems to me evident, from the considerations that have been set forth in the preceding lectures, that in no area of our foreign policy will we be well served, in this coming period, by an approach directed strictly to countering the Soviet threat as a straight military problem. This consideration is valid not only for our relations with the non-communist countries, whose people obviously expect other and more positive things from us; it is also valid from the standpoint of our approach to the communist problem itself in its broader aspects.

Let us remember that the dominant characteristic of our present international situation is the passing of the phenomenon people have called "bipolarity"—a state of affairs that marked the immediate post-hostilities period—and the rise to renewed vigor and importance of the so-called "in-between" countries, particularly our recent enemies, but not only them. We are today in the midst of a transition from a simple to a complex international pattern. Yet many of us seem not to be aware of this.

The test of statesmanship for both the Russians and ourselves in the coming period is going to be the skill with which we are able to adjust to this new situation, and the vision and imagination with which we succeed in shaping new and advantageous relations with the in-between countries, to replace those that have rested, since the recent war, on the abnormal conditions of political subjection in the Russian case, and economic dependence in our own. Here, in application to this new task, a strictly military approach, which attempts to subordinate all other considerations to the balancing of the military equation, will be not only inadequate but downright harmful. For the demands placed on our policy by the rise of these in-between countries to positions of new vitality and importance will often be in direct conflict with the requirements of the perfect and total military posture; and any marked failure on our part to meet these new demands will only be capitalized

on at once by the communists within the respective countries; so that by a rigid military approach we will be in danger of losing on the political level more than we gain on the military one. We will be like the man whose exclusive preoccupation with barricading the front door has made it easy for his enemies to enter by the back door.

Now what the in-between countries are looking to us for is not to be taught how to combat communism—however much we may think they need to learn about it—but rather for positive and imaginative suggestions as to how the peaceful future of the world might be shaped and how our own vast economic strength in particular might be so adjusted to the lives of other peoples as to permit a fruitful and mutually profitable interchange, without leading to relationships of political dependence and coercion. But it is not only the more conspicuous of the in-between countries who are looking to us for this; it is all the non-communist countries, in fact, and even all the subject peoples within the communist orbit, who know that their chances of liberation will be best if we Americans are able to develop positive and constructive purposes that serve to place the negative, destructive purposes of communism in the shadows where they belong.

In the larger sense, therefore, it may be said that the problem of world communism is one of those problems which can be dealt with effectively only if you learn to look away from it, not in the sense that you take no precautionary measures with regard to it, but in the sense that you do not permit it to preoccupy your thoughts and your vision but rather insist on the right to proceed with your positive undertakings in spite of it. This is a quality not peculiar to Moscow's communism. Only too often in life we find ourselves beset by demons, sometimes outside ourselves, sometimes within us, who have power over us only so long as they are able to monopolize our attention and lose that power when we refuse to permit ourselves to be diverted and intimidated by them and when we simply go on with the real work we know we have to do. Thus it is with communism; and in this recognition lies, I believe, not only the key to the only successful method of dealing with that particular phenomenon but also the key to a successful global approach to our world problems generally, in this coming period. It is to the possible nature of such a global approach that I would like to devote the remainder of my observations.

Let us attempt, for a moment, to look beyond the problem of Soviet power, at least to the extent that we assume a world with no single political group seriously aspiring to world domination and with no more than what we might call the normal incidence of tension, misunderstanding, and violence. Toward what sort of an ultimate pattern of international relationships would we, in such circumstances, like to see the world community move? And what would be our place in this pattern?

In the first of these lectures I spoke of the original objects of American society and of the modest limited

concepts of foreign policy that flowed from them. These concepts still appeal to me strongly. Even today I find them preferable to pretentious and unrealistic ones. But I must confess that I do not think that the original objects from which these concepts flowed are now fully adequate to the present nature of our society, to the significance of our position in the world, and to the responsibilities that rest upon us. I believe, in other words, that we must consciously enlarge the objects of our society in order that they may become commensurate with our present stature as a nation.

You will recall that those objects were initially confined to the cultivation of a certain type of social experiment on our national territory and did not embrace any real sense of responsibility for the trend of international life outside our borders. We were like a child in an adult world, privileged to enjoy the typical egocentricity of the child, if not his dependence on others. But today that egocentricity is no longer permissible. It has yielded to the responsibilities of maturity just as in individual life the irresponsibility of the child yields to the obligations of maturity and parenthood.

Today our own dependence on our foreign environment has grown to the dimension of a vital interest of our society. Yet we have to recognize that this foreign environment is in some measure what we make of it, that it is extensively influenced by the way we behave ourselves. And the most important thing to be realized is that this exertion of influence takes place, for better or for worse, whether we mean it to do so or not. It flows of itself from our relative physical weight in the world and from the growing crowdedness of the planet we inhabit. We have become, as I have had occasion to say before, like a giant in a crowded room: we may wish to have nothing to do with the others, but everywhere we move we crowd someone or step on someone, and we have no choice but to recognize the resulting social obligation.

I submit, therefore, that in defining in our own minds the objects to which we consider our society now to be dedicated, we take as our point of departure the condition to which our development has already brought us at this time; that we recognize that the advance of our society along the lines of its traditional ideals is no longer something that can be realized just within the framework of our national life itself, but that it must be pursued at least partly in the broader theater of our international environment; and that accordingly we make it our object so to conduct ourselves in our capacity as a member of the world community as to enhance the chances for the preservation of the values we cherish here at home.

This may not seem too different from what we have thought and done in the past, but to my mind there is an important distinction. What I am talking about means that we must be prepared to make real sacrifices and painful adjustments in our domestic life for the sake of the health of our world environment—not just those sacrifices in the form of military expenditures which we are accustomed to thinking of as a prerequisite

to the assurance of our military security, but sacrifices in phases of our lives which we have never learned to think of in connection with foreign affairs at all, and ones which would be directed to the positive formation of our relationship to the outside world rather than to the negative enterprise of military preparedness.

Now many people who would agree with me in all that I have just said would be inclined to suppose that the problem was merely one of the creation and cultivation of suitable multilateral institutions for the ironing out of the frictions between our national life and that of other people. They have felt that what was required was only the establishment of new forums where we could deal with the outside world in a different way from what we have in the past.

I am bound to say that to my mind this is not the correct approach. New institutional facilities may some day be required; but if so, they will come last on the list of the important things to be done, and not first. What seems to me to be of first and vital importance is something that we Americans have to do for ourselves and by ourselves, and that is to render our country fit and eligible for the sort of adjustment our foreign relationships are going to have to go through.

I have often had occasion to take issue with the enthusiasts for world government. I must still do so from the immediate political standpoint. But I would suggest that they are right in one thing, and that is in their appreciation that this country will not solve the problems of its developing world relationships except on the basis of a readiness to go in for an extensive merging of its life with that of other peoples. The difference between us is mainly about the way we should move toward this goal. The partisans of world government would have us reach out and embrace the entire world community all at once, through the immediate establishment of a new series of political relationships. I would have us start by tackling first the problem of our relationship with the peoples nearest and closest to us, and then to begin not by frightening them half to death with offers of our immediate intimacy but by doing things to ourselves which would mean that the prospect of our intimacy would no longer be so frightening. The best way for us to move toward any form of unification is to try to make it so far as possible a living reality, or at least a living possibility, by unilateral actions affecting the nature of our own society, before the problems of a formal contractual relationship are dealt with.

You will see that what I am pleading for here is a recognition of the fact that if our society, which has always been predicated on the experience of growth and expansion, is to retain its vitality, there must continue to be an expansion of the actual sphere in which our national life proceeds. But there could be nothing more tragic and unfortunate than that we should try to bring about this expansion by any means involving violence to the needs and feelings of peoples elsewhere. It must come on a voluntary basis and as a response to the needs of others as well as of ourselves. And it

must be an expansion not restricted only to material things but one embracing our outlook, our vision, and our inner experience as human beings. It is in this sense that I am speaking when I express the conviction that the development of our society will not be a healthy one unless it envisages and works toward the ultimate merging of its social and political identity with those of at least certain other nations, and particularly those closest to us by tradition, by outlook, and by the circumstances of their world position. On the other hand, I am not pleading for "union now." I do not think this country is today in any condition to unite with anyone. Sometimes I think it is scarcely in a condition to unite with itself. And what I am proposing is that we make it our aim to do things which would put us in a position to expand the scope of our national life when time and circumstance become ripe for us to do so. Some of these things pertain to our relations with others; others pertain directly to ourselves.

The first and most important step in this great task is, as I see it, to change ourselves from an exclusive to a receptive nation in psychology and in practice. If we are to adjust to the demands of a new world position, the first thing we have to learn to do is to take as well as to give. I mean this in every sense: the economic, the demographic, the cultural, and the intellectual. There is no salvation for America in a frame of mind that tries to shut out its world environment.

This means, in the first place, that we must learn to accept the goods and services of others. Economic protectionism is not only an anomaly, but it is a ridiculous and ignominious expedient for a nation of our economic vigor and stature. What was right and necessary for a struggling underdeveloped country can be a form of infantile escapism for a strong and ostensibly mature one. If we have any real faith in those principles of free economic competition to which we believe ourselves to be dedicated, we should not be afraid of our ability to compete today on free economic terms with any nation in the world.

The same thing applies to the movement of people. If we are ever going to adjust our economic relationships with the older industrial areas of Europe, I am persuaded that we will have to permit a greater liberality of personal movement as between our country and theirs. This applies both to temporary travel and to freedom of permanent migration. So far as temporary travel is concerned, I am not impressed with the suggestion, which seems to me to be implicit in the present administration of our immigration laws, that our national security is going to be shaken if the Dean of Canterbury or some liberal European scholar visits our shores, or if some American playwright attends a gala première in Brussels. Such timidity is not the mark of a strong society. I am also not impressed with the argument that by greater liberality with regard to immigration our old American virtues would be swamped under a flood of uncouth newcomers. It is too late for all that. Immigration has been going on apace in this country for over a hundred years. The

old American virtues, such as they were, are already dependent for their survival on the degree to which they can commend themselves to great masses of people who had no share in their origin. If we wanted to go in for this sort of protectionism, we should have started a hundred years ago. Today, America is either a cosmopolitan nation—a great cross-section of general humanity, distinguished from other nations not by any peculiarity of blood or color but only by geography and tradition and spirit—or it is nothing at all.

What I have just said about goods and people goes a thousand-fold for the world of the mind and the spirit. In this respect we Americans stand today at a crossroad of the most profound significance. Our national myth relates—let us remember—to an America which has long since ceased to be the real and dominant one. It relates to a rural America, an unmechanical America, an America without motor cars and television sets, an America of the barefoot boy and the whitewashed board fence, the America of the Webster cartoon. It was a wonderful old America. I sometimes wonder whether those of us who knew it will ever really adjust to any other. I hope its memory and its inspiration will never die. But it is not the America of today; and if we cling timorously to its image as the ceiling of our cultural outlook we not only run the risk of a deep and neurotic division within ourselves as between the dream and the reality, but we run the risk of becoming essentially a provincial nation, an eddy in the current of world thought, unable to receive stimulus and inspiration from without and unable to impart it to others. Such a situation, I promise you, will never meet the needs of our future international relationships. In the intellectual sense as in the demographic sense, we are either a cosmopolitan nation, part of the world stream of thought and feeling, or we are nothing at all. Smaller nations, weaker nations, nations less exposed by the very proportion of their physical weight in the world, might be able to get away with exclusiveness and provincialism and an intellectual remoteness from the feelings and preoccupations of mankind generally. Americans cannot. It will never be forgiven us if we attempt to do it. If this is the path we go, we shall never succeed in projecting to our neighbors in this world, not even to the best of our friends and partners, those bridges that will have to be projected if the pounding, surging traffic of the future world is to be carried.

Thus the first dictate of progress toward a better world is, it seems to me, that America must become more receptive and more outgoing. The second is that it must take a tighter control of its own life and evolve a greater sense of purpose with regard to the shaping of its own development. I realize that these words carry very far, that they are at odds with the original concept of the objects of American society, with the original *laissez faire* theory that the individual is always capable of perceiving and pursuing his own self-interest and that the best interests of society at large will always flow from his continuing to do so. I still believe in the

soundness of that theory in many respects. I believe in it particularly with respect to the freedom of our business life, and I do so after spending some years in intimate contemplation of a world where the principle of free enterprise has been wholly abandoned. In suggesting that the United States needs a greater sense of purpose in its domestic life I am not suggesting the welfare state or any brand of socialization of the means of production or distribution. But I am suggesting that in certain ways we are going to have to take the development of our national life more tightly in hand and to shape it more consciously and vigorously with an eye to the demands of the future.

One of the things that I have in mind is the manner in which we treat our natural environment here on this North American territory. I think we can no longer permit the economic advance of our country to take place so extensively at the cost of the devastation of its natural resources and its natural beauty. I think that we shall have to take stock in the most careful manner of what is still left to us out of the original fund of topsoil and mineral resources and water tables and forests and wild life with which God had endowed this territory, and to ask ourselves in all good conscience what we are likely to need of all these things in the future in the light of the numerical expansion of our population and the growing technological demands of each individual citizen. Having done this, I think we are then going to have to chart out realistic guidelines for national action which would assure that these future needs will be met, and that they will be met without increasing the present disharmony between man and nature. We will have to find some means to make these guidelines respected and understood by the myriads of state and local authorities and individual entrepreneurs whose collaboration will be essential to their observance.

In closest connection with this must stand the continuous and careful study of the development of our dependence on other countries for materials vital to the functioning of our economy, and a conscious attempt to shape our relationships with other economies in all these matters in such a way that they have some stability and some firm foundation of mutual understanding and do not lead in the future to all sorts of crises and tensions and tragedies. This means forward thinking, frank talking in our dealings with others, and a determination not to let private interests stand in the way of a far-seeing and prudent approach to the solution of our resources problem.

Beyond this, I think we have to contrive to give attention to something else which is very hard to describe and will be harder still to tackle as a practical problem, but which nevertheless has a lot to do with our future ability to meet the demands of our world position. I am referring here to the unhealthy development of social and community relationships in many parts of our country by virtue of precipitous and uncontrolled technological changes. I have in mind particularly the partial disintegration of many of our large urban communities, the general deterioration of social environment in the large portions of those communities, and the chaotic and often unsatisfactory manner in which new communities are being permitted to come into existence. I am talking here, if you will, about the need for municipal and regional planning in the light of the undeniable fact that the arrangement of the physical facilities for living and working unquestionably has a great deal to do with the inner health and happiness of the individual and with his ability to develop to the maximum his possibilities as a citizen and a human being. I am aware that there are experts on this subject who would deny that these conditions are really serious enough to warrant concentrated attention and recognition as a problem at the national level. But I can only voice a personal conviction that their significance for all of us is greater than we generally realize. And whether or not I am right in this judgment, I would like to say that the way things are proceeding at present produces on the surface of our national life a number of depressing and discreditable phenomena which are visible to the world at large and are genuinely important from the standpoint of our relationships with other peoples. Blighted areas, filthy streets, community demoralization, juvenile delinquency, chaotic traffic conditions, utter disregard for esthetic and recreational values in urban development, and an obviously unsatisfactory geographic distribution of various facilities for homelife and work and recreation and shopping and worship: these things may not mark all our urban communities in conspicuous degree; but they mark enough of them to put a definite imprint on the image of our life that is carried to the world around us, and this is an imprint that leads others to feel that we are not really the masters of our own fate, that our society is not really under control, that we are being helplessly carried along by forces we do not have the courage or the vitality to master.

The same impression is conveyed by the extent to which we have permitted the satisfying of the cultural and recreational and in part even educational demands of our population to be dominated by the mass media and, ultimately, by the advertisers. A foreigner easily gains the impression that we are wholly indifferent to the possibilities inherent in the way such matters are handled; that here, as elsewhere, we have resigned ourselves helplessly to the workings of our economic system; and that we are content to move wherever that system carries us, regardless of the effect on the esthetic taste, the intellectual health, and the emotional freshness of our people.

I cannot overemphasize how unfortunate such impressions are from the standpoint of our developing world relationships. We know from personal life that only he is capable of exercising leadership over others who is capable of some real degree of mastery over himself. Peoples of the world are not going to be inclined to accept leadership from a country which they feel is drifting in its own internal development and drifting into bad and dangerous waters. Even if we feel

that we do not need this greater measure of control from the standpoint of the requirements of our own society, I suggest that we may nevertheless need it for the sake of the external impression if our own national life is to become a source of inspiration to peoples elsewhere.

To the extent that we are able to devise and implement programs of national action that look toward the creation of a genuinely healthy relationship both of man to nature and of man to himself, we will then, for the first time, have something to say to people elsewhere of an entirely different order than the things we have had to say to them hitherto. To the extent that we are able to develop a social purpose in our own society, our life and our experiences will become interesting and meaningful to peoples in other parts of the world. We must remember that we are practically the only country that has been able to afford for any length of time the luxury of this experimentation with the uninhibited flow of self-interest. Almost everywhere else, men are convinced that the answers to their problems are to be found in the acceptance of a high degree of collective responsibility and discipline. To many of them, the sight of an America in which there is visible no higher social goal than the self-enrichment of the individual, and where that self-enrichment takes place primarily in material goods and gadgets that are of doubtful utility in the achievement of the deeper satisfactions of life—this sight fails to inspire either confidence or enthusiasm. The world knows we can make automobiles and television sets and that we can distribute them, but it is looking to us for other things as well, things more relevant to the deeper needs of men everywhere. No matter what we may think, individually, of the TVA, it should give us all pause for thought that no other American undertaking has ever commanded more interest and respect in the world beyond our borders.

Now this problem of the adjustment of man to his natural resources, and the problem of how such things as industrialization and urbanization can be accepted without destroying the traditional values of a civilization and corrupting the inner vitality of its life—these things are not only the problems of America; they are the problems of men everywhere. To the extent that we Americans become able to show that we are aware of these problems, and that we are approaching them with coherent and effective ideas of our own which we have the courage to put into effect in our own lives, to that extent a new dimension will come into our relations with the peoples beyond our borders, to that extent, in fact, the dreams of these earlier generations of Americans who saw us as leaders and helpers to the peoples of the world at large will begin to take on flesh and reality.

There is one last point to be added. I have spoken here primarily of things that had to do with our physical environment. I would like to say that probably more important than any of these things, in the ultimate effect on our foreign relations, will be the things we

do in this coming period with respect to our own inner American selves and the state of our national soul.

This is a hard and cruel world we live in. It contains many spectres, many horrors, many appalling situations. No one who travels widely or lives extensively beyond our borders can fail to feel at times a sinking of the heart at the depth and complexity of our world problems, at the degree of misery and hatred and bewilderment by which human life is attended in other parts of the world, at the envy and jealousy we face, at the hideousness and reality of the threats to our security. I have personally had to look at these things over some eighteen years of foreign residence, and many of them near the seat of the most calculated and intense political antagonism that any nation has ever faced, and I think I know what a *tour de force* it is going to be if this nation succeeds in conducting for long its rich and comfortable existence without real difficulty in a world of so much poverty and misery and frustration.

Yet if I were to ask myself what is the most frightening and menacing thing with which we are today confronted, I would say without hesitation that it is not something outside our society, but something within it. I am not thinking here only of that pathetic fringe of our population, now cowering three-fourths underground, that still finds solace for its ego in an association with the communist party. What I have in mind is far more serious than that. It is the much larger proportion of our people who find it impossible to accept the relatively minor and almost routine problem presented for us by the phenomenon of external penetration and subversion in our life without permitting it to become for them a source of loss of confidence in the integrity of our society as a whole. There can be nothing more disruptive of our success in every great area of foreign policy than the impression that we no longer believe in ourselves and that we are prepared to sacrifice the traditional values of our civilization to our fears rather than to defend those values with our faith. This is not just a question of the spectacle of a few men setting out to achieve a cheap political success by appealing to primitive reactions, by appealing to the uncertain, suspicious little savage that lies at the bottom of almost every human breast; it is more importantly the spectacle of millions of our citizens listening eagerly to these suggestions and then trotting off faithfully and anxiously, like the victims of some totalitarian brainwashing, to snoop and check up on their fellow citizens, to purge the libraries and the lecture platforms, to protect us all from the impact of ideas. The outside world knows perfectly well that no nation has ever had less need for this sort of thing than our own, that it responds to no real and commensurate requirement of our national situation, that it can only be the reflection of some deep inner crisis, some gnawing fear of ourselves.

If we wish to stride forward successfully in our relations with other peoples in this coming period, and this means in the development of our own civilization as a

whole, then we must proceed with vigor and determination to conquer this demoralization, to recover our inner equilibrium, to teach ourselves again to act like what Americans really are, and not like what we fear they might be.

I am afraid I have taken you very far and very fast in these lectures. It is certainly a most imperfect picture I have presented to you. I have left many gaps. In many respects I am afraid I have raised more questions than I have answered.

But if there is any one impression I would hope I might have left in your minds, it is the impression of the essential unity of all the problems of our national behavior and accordingly of the unsoundness and danger implicit in any attempt to compartmentalize our thinking about the problems of foreign policy. We saw in the first of these lectures how our thought had been split by two separate planes of international reality. We subsequently looked more closely at each of these planes to determine the demands it placed on our national conduct. To my own mind, the upshot of these considerations is that it is in the inner development of our civilization—in what we are to ourselves and not what we are to others—that these two planes of international reality really come together. We will not find the unity of foreign policy for which we are concerned if we seek it only in the fashioning of relationships external to our national life. We will find it only in the recognition of the full solemnity of our obligation as Americans of the twentieth century: the obligation of each of us, as an individual, to his God and his faith; the obligation of all of us, as a political society, to our own national ideals and through those ideals to the wider human community of which we are in ever increasing measure a part.

Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (1954), pp. 1-6, 315-332

I

Introduction

I

It is not surprising that an age faced with the threat of thermonuclear extinction should look nostalgically to periods when diplomacy carried with it less drastic penalties, when wars were limited and catastrophe almost inconceivable. Nor is it strange in such circumstances that the attainment of peace should become the overriding concern or that the need for peace should be thought to provide the impetus for its attainment.

But the attainment of peace is not as easy as the desire for it. Not for nothing is history associated with the figure of Nemesis, which defeats man by fulfilling his wishes in a different form or by answering his prayers too completely. Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear least able to achieve tranquillity. Whenever peace—conceived as the avoidance of war—has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. Whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.

Stability, then, has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. "Legitimacy" as here used should not be confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy. A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought *in the name of* the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expression of the "legitimate", general consensus. Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiation, is possible only in "legitimate" international orders.

Whenever there exists a power which considers the international order or the manner of legitimizing it oppressive, relations between it and other powers will be revolutionary. In such cases, it is not the adjustment of differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system itself. Adjustments are possible, but they will be conceived as tactical manœuvres to consolidate positions for the inevitable showdown, or as tools to undermine the morale of the antagonist. To be sure, the motivation of the revolutionary power may well be defensive; it may well be sincere in its protestations of feeling threatened. But the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not that it feels threatened—such feeling is inherent in the nature of international relations based on sovereign states—*but that nothing can reassure it.* Only absolute security—the neutralization of the opponent—is considered a sufficient guarantee, and thus the desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others.

Diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of power, cannot function in such an environment. It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle international disputes if there is "good faith" and "willingness to come to an agreement". For in a revolutionary international order, each power will seem to its opponent to lack precisely these qualities. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language. In the absence of an agreement on what constitutes a reasonable demand, diplomatic conferences are occupied with sterile repetitions of basic positions and accusations of bad faith, or allegations of "unreasonableness" and "subversion". They become elaborate stage plays which attempt to attach as yet uncommitted powers to one of the opposing systems.

For powers long accustomed to tranquillity and without experience with disaster, this is a hard lesson to come by. Lulled by a period of stability which had seemed permanent, they find it nearly impossible to take at face value the assertion of the revolutionary power that it means to smash the existing framework. The defenders of the status quo therefore tend to begin by treating the revolutionary power as if its protestations were merely tactical; as if it really accepted the existing legitimacy but overstated its case for bargaining purposes; as if it were motivated by specific grievances to be assuaged by limited concessions. Those who warn against the danger in time are considered alarmists; those who counsel adaptation to circumstance are considered balanced and sane, for they have all the good "reasons" on their side: the arguments accepted as valid in the existing framework. "Appeasement", where it is not a device to gain time, is the result of an inability to come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives.

But it is the essence of a revolutionary power that it possesses the courage of its convictions, that it is willing, indeed eager, to push its principles to their ultimate conclusion. Whatever else a revolutionary power may achieve therefore, it tends to erode, if not the legitimacy of the international order, at least the restraint with which such an order operates. The characteristic of a stable order is its spontaneity; the essence of a revolutionary situation is its self-consciousness. Principles of obligation in a period of legitimacy are taken so much for granted that they are never talked about, and such periods therefore appear to posterity as shallow and self-righteous. Principles in a revolutionary situation are so central that they are constantly talked about. The very sterility of the effort soon drains them of all meaning, and it is not unusual to find both sides invoking their version of the "true" nature of legitimacy in identical terms. And because in revolutionary situations the contending systems are less concerned with the adjustment of differences than with the subversion of loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either by war or by an armaments race.

II

This work will deal with a decade which throws these problems into sharp relief: the conclusion and the aftermath of the wars of the French Revolution. Few periods illustrate so well the dilemma posed by the appearance of a revolutionary power, the tendency of terms to change their meaning and of even the most familiar relationships to alter their significance. A new philosophy boldly claimed that it would recast the existing structure of obligations, and Revolutionary France set about to give this claim effect. "What can make authority legitimate?" had been defined by Rousseau as the key question of politics and, however they might try, his opponents could not eliminate the question. Henceforth, disputes no longer concerned the adjustment of differences within an accepted framework, but the validity of the framework itself; the political contest had become doctrinal: the balance of power which had operated so intricately throughout the eighteenth century suddenly lost its flexibility and the European equilibrium came to seem an insufficient protection to powers faced by a France which proclaimed the incompatibility of its political maxims with those of the other states. But the half-hearted effort of Prussia and Austria to restore the legitimate ruler of France to his former position only accelerated the revolutionary *élan*. A French army based on conscription, inconceivable to even the most absolutist ruler by the grace of God, defeated the invading armies and overran the Low Countries. And then there appeared a conqueror who sought to translate the moral claims of the French Revolution into reality. Under the impact of Napoleon, there disintegrated not only the system of legitimacy of the eighteenth century, but with it the physical safeguards which, to contemporaries at least, seemed the prerequisite of stability.

The Napoleonic Empire for all its extent demonstrated however the tenuousness of a conquest not accepted by the subjugated peoples. Although Napoleon had succeeded in overthrowing the existing concept of legitimacy, he could not replace it with an alternative. Europe was unified from the Niemen to the Bay of Biscay, but force had replaced obligation, the material achievements of the French Revolution had outrun their moral base. Europe was united, but only negatively, in its opposition to a power felt as foreign (which is the surest indication of the absence of legitimacy), in a consciousness of "otherness" which was soon endowed with moral claims and became the basis of nationalism.

When Napoleon was defeated in Russia, the problem of constructing a legitimate order confronted Europe in its most concrete form. For opposition can create a wide consensus, perhaps even the widest attainable one, but its components, united by what they do not like, may be greatly at odds about what should replace it. It is for this reason that the year 1812 is the starting point of our discussion. However one conceives it—and it has been given a variety of interpretations ranging from the moral vindication of national self-determination to the tragic destiny of the Hero—this year marked the moment when it became evident that Europe was not to be organized

by force. But the alternative was not nearly so apparent. It was clear that there were new forces loose in the world clamouring for popular participation in government. But it seemed equally evident that these forces had been responsible for a quarter-century of turmoil. The French Revolution had dealt a perhaps mortal blow to the divine right of kings; yet the representatives of this very doctrine were called upon to end the generation of bloodshed. In these circumstances what is surprising is not how imperfect was the settlement that emerged, but how sane; not how "reactionary" according to the self-righteous doctrines of nineteenth-century historiography, but how balanced. It may not have fulfilled all the hopes of an idealistic generation, but it gave this generation something perhaps more precious: a period of stability which permitted their hopes to be realized without a major war or a permanent revolution. And our account will end in 1822, when the international order which emerged out of the revolutionary conflict assumed the form it was to retain for over a generation. The period of stability which ensued was the best proof that a "legitimate" order had been constructed, an order accepted by all the major powers, so that henceforth they sought adjustment within its framework rather than in its overthrow.

That Europe rescued stability from seeming chaos was primarily the result of the work of two great men: of Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, who negotiated the international settlement, and of Austria's minister, Metternich, who legitimized it. This is not to say that an international order emerged from personal intuition. Every statesman must attempt to reconcile what is considered just with what is considered possible. What is considered just depends on the domestic structure of his state; what is possible depends on its resources, geographic position and determination, and on the resources, determination and domestic structure of other states. Thus Castlereagh, secure in the knowledge of England's insular safety, tended to oppose only *overt* aggression. But Metternich, the statesman of a power situated in the centre of the Continent, sought above all to *forestall* upheavals. Convinced of the unassailability of its domestic institutions, the insular power developed a doctrine of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of other states. Oppressed by the vulnerability of its domestic structure in an age of nationalism, the polyglot Austro-Hungarian empire insisted on a generalized right of interference to defeat social unrest wherever it occurred. Because Britain was threatened only if Europe fell under the domination of a single power, Castlereagh was primarily concerned with constructing a balance of forces. Because the balance of power only limits the scope of aggression but does not prevent it, Metternich sought to buttress the equilibrium by developing a doctrine of legitimacy and establishing himself as its custodian.

Each failed as he succeeded: Castlereagh in making Britain a permanent part of the concert of Europe; Metternich in preserving the principle of legitimacy he had striven so hard to establish. But their achievements were not inconsiderable: a period of peace lasting almost a hundred years, a stability so pervasive that it may have contributed to disaster. For in the long interval of peace the sense of the tragic was lost; it was forgotten that states could die, that upheavals could be irretrievable, that fear could become the means of social cohesion. The hysteria of joy which swept over Europe at the outbreak of the First World War was the symptom of a fatuous age, but also of a secure one. It revealed a millennial faith; a hope for a world which had all the blessings of the Edwardian age made all the more agreeable by the absence of armament races and of the fear of war. What minister who declared war in August 1914, would not have recoiled with horror had he known the shape of the world in 1918, not to speak of the present?[1]

That such a world was inconceivable in 1914 is a testimony to the work of the statesmen with whom this book deals.

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[1] One who had such an intuition and did so recoil was, of course, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey.

II

Few periods present such a dramatic contrast of personalities or illustrate so well the problems of organizing a legitimate order as the interval between the defeat of Napoleon in Russia and the Congress of Verona. While Napoleon dominated Europe, policy based on a conception of national strategy was impossible. The fate of states depended on the will of the conqueror, and safety could be found only in adaptation to the French system. But Napoleon's defeat in Russia made clear that Europe could no longer be governed by force, that the man of will would have to find safety in a recognition of limits. And the disintegration of the Grande Armée obliged the European nations to define anew their place in the international order, to create a balance of forces to discourage future aggression, and to wrest out of the chaos of the disintegrated structure of the eighteenth century some principle of organization which would ensure stability.

It is fortunate for the lessons posterity may draw from this period that its chief protagonists were men of marked individuality, each in his way symbolizing an answer to the problem of order: Napoleon of the claims of power; Alexander of the indeterminacy of a policy of absolute moral claims; Castlereagh of the conception of an equilibrium maintained by the recognition of the self-evident advantages of peace; Metternich of an equilibrium maintained by an agreement on a legitimizing principle. Napoleon and Alexander were revolutionaries, because both strove to identify the organization of Europe with their will. To be sure, Napoleon sought order in universal dominion and Alexander in a reconciled humanity. But the claims of the prophet are sometimes as dissolving as those of the conqueror. For the claims of the prophet are a counsel of perfection, and perfection implies uniformity. Utopias are not achieved except by a process of levelling and dislocation which must erode all patterns of obligation. These are the two great symbols of the attacks on the legitimate order: the Conqueror and the Prophet, the quest for universality and for eternity, for the peace of impotence and the peace of bliss.

But the statesman must remain forever suspicious of these efforts, not because he enjoys the pettiness of manipulation, but because he must be prepared for the worst contingency. To be dependent on the continued goodwill of another sovereign state is demoralizing, because it is a confession of impotence, an invitation to the irresponsibility induced by the conviction that events cannot be affected by one's will. And to rely entirely on the moral purity of an individual is to abandon the possibility of restraint, because moral claims involve a quest for absolutes, a denial of nuance, a rejection of history. This in its fundamental sense is the issue between the conqueror or

the prophet on the one side and the statesman on the other; between the identification of conception and possibility and the insistence on the contingency of the individual will; between the effort to escape time and the need to survive in it. It is a tragic and necessarily inconclusive contest. For the statesman will treat the prophet as a political manifestation, and the prophet will judge the statesman by transcendental standards. The prophet, however pure his motives, pays the penalty for the "false" prophets who have preceded him, and it is the latter for which statesmanship attempts to provide. And the statesman is confronted with what must always upset his calculations; that it is not balance which inspires men but universality, not security but immortality.

It is the inextricable element of history, this conflict between inspiration and organization. Inspiration implies the identification of the self with the meaning of events. Organization requires discipline, the submission to the will of the group. Inspiration is timeless; its validity is inherent in its conception. Organization is historical, depending on the material available at a given period. Inspiration is a call for greatness; organization a recognition that mediocrity is the usual pattern of leadership. To be effective politically one requires organization, and for this reason the translation into political terms of prophetic visions always falsifies the intentions of their proponents. It is no accident that the greatest spiritual achievements of religious or prophetic movements tend to occur when they are still in opposition, when their conception is their *only* reality. Nor is it strange that established religions or prophetic movements should exhibit a longing for their vanished period of "true" inwardness. It is the origin of mass frenzy, of crusades, of "reformations", of purges, this realization that the spontaneity of individual reflection cannot be institutionalized.

While the conqueror attempts to equate his will with the structure of obligations and the prophet seeks to dissolve organization in a moment of transcendence, the statesman strives to keep latent the tension between organization and inspiration; to create a pattern of obligations sufficiently spontaneous to reduce to a minimum the necessity for the application of force, but, at the same time, of sufficient firmness not to require the legitimization of a moment of exaltation. It is not surprising that Castlereagh and Metternich were statesmen of the equilibrium, seeking security in a balance of forces. Their goal was stability, not perfection, and the balance of power is the classic expression of the lesson of history that no order is safe without physical safeguards against aggression. Thus the new international order came to be created with a sufficient awareness of the connection between power and morality; between security and legitimacy. No attempt was made to found it entirely on submission to a legitimizing principle; this is the quest of the prophet and dangerous because it presupposes the self-restraint of sanctity. But neither was power considered self-limiting; the experience of the conqueror had proved the opposite. Rather, there was created a balance of forces which, because it conferred a relative security, came to be generally accepted, and whose relationships grew increasingly spontaneous as its legitimacy came to be taken for granted.

To be sure, the international order had been founded on a misunderstanding and a misconception; a misunderstanding because the conference system which Castlereagh created as a symbol of harmony was used by Metternich as a diplomatic weapon to isolate his opponents. And a misconception because Castlereagh equated stability with a *consciousness* of reconciliation. But the belief that *all* threats, not only those of universal dominion, would be interpreted in the same manner by every power proved a tragic mistake. It is the essence of a revolutionary period that the attack on the "legitimate" order obliterates all differences within it; but by the same token it is the nature of a stable period that the acceptance of its legitimacy makes it safe to contest on local or peripheral issues. Because after Napoleon's overthrow the international order no longer contained a revolutionary power, no real motive for Britain's continued participation in the conference system existed, all the less so since the chief threat to the international order, the twin movements of liberalism and nationalism were not considered dangerous in Great Britain. Thus the conference system led either to a dispute on peripheral issues, which seemed petty and distasteful to Castlereagh, or it exhibited a unanimity over a threat that Britain could not admit as an international problem. When the unity of Europe came to pass, it was not because of the self-evidence of its necessity, as Castlereagh had imagined, but through a cynical use of the conference machinery to define a legitimizing principle of social repression; not through Castlereagh's good faith, but through Metternich's manipulation.

But even with these qualifications, it remains to be asked how it was possible to create an approximation to a European government, however tenuous, and with Britain as an observer on the sidelines.

What enabled Metternich to emerge as the Prime Minister of Europe? It was Metternich's misfortune that history in the latter half of the nineteenth century was written by his opponents, to whom he was anathema both by principle and policy and who ascribed his achievements to a contradictory combination of cunning and good fortune, of mediocrity and incompetent adversaries, without explaining how such a man managed to place his stamp on his period. For the documents of his period leave no doubt that for over a generation nothing occurred in Europe which was not shaped by Metternich either directly or through his opposition. To be sure, Metternich was aided by the instability of the Tsar and the indecisiveness of the Prussian King. But the Tsar's mercurial temper might also have resulted in a new crusade; and although Alexander's instability was there for everyone to exploit, only Metternich managed to achieve a personal domination. On the other hand, Metternich's own interpretation of the superiority of his philosophical maxims is refuted by their conventionality, while mere deviousness could not have duped all of Europe for over a decade. Rather, Metternich's successes were due to two factors: that the unity of Europe was not Metternich's invention, but the common conviction of *all* statesmen; and because Metternich was the last diplomat of the great tradition of the eighteenth century, a "scientist" of politics, coolly and unemotionally arranging his combinations in an age increasingly conducting policy by "causes". The maxims on which he so prided himself had therefore a psychological, but not a philosophical, significance: because he was convinced, indeed cocksure, of his rectitude, he could soberly and cynically evaluate the maxims of others as forces to be exploited. Because he considered policy a science, he permitted no sentimental attachments to interfere with his measures. There was not found in Metternich's diplomacy the rigid dogmatism which characterized his choice of objectives nor the undisciplined sentimentality of Alexander's conduct. And because, despite his vanity, he was always ready to sacrifice the form of a settlement for the substance, his victories became, not wounds, but definitions of a continuing relationship.

Metternich was aided by an extraordinary ability to grasp the fundamentals of a situation and a profound psychological insight which enabled him to dominate his adversaries. In 1805, he was almost alone in pointing out that Prussia was no longer the state of Frederick the Great; in 1812, he was one of the first to realize the essential transformation brought about by Napoleon's defeat; after

1815, he understood better than anyone the nature of the social transformation preparing itself in Europe, and that he decided to defy the tide may be a reflection on his statesmanship but not on his insight. He therefore had the great advantage over his adversaries that he knew what he wanted; and if his goals were sterile, they were fixed. "Everybody wants something," wrote Metternich at the height of the Greek crisis, "without having any idea how to obtain it and the really intriguing aspect of the situation is that nobody quite knows how to achieve what he desires. But because I know what I want and what the others *are capable of* [Metternich's italics] I am completely prepared."[1] That this statement was boastful, vain, and smug does not detract from its truth.

But all his diplomatic skill would have availed Metternich nothing, had he not operated in a framework in which his invocation of the unity of Europe could appear as something other than a euphemism for Austrian national interest. The early nineteenth century was a transition period, and, as in all such periods, the emergence of a new pattern of obligation for a time served only to throw into sharp relief the values being supplanted. The political structure of the eighteenth century had collapsed, but its ideals were still familiar. And because those ideals were derived from a rationalistic philosophy validated by its truth, they claimed a universal applicability. To Metternich's contemporaries the unity of Europe was a reality, the very ritualism of whose invocation testified to its hold on the general consciousness. Regional differences were recognized, but they were considered local variations of a greater whole. Unity was not yet equated with identity, nor the claims of the nation with the dictates of morality. All of Metternich's colleagues were therefore products of essentially the same culture, professing the same ideals, sharing similar tastes. They understood each other, not only because they could converse with facility in French, but because in a deeper sense they were conscious that the things they shared were much more fundamental than the issues separating them. When Metternich introduced the Italian opera in Vienna, or Alexander brought German philosophy to Russia, they were not being consciously tolerant or even aware that they were importing something "foreign". The ideal of "excellence" still was more important than that of origin. Thus the Russian Prime Minister, Capo d'Istria, was a Greek, the Russian ambassador in Paris, Pozzo di Borgo, was a Corsican, while Richelieu, the French Prime Minister, had been governor of Odessa. Wellington gave military advice to Austria in its campaign against Murat, and in 1815 both Prussia and Austria asked Stein to serve as their ambassador with the Assembly of the Confederation. And Metternich with his cosmopolitan education and rationalist philosophy, Austrian only by the accident of feudal relationships, could be imagined equally easily as the minister of any other state. If he had any special ties to Austria, they derived from a philosophical not a national identification, because the principles Austria represented were closest to his own maxims, because Austria, the polyglot Empire, was a macrocosm of his cosmopolitan values. "For a long time now," he wrote to Wellington in 1824, "Europe has had for me the quality of a fatherland [*patrie*]."

For these reasons, Metternich was effective not only because he was persuasive but, above all, because he was plausible. Of all his colleagues he was best able to appeal to the maxims of the eighteenth century, partly because they corresponded to his own beliefs, but, more importantly, because Austria's interests were identical with those of European repose. And because the end-result of Metternich's policy was stability and Austria's gain was always intangible, his extraordinary cynicism, his cold-blooded exploitation of the beliefs of his adversaries did not lead to a disintegration of all restraint, as the same tactics were to do later in the hands of Bismarck. Metternich's policy was thus one of status quo *par excellence*, and conducted, not by marshalling a superior force, but by obtaining a voluntary submission to his version of legitimacy. Its achievement was a period of peace lasting for over a generation without armament races or even the threat of a major war. And when the change came after 1848, it could be integrated into the existing structure without leading to the disintegration of Austria or to permanent revolution.

But its failure was the reverse side of this success. The identification of stability with the status quo in the middle of a revolutionary period reinforced the tendency towards rigidity of Austria's domestic structure and led eventually to its petrifaction. The very dexterity of Metternich's diplomacy obscured the real nature of his achievements, that he was merely hiding the increasing anachronism of Austria in a century of nationalism and liberalism; that he was but delaying the inevitable day of reckoning. To be sure, a truly successful policy for a polyglot Empire may have been impossible in a century of nationalism. And the Emperor would certainly have opposed any serious effort of domestic reform with his characteristic obtuse stubbornness. Nevertheless, the end of the Napoleonic war marked the last moment for Austria to attempt to brave the coming storm by adaptation, to wrench itself loose from the past, however painful the process. But Metternich's marvellous diplomatic skill enabled Austria to avoid the hard choice between domestic reform and revolutionary struggle; to survive with an essentially unaltered domestic structure in a century of rationalized administration; to continue a multi-national Empire in a period of nationalism. So agile was Metternich's performance that it was forgotten that its basis was diplomatic skill and that it left the fundamental problems unsolved, that it was manipulation and not creation. For diplomacy can achieve a great deal through the proper evaluation of the factors of international relations and by their skilful utilization. But it is not a substitute for conception; its achievements ultimately will depend on its objectives, which are defined outside the sphere of diplomacy and which diplomacy must treat as given. So resourceful was Metternich that for a time he could make a performance of juggling appear as the natural pattern of international relations; so dexterous were his combinations that during a decade they obscured the fact that what seemed the application of universal principles was in reality the *tour de force* of a solitary figure.

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[1] N.P. III, p. 511

Only a shallow historicism would maintain that successful policies are always possible. There existed no easy solution for Austria's tragic dilemma; that it could adapt itself by giving up its soul or that it could defend its values and in the process bring about their petrifaction. Any real criticism of Metternich must therefore attack, not his ultimate failure, but his reaction to it. It is Metternich's smug self-satisfaction with an essentially technical virtuosity which prevented him from achieving the tragic stature he might have, given the process in which he was involved. Lacking in Metternich is the attribute which has enabled the spirit to transcend an impasse at so many crises of history: the ability to contemplate an abyss, not with the detachment of a scientist, but as a challenge to overcome—or to perish in the process. Instead one finds a bitter-sweet resignation which was not without its own grandeur, but which doomed the statesman of the anachronistic Empire in his primary ambition: to become a symbol of conservatism for posterity. For men become myths, not by what they know, nor even by what they achieve, but by the tasks they set for themselves.

Metternich had learned the lessons of the eighteenth-century cabinet diplomacy too well. Its skilful sense of proportion was appropriate for a period whose structure was unchallenged and whose components were animated by a consciousness of their safety; but it was sterile in an era of constant flux. Whenever Metternich operated within a fixed framework, when an alliance had to be constructed or a settlement negotiated, his conduct was masterly. Whenever he was forced to create his own objectives, there was about him an aura of futility. Because he sought tranquillity in the manipulation of factors he treated as given, the statesman of repose became the prisoner of events. Because he never fought a battle he was not certain of winning, he failed in becoming a symbol. He understood the forces at work better than most of his contemporaries, but this knowledge proved of little avail, because he used it almost exclusively to deflect their inexorable march, instead of placing it into his service for a task of construction. Thus the last vestige of the eighteenth century had to prove the fallacy of one of the maxims of the Enlightenment, that knowledge was power. And for this reason, too, the final result of Metternich's policies had the quality of a series of ironies: that the policy of the statesman who most prided himself on the universality of his maxims lost its flexibility with the death of one man; that its structure was disintegrated by Prussia, the power he had conceived as one of its pillars, and that its legitimacy collapsed through the efforts, not of a representative of the social revolution or the middle class, but of the most traditionalist segment of Prussian society: Otto von Bismarck, whose ancestry antedated even that of the Prussian monarchs and who nevertheless completed the work of the futile revolutions which Metternich had mastered.

The two statesmen of repose were therefore both defeated in the end by their domestic structure: Castlereagh by ignoring it, Metternich by being too conscious of its vulnerability. But their achievements remain, not only in the long period of peace they brought about, but also in their impact on their time. The concert of Europe which emerged out of the Napoleonic wars was almost identical with their notion of the equilibrium, and the conference system which maintained it was Castlereagh's personal creation. It was he who mediated the differences of the Coalition and who, throughout his life, remained the conscience of the Alliance, even after he was forced into an increasingly passive role. Almost singlehandedly, he identified British security with Continental stability; and while in time the realities of an insular mentality reasserted themselves, British participation had lasted long enough to launch the new order without catastrophe. And Metternich, however he might struggle against the term "Metternich system", summed up the meaning of a generation of struggle. Between 1809 and 1848, it was possible to disagree with him, to detest him, but never to escape him. He was the High Priest of the Holy Alliance, the recognized interpreter of its maxims. He was the manipulator of the conference system, where his opponents suddenly found themselves isolated through the dexterous utilization of their own proposals. The very bitterness of the attacks on him testified to his central role. Anonymously, obliquely, indirectly, he demonstrated that policy may be based on knowledge, but that its conduct is an art.

III

What then is the role of statesmanship? A scholarship of social determinism has reduced the statesman to a lever on a machine called "history", to the agent of a fate which he may dimly discern but which he accomplishes regardless of his will. And this belief in the pervasiveness of circumstance and the impotence of the individual extends to the notion of policy-making. One hears a great deal about the contingency of planning because of the unavailability of fact, about the difficulty of action because of the limitation of knowledge. It cannot be denied, of course, that policy does not occur in a void, that the statesman is confronted with material he must treat as given. Not only geography and the availability of resources trace the limits of statesmanship, but also the character of the people and the nature of its historical experience. But to say that policy does not create its own substance is not the same as saying that the substance is self-implementing. The realization that the Napoleonic Empire was tottering was the *condition* of policy in 1813, but it was not *itself* a policy. That the period of revolution should be replaced by an order of equilibrium, that the assertion of the will give way to an insistence on legitimacy may have been "in the air". But one has only to study the vacillating measures of most powers to appreciate that neither the nature of this equilibrium nor the measures to attain it were immediately apparent. However "self-evident" the national interest may appear in retrospect, contemporaries were oppressed by the multiplicity of available policies, counselling contradictory courses of action: in 1813, most Austrian statesmen who did not advocate unconditional neutrality argued either for a continued alliance with France to solidify Austria's relations with the invincible Conqueror or for an immediate change of sides in deference to the national passion sweeping across Europe. Almost alone Metternich held firm, because he was convinced that the incompatibility of Napoleon's Empire with a system of equilibrium did not necessarily imply the compatibility of a polyglot Empire with an era of nationalism. At the same moment, the British Cabinet only reflected public opinion when it urged Napoleon's overthrow and, later on, a harsh peace. It was Castlereagh who brought about a peace of equilibrium and not of vengeance, a reconciled and not an impotent France. The choice between these policies did not reside in the "facts", but in their interpretation.[1] It involved what was essentially a moral act: an *estimate* which depended for its validity on a conception of goals as much as on an understanding of the available material, which was based on knowledge but not identical with it.

The test of a statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends. That Austria should seek stability was inherent in its geographic position and domestic structure. But that it would succeed, if only temporarily and however unwisely, in identifying its domestic legitimizing principle with that of the international order was the work of its Foreign Minister. That Great Britain should attempt to find security in a balance of power was the consequence of twenty-three years of intermittent warfare. But that it should emerge as a part of the concert of Europe was due to the efforts of a solitary individual. No policy is better, therefore, than the goals it sets itself. It was the measure of Castlereagh's statesmanship that he recognized the precedence of integration over retribution in the construction of a legitimate order, as of Metternich's that he never confused the form and the substance of his achievements, that he understood that the Central Empire could survive, not on its triumphs, but only on its reconciliations. It was their failure that they set themselves tasks beyond the capacity of their material: Castlereagh through a vision beyond the conception of his domestic structure, Metternich through an effort unattainable in a century of nationalism.

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[1] The argument that policy is "objective" because it reflects the requirements of security amounts to a truism which assigns a motivation to completed action. For the crucial problem of statesmanship is not to find a formal definition for accomplished policy, but to understand its *content* at any given period. Disputes over policy never concern a disagreement over the wisdom of safety but over its nature, nor about the desirability of security but about the best means to accomplish it.

But it is not sufficient to judge the statesman by his conceptions alone, for unlike the philosopher he must implement his vision. And the statesman is inevitably confronted by the inertia of his material, by the fact that other powers are not factors to be manipulated but forces to be reconciled; that the requirements of security differ with the geographic location and the domestic structure of the powers. His instrument is diplomacy, the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action which reconciles particular aspirations with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on persuasion and not imposition, it presupposes a determinate framework, either through an agreement on a legitimizing principle or, theoretically, through an identical interpretation of power-relationships, although the latter is in practice the most difficult to attain. The achievements of Castlereagh and Metternich were due in no small measure to their extraordinary ability as diplomats. Both dominated every negotiation in which they participated: Castlereagh by the ability to reconcile conflicting points of view and by the single-mindedness conferred by an empirical policy; Metternich through an almost uncanny faculty of achieving a personal dominance over his adversaries and the art of defining a moral framework which made concessions appear, not as surrenders, but as sacrifices to a common cause.

The acid test of a policy, however, is its ability to obtain domestic support. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimizing a policy *within* the governmental apparatus, which is a problem of bureaucratic rationality; and that of harmonizing it with the national experience, which is a problem of historical development. It was no accident, even if it was paradoxical, that in 1821 Metternich had greater difficulty with the Austrian than with the Russian ministers, or that in every negotiation Castlereagh had to fight a more desperate battle with his Cabinet than with his foreign colleagues. For the spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed. The essence of policy is its contingency; its success depends on the correctness of an estimate which is in part conjectural. The essence of bureaucracy is its quest for safety; its success is calculability. Profound policy thrives on perpetual creation, on a constant redefinition of goals. Good administration thrives on routine, the

definition of relationships which can survive mediocrity. Policy involves an adjustment of risks; administration an avoidance of deviation. Policy justifies itself by the relationship of its measures and its sense of proportion; administration by the rationality of each action in terms of a given goal. The attempt to conduct policy bureaucratically leads to a quest for calculability which tends to become a prisoner of events. The effort to administer politically leads to total irresponsibility, because bureaucracies are designed to execute, not to conceive.

The temptation to conduct policy administratively is ever present, because most governments are organized primarily for the conduct of domestic policy, whose chief problem is the implementation of social decisions, a task which is limited only by its technical feasibility. But the concern with technical problems in foreign affairs leads to a standard which evaluates by mistakes avoided rather than by goals achieved, and to a belief that ability is more likely to be judged by the pre-vision of catastrophes than the discovery of opportunities. It is not surprising that, at the height of the dispute at Vienna in 1814, Vansittart simply denied the reality of the Russian threat, or that Stadion in 1821 protested against the drain on the Austrian treasury of a campaign against Piedmont. In each instance the risks were immediately apparent, while the dangers were either symbolic or deferred; in each case the quest for determinacy took the form of denying the reality of the danger.

For this reason, too, it is dangerous to separate planning from the responsibility of execution. For responsibility involves a standard of judgment, a legitimacy. But the standard of a bureaucracy is different from that of the social effort. Social goals are justified by the legitimizing principle of the domestic structure, which may be rationality, tradition or charisma, but which is in any case considered an *ultimate* value. Bureaucratic measures are justified by an essentially *instrumental* standard, the suitability of certain actions for achieving ends conceived as given. A society is capable of only a limited range of decisions, because its values are relatively fixed; an ideal bureaucracy should be able to carry out *any* decision which is administratively feasible. The attempt to define social goals bureaucratically will, therefore, always lead to the distortion inherent in applying a rationality of means to the development of ends. It was in large part the identification of conception and responsibility which gave Castlereagh's policy such flexibility and which allowed Metternich to conduct himself with such subtle pliability. Because they were legitimized by the goals of the social effort and not an administrative routine, Castlereagh and Metternich were able to plan policy as long-range national strategy. Because their tenure in office was prolonged, they could execute their conception with due regard to the relation of their measures to each other and not only their individual rationality.

In addition to the obstacle of bureaucratic inertia, a statesman will tend to have great difficulty legitimizing his policy domestically, because of the incommensurability between a nation's domestic and its international experience. The whole domestic effort of a people exhibits an effort to transform force into obligation by means of a consensus on the nature of justice. The more spontaneous the pattern of obligation, the more "natural" and "universal" will social values appear. But the international experience of a people is a challenge to the universality of its notion of justice, for the stability of an international order depends on self-limitation, on the reconciliation of different versions of legitimacy. A nation will evaluate a policy in terms of its domestic legitimization, because it has no other standard of judgment. But the effort to identify the legitimizing principle of the international order with a parochial version of justice must lead to a revolutionary situation, particularly if the domestic legitimizing principles are sufficiently incommensurable. If a society legitimizes itself by a principle which claims both universality and exclusiveness, if its concept of "justice", in short, does not include the existence of different principles of legitimacy, relations between it and other societies will come to be based on force. For this reason competing systems of legitimacy find it extremely difficult to come to an understanding, not only because they will not be able to agree on the nature of "just" demands, but, perhaps more importantly, because they will not be able to legitimize the attainable international consensus domestically.

But even when there exists no fundamental ideological gulf, a nation's domestic experience will tend to inhibit its comprehension of foreign affairs. Domestically, the most difficult problem is an agreement on the nature of "justice". But internationally, the domestic consensus inherent in the definition of a policy must often be compromised with a similar domestic consensus of other powers. It is no accident that the tool of policy domestically is bureaucracy, which symbolizes the unity of will and execution, while its tool internationally is diplomacy, which symbolizes the contingency of application. Not for nothing do so many nations exhibit a powerful if subconscious, rebellion against foreign policy, which leaves the travail of the soul inherent in arriving at decisions unrewarded, against this double standard which considers what is defined as "justice" domestically, merely an object for negotiation internationally. Nor is it an accident that the vision of itself of so many societies exhibits a picture of rectitude deprived of its birthright by the sharp practices of foreigners. For the impetus of domestic policy is a direct social experience; but that of foreign policy is not actual, but potential experience—the threat of war—which statesmanship attempts to avoid being made explicit.

The statesman is therefore like one of the heroes in classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its "truth". Nations learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act. But statesmen must act *as if* their intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration were truth. It is for this reason that statesmen often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honour in their own country, that they always have a difficult task in legitimizing their programmes domestically, and that their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience. The statesman must therefore be an educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future. In this task his possibilities are limited. A statesman who too far outruns the experience of his people will fail in achieving a domestic consensus, however wise his policies; witness Castlereagh. A statesman who limits his policy to the experience of his people will doom himself to sterility; witness Metternich.

It is for this reason that most great statesmen have been either representatives of essentially conservative social structures or revolutionaries: the conservative is effective because of his understanding of the experience of his people and of the essence of a continuing relationship, which is the key to a stable international organization. And the revolutionary, because he transcends experience and identifies the just with the possible. The conservative (particularly if he represents an essentially conservative social structure) is legitimized by a consensus on the basic goals of the social effort and on the nature of the social experience. There is, therefore, no need to justify every step along the way. The revolutionary is legitimized by his charismatic quality, by an agreement on the legitimacy of his person or of his principle. His means are therefore considered incidental; his ends or his person legitimize the means. A conservative structure produces a notion of *quality*, which provides the framework of great conception; a revolutionary order produces a notion of *exaltation*, which dissolves technical limitations. Both thus deal with the fundamental problem of statesmanship: how to produce an understanding of the *complexity* of policy when it is impossible to produce a comprehension of its *substance*.

This book has dealt with conservative statesmen of countries with traditionalist social structures, of societies with sufficient cohesion so that policy could be conducted with the certainty conferred by the conviction that domestic disputes were essentially technical and confined to achieving an agreed goal. This enabled Metternich to pursue a policy of "collaboration" between 1809 and 1812 without being accused of treason and Castlereagh to negotiate with Napoleon without being charged with "selling his country". Statesmanship thus involves not only a problem of conception but also of implementation, an appreciation of the attainable as much as a vision of the desirable. The description of the efforts of Castlereagh and Metternich to harmonize the just with the possible and the international with the domestic legitimization was their story as statesmen. Their failure to achieve permanence for that which they held most dear was their story as men.

IV

There remains the question of the validity of conclusions drawn from historical experience, expressed in the assertion that historical events are essentially unique. It can be admitted that events do not recur precisely, that in this sense history does not "repeat" itself. But this is true of even the coarsest physical experience. A man seeing an elephant for the first time would not know what he was confronting. (Unless he had seen a picture or description which is a substitute for experience.) When he saw a second elephant, he might be able to name it by abstracting from its individual appearance in time and by establishing a standard of correspondence. A concept, therefore, never says "everything" about an object nor a "law" about a class. It is no indictment of Newton's Law that it fails to say anything significant about apples, because its significance resides precisely in the fact that it abstracted from the apples both their "uniqueness", their individual appearance in time, and their "appleness", their appearance as members of a class, through the recognition of a formal relationship of "falling bodies". Similarly, it is no objection to a study of international relations in terms of history to point out that Napoleon is not exactly equivalent to Hitler or Castlereagh to Churchill. Whatever relationship exists depends, not on a precise correspondence, but on a similarity of the problems confronted. And the conclusions will reflect—just as with any other generalization—the ability to abstract from the uniqueness of individual experience.

A physical law is an explanation and not a description, and history teaches by analogy, not identity. This means that the lessons of history are never automatic, that they can be apprehended only by a standard which admits the significance of a range of experience, that the answers we obtain will never be better than the questions we pose. No profound conclusions were drawn in the natural sciences before the *significance* of sensory experience was admitted by what was essentially a moral act. No significant conclusions are possible in the study of foreign affairs—the study of states acting as units—without an awareness of the historical context. For societies exist in time more than in space. At any given moment a state is but a collection of individuals, as positivist scholars have never wearied of pointing out. But it achieves identity through the consciousness of a common history. This is the only "experience" nations have, their only possibility of learning from themselves. History is the memory of states.

To be sure, states tend to be forgetful. It is not often that nations learn from the past, even rarer that they draw the correct conclusions from it. For the lessons of historical experience, as of personal experience, are contingent. They teach the consequences of certain actions, but they cannot force a recognition of comparable situations. An individual may have experienced that a hot stove burns but, when confronted with a metallic object of a certain size, he must decide from case to case whether it is in fact a stove before his knowledge will prove useful. A people may be aware of the probable consequences of a revolutionary situation. But its knowledge will be empty if it cannot *recognize* a revolutionary situation. There is this difference between physical and historical knowledge, however: each generation is permitted only one effort of abstraction; it can attempt only one interpretation and a single experiment, for it is its own subject. This is the challenge of history and its tragedy; it is the shape "destiny" assumes on the earth. And its solution, even its recognition, is perhaps the most difficult task of statesmanship.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy

I. *The Role of Domestic Structure*

IN THE traditional conception, international relations are conducted by political units treated almost as personalities. The domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.

But this approach is appropriate only to stable periods because then the various components of the international system generally have similar conceptions of the "rules of the game." If the domestic structures are based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develops. If domestic structures are reasonably stable, temptations to use an adventurous foreign policy to achieve domestic cohesion are at a minimum. In these conditions, leaders will generally apply the same criteria and hold similar views about what constitutes a "reasonable" demand. This does not guarantee agreement, but it provides the condition for a meaningful dialogue, that is, it sets the stage for traditional diplomacy.

When the domestic structures are based on fundamentally different conceptions of what is just, the conduct of international affairs grows more complex. Then it becomes difficult even to define the nature of disagreement because what seems most obvious to one side appears most problematic to the other. A policy dilemma arises because the pros and cons of a given course seem evenly balanced. The definition of what constitutes a problem and what criteria are relevant in "solving" it reflects to a considerable extent the domestic notions of what is just, the pressures produced by the decision-making process, and the experience which forms the leaders in their rise to eminence. When domestic structures—and the concept of legitimacy on which they are based—differ widely, statesmen can still meet, but their ability to persuade has been reduced for they no longer speak the same language.

This can occur even when no universal claims are made. Incompatible domestic structures can passively generate a gulf, simply because of the difficulty of achieving a consensus about the nature of "reasonable" aims and methods. But when one or more states claim universal applicability for their particular structure, schisms grow deep indeed. In that event, the domestic structure becomes not only an obstacle to understanding but one of the principal issues in international affairs. Its requirements condition the conception of alternatives; survival seems involved in every dispute. The symbolic aspect of foreign policy begins to overshadow the substantive component. It becomes difficult to consider a dispute "on its merits" because the disagreement seems finally to turn not on a specific issue but on a set of values as expressed in domestic arrangements. The consequences of such a state of affairs were explained by Edmund Burke during the French Revolution:

> I never thought we could make peace with the system; because it was not for the sake of an object we pursued in rivalry with each other, but with the system itself that we were at war. As I understood the matter, we were at war not with its conduct but with its existence; convinced that its existence and its hostility were the same.[1]

Of course, the domestic structure is not irrelevant in any historical period. At a minimum, it determines the amount of the total social effort which can be devoted to foreign policy. The wars of the kings who governed by divine right were limited because feudal rulers, bound by customary law, could not levy income taxes or conscript their subjects. The French Revolution, which based its policy on a doctrine of popular will, mobilized resources on a truly national scale for the first time. This was one of the principal reasons for the startling successes of French arms against a hostile Europe which possessed greater over-all power. The ideological regimes of the twentieth century have utilized a still larger share of the national effort. This has enabled them to hold their own against an environment possessing far superior resources.

Aside from the allocation of resources, the domestic structure crucially affects the way the actions of other states are interpreted. To some extent, of course, every society finds itself in an environment not of its own making and has some of the main lines of its foreign policy imposed on it. Indeed, the pressure of the environment can grow so strong that it permits only one interpretation of its significance; Prussia in the eighteenth century and Israel in the contemporary period may have found themselves in this position.

But for the majority of states the margin of decision has been greater. The actual choice has been determined to a considerable degree by their interpretation of the environment and by their leaders' conception of alternatives. Napoleon rejected peace offers beyond the dreams of the kings who had ruled France by "divine right" because he was convinced that *any* settlement which demonstrated the limitations of his power was tantamount to his downfall. That Russia seeks to surround itself with a belt of friendly states in Eastern Europe is a product of geography and history. That it is attempting to do so by imposing a domestic structure based on a particular ideology is a result of conceptions supplied by its domestic structure.

The domestic structure is decisive finally in the elaboration of positive goals. The most difficult, indeed tragic, aspect of foreign policy is how to deal with the problem of conjecture. When the scope for action is greatest, knowledge on which to base such action is small or ambiguous. When knowledge becomes available, the ability to affect events is usually at a minimum. In 1936, no one could know whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac. By the time certainty was achieved, it had to be paid for with millions of lives.

The conjectural element of foreign policy—the need to gear actions to an assessment that cannot be proved true when it is made—is never more crucial than in a revolutionary period. Then, the old order is obviously disintegrating while the shape of its replacement is highly uncertain. Everything depends, therefore, on some conception of the future. But varying domestic structures can easily produce different assessments of the significance of existing trends and, more importantly, clashing criteria for resolving these differences. This is the dilemma of our time.

Problems are novel; their scale is vast; their nature is often abstract and always psychological. In the past, international relations were confined to a limited geographic area. The various continents pursued their relations essentially in isolation from each other. Until the eighteenth century, other continents impinged on Europe only sporadically and for relatively brief periods. And when Europe extended its sway over much of the world, foreign policy became limited to the Western Powers with the single exception of Japan. The international system of the nineteenth century was to all practical purposes identical with the concert of Europe.

The period after World War II marks the first era of truly global foreign policy. Each major state is capable of producing consequences in every part of the globe by a direct application of its power or because ideas can be transmitted almost instantaneously or because ideological rivalry gives vast symbolic significance even to issues which are minor in geopolitical terms. The mere act of adjusting perspectives to so huge a scale would produce major dislocations. This problem is compounded by the emergence of so many new states. Since 1945, the number of participants in the international system has nearly doubled. In previous periods the addition of even one or two new states tended to lead to decades of instability until a new equilibrium was established and accepted. The emergence of scores of new states has magnified this difficulty many times over.

These upheavals would be challenge enough, but they are overshadowed by the risks posed by modern technology. Peace is maintained through the threat of mutual destruction based on weapons for which there has been no operational experience. Deterrence—the policy of preventing an action by confronting the opponent with risks he is unwilling to run—depends in the first instance on psychological criteria. What the potential aggressor believes is more crucial than what is objectively true. Deterrence occurs above all in the minds of men.

To achieve an international consensus on the significance of these developments would be a major task even if domestic structures were comparable. It becomes especially difficult when domestic structures differ widely and when universal claims are made on behalf of them. A systematic assessment of the impact of domestic structure on the conduct of international affairs would have to treat such factors as historical traditions, social values, and the economic system. But this would far transcend the scope of an article. For the purposes of this discussion we shall confine ourselves to sketching the impact of two factors only: administrative structure and the formative experience of leadership groups.

II. *The Impact of the Administrative Structure*

In the contemporary period, the very nature of the governmental structure introduces an element of rigidity which operates more or less independently of the convictions of statesmen or the ideology which they represent. Issues are too complex and relevant facts too manifold to be dealt with on the basis of personal intuition. An institutionalization of decision-making is an inevitable by-product of the risks of international affairs in the nuclear age. Moreover, almost every modern state is dedicated to some theory of "planning" —the attempt to structure the future by understanding and, if necessary, manipulating the environment. Planning involves a quest for predictability and, above all, for "objectivity." There is a deliberate effort to reduce the relevant elements of a problem to a standard of average performance. The vast bureaucratic mechanisms that emerge develop a momentum and a vested interest of their own. As they grow more complex, their internal standards of operation are not necessarily commensurable with those of other countries or even with other bureaucratic structures in the same country. There is a trend toward autarky. A paradoxical consequence may be that increased control over the domestic environment is purchased at the price of loss of flexibility in international affairs.

The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems. A bureaucracy is efficient if the matters which it handles routinely are, in fact, the most frequent and if its procedures are relevant to their solution. If those criteria are met, the energies of the top leadership are freed to deal creatively with the unexpected occurrence or with the need for innovation. Bureaucracy becomes an obstacle when what it defines as routine does not address the most significant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves irrelevant to the problem.

When this occurs, the bureaucracy absorbs the energies of top executives in reconciling what is expected with what happens; the analysis of where one is overwhelms the consideration of where one should be going. Serving the machine becomes a more absorbing occupation than defining its purpose. Success consists in moving the administrative machine to the point of decision, leaving relatively little energy for analyzing the merit of this decision. The quest for "objectivity"—while desirable theoretically—involves the danger that means and ends are confused, that an average standard of performance is exalted as the only valid one. Attention tends to be diverted from the act of choice—which is the ultimate test of statesmanship—to the accumulation of facts. Decisions can be avoided until a crisis brooks no further delay, until the events themselves have removed the element of ambiguity. But at that point the scope for constructive action is at a minimum. Certainty is purchased at the cost of creativity.

Something like this seems to be characteristic of modern bureaucratic states whatever their ideology. In societies with a pragmatic tradition, such as the United States, there develops a greater concern with an analysis of where one is than where one is going. What passes for planning is frequently the projection of the familiar into the future. In societies based on ideology, doctrine is institutionalized and exegesis takes the place of innovation. Creativity must make so many concessions to orthodoxy that it may exhaust itself in doctrinal adaptations. In short, the accumulation of knowledge of the bureaucracy and the impersonality of its method of arriving at decisions can be achieved at a high price. Decision-making can grow so complex that the process of producing a bureaucratic consensus may overshadow the purpose of the effort.

While all thoughtful administrators would grant in the abstract that these dangers exist, they find it difficult to act on their knowledge. Lip service is paid to planning; indeed planning staffs proliferate. However, they suffer from two debilities. The "operating" elements may not take the planning effort seriously. Plans become esoteric exercises which are accepted largely because they imply no practical consequence. They are a sop to administrative theory. At the same time, since planning staffs have a high incentive to try to be "useful," there is a bias against novel conceptions which are difficult to adapt to an administrative mold. It is one thing to assign an individual or a group the task of looking ahead; this is a far cry from providing an environment which encourages an understanding for deeper historical, sociological, and economic trends. The need to provide a memorandum may outweigh the imperatives of creative thought. The quest for objectivity creates a temptation to see in the future an updated version of the present. Yet true innovation is bound to run counter to prevailing standards. The dilemma of modern bureaucracy is that while every creative act is lonely, not every lonely act is creative. Formal criteria are little help in solving this problem because the unique cannot be expressed "objectively."

The rigidity in the policies of the technologically advanced societies is in no small part due to the complexity of decision-making. Crucial problems may—and frequently do—go unrecognized for a long time. But once the decision-making apparatus has disgorged a policy, it becomes very difficult to change it. The alternative to the *status quo* is the prospect of repeating the whole anguishing process of arriving at decisions. This explains to some extent the curious phenomenon that decisions taken with enormous doubt and perhaps with a close division become practically sacrosanct once adopted. The whole administrative machinery swings behind their implementation as if activity could still all doubts.

Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political survival, of most leaders depends on their ability to realize their goals, however these may have been arrived at. Whether these goals are desirable is relatively less crucial. The time span by which administrative success is measured is considerably shorter than that by which historical achievement is determined. In heavily bureaucratized societies all pressures emphasize the first of these accomplishments.

Then, too, the staffs on which modern executives come to depend develop a momentum of their own. What starts out as an aid to decision-makers often turns into a practically autonomous organization whose internal problems structure and sometimes compound the issues which it was originally designed to solve. The decision-maker will always be aware of the morale of his staff. Though he has the authority, he cannot overrule it too frequently without impairing its efficiency; and he may, in any event, lack the knowledge to do so. Placating the staff then becomes a major preoccupation of the executive. A form of administrative democracy results, in which a decision often reflects an attainable consensus rather than substantive conviction (or at least the two imperceptibly merge). The internal requirements of the bureaucracy may come to predominate over the purposes which it was intended to serve. This is probably even more true in highly institutionalized Communist states—such as the U.S.S.R.—than in the United States.

When the administrative machine grows very elaborate, the various levels of the decision-making process are separated by chasms which are obscured from the outside world by the complexity of the apparatus. Research often becomes a means to buy time and to assuage consciences. Studying a problem can turn into an escape from coming to grips with it. In the process, the gap between the technical competence of research staffs and what hard-pressed political leaders are capable of absorbing widens constantly. This heightens the insecurity of the executive and may thus compound either rigidity or arbitrariness or both. In many fields—strategy being a prime example—decision-makers may find it difficult to give as many hours to a problem as the expert has had years to study it. The ultimate decision often depends less on knowledge than on the ability to brief the top administrator—to present the facts in such a way that they can be absorbed rapidly. The effectiveness of briefing, however, puts a premium on theatrical qualities. Not everything that sounds plausible is correct, and many things which are correct may not sound plausible when they are first presented; and a second hearing is rare. The stage aspect of briefing may leave the decision-maker with a gnawing feeling of having been taken—even, and perhaps especially, when he does not know quite how.

Sophistication may thus encourage paralysis or a crude popularization which defeats its own purpose. The excessively theoretical approach of many research staffs overlooks the problem of the strain of decision-making in times of crisis. What is relevant for policy depends not only on academic truth but also on what can be implemented under stress. The technical staffs are frequently operating in a framework of theoretical standards while in fact their usefulness depends on essentially psychological criteria. To be politically meaningful, their proposals must involve answers to the following types of questions: Does the executive understand the proposal? Does he believe in it? Does he accept it as a guide to action or as an excuse for doing nothing? But if these kinds of concerns are given too much weight, the requirements of salesmanship will defeat substance.

The pragmatism of executives thus clashes with the theoretical bent of research or planning staffs. Executives as a rule take cognizance of a problem only when it emerges as an administrative issue. They thus unwittingly encourage bureaucratic contests as the only means of generating decisions. Or the various elements of the bureaucracy make a series of nonaggression pacts with each other and thus reduce the decision-maker to a benevolent constitutional monarch. As the special role of the executive increasingly becomes to choose between proposals generated administratively, decision-makers turn into arbiters rather than leaders. Whether they wait until a problem emerges as an administrative issue or until a crisis has demonstrated the irrelevance of the standard operating procedure, the modern decision-makers often find themselves the prisoners of their advisers.

Faced with an administrative machine which is both elaborate and fragmented, the executive is forced into essentially lateral means of control. Many of his public pronouncements, though ostensibly directed to outsiders, perform a perhaps more important role in laying down guidelines for the bureaucracy. The chief significance of a foreign policy speech by the President may thus be that it settles an internal debate in Washington (a public statement is more useful for this purpose than an administrative memorandum because it is harder to reverse). At the same time, the bureaucracy's awareness of this method of control tempts it to shortcut its debates by using pronouncements by the decision-makers as charters for special purposes. The executive thus finds himself confronted by proposals for public declarations which may be innocuous in themselves—and whose bureaucratic significance may be anything but obvious—but which can be used by some agency or department to launch a study or program which will restrict his freedom of decision later on.

All of this drives the executive in the direction of extra-bureaucratic means of decision. The practice of relying on special emissaries or personal envoys is an example; their status outside the bureaucracy frees them from some of its restraints. International agreements are sometimes possible only by ignoring safeguards against capricious action. It is a paradoxical aspect of modern bureaucracies that their quest for objectivity and calculability often leads to impasses which can be overcome only by essentially arbitrary decisions.

Such a mode of operation would involve a great risk of stagnation even in "normal" times. It becomes especially dangerous in a revolutionary period. For then, the problems which are most obtrusive may be least relevant. The issues which are most significant may not be suitable for administrative formulation and even when formulated may not lend themselves to bureaucratic consensus. When the issue is how to transform the existing framework, routine can become an additional obstacle to both comprehension and action.

This problem, serious enough *within* each society, is magnified in the conduct of international affairs. While the formal machinery of decision-making in developed countries shows many similarities, the criteria which influence decisions vary enormously. With each administrative machine increasingly absorbed in its own internal problems, diplomacy loses its flexibility. Leaders are extremely aware of the problems of placating their own bureaucracy; they cannot depart too far from its prescriptions without raising serious morale problems. Decisions are reached so painfully that the very anguish of decision-making acts as a brake on the give-and-take of traditional diplomacy.

This is true even *within* alliances. Meaningful consultation with other nations becomes very difficult when the internal process of decision-making already has some of the characteristics of compacts between quasi-sovereign entities. There is an increasing reluctance to hazard a hard-won domestic consensus in an international forum.

What is true within alliances—that is, among nations which have at least some common objectives—becomes even more acute in relations between antagonistic states or blocs. The gap created when two large bureaucracies generate goals largely in isolation from each other and on the basis of not necessarily commensurable criteria is magnified considerably by an ideological schism. The degree of ideological fervor is not decisive; the problem would exist even if the original ideological commitment had declined on either or both sides. The criteria for bureaucratic decision-making may continue to be influenced by ideology even after its élan has dissipated. Bureaucratic structures generate their own momentum which may more than counterbalance the loss of earlier fanaticism. In the early stages of a revolutionary movement, ideology is crucial and the accident of personalities can be decisive. The Reign of Terror in France was ended by the elimination of a single man, Robespierre. The Bolshevik revolution could hardly have taken place had Lenin not been on the famous train which crossed Germany into Russia. But once a revolution becomes institutionalized, the administrative structures which it has spawned develop their own vested interests. Ideology may grow less significant in creating commitment; it becomes pervasive in supplying criteria of administrative choice. Ideologies prevail by being taken for granted. Orthodoxy substitutes for conviction and produces its own form of rigidity.

In such circumstances, a meaningful dialogue across ideological dividing lines becomes extraordinarily difficult. The more elaborate the administrative structure, the less relevant an individual's view becomes—indeed one of the purposes of bureaucracy is to liberate decision-making from the accident of personalities. Thus while personal convictions may be modified, it requires a really monumental effort to alter bureaucratic commitments. And if change occurs, the bureaucracy prefers to move at its own pace and not be excessively influenced by statements or pressures of foreigners. For all these reasons, diplomacy tends to become rigid or to turn into an abstract bargaining process based on largely formal criteria such as "splitting the difference." Either course is self-defeating: the former because it negates the very purpose of diplomacy; the latter because it subordinates purpose to technique and because it may encourage intransigence. Indeed, the incentive for intransigence increases if it is known that the difference will generally be split.

Ideological differences are compounded because major parts of the world are only in the first stages of administrative evolution. Where the technologically advanced countries suffer from the inertia of overadministration, the developing areas often lack even the rudiments of effective bureaucracy. Where the advanced countries may drown in "facts," the emerging nations are frequently without the most elementary knowledge needed for forming a meaningful judgment or for implementing it once it has been taken. Where large bureaucracies operate in alternating spurts of rigidity and catastrophic (in relation to the bureaucracy) upheaval, the new states tend to take decisions on the basis of almost random pressures. The excessive institutionalization of one and the inadequate structure of the other inhibit international stability.

III. *The Nature of Leadership*

Whatever one's view about the degree to which choices in international affairs are "objectively" determined, the decisions are made by individuals who will be above all conscious of the seeming multiplicity of options. Their understanding of the nature of their choice depends on many factors, including their experience during the rise to eminence.

The mediating, conciliatory style of British policy in the nineteenth century reflected, in part, the qualities encouraged during careers in Parliament and the values of a cohesive leadership group connected by ties of family and common education. The hysterical cast of the policy of Imperial Germany was given impetus by a domestic structure in which political parties were deprived of responsibility while ministers were obliged to balance a monarch by divine right against a Parliament composed of representatives without any prospect of ever holding office. Consensus could be achieved most easily through fits of national passion which in turn disquieted all of Germany's neighbors. Germany's foreign policy grew unstable because its domestic structure did little to discourage capricious improvisations; it may even have put a premium on them.

The collapse of the essentially aristocratic conception of foreign policy of the nineteenth century has made the career experiences of leaders even more crucial. An aristocracy—if it lives up to its values—will reject the arbitrariness of absolutist rule; and it will base itself on a notion of quality which discourages the temptations of demagoguery inherent in plebiscitarian democracy. Where position is felt to be a birthright, generosity is possible (though not guaranteed); flexibility is not inhibited by a commitment to perpetual success. Where a leader's estimate of himself is not completely dependent on his standing in an administrative structure, measures can be judged in terms of a conception of the future rather than of an almost compulsive desire to avoid even a temporary setback. When statesmen belonged to a community transcending national boundaries, there tended to be consensus on the criteria of what constituted a reasonable proposal. This did not prevent conflicts, but it did define their nature and encourage dialogue. The bane of aristocratic foreign policy was the risk of frivolousness, of a self-confidence unrelated to knowledge, and of too much emphasis on intuition.

In any event, ours is the age of the expert or the charismatic leader. The expert has his constituency—those who have a vested interest in commonly held opinions; elaborating and defining its consensus at a high level has, after all, made him an expert. Since the expert is often the product of the administrative dilemmas described earlier, he is usually in a poor position to transcend them. The charismatic leader, on the other hand, needs a perpetual revolution to maintain his position. Neither the expert nor the charismatic leader operates in an environment which puts a premium on long-range conceptions or on generosity or on subordinating the leader's ego to purposes which transcend his own career.

Leadership groups are formed by at least three factors: their experiences during their rise to eminence; the structure in which they must operate; the values of their society. Three contemporary types will be discussed here: (a) the bureaucratic-pragmatic type, (b) the ideological type, and (c) the revolutionary-charismatic type.

Bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership. The main example of this type of leadership is the American élite—though the leadership groups of other Western countries increasingly approximate the American pattern. Shaped by a society without fundamental social schisms (at least until the race problem became visible) and the product of an environment in which most recognized problems have proved soluble, its approach to policy is *ad hoc*, pragmatic, and somewhat mechanical.

Because pragmatism is based on the conviction that the context of events produces a solution, there is a tendency to await developments. The belief is prevalent that every problem will yield if attacked with sufficient energy. It is inconceivable, therefore, that delay might result in irretrievable disaster; at worst it is thought to require a redoubled effort later on. Problems are segmented into constitutent elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. There is little emphasis or concern for their interrelationship. Technical issues enjoy more careful attention, and receive more sophisticated treatment, than political ones. Though the importance of intangibles is affirmed in theory, it is difficult to obtain a consensus on which factors are significant and even harder to find a meaningful mode for dealing with them. Things are done because one knows how to do them and not because one ought to do them. The criteria for dealing with trends which are conjectural are less well developed than those for immediate crises. Pragmatism, at least in its generally accepted form, is more concerned with method than with judgment; or rather it seeks to reduce judgment to methodology and value to knowledge.

This is reinforced by the special qualities of the professions—law and business—which furnish the core of the leadership groups in America. Lawyers—at least in the Anglo-Saxon tradition—prefer to deal with actual rather than hypothetical cases; they have little confidence in the possiblity of stating a future issue abstractly. But planning by its very nature is hypothetical. Its success depends precisely on the ability to transcend the existing framework. Lawyers may be prepared to undertake this task; but they will do well in it only to the extent that they are able to overcome the special qualities encouraged by their profession. What comes naturally to lawyers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition is the sophisticated analysis of a series of *ad hoc* issues which emerge as problems through adversary proceedings. In so far as lawyers draw on the experience which forms them, they have a bias toward awaiting developments and toward operating within the definition of the problem as formulated by its chief spokesmen.

This has several consequences. It compounds the already powerful tendencies within American society to identify foreign policy with the solution of immediate issues. It produces great refinement of issues as they arise, but it also encourages the administrative dilemmas described earlier. Issues are dealt with only as the pressure of events imposes the need for resolving them. Then, each of the contending factions within the bureaucracy has a maximum incentive to state its case in its most extreme form because the ultimate outcome depends, to a considerable extent, on a bargaining process. The premium placed on advocacy turns decision-making into a series of adjustments among special interests—a process more suited to domestic than to foreign policy. This procedure neglects the long-range because the future has no administrative constituency and is, therefore, without representation in the adversary proceedings. Problems tend to be slighted until some agency or department is made responsible for them. When this occurs—usually when a difficulty has already grown acute—the relevant department becomes an all-out spokesman for its particular area of responsibility. The outcome usually depends more on the pressures or the persuasiveness of the contending advocates than on a concept of over-all purpose. While these tendencies exist to some extent in all bureaucracies they are particularly pronounced in the American system of government.

This explains in part the peculiar alternation of rigidity and spasms of flexibility in Amercan diplomacy. On a given issue—be it the Berlin crisis or disarmament or the war in Viet-Nam—there generally exists a great reluctance to develop a negotiating position or a statement of objectives except in the most general terms. This stems from a desire not to prejudge the process of negotiations and above all to retain flexibility in the face of unforeseeable events. But when an approaching conference or some other pressures make the development of a position imperative and some office or individual is assigned the specific task, a sudden change occurs. Both personal and bureaucratic success are then identified with bringing the particular assignment to a conclusion. Where so much stock is placed in negotiating skill, a failure of a conference may be viewed as a reflection on the ability of the negotiator rather than on the objective difficulty of the subject. Confidence in the bargaining process causes American negotiators to be extremely sensitive to the tactical requirements of the conference table—sometimes at the expense of longer-term considerations. In internal discussions, American negotiators—generally irrespective of their previous commitments—often become advocates for the maximum range of concessions; their legal background tempts them to act as mediators between Washington and the country with which they are negotiating.

The attitudes of the business élite reinforce the convictions of the legal profession. The American business executive rises through a process of selection which rewards the ability to manipulate the known—in itself a conciliatory procedure. The special skill of the executive is thought to consist in coordinating well-defined functions rather than in challenging them. The procedure is relatively effective in the business world, where the executive can often substitute decisiveness, long experience, and a wide range of personal acquaintance for reflectiveness. In international affairs, however—especially in a revolutionary situation—the strong will which is one of our business executives' notable traits may produce essentially arbitrary choices. Or unfamiliarity with the subject matter may have the opposite effect of turning the executive into a spokesman of his technical staffs. In either case, the business executive is even more dependent than the lawyer on the bureaucracy's formulation of the issue. The business élite is even less able or willing than the lawyer to recognize that the formulation of an issue, not the technical remedy, is usually the central problem.

All this gives American policy its particular cast. Problems are dealt with as they arise. Agreement on what constitutes a problem generally depends on an emerging crisis which settles the previously inconclusive disputes about priorities. When a problem is recognized, it is dealt with by a mobilization of all resources to overcome the immediate symptoms. This often involves the risk of slighting longer-term issues which may not yet have assumed crisis proportions and of overwhelming, perhaps even undermining, the structure of the area concerned by a flood of American technical experts proposing remedies on an American scale. Administrative decisions emerge from a compromise of conflicting pressures in which accidents of personality or persuasiveness play a crucial role. The compromise often reflects the maxim that "if two parties disagree the truth is usually somewhere in between." But the pedantic application of such truisms causes the various contenders to exaggerate their positions for bargaining purposes or to construct fictitious extremes to make their position appear moderate. In either case, internal bargaining predominates over substance.

The *ad hoc* tendency of our decision-makers and the reliance on adversary proceeding cause issues to be stated in black and white terms. This suppresses a feeling for nuance and makes it difficult to recognize the relationship between seemingly discrete events. Even with the perspective of a decade there is little consensus about the relationship between the actions culminating in the Suez fiasco and the French decision to enter the nuclear field; or about the inconsistency between the neutralization of Laos and the step-up of the military effort in Viet-Nam.

The same quality also produces a relatively low valuation of historical factors. Nations are treated as similar phenomena, and those states presenting similar immediate problems are treated similarly. Since many of our policy-makers first address themselves to an issue when it emerges as their area of responsibility, their approach to it is often highly anecdotal. Great weight is given to what people say and relatively little to the significance of these affirmations in terms of domestic structure or historical background. Agreement may be taken at face value and seen as reflecting more consensus than actually exists. Opposition tends to produce moral outrage which often assumes the form of personal animosity—the attitude of some American policy-makers toward President de Gaulle is a good example.

The legal background of our policy-makers produces a bias in favor of constitutional solutions. The issue of supra-nationalism or confederalism in Europe has been discussed largely in terms of the right of countries to make independent decisions. Much less weight has been given to the realities which would limit the application of a majority vote against a major country whatever the legal arrangements. (The fight over the application of Article 19 of the United Nations Charter was based on the same attitude.) Similarly, legal terms such as "integration" and "assignment" sometimes become ends in themselves and thus obscure the operational reality to which they refer. In short, the American leadership groups show high competence in dealing with technical issues, and much less virtuosity in mastering a historical process. And the policies of other Western countries exhibit variations of the American pattern. A lesser pragmatism in continental Europe is counter-balanced by a smaller ability to play a world-role.

The ideological type of leadership. As has been discussed above, the impact of ideology can persist long after its initial fervor has been spent. Whatever the ideological commitment of individual leaders, a lifetime spent in the Communist hierarchy must influence their basic categories of thought—especially since Communist ideology continues to perform important functions. It still furnishes the standard of truth and the guarantee of ultimate success. It provides a means for maintaining cohesion among the various Communist parties of the world. It supplies criteria for the settlement of disputes both within the bureaucracy of individual Communist countries and among the various Communist states.

However attenuated, Communist ideology is, in part, responsible for international tensions. This is less because of specific Marxist tactical prescriptions—with respect to which Communists have shown a high degree of flexibility—than because of the basic Marxist-Leninist categories for interpreting reality. Communist leaders never tire of affirming that Marxism-Leninism is the key element of their self-proclaimed superiority over the outside world; as Marxist-Leninists they are convinced that they understand the historical process better than the non-Communist world does.

The essence of Marxism-Leninism—and the reason that normal diplomacy with Communist states is so difficult—is the view that "objective" factors such as the social structure, the economic process, and, above all, the class struggle are more important than the personal convictions of statesmen. Belief in the predominance of objective factors explains the Soviet approach to the problem of security. If personal convictions are "subjective," Soviet security cannot be allowed to rest on the good will of other statesmen, especially those of a different social system. This produces a quest for what may be described as absolute security—the attempt to be so strong as to be independent of the decisions of other countries. But absolute security for one country means absolute insecurity for all others; it can be achieved only by reducing other states to impotence. Thus an essentially defensive foreign policy can grow indistinguishable from traditional aggression.

The belief in the predominance of objective factors explains why, in the past, periods of détente have proved so precarious. When there is a choice between Western good will or a physical gain, the pressures to choose the latter have been overwhelming. The wartime friendship with the West was sacrificed to the possibility of establishing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of undermining the Western position in the Middle East. The many overtures of the Kennedy administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable for a test of strength.

The reliance on objective factors has complicated negotiations between the West and the Communist countries. Communist negotiators find it difficult to admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of men who have, by definition, an inferior grasp of the laws of historical development. No matter what is said, they think that they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. Concessions are possible, but they are made to "reality," not to individuals or to a bargaining process. Diplomacy becomes difficult when one of the parties considers the key element to negotiation—the give-and-take of the process of bargaining—as but a superstructure for factors not part of the negotiation itself.

Finally, whatever the decline in ideological fervor, orthodoxy requires the maintenance of a posture of ideological hostility to the non-Communist world even during a period of coexistence. Thus, in a reply to a Chinese challenge, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. declared: "We fully support the destruction of capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism but we are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible."[2]

The wariness toward the outside world is reinforced by the personal experiences which Communist leaders have had on the road to eminence. In a system where there is no legitimate succession, a great deal of energy is absorbed in internal maneuvering. Leaders rise to the top by eliminating—sometimes physically, always bureaucratically—all possible opponents. Stalin had all individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich, whose protegé he had been, and turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his other colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they nevertheless overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, dedicated, and, above all, motivated by an enormous desire for power. Nothing in the personal experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to accept protestations of good will at face value. Suspiciousness is inherent in their domestic position. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world is more benign than toward their own colleagues or that they would expect more consideration from it.

The combination of personal qualities and ideological structure also affects relations *among* Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear wherever Socialism has triumphed. When disagreements occur they are dealt with by analogy to internal Communist disputes: by attempting to ostracize and then to destroy the opponent. The tendency to treat different opinions as manifestations of heresy causes disagreements to harden into bitter schisms. The debate between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. is in many respects more acrimonious than that between the U.S.S.R. and the non-Communist world.

Even though the basic conceptual categories of Communist leadership groups are similar, the impact of the domestic structure of the individual Communist states on international relations varies greatly. It makes a considerable difference whether an ideology has become institutionalized, as in the Soviet Union, or whether it is still impelled by its early revolutionary fervor, as in Communist China. Where ideology has become institutionalized a special form of pragmatism may develop. It may be just as empirical as that of the United States but it will operate in a different realm of "reality." A different philosophical basis leads to the emergence of another set of categories for the settlement of disputes, and these in turn generate another range of problems.

A Communist bureaucratic structure, however pragmatic, will have different priorities from ours; it will give greater weight to doctrinal considerations and conceptual problems. It is more than ritual when speeches of senior Soviet leaders begin with hour-long recitals of Communist ideology. Even if it were ritual, it must affect the definition of what is considered reasonable in internal arguments. Bureaucratization and pragmatism may lead to a loss of élan; they do not guarantee convergence of Western and Soviet thinking.

The more revolutionary manifestations of Communism, such as Communist China, still possess more ideological fervor, but, paradoxically, their structure may permit a wider latitude for new departures. Tactical intransigence and ideological vitality should not be confused with structural rigidity. Because the leadership bases its rule on a prestige which transcends bureaucratic authority, it has not yet given so many hostages to the administrative structure. If the leadership should change—or if its attitudes are modified—policy could probably be altered much more dramatically in Communist China than in the more institutionalized Communist countries.

The charismatic-revolutionary type of leadership. The contemporary international order is heavily influenced by yet another leadership type: the charismatic-revolutionary leader. For many of the leaders of the new nations the bureaucratic-pragmatic approach of the West is irrelevant because they are more interested in the future which they wish to construct than in the manipulation of the environment which dominates the thinking of the pragmatists. And ideology is not satisfactory because doctrine supplies rigid categories which overshadow the personal experiences which have provided the impetus for so many of the leaders of the new nations.

The type of individual who leads a struggle for independence has been sustained in the risks and suffering of such a course primarily by a commitment to a vision which enabled him to override conditions which had seemed overwhelmingly hostile. Revolutionaries are rarely motivated primarily by material considerations—though the illusion that they are persists in the West. Material incentives do not cause a man to risk his existence and to launch himself into the uncertainties of a revolutionary struggle. If Castro or Sukarno had been principally interested in economics, their talents would have guaranteed them a brillant career in the societies they overthrew. What made their sacrifices worthwhile to them was a vision of the future—or a quest for political power. To revolutionaries the significant reality is the world which they are striving to bring about, not the world they are fighting to overcome.

This difference in perspective accounts for the inconclusiveness of much of the dialogue between the West and many of the leaders of the new countries. The West has a tendency to believe that the tensions in the emerging nations are caused by a low level of economic activity. To the apostles of economic development, raising the gross national product seems the key to political stability. They believe that it should receive the highest priority from the political leaders of new countries and supply their chief motivation.

But to the charismatic heads of many of the new nations, economic progress, while not unwelcome, offers too limited a scope for their ambitions. It can be achieved only by slow, painful, highly technical measures which contrast with the heroic exertions of the struggle for independence. Results are long-delayed; credit for them cannot be clearly established. If Castro were to act on the advice of theorists of economic development, the best he could hope for would be that after some decades he would lead a small progressive country—perhaps a Switzerland of the Caribbean. Compared to the prospect of leading a revolution throughout Latin America, this goal would appear trivial, boring, perhaps even unreal to him.

Moreover, to the extent that economic progress is achieved, it may magnify domestic political instability, at least in its early phases. Economic advance disrupts the traditional political structure. It thus places constant pressures on the incumbent leaders to re-establish the legitimacy of their rule. For this purpose a dramatic foreign policy is particularly apt. Many leaders of the new countries seem convinced that an adventurous foreign policy will not harm prospects for economic development and may even foster it. The competition of the superpowers makes it likely that economic assistance will be forthcoming regardless of the actions of the recipient. Indeed the more obstrusive their foreign policy the greater is their prospect of being wooed by the chief contenders.

The tendency toward a reckless policy is magnified by the uncertain sense of identity of many of the new nations. National boundaries often correspond to the administrative subdivisions established by the former colonial rulers. States thus have few of the attributes of nineteenth-century European nationalism: common language, common culture, or even common history. In many cases, the only common experience is a century or so of imperial rule. As a result, there is a great pressure toward authoritarian rule, and a high incentive to use foreign policy as a means of bringing about domestic cohesion.

Western-style democracy presupposes that society transcends the political realm; in that case opposition challenges a particular method of achieving common aims but not the existence of the state itself. In many of the new countries, by contrast, the state represents the primary, sometimes the sole, manifestation of social cohesion. Opposition can therefore easily appear as treason—apart from the fact that leaders who have spent several decades running the risks of revolutionary struggle or who have achieved power by a coup d'état are not likely to favor a system of government which makes them dispensable. Indeed the attraction of Communism for many of these leaders is not Marxist-Leninist economic theory but the legitimacy for authoritarian rule which it provides.

No matter what the system of government, many of the leaders of the new nations use foreign policy as a means to escape intractable internal difficulties and as a device to achieve domestic cohesion. The international arena provides an opportunity for the dramatic measures which are impossible at home. These are often cast in an anti-Western mold because this is the easiest way to recreate the struggle against imperial rule which is the principal unifying element for many new nations. The incentive is particularly strong because the rivalry of the nuclear powers eliminates many of the risks which previously were associated with an adventurous foreign policy—especially if that foreign policy is directed against the West which lacks any effective sanctions.

Traditional military pressure is largely precluded by the nuclear stalemate and respect for world opinion. But the West is neither prepared nor able to use the sanction which weighs most heavily on the new countries: the deliberate exploitation of their weak domestic structure. In many areas the ability to foment domestic unrest is a more potent weapon than traditional arms. Many of the leaders of the new countries will be prepared to ignore the classical panoply of power; but they will be very sensitive to the threat of domestic upheaval. States with a high capacity for exploiting domestic instability can use it as a tool of foreign policy. China, though lacking almost all forms of classical long-range military strength, is a growing factor in Africa. Weak states may be more concerned with a country's capacity to organize domestic unrest in their territory than with its capacity for physical destruction.

Conclusion. Contemporary domestic structures thus present an unprecedented challenge to the emergence of a stable international order. The bureaucratic-pragmatic societies concentrate on the manipulation of an empirical reality which they treat as given; the ideological societies are split between an essentially bureaucratic approach (though in a different realm of reality than the bureaucratic-pragmatic structures) and a group using ideology mainly for revolutionary ends. The new nations, in so far as they are active in international affairs, have a high incentive to seek in foreign policy the perpetuation of charismatic leadership.

These differences are a major obstacle to a consensus on what constitutes a "reasonable" proposal. A common diagnosis of the existing situation is hard to achieve, and it is even more difficult to concert measures for a solution. The situation is complicated by the one feature all types of leadership have in common: the premium put on short-term goals and the domestic need to succeed at all times. In the bureaucratic societies policy emerges from a compromise which often produces the least common denominator, and it is implemented by individuals whose reputation is made by administering the *status quo*. The leadership of the institutionalized ideological state may be even more the prisoner of essentially corporate bodies. Neither leadership can afford radical changes of course for they result in profound repercussions in its administrative structure. And the charismatic leaders of the new nations are like tightrope artists—one false step and they will plunge from their perch.

IV. *Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy: The Prospects for World Order*

Many contemporary divisions are thus traceable to differences in domestic structure. But are there not countervailing factors? What about the spread of technology and its associated rationality, or the adoption on a global scale of many Western political forms? Unfortunately the process of "Westernization" does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality. For what matters is not the institutions or the technology, but the significance which is attached to them. And this differs according to the evolution of the society concerned.

The term "nation" does not mean the same thing when applied to such various phenomena as India, France, and Nigeria. Similarly, technology is likely to have a different significance for different peoples, depending on how and when it was acquired.

Any society is part of an evolutionary process which proceeds by means of two seemingly contradictory mechanisms. On the one hand, the span of possible adaptations is delimited by the physical environment, the internal structure, and, above all, by previous choices. On the other hand, evolution proceeds not in a straight line but through a series of complicated variations which appear anything but obvious to the chief actors. In retrospect a choice may seem to have been nearly random or else to have represented the only available alternative. In either case, the choice is not an isolated act but an accumulation of previous decisions reflecting history or tradition and values as well as the immediate pressures of the need for survival. And each decision delimits the range of possible future adaptations.

Young societies are in a position to make radical changes of course which are highly impractical at a later stage. As a society becomes more elaborate and as its tradition is firmly established, its choices with respect to its internal organization grow more restricted. If a highly articulated social unit attempts basic shifts, it runs the risk of doing violence to its internal organization, to its history and values as embodied in its structure. When it accepts institutions or values developed elsewhere it must adapt them to what its structure can absorb. The institutions of any political unit must therefore be viewed in historical context for that alone can give an indication of their future. Societies—even when their institutions are similar—may be like ships passing in the night which find themselves but temporarily in the same place.

Is there then no hope for cooperation and stability? Is our international system doomed to incomprehension and its members to mounting frustration?

It must be admitted that if the domestic structures were considered in isolation, the prognosis would not be too hopeful. But domestic structures do not exist in a vacuum. They must respond to the requirements of the environment. And here all states find themselves face to face with the necessity of avoiding a nuclear holocaust. While this condition does not restrain all nations equally, it nevertheless defines a common task which technology will impose on even more countries as a direct responsibility.

Then, too, a certain similarity in the forms of administration may bring about common criteria of rationality as Professor Jaguaribe has pointed out in his contribution to this volume.[8] Science and technology will spread. Improved communications may lead to the emergence of a common culture. The fissures between domestic structures and the different stages of evolution are important, but they may be outweighed by the increasing interdependence of humanity.

It would be tempting to end on this note and to base the hope for peace on the self-evidence of the need for it. But this would be too pat. The deepest problem of the contemporary international order may be that most of the debates which form the headlines of the day are peripheral to the basic division described in this article. The cleavage is not over particular political arrangements—except as symptoms—but between two styles of policy and two philosophical perspectives.

The two styles can be defined as the political as against the revolutionary approach to order or, reduced to personalities, as the distinction between the statesman and the prophet.

The statesman manipulates reality; his first goal is survival; he feels responsible not only for the best but also for the worst conceivable outcome. His view of human nature is wary; he is conscious of many great hopes which have failed, of many good intentions that could not be realized, of selfishness and ambition and violence. He is, therefore, inclined to erect hedges against the possibility that even the most brilliant idea might prove abortive and that the most eloquent formulation might hide ulterior motives. He will try to avoid certain experiments, not because he would object to the results if they succeeded, but because he would feel himself responsible for the consequences if they failed. He is suspicious of those who personalize foreign policy, for history teaches him the fragility of structures dependent on individuals. To the statesman, gradualism is the essence of stability; he represents an era of average performance, of gradual change and slow construction.

By contrast, the prophet is less concerned with manipulating than with creating reality. What is possible interests him less than what is "right." He offers his vision as the test and his good faith as a guarantee. He believes in total solutions; he is less absorbed in methodology than in purpose. He believes in the perfectibility of man. His approach is timeless and not dependent on circumstances. He objects to gradualism as an unnecessary concession to circumstance. He will risk everything because his vision is the primary significant reality to him. Paradoxically, his more optimistic view of human nature makes him more intolerant than the statesman. If truth is both knowable and attainable, only immorality or stupidity can keep man from realizing it. The prophet represents an era of exaltation, of great upheavals, of vast accomplishments, but also of enormous disasters.

The encounter between the political and the prophetic approach to policy is always somewhat inconclusive and frustrating. The test of the statesman is the permanence of the international structure under stress. The test of the prophet is inherent in his vision. The statesman will seek to reduce the prophet's intuition to precise measures; he judges ideas on their utility and not on their "truth." To the prophet this approach is almost sacrilegious because it represents the triumph of expediency over universal principles. To the statesman negotiation is the mechanism of stability because it presupposes that maintenance of the existing order is more important than any dispute within it. To the prophet negotiations can have only symbolic value—as a means of converting or demoralizing the opponent; truth, by definition, cannot be compromised.

Both approaches have prevailed at different periods in history. The political approach dominated European foreign policy between the end of the religious wars and the French Revolution and then again between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of

World War I. The prophetic mode was in the ascendant during the great upheavals of the religious struggles and the period of the French Revolution, and in the contemporary uprisings in major parts of the world.

Both modes have produced considerable accomplishments, though the prophetic style is likely to involve the greater dislocations and more suffering. Each has its nemesis. The nemesis of the statesman is that equilibrium, though it may be the condition of stability, does not supply its own motivation; that of the prophet is the impossibility of sustaining a mood of exaltation without the risk of submerging man in the vastness of a vision and reducing him to a mere figure to be manipulated.

As for the difference in philosophical perspective, it may reflect the divergence of the two lines of thought which since the Renaissance have distinguished the West from the part of the world now called underdeveloped (with Russia occupying an intermediary position). The West is deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data—the more accurately the better. Cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking have retained the essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost completely *internal* to the observer.

Although this attitude was a liability for centuries—because it prevented the development of the technology and consumer goods which the West enjoyed—it offers great flexibility with respect to the contemporary revolutionary turmoil. It enables the societies which do not share our cultural mode to alter reality by influencing the perspective of the observer—a process which we are largely unprepared to handle or even to perceive. And this can be accomplished under contemporary conditions without sacrificing technological progress. Technology comes as a gift; acquiring it in its advanced form does not presuppose the philosophical commitment that discovering it imposed on the West. Empirical reality has a much different significance for many of the new countries than for the West because in a certain sense they never went through the process of discovering it (with Russia again occupying an intermediary position). At the same time, the difference in philosophical perspective may cause us to seem cold, supercilious, lacking in compassion. The instability of the contemporary world order may thus have at its core a philosophical schism which makes the issues producing most political debates seem largely tangential.

Such differences in style and philosophical perspective are not unprecedented. What is novel is the global scale on which they occur and the risks which the failure to overcome them would entail. Historically, cleavages of lesser magnitude have been worked out dialectically, with one style of policy or one philosophical approach dominant in one era only to give way later to another conception of reality. And the transition was rarely free of violence. The challenge of our time is whether we can deal consciously and creatively with what in previous centuries was adjusted through a series of more or less violent and frequently catastropic upheavals. We must construct an international order *before* a crisis imposes it as a necessity.

This is a question not of blueprints, but of attitudes. In fact the overconcern with technical blueprints is itself a symptom of our difficulties. Before the problem of order can be "dealt" with—even philosophically—we must be certain that the right questions are being asked.

We can point to some hopeful signs. The most sensitive thinkers of the West have recognized that excessive empiricism may lead to stagnation. In many of the new countries—and in some Communist ones as well—the second or third generation of leaders is in the process of freeing itself from the fervor and dogmatism of the early revolutionary period and of relating their actions to an environment which they helped to create. But these are as yet only the first tentative signs of progress on a course whose significance is not always understood. Indeed it is characteristic of an age of turmoil that it produces so many immediate issues that little time is left to penetrate their deeper meaning. The most serious problem therefore becomes the need to acquire a sufficiently wide perspective so that the present does not overwhelm the future.

III

The Convictions of an Apprentice Statesman

An Historian's Perspective

THE moment of responsibility is profoundly sobering, especially for one trained as an academic. Suddenly forced to make the transition from reflection to decision, I had to learn the difference between a conclusion and a policy. It was no longer enough to be plausible in argument; one had to be convincing in action. Problems were no longer theoretical; the interlocutors were not debaters but sovereign countries, some of which had the physical power to make their views prevail.

Any statesman is in part the prisoner of necessity. He is confronted with an environment he did not create, and is shaped by a personal history he can no longer change. It is an illusion to believe that leaders gain in profundity while they gain experience. As I have said, the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect. They are locked in an endless battle in which the urgent constantly gains on the important. The public life of every political figure is a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the pressure of circumstance.

When I entered office, I brought with me a philosophy formed by two decades of the study of history. History is not, of course, a cookbook offering pretested recipes. It teaches by analogy, not by maxims. It can illuminate the consequences of actions in comparable situations, yet each generation must discover for itself what situations are in fact comparable. No academic discipline can take from our shoulders the burden of difficult choices.

I had written a book and several articles on the diplomacy of the nineteenth century. My motive was to understand the processes by which Europe after the Napoleonic wars established a peace that lasted a century; I also wanted to know why that peace collapsed in 1914. But I had never conceived that designs and strategies of previous periods could be

applied literally to the present. As I entered office I was convinced that the past could teach us some important lessons. But I was also aware that we were entering a period for which there was no precedent: in the destructiveness of weapons, in the speed of the spread of ideas, in the global impact of foreign policies, in the technical possibility to fulfill the age-old dreams of bettering the condition of mankind.

If history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint. But I believed equally that no nation could face or even define its choices without a moral compass that set a course through the ambiguities of reality and thus made sacrifices meaningful. The willingness to walk this fine line marks the difference between the academic's — or any outsider's — perception of morality and that of the statesman. The outsider thinks in terms of absolutes; for him right and wrong are defined in their conception. The political leader does not have this luxury. He rarely can reach his goal except in stages; any partial step is inherently morally imperfect and yet morality cannot be approximated without it. The philosopher's test is the reasoning behind his maxims; the statesman's test is not only the exaltation of his goals but the catastrophe he averts. Mankind will never know what it was spared because of risks avoided or because of actions taken that averted awful consequences — if only because once thwarted the consequences can never be proved. The dialogue between the academic and the statesman is therefore always likely to be inconclusive. Without philosophy, policy will have no standards; but without the willingness to peer into darkness and risk some faltering steps without certainty, humanity would never know peace.

History knows no resting places and no plateaus. All societies of which history informs us went through periods of decline; most of them eventually collapsed. Yet there is a margin between necessity and accident, in which the statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication; it is to neglect the elements of strength and hope and inspiration which through the centuries have sustained mankind. The statesman's responsibility is to struggle against transitoriness and not to insist that he be paid in the coin of eternity. He may know that history is the foe of permanence; but no leader is entitled to resignation. He owes it to his people to strive, to create, and to resist the decay that besets all human institutions.

The American Experience

I REACHED high office unexpectedly at a particularly complex period of our national life. In the life of nations, as of human beings, a point is often reached when the seemingly limitless possibilities of youth suddenly narrow and one must come to grips with the fact that not every option is open any longer. This insight can inspire a new creative impetus, less innocent perhaps than the naive exuberance of earlier years, but more complex and ultimately more permanent. The process of coming to grips with one's limits is never easy. It can end in despair or in rebellion; it can produce a self-hatred that turns inevitable compromises into a sense of inadequacy.

America went through such a period of self-doubt and self-hatred in the late 1960s. The trigger for it was the war in Vietnam. Entered into gradually by two administrations, by 1969 it had resulted in over 31,000 American dead with no prospect of early resolution. It began with overwhelming public and Congressional approval, but this had evolved first into skepticism and then into increasingly hostile rebellion. For too many, a war to resist aggression had turned into a symbol of fundamental American evil. A decade that had begun with the bold declaration that America would pay any price and bear any burden to ensure the survival and success of liberty had ended in an agony of assassinations, urban riots, and ugly demonstrations. The Sixties marked the end of our innocence; this was certain. What remained to be determined was whether we could learn from this knowledge or consume our substance in rebelling against the reality of our maturity.

The turmoil of the 1960s was all the more unsettling to Americans because it came at the end of an extraordinary period of American accomplishment. We had built alliances that preserved the peace and fostered the growth of the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We had helped create international economic institutions that had nourished global prosperity for a generation. We had promoted decolonization and pioneered in development assistance for the new nations. In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, the United States had every reason to take pride in its global contribution — its energy, idealism, and enduring accomplishment.

The fact remained that at the end of twenty years of exertion America was not at peace with itself. The consensus that had sustained our postwar foreign policy had evaporated. The men and women who had sustained our international commitments and achievements were demoralized by what they considered their failure in Vietnam. Too many of our young were in rebellion against the successes of their fathers, attacking what they claimed to be the overextension of our commitments and mocking the values that had animated the achievements. A new isolationism was growing. Whereas in the 1920s we had withdrawn from the world because we thought we were too good for it, the insidious theme of the late 1960s was that we should withdraw from the world because we were too evil for it.

Not surprisingly, American self-doubt proved contagious; it is hard for foreign nations to have more faith in a country than it has in itself. European intellectuals began to argue that the Cold War was caused by American as well as by Soviet policies; they urged their governments to break out of the vicious circle by peace initiatives of their own. Many European leaders, catering to this mood, became fervent advocates of détente, playing the role of a "bridge" between East and West — visiting Moscow, exploring ties with Peking, urging disarmament and East-West trade.

These protestations were all very well until the United States, in the late Sixties, began to take them to heart and adopt the policy implicit in them. Suddenly European statesmen reversed course. Now they were fearful of a US–Soviet condominium, a "Super-Yalta" in which American and Soviet leaders would settle global issues over the heads of European governments. In the year that saw the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the United States was accused by many of its allies of being at one and the same time too bellicose in Southeast Asia and too accommodating in its dealings with the Soviet Union. This ambivalence gnawed at the unity of the Alliance. Unnerved by events in Czechoslovakia, pressed by public opinion toward conciliation, impelled by conviction to strengthen security, the Western Alliance was becalmed like a ship dead in the water.

Similar uncertainty marked our other policies. For two decades our contacts with China had been limited to the reciprocal recriminations of sporadic ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw. The Middle East was explosive, but in the aftermath of the 1967 war no diplomacy was in train. Our domestic divisions prevented decisive initiatives. America seemed reduced to passivity in a world in which, with all our self-doubt, only our power could offer security, only our dedication could sustain hope.

In my view, Vietnam was not the cause of our difficulties but a symptom. We were in a period of painful adjustment to a profound transformation of global politics; we were being forced to come to grips with the tension between our history and our new necessities. For two centuries America's participation in the world seemed to oscillate between overinvolvement and withdrawal, between expecting too much of our power and being ashamed of it, between optimistic exuberance and frustration with the ambiguities of an imperfect world. I was convinced that the deepest cause of our national unease was the realization — as yet dimly perceived — that we were becoming like other nations in the need to recognize that our power, while vast, had limits. Our resources were no longer infinite in relation to our problems; instead we had to set priorities, both intellectual and material. In the Fifties and Sixties we had attempted ultimate solutions to specific problems; now our challenge was to shape a world and an American role to which we were permanently committed, which could no longer be sustained by the illusion that our exertions had a terminal point.

Any Administration elected in 1968 would have faced this problem. It was a colossal task in the best of circumstances; the war in Vietnam turned it into a searing and anguishing enterprise.

Our history ill prepared us. Ironically, our Founding Fathers were sophisticated statesmen who understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly, first to bring about America's independence and then to preserve it. The shrewd diplomacy of Franklin and Jefferson engaged Britain's enemies (France, Spain, and Russia) on our side; our negotiating hand thus strengthened, John Jay secured recognition from the British Crown and liquidated the residual problems of our war with England. At that point, however, in the best traditions of the European balance of power, we cut loose from our temporary allies and went on our own way. For more than three decades after independence, we lived precariously, like other nations. We went to the brink of war with France and endured the capture of our capital by British forces. But we moved astutely to take advantage of new opportunities. The effective elimination of France and Spain from the Western Hemisphere, the new danger of Russian expansion in the Pacific Northwest, and Great Britain's growing estrangement from the European nations led us in 1823 to concert the Monroe Doctrine with Britain to exclude European power from our hemisphere.

Britain's perspective was that of the European equilibrium. Prime Minister Canning perceived that the Monroe Doctrine "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." But in the New World it meant that we were free to turn our backs on Europe and to devote our energies to opening up the continent to the west of us. For the hundred years between Waterloo and 1914, we were shielded by our geographic remoteness and British sea power, which maintained global stability.

As the United States grew in strength and European rivalries focused on Europe, Africa, and Asia, Americans came to consider the isolation conferred by two great oceans as the normal pattern of foreign relations. Rather arrogantly we ascribed our security entirely to the superiority of our beliefs rather than to the weight of our power or the fortunate accidents of history and geography. After the Napoleonic upheaval, America stood apart from European conflicts throughout the nineteenth century — although in order to round out our national territory and maintain our national unity we fought as many wars as any European country and probably suffered more casualties. But these wars were not seen in terms of a concept of international relations; to Americans they reflected the imperatives of a manifest destiny.

Americans, whether Mayflower descendants or refugees from the failed revolutions of 1848, came to assume that we were immune from the necessities that impelled other nations. There was, of course, also a pragmatic and realistic strain. Admiral Mahan's perception of the role of sea power proved that Americans could think profoundly in geopolitical terms. The methods by which we acquired the Philippines and the Panama Canal proved that power politics was not totally neglected. Nevertheless, American political thought had come increasingly to regard diplomacy with suspicion. Arms and alliances were considered immoral and reactionary. Negotiations were treated less as a means of reconciling our ideals with our interests than as a trap to entangle us in the endless quarrels of a morally questionable world. Our native inclination for straightforwardness, our instinct for open, noisy politics, our distrust of European manners and continental elites all brought about an increasing impatience with the stylized methods of European diplomacy and with its tendency toward ambiguous compromise. In its day even the purchase of Alaska, which finally ejected Russia from our continent, was regarded as a towering folly explicable only by American gullibility in the face of Old World diplomatic machinations. Congress was prevailed upon only with the greatest difficulty to appropriate $7 million to complete the deal.

The mythology of foreigners' guileful superiority in the ways of diplomacy was carried into the twentieth century. Will Rogers was always assured of a laugh when he cracked: "America never lost a war and never won a conference."

Thus America entered the twentieth century largely unprepared for the part it would be called upon to play. Forgotten was the skilled statecraft by which the Founding Fathers had secured our independence; disdained were the techniques by which all nations must preserve their interests. As Lord Bryce observed in 1888 in *The American Commonwealth,* America had been sailing "on a summer sea," but now a cloud bank was "on the horizon and now no longer distant, a time of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may be concealed whose form and magnitude she can scarcely conjecture."

Though America was not to grasp its consequences for many decades, the Pax Britannica on which we had relied for so long was ending. We had developed into the world's major economic power; and we were fast becoming the only democratic nation with sufficient strength to maintain a precarious world balance.

Our entry into World War I was the inevitable result of our geopolitical interest in maintaining freedom of the seas and preventing Europe's domination by a hostile power. But true to our tradition, we chose to interpret our participation in legal and idealistic terms. We fought the war "to end all wars" and "to make the world safe for democracy." The inevitable disillusion with an imperfect outcome let loose the tide of isolationism. We fell back on our preference for law in repeated attempts to legislate an end to international conflict — automatic machinery for collective security, new disarmament schemes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact to ban war. Our refusal to accept that foreign policy must start with security led us in the interwar years to treat allies as rivals, whose armaments had to be limited because weapons by definition contributed to international tensions. We looked for scapegoats — the so-called munitions-makers — to explain why we had ever engaged in so sordid an undertaking as the First World War. Intelligence services were considered unworthy if not a threat to our liberties. Economic activity was seen as the only defensible form of American involvement abroad; its objectives were either humanitarian, exemplified by the relief efforts of Herbert Hoover, or essentially passive: free trade, as advocated by Cordell Hull.

Later, when totalitarianism was on the rise and the entire international order was being challenged, we clung to our isolation, which had been transformed from a policy preference into a moral conviction. We had virtually abandoned the basic precautions needed for our national security. Only with the greatest difficulty could President Roosevelt take the first tentative steps against the mounting threat, aiding Great Britain by subterfuge and rebuilding our military might. The Second World War was well under way before we were shocked out of isolation by a surprise attack against American soil. But then in our absorption with total victory, we spurned the notion that the security of the postwar world might depend on some sort of equilibrium of power. We were thus much surprised by the war's aftermath. The central fact of the postwar period was that the destruction of Germany and Italy and the exhaustion of Britain and France drew Soviet power into the heart of the European continent and for a while seemed to place Western Europe at Soviet mercy. Moscow's renewed ideological hostility increasingly challenged our comfortable wartime assumptions about postwar international harmony. And our scientists had unleashed the atom, ushering in a revolution in weaponry that set our age apart from all that had gone before.

When Dean Acheson said he was "present at the creation," he referred not only to the creation of our postwar foreign policy but to a new era in our own history. After two world wars in this century, the responsibilities and the burdens of world leadership proved inescapable. The United States had despite itself become the guardian of the new equilibrium. It is to the lasting credit of that generation of Americans that they assumed these responsibilities with energy, imagination, and skill. By helping Europe rebuild, encouraging European unity, shaping institutions of economic cooperation, and extending the protection of our alliances, they saved the possibilities of freedom. This burst of creativity is one of the glorious moments of American history.

Yet this period of exuberance was bound to wane, if only because we inevitably encountered the consequences of our success. The recovery of Europe and Japan required adjustments in our alliance relations; the developing world of new nations whose independence we had promoted was certain to claim a greater share of global prosperity. And nothing we could have done would have prevented the Soviet Union from recovering from the war and asserting its new power. Our early postwar successes did not equip us for a new era of more complex problems. Our early programs like the Marshall Plan and Point Four expressed our idealism, our technological know-how, and our ability to overwhelm problems with resources. In a sense we were applying the precepts of our own New Deal, expecting political conflict to dissolve in economic progress. It worked in Europe and parts of Asia where political structures existed; it would be less relevant in the scores of new nations. In the relatively simple bipolar world of the Cold War, we held fast against pressure or blackmail in Berlin, in Korea, in Berlin again, and finally during the Cuban missile crisis. These were successes. But in an important sense we had only begun to scratch the surface of the long-term problem of our relationship with the Soviet Union in the thermonuclear age, which would soon produce more ambiguous challenges.

Our deeper problem was conceptual. Because peace was believed to be "normal," many of our great international exertions were expected to bring about a final result, restoring normality by overcoming an intervening obstacle. The programs for European economic recovery were expected to bring lasting prosperity. Exertions to ensure security were aimed at a conclusive settlement with the Soviet Union. This was implicit in the concept of "containment" that expressed our postwar policy toward the Soviet Union.[1]

According to George Kennan's famous "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, our task was to resist Soviet probes with counterforce, patiently awaiting the mellowing of the Soviet system. As applied in the diplomacy of Dean Acheson and to some extent John Foster Dulles, we were to mark time until we built the strength to contain Soviet aggression — especially the assault on Central Europe, which preoccupied our strategic thinking. After containment had been achieved, diplomacy would take over. "What we must do," said Secretary of State Acheson, "is to create situations of strength; we must build strength and if we create that strength then I think the whole situation in the world begins to change . . . with that change there comes a difference in the negotiating positions of the various parties, and out of that I should hope that there would be a willingness on the part of the Kremlin to recognize the facts. . . ."[2]

This definition of containment treated power and diplomacy as two distinct elements or phases of policy. It aimed at an ultimate negotiation but supplied no guide to the content of those negotiations. It implied that strength was self-evident and that once negotiations started their content would also be self-evident. It did not answer the question of how the situation of strength was to be demonstrated in the absence of a direct attack on us or on our allies. Nor did it make clear what would happen after we had achieved a position of strength if our adversary, instead of negotiating, concentrated on eroding it or turning our flank.

This policy of containment was flawed in three ways. First, our excessively military conception of the balance of power — and its corollary, the policy of deferring negotiations for a postwar settlement — paradoxically gave the Soviet Union time to consolidate its conquests and to redress the nuclear imbalance. To be sure, in the immediate postwar period the massive Soviet armies in Central Europe were much larger than the forces arrayed against them; Western Europe was prostrate and the United States was demobilized. But the real strength of the Soviet Union was but a fraction of our own. The Soviet Union had been exhausted by four years of war and 20 million casualties. We had an atomic monopoly and for twenty years a vast nuclear superiority. Our relative strength was never greater than at the beginning of what soon came to be called the Cold War.

Secondly, the nature of military technology was such that the balance of power could no longer be thought of as uniform. Nuclear weapons were so cataclysmic that as the arsenals grew they proved less and less useful to repel every conceivable aggression. For a while this reality was obscured by our nuclear monopoly and later by our numerical preponderance. But the point was inevitably reached when technology enabled the Kremlin to pose risks that reduced the credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation. From then on, managing the military balance of power required vigilance on two levels: being strong enough not only strategically with nuclear power but also locally with conventional arms. Formal declarations of the unimpaired sincerity of our nuclear guarantee would not remove the fact of nuclear deadlock and the consequent requirement for alternative regional defenses. Yet every decade has had to relearn the essential duality of our burden.

Thirdly, our doctrine of containment could never be an adequate response to the modern impact of Communist ideology, which transforms relations between states into conflicts between philosophies and poses challenges to the balance of power through domestic upheavals.

In short, we never fully understood that while our absolute power was growing, our *relative* position was bound to decline as the USSR recovered from World War II. Our military and diplomatic position was never more favorable than at the *very beginning* of the containment policy in the late 1940s. That was the time to attempt a serious discussion on the future of Europe. We lost our opportunity.

In fact, I am inclined to doubt that Stalin originally expected to lock all of Eastern Europe into his satellite orbit; his first postwar steps — such as permitting free elections in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, all of which the Communists lost — suggest that he might have been prepared to settle for their having a status similar to Finland's. Unexpectedly, we deferred serious negotiations until we had mobilized more of our potential strength. Thus we gave the Soviet Union time — the most precious commodity it needed to consolidate its conquests and to recover from the war.

As so often before, Winston Churchill understood this best. In a much neglected speech in October 1948, during his period out of office, he said:

> The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against using this strange new power against them, what will they do when they themselves have large quantities of atomic bombs? . . . No one in his senses can believe that we have a limitless period of time before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad for us to turn up. The Western Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too.[3]

So it happened that the two wars in which America engaged after 1945 — in Korea and Vietnam — did not correspond to any of our political or strategic expectations. Korea was a war not initiated by an attack on the United States or our major allies. It was not aimed at the heartland of Europe. Nor did it directly involve the USSR. Little wonder that those responsible in Washington saw in it a strategic diversion to draw us into Asia while the Soviet Union prepared an onslaught in Europe. Our conduct of the war was, therefore, tentative. Our objectives fluctuated with the military situation. At various times our aim was declared to be repelling aggression, the unification of Korea, the security of our forces, or a guaranteed armistice to ratify the military stalemate.

Our perception of power and diplomacy as distinct and successive phases of foreign policy prevented us from negotiating to settle the Korean War after the landing at Inchon when we were in the strongest military position; it tempted us to escalate our aims. A year later it also caused us to stop military operations except of a purely defensive nature the moment negotiations got under way, thus removing the enemy's major incentive for a rapid diplomatic settlement. We acted as if the process of negotiations operated on its own inherent logic independent of the military balance — indeed, that military pressures might jeopardize the negotiations by antagonizing our adversary or demonstrating bad faith. Not surprisingly, a stalemate of nearly two years' duration followed, during which our casualties equaled those we had endured when hostilities were unconstrained. Treating force and diplomacy as discrete phenomena caused our power to lack purpose and our negotiations to lack force.

The result was domestic convulsion that represented the first breach in the new national consensus on foreign policy: the conflict between General Douglas MacArthur and the civilian and military leadership in Washington. MacArthur advocated victory in the Far East. His critics argued, among other things, that we had to conserve our strength for a possibly imminent all-out test with the Soviet Union, probably in Europe. MacArthur objected to his directives because they seemed to him too confining in terms of our traditional concept of war; to the political leadership, on the other hand, Korea was a strategic diversion: It was too big a war in terms of Washington's perception of Europe as the decisive arena.

Given the threat the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal would soon pose, it is possible to doubt the premises that time was on our side or that we had more to lose from an all-out war than the Soviet Union. The paradox we never solved was that we had entered the Korean War because we were afraid that to fail to do so would produce a much graver danger to Europe in the near future. But then the very reluctance to face an all-out onslaught on Europe severely circumscribed the risks we were prepared to run to prevail in Korea. The resulting deadlock sapped our domestic cohesion and contributed to the assault on our liberties in the form of McCarthyism.

Ten years later we encountered the same dilemmas in Vietnam. Once more we became involved because we considered the warfare in Indochina the manifestation of a coordinated global Communist strategy. Again we sought to limit our risks because the very global challenge of which Indochina seemed to be a part also made Vietnam appear as an unprofitable place for a showdown. At every stage we sought to keep our risks below the level which in our estimate would trigger Chinese or Soviet intervention. In short, our perception of the global challenge at the same time tempted us into distant enterprises and prevented us from meeting them conclusively. Once again, a war that we had entered with great public support turned into a frustrating stalemate that gradually forfeited public acceptance.

By 1969, the war in Vietnam had become a national nightmare that stimulated an attack on our entire postwar foreign policy. The

hitherto almost unanimous conviction that the Cold War had been caused by Soviet intransigence was challenged by a vocal and at times violent minority which began to insist it was American bellicosity, American militarism, and American economic imperialism that were the root causes of international tensions. This home-grown radicalism never had many true adherents; it collapsed instantaneously once we left Vietnam. What is striking is not so much its temporary appeal as its shattering effect in demoralizing the very groups that might have been expected to defend the premises and accomplishments of our postwar policy. The internationalist Establishment, which had been responsible for the great achievements of our foreign policy, collapsed before the onslaught of its children who questioned all its values.

The new Nixon Administration was the first of the postwar generation that had to conduct foreign policy without the national consensus that had sustained its predecessors largely since 1947. And our task was if anything more complex. We faced not only the dislocations of a war but the need to articulate a new foreign policy for a new era. Sooner or later the Vietnam war would end. What were the global challenges we faced? What were our goals in the world? Could we shape a new consensus that could reconcile our idealism and our responsibilities, our security and our values, our dreams and our possibilities?

Problems of a New Equilibrium

Even as we entered office, it was clear that the agony of Vietnam threatened a new disillusionment with international affairs that could draw America inward to nurse its wounds and renounce its world leadership. This would be a profound tragedy, far more grievous than the tragedy of Vietnam itself. We would be back to our historical cycle of exuberant overextension and sulking isolationism. And this time we would be forsaking a world far more complex, more dangerous, more dependent upon America's leadership than the world of the 1930s. Therefore the Nixon Administration saw it as its task to lay the foundation for a long-range American foreign policy, even while liquidating our Indochina involvement. Crisis management, the academic focus of the Sixties, was no longer enough. Crises were symptoms of deeper problems which if allowed to fester would prove increasingly unmanageable. Moral exuberance had inspired both overinvolvement and isolationism. It was my conviction that a concept of our fundamental national interests would provide a ballast of restraint and an assurance of continuity. Our idealism had to be not an excuse for irresponsibility but a source of courage, stamina, self-confidence, and direction. Only in this manner would we be able to shape an emerging international system that was unprecedented in its perils, its promise, and its global nature.

Since we were beset by a malaise deeper than Vietnam, its solution was less a matter of expertise than of philosophy. In an essay published a few weeks before the 1968 election, when I had no inkling that I would be asked to put my ideas to the test, I wrote:

> The contemporary unrest is no doubt exploited by some whose purposes are all too clear. But that it is there to exploit is proof of a profound dissatisfaction with the merely managerial and consumer-oriented qualities of the modern state and with a world which seems to generate crises by inertia. The modern bureaucratic state, for all its panoply of strength, often finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittleness and the world-wide revolution of youth — especially in advanced countries and among the relatively affluent — suggest a spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a political environment that increasingly emphasizes bureaucratic challenges and is dedicated to no deeper purpose than material comfort. . . .
>
> In the best of circumstances, the next administration will be beset by crises. In almost every area of the world, we have been living off capital — warding off the immediate, rarely dealing with underlying problems. These difficulties are likely to multiply when it becomes apparent that one of the legacies of the war in Vietnam will be a strong American reluctance to risk overseas involvements.
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> A new administration has the right to ask for compassion and understanding from the American people. But it must found its claim not on pat technical answers to difficult issues; it must above all ask the right questions. It must recognize that, in the field of foreign policy, we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it.[4]

The most ominous change that marked our period was the transformation in the nature of power. Until the beginning of the nuclear age it would have been inconceivable that a country could possess too much military strength for effective political use; every addition of power was — at least theoretically — politically useful. The nuclear age destroyed this traditional measure. A country might be strong enough to destroy an adversary and yet no longer be able to protect its population against attack. By an irony of history a gargantuan increase in power had eroded the relationship of power to policy. Henceforth, the major nuclear powers would be able to devastate one another. But they would also have great difficulty in bringing their power to bear on the issues most likely to arise. They might be able to deter direct challenges to their own survival; they could not necessarily use this power to impose their will. The capacity to destroy proved difficult to translate into

a plausible threat even against countries with no capacity for retaliation. The margin of the superpowers over non-nuclear states had been widening; yet the awesomeness of their power had increased their inhibitions. As power had grown more awesome, it had also turned abstract, intangible, elusive.

The military policy we adopted was deterrence. But deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. It depends above all on what a potential aggressor considers an unacceptable risk. In the nuclear age a bluff taken seriously is useful; a serious threat taken as a bluff may prove disastrous. The longer deterrence succeeds, the more difficult it is to demonstrate what made it work. Was peace maintained by the risk of war, or because the adversary never intended aggression in the first place? It is no accident that peace movements have multiplied the longer peace has been maintained. But if deterrence is effectual, then we dismantle the forces that sustain it only at our grave peril.

Nuclear weapons have compounded the political rigidity of a two-power world. The guardians of the equilibrium of the nineteenth century were prepared to adjust it to changes in the structure of power. The policymakers of the superpowers in the second half of the twentieth century have much less confidence in the ability of the equilibrium to right itself after disturbance. The "balance" between the superpowers has become both precarious and inflexible. As the world has grown bipolar, it has also lost the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to bear on the question of survival. Diplomacy turns rigid; relations are inherently wary.

At the same time, strangely enough, military bipolarity has encouraged, and not diminished, the global diffusion of political power. Smaller countries are torn between a desire for protection and a wish to escape big-power dominance. To the degree that smaller allies doubt that their senior partner would risk its own survival to preserve theirs, they are driven to seek some independent means for defending themselves. Even when they do count on the senior partner to defend them, they are all the more tempted to conduct independent foreign policies even in defiance of its wishes. It is probable that Charles de Gaulle's bold challenge to the United States in the 1960s reflected more his conviction that the United States would have no choice but to defend France in case of Soviet attack than his proclaimed fear that we would not. Similarly, the new nations have proved shrewdly adept at playing the superpowers against each other, even while the military predominance of the superpowers is enormous and growing.

Every new President soon learns that he faces two seemingly contradictory obligations. He must assemble adequate strength to protect the security of America and of its allies and friends. And he must face too the moral necessity of avoiding nuclear war. If he is perceived otherwise he will forfeit the domestic support he needs should a confrontation prove unavoidable. He must both assemble power and discipline its use; he must maintain America's readiness for both defense and peace. He can do neither without a public that has confidence in his purposes. Before he can act as a practical guide, the President must establish his moral leadership.

The elusive problem of peace would have been difficult enough in any circumstances; in our time it is compounded by ideological conflict. In periods heavily influenced by ideology, political loyalties no longer coincide with national boundaries. Communist parties everywhere adhere to a philosophy that asserts universal validity and historical inevitability and pay allegiance to a foreign nation often in conflict with their own; many new nations are swept by an ideology whose central tenet, if not Communism, is powerfully anti-Western in the name of anti-imperialism; a crucial new conflict is the struggle between moderates and radicals in the developing world. In such conditions a domestic upheaval in any country can cause a major shift in international alignments. Nations begin to feel threatened not only by foreign policies but also and perhaps especially by domestic transformations. A liberalized *Communist* regime in Prague, which in no way challenged Soviet preeminence in foreign policy, caused the Soviet Union in 1968 to invade rather than risk the contagion of ideas that it feared could spread elsewhere in its empire. Ten years later the upheaval in Iran shook stability throughout the Middle East.

And all these confrontations and uncertainties were being played out for the first time on a global scale. Throughout history the various continents had existed in relative isolation. As late as the outbreak of the Second World War, the crucial decisions of world politics were taken in a few European capitals. The postwar period was the first in which *all* the continents interacted. In 1945, the world community comprised fifty-one nations; by 1968 it had more than doubled, to nearly one hundred thirty. Modern communications transmitted news and ideas instantaneously. Events that used to be local — wars, rivalries, scandals, domestic upheavals, natural tragedies — suddenly began to assume global significance. When the Nixon Administration entered office all the elements of international relations were in flux simultaneously.

On the one hand the industrial democracies had gained in economic well-being and political vitality. Inevitably this produced a challenge to our previous predominance in our alliances. Most American leaders tended to lay the blame on the awesome, enigmatic Charles de Gaulle. I did not share the conventional view of de Gaulle. I saw him not as the cause of current difficulties and doubts but as the symptom of deep-seated structural changes in the Atlantic relationship. It was not natural that the major decisions affecting the destiny of countries so rich in

traditions, national pride, and economic strength as Western Europe and Japan should be made thousands of miles away. I had urged for years that it was in the American national interest to encourage a sharing of responsibilities. If the United States insisted on being the trustee of all the non-Communist areas we would exhaust ourselves psychologically long before we did so physically. A world of more centers of decision, I believed, was fully compatible with our interests as well as our ideals. This is why I opposed the efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to abort the French and if possible even the British nuclear programs, and Washington's tendency in the 1960s to turn consultation into the exegesis of American prescriptions.

At the same time, the so-called Third World of developing nations tested our intellectual and political understanding. Our experiences of the New Deal and the Marshall Plan were not entirely relevant to promoting economic progress and nation-building in countries with no political tradition and no middle class of managers and administrators. Instead, leaders were often overwhelmed by the task of establishing cohesion. We were dealing not with mature economies but with societies taking the wrenching first steps toward modernization. It became apparent that nation-building depended crucially on the ability to establish political authority. Economic aid, by accelerating the erosion of the traditional (frequently feudal) order, often made political stability even harder to achieve. By one of the ironies of history, Marxism has proved attractive to developing nations not because of the economic theory on which it prides itself but because it has supplied an answer to the problem of political legitimacy and authority — a formula for social mobilization, a justification for political power, a means of harnessing resentments against Western cultural and political dominance as a method of fostering unity. Democracy has less appeal, not because of the West's sins but because leaders in most developing countries did not undergo the risks of the anticolonial struggle in order to make themselves dispensable. By an historical joke, a materialist philosophy that has solved no country's economic problems has spread because of its moral claims, while the West, professing an idealistic philosophy, has bemused itself with economic and technical remedies largely irrelevant to the underlying political and spiritual problem.

Thus the new Administration confronted a world of turbulence and complexity, which would require of us qualities that had no precedent in American experience. Simultaneously we had to end a war, manage a global rivalry with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear weapons, reinvigorate our alliance with the industrial democracies, and integrate the new nations into a new world equilibrium that would last only if it was compatible with the aspiration of all nations. We had to turn to new tasks of construction even while we had learned the limits of our capacities. We had to find within ourselves the moral stamina to persevere while our society was assailed by doubt.

In the late eighteenth century the philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his essay *Perpetual Peace,* had written that world peace was inevitable; it would come about either because all nations shared the same sense of justice or because of a cycle of wars of ever increasing violence that would teach men the futility of conflict. Our period was giving new meaning to Kant's prediction. When nations are able to inflict tens of millions of casualties in a matter of hours, peace has become a moral imperative. No one entering office could evade this fundamental responsibility. But the root dilemma of our time is that if the quest for peace turns into the *sole* objective of policy, the fear of war becomes a weapon in the hands of the most ruthless; it produces moral disarmament. How to strive for both peace and justice, for an end of war that does not lead to tyranny, for a commitment to justice that does not produce cataclysm — to find this balance is the perpetual task of the statesman in the nuclear age.

These, then, were the perceptions about which I had thought and written much as a professor. They would soon be tested by events. For once the oath of office has been taken by a new President, there is no longer time for calm reflection. The policymaker is then like a man on a tightrope; he can avoid a precipitous drop only by moving forward.

The Enduring Philosophical Problem of US–Soviet Relations

FEW foreign policy issues have bedeviled the American domestic debate or challenged our traditional categories of thought more than relations with the Soviet Union. Little in our historical experience prepared us for dealing with an adversary of comparable strength on a permanent basis. We had never needed to confront nations sharply opposed to us for more than brief periods of great exertion. The shock of Russia's animosity after 1945 was all the greater because the wartime grand alliance had encouraged a confidence that peace would be maintained by a permanent coalition of the victors. Instead, we found ourselves in a world of political rivalry and ideological struggle, overshadowed by fearful weapons that at one and the same time compounded tensions and made them insoluble. No wonder the riddle of relations with the other nuclear superpower has been a persistent preoccupation for postwar American foreign policy.

It is remarkable that we ever thought we could retreat into our traditional isolation. Two world wars had destroyed the international system that had dominated world affairs for two hundred years. Germany and Japan temporarily disappeared as major factors; China was wracked by civil war. Every significant power abroad, with the exception of Great Britain, had been occupied either during the war or as a result of it. And Britain was so exhausted by its heroic struggle that it could no longer play its historical role as the guardian of the equilibrium. Somehow we cherished the idea that this vacuum could endure as, within months of victory, we demobilized our vast military establishment. Our diplomacy sought conciliation, disarmament, and global cooperation through the United Nations. Our secret dream in the first postwar years was to play the role that India's Prime Minister Nehru later arrogated to himself; we would have liked some other country, say Britain, to maintain the balance of power while we nobly mediated its conflicts with the Soviet Union. It was symptomatic of this attitude that President Truman refused to stop in Britain on the way to or from the Potsdam Conference because he did not wish to appear to collude against our Soviet ally. Our traditional revulsion against balance-of-power politics postponed our awareness that the very totality of our victory had created a gross imbalance of force and influence in the center of Europe. American demobilization became a Soviet opportunity; it accelerated the Communist domination of all of Eastern Europe, which may not even have been Stalin's original expectation; and it produced a pervasive alarm and insecurity in countries around the Soviet periphery.

Our age of innocence ended in 1947 when Britain informed us she could no longer assure the defense of Greece and Turkey. We were obliged to step in — but not merely as vocal guarantors of national integrity. Like it or not, we were assuming the historical responsibility for preserving the balance of power; and we were poorly prepared for the task. In both world wars we equated victory with peace, and even in the crises of 1947 we still thought that the problem of maintaining global equilibrium consisted in coping with a temporary dislocation of some natural order of things. We saw power in military terms and, just having dismantled the huge forces for a world war, we perceived a need for similar strength before we could have a serious negotiation with the Soviet Union. Once we had contained its expansionary drives, we reasoned, diplomacy could again come into its own as an exercise of goodwill and conciliation.

But the management of a balance of power is a permanent undertaking, not an exertion that has a foreseeable end. To a great extent it is a psychological phenomenon; if an equality of power is perceived it will not be tested. Calculations must include potential as well as actual power, not only the possession of power but the will to bring it to bear. Management of the balance requires perseverance, subtlety, not a little courage, and above all understanding of its requirements.

As I discussed in Chapter III, our first response was the policy of containment, according to which no serious negotiation with the Soviets could take place until we had first built up our strength; afterward, we hoped, the Soviet leadership would have learned the advantages of peace. Paradoxically, this approach exaggerated the Soviets' military advantage, underestimated our potential power and psychological advantages (not to mention our nuclear monopoly), and gave the Soviet Union the time it desperately needed to consolidate its conquests and to redress the nuclear imbalance.

I have also mentioned the transformation of the nature of power wrought by nuclear weapons. Because nuclear weapons are so cataclysmic, they are hardly relevant to a whole gamut of challenges: probes, guerrilla wars, local crises. The weakness of Dulles's "massive retaliation" strategy of the 1950s (the doctrine that we reserved the right to retaliate against local challenges by threatening to launch strategic war) was not that it brought us close to nuclear war, but that in a crisis it gave us only the choice between nuclear war and doing nothing. We ended up doing nothing (or using conventional forces, as in Lebanon in 1958, which contradicted our proclaimed strategy).

This was the context in which the United States attempted to grapple with the dynamics of the Soviet system.

The most singular feature of Soviet foreign policy is, of course, Communist ideology, which transforms relations among states into conflicts between philosophies. It is a doctrine of history and also a motivating force. From Lenin, to Stalin, to Khrushchev, to Brezhnev, and to whoever succeeds him, Soviet leaders have been partly motivated by a self-proclaimed insight into the forces of history and by a conviction that their cause is the cause of historical inevitability. Their ideology teaches that the class struggle and economic determinism make revolutionary upheaval inevitable. The conflict between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution is irreconcilable. To the industrial democracies peace appears as a naturally attainable condition; it is the composition of differences, the absence of struggle. To the Soviet leaders, by contrast, struggle is ended not by compromise but by the victory of one side. Permanent peace, according to Communist theory, can be achieved only by abolishing the class struggle and the class struggle can be ended only by a Communist victory. Hence, any Soviet move, no matter how belligerent, advances the cause of peace, while any capitalist policy, no matter how conciliatory, serves the ends of war. "Until the final issue [between capitalism and Communism] is decided," said Lenin, "the state of awful war will continue. . . . Sentimentality is no less a crime than cowardice in war."[1] Statements of Western leaders or analysts stressing the importance of goodwill can only appear to Soviet leaders either as hypocrisy or stupidity, propaganda or ignorance.

Soviet policy thus uses a vocabulary all its own. In 1939, it was the League of Nations that in Soviet propaganda threatened peace by condemning the Soviet attack on Finland. While Soviet tanks were shooting down civilians in Hungary in the fall of 1956, it was the United Nations that was accused by Moscow of threatening peace by debating Soviet armed intervention. When in 1968 the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia, they did so amid a smokescreen of accusations against the United States, West Germany, and NATO for "interfering," even though the West had bent over backward *not* to involve itself in Czechoslovakia. In 1978, the USSR "warned" the United States against interfering in Iran, not because they feared it but because they knew it would not happen; it was a way to accelerate the demoralization of those who might resist the upheaval already taking place. The Soviet leadership is burdened by no self-doubt or liberal guilt. It has no effective domestic opposition questioning the morality of its actions. The result is a foreign policy free to fill every vacuum, to exploit every opportunity, to act out the implications of its doctrine. Policy is constrained principally by calculations of objective conditions. Soviet proclamations of peaceful intent must be judged by this vocabulary. They may well be "sincere" but for pragmatic reasons. Where there exists a danger of nuclear war they are unquestionably sincere because Soviet leaders have no intention of committing suicide. But fundamentally they reflect less of a principle and more of a judgment that the relation of forces is unfavorable for military pressure. And even during the most strenuous peace offensives Soviet leaders have never disguised their intention of waging a permanent war for men's minds.

In his report to the Party Congress outlining his new commitment to coexistence, Khrushchev explained his policy in purely tactical terms, as a device to enable capitalists to surrender peacefully: "There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie . . . [is] inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. . . . The greater or lesser intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or non-use of violence in the transition to socialism depend on the resistance of the exploiters. . . ."[2]

Historical trends are considered immune from tactical compromise. Marxist theory combines with Russian national advantage to place the Soviet Union on the side of all radical anti-Western movements in the Third World, regardless of what practical accommodations are made between East and West on nuclear matters. Leonid Brezhnev declared at the twenty-fourth Party Congress at the end of March 1971:

> We declare that, while consistently pursuing its policy of peace and friendship among nations, the Soviet Union will continue to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism, and firmly to rebuff the evil designs and subversions of aggressors. As in the past, we shall give undeviating support to the people's struggle for democracy, national liberation and socialism.

His colleague, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, declared in November 1973:

> As the Soviet people see it, a just and democratic world cannot be achieved without the national and social liberation of peoples. The struggle by the Soviet Union for the relaxation of international tensions, for peaceful coexistence among states and different systems does not represent, and cannot represent, a departure from the class principles of our foreign policy.[3]

The arena of international struggle thereby expands to include the internal policies and social structures of countries, mocking the traditional standard of international law that condemns interference in a country's domestic affairs. In the centuries in which the European nations dominated the world, a country could increase its influence only by territorial acquisitions; these were visible and evoked after a time the united resistance of those threatened by the upset of the established order. But in the postwar period it is possible to change the balance of power through developments — upheavals, revolutions, subversion — within the sovereign territory of another country. Ideology thus challenges the stability of the international system — like the Napoleonic upheavals after the French Revolution, or the religious wars that convulsed Europe for centuries. Ideology transcends limits, eschews restraints, and disdains tolerance or conciliation.

Soviet policy is also, of course, the inheritor of an ancient tradition of Russian nationalism. Over centuries the strange Russian empire has seeped outward from the Duchy of Muscovy, spreading east and west across endless plains where no geographical obstacle except distance set a limit to human ambition, inundating what resisted, absorbing what yielded. This sea of land has, of course, been a temptation for invaders as well, but as it has eventually swallowed up all conquerors — aided no little by a hard climate — it has impelled the Russian people who have endured to identify security with pushing back all surrounding countries. Perhaps from this insecure history, perhaps from a sense of inferiority, Russia's rulers — Communists or tsars — have responded by identifying security not only with distance but also with domination. They have never believed that they could build a moral consensus among other peoples. Absolute security for Russia has meant infinite insecurity for all its neighbors. The distinction of Leninist Communism was that it, for the first time in Russian history, gave the expansionist instinct a theoretical formulation that applied universally around the globe. It salved Russian consciences; it compounded the problem for all other peoples.

These durable impulses of nationalism and ideology that lie behind Soviet policy emphasize the irrelevance of much Western debate whether this or that Soviet move is the prelude to a global showdown, or, alternatively, whether some new overture marks a thaw, a change of heart. The question is continually asked: What are the Soviet Union's ultimate aims? What are the Soviet leaders' real intentions? It may be the wrong question. It seems to imply that the answer lies in the secret recesses of the minds of Soviet leaders, as if Brezhnev might divulge it if awakened in the middle of night or caught in an unguarded moment. Focusing on the question of ultimate aims is bound to leave the democracies uncertain and hesitant at each new Soviet geopolitical move, as they try to analyze and debate among themselves whether the intrinsic value of the area at stake is of any "strategic importance," or whether it heralds a turn to a hard line. These are not the alternatives as the Soviet leaders see them. The Soviet practice, confident of the flow of history, is to promote the attrition of adversaries by gradual increments, not to stake everything on a single throw of the dice. "To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime," wrote Lenin.[4] By the same token, the failure to engage in the conflict when the relation of forces is favorable is equally a crime. The choice of Soviet tactics is, therefore, at each time and place determined by their assessment of the "objective correlation of forces," which as Marxists they pride themselves on discerning.

It seems to me more useful, therefore, to view Soviet strategy as essentially one of ruthless opportunism. No chance of incremental gain must be given up for Western concepts of goodwill. The immense reservoir of sympathy built up during World War II was sacrificed without hesitation to obtain a bastion in Eastern Europe. The Geneva summit conference of 1955 was used to perpetuate the Soviet position in East Germany and opened the way to the Soviet arms deal with Egypt, which helped to produce two decades of turmoil in the Middle East. In 1962 a new Administration that had eagerly — almost pleadingly — expressed its desire for a new era of US–Soviet relations was confronted with an ultimatum over Berlin and a Cuban missile crisis. In 1975–1976 a possible SALT agreement did not prevent the dispatch of Soviet-backed Cuban forces to Angola. In 1977 the hopeful prospect of a new Administration eager to revive détente did not tilt the balance in favor of restraint when an opportunity for proxy war presented itself in Ethiopia. In every policy choice the Soviet leaders have identified their interests not with the goodwill of countries that Soviet doctrine defines as organically hostile but with strategic opportunity as they saw it. To expect the Soviet leaders to restrain themselves from exploiting circumstances they conceive to be favorable is to misread history. To foreclose Soviet opportunities is thus the essence of the West's responsibility. It is up to *us* to define the limits of Soviet aims.

This is an attainable objective. The imposing monolith of totalitarian states often obscures their latent weaknesses. The Soviet system is unstable politically; it has no mechanism for succession. Of the four General Secretaries of the Soviet Communist Party two have died in office; the third has been removed by couplike procedures; the fate of the fourth is unsettled at this writing. Precisely because there is no "legitimate" means of replacing leaders they all grow old together in office. A ponderous bureaucratic machinery and the complexity of collective leadership make it rare that Soviet foreign policy shows great brilliance or even quick responses to fast-moving events.

Nor is their economic system impressive. Ironically, in a country that exalts economic determinism, the standard of living of the Soviet Union, a land rich in resources, still lags even behind that of its East European satellites over sixty years after the advent of Communism. Over time this inefficiency is bound to produce strains and competing claims on the resources now devoted so predominantly to military preparations. Nor is the Communist Party likely to remain forever monolithic and unchallenged. The system of total planning leads to top-heavy competing bureaucracies uneasily arbitrated by the aging leaders in the Politburo. It is one of the ironies of elaborated Communist states that the Communist Party has no real function even though it permeates every aspect of society. It is not needed for running the economy, for administration, or for government. Rather, it embodies a social structure of privilege; it justifies itself by vigilance against enemies, domestic and foreign — thus producing a vested interest in tension. Sooner or later this essentially parasitic function is bound to lead to internal pressures, especially in a state comprised of many nationalities.

Nothing could be more mistaken than to fall in with the myth of an inexorable Soviet advance carefully orchestrated by some superplanners. Coexistence on the basis of the balance of forces should therefore be within our grasp — provided the nature of the challenge is correctly understood. But this is precisely what the democracies have had difficulty doing. The themes dominant in the West's perceptions of the Soviet Union have been recurrent: first, that Soviet purposes have already changed and the Soviet leaders are about to concentrate on economic development rather than foreign adventures; second, that improvements in atmosphere and good personal relations with Soviet leaders will help mitigate hostility; and third, that the Kremlin is divided between hawks and doves and that it is the duty of the Western democracies to strengthen the doves by a policy of conciliation.

The eagerness of so many in the non-Communist world to declare an end to the tensions and perils of the Cold War does not lack poignancy. In the 1930s the prominent American historian Michael Florinsky argued: “The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools, and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate victory of the proletariat.”[5] In the 1930s, the democratic freedoms described in the Soviet Constitution were admired in Europe and the United States even while the Gulag Archipelago was growing, the purge trials mocked any concept of justice, and the Soviet Union became the first major country to make an overture toward Hitler. After Stalin disbanded the Comintern in 1943, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, hardly known for his softness on Communism, was reported as saying: “Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts.”[6] Wrote Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, “Upon the conclusion of the present war, the Soviet government undoubtedly will have to dedicate its chief energies for a term of years to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of its devastated cities and territories, to the problem of industrialization, and to the achievement of a rise in the popular standard of living.”[7]

This theme that the Soviet Union should prefer economic development has never died. The Western democracies, extrapolating from their own domestic experience, assume that popular frustrations are assuaged by economic advance and that economic progress is a more rational objective than foreign adventures. In 1959 Averell Harriman wrote: “I think Mr. Khrushchev is keenly anxious to improve Soviet living standards. I believe that he looks upon the current Seven Year Plan as the crowning success of the Communist revolution and a historic turning point in the lives of the Soviet people. He also considers it a monument to himself that will mark him in history as one of his country's great benefactors.”[8] The bitter disappointments to follow did not inter this thought.

Thus in February 1964 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, hardly a dove, confidently asserted: “They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and the people.”[9] The suppression of the East German and Hungarian uprisings, the several confrontations over Berlin, the Cuban missile crisis, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the massive supplies to North Vietnam, the exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East, the never-ending attempt to probe for weak spots in Africa — none of these affected the persistent conviction of many that a Soviet change of heart was imminent and that the Soviets would prefer economic development to foreign adventures. (Of course, one reason why it has been difficult to test this last proposition is that the industrial democracies have never insisted that the Soviet Union make this choice: credits and trade have continued even in periods of Soviet aggressiveness.)

Equally perennial has been the conviction that there rages in the Kremlin a continual struggle in which America can assist the more peace-loving element by a conciliatory policy. The West has been assiduous in finding alibis for a succession of Soviet leaders; the incumbent was always considered the leader of the “liberal” faction — even Josef Stalin. Perhaps the definitive example of this Western attitude was written in 1945; today we can appreciate the irony of it. After the Yalta Conference, White House adviser Harry Hopkins told the author Robert Sherwood:

> The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine. But I have to make one amendment to that — I think we all had in our minds the reservation that we could not foretell what the results would be if anything should happen to Stalin. We felt sure that we could count on him to be reasonable and sensible and understanding — but we never could be sure who or what might be in back of him there in the Kremlin.[10]

"The prospect that the survival of Nikita S. Khrushchev's liberal regime rests upon a meeting this year between the Soviet Premier and Western leaders is being discussed by Western diplomats," reported the *New York Times* on May 5, 1958, a view that led to Khrushchev's visit to Washington in 1959. After Khrushchev's effort to change the strategic balance was rebuffed in the Cuban missile crisis, Washington experts speculated that he was struggling against hard-liners in the Kremlin and needed understanding and support from the United States lest these hard-liners prevail — ignoring the fact that it was Khrushchev himself who had sent the missiles to Cuba and that he was being attacked mainly because he had failed.[11] A plausible argument can be made that we strengthen whatever moderate elements there are in the Kremlin more by firmness, which demonstrates the risks of Soviet adventures, than by creating the impression that seemingly marginal moves are free of cost.

The idea of the Kremlin struggle that America should seek to influence adds impetus to the other dominant idea that tensions are caused by personal misunderstandings which charm and sincerity can eradicate. A little more than two years after coming into office with the argument that it would roll back Communism, the Eisenhower Administration undertook a summit with the Soviets at which the personal magic of the President was widely hailed as ushering in a new era. "No one would want to underestimate the change in the Russian attitude," said the *New York Herald Tribune* on July 21, 1955. "Without that, nothing would have been possible. . . . But it remains President Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace." *Life* magazine averred on August 1, 1955: "The chief result of the Geneva conference is so simple and breath-taking that cynics and comma-chasers still question it and Americans, for other reasons, find it a little difficult to grasp. The championship of peace has changed hands. In the mind of Europe, which judges this unofficial title, it has passed from Moscow to Washington." It was open to question how a country that had in short order turned all of Eastern Europe into satellites, blockaded Berlin, and suppressed a revolt in East Germany should have qualified for the championship of peace in the first place. But the belief that peace depended on good personal relations was extraordinarily pervasive even in the 1950s. The most eloquent statement of this attitude was made by then British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan at the end of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1955. This meeting had deadlocked precisely because the preceding summit conference had achieved the Soviet aim of relaxing tensions entirely through atmospherics:

> Why did this meeting [the summit] send a thrill of hope and expectation round the world? It wasn't that the discussions were specially remarkable. . . . It wasn't that they reached any very sensational agreement. It wasn't really what they did or said. What struck the imagination of the world was the fact of the friendly meeting between the Heads of the two great groups into which the world is divided. These men, carrying their immense burdens, met and talked and joked together like ordinary mortals. . . . The Geneva spirit was really a return to normal human relations.[12]

A year later these same Soviet leaders suppressed the uprising in Hungary and threatened Britain and France with nuclear war over the crisis in the Middle East — after the United States had ostentatiously dissociated itself from its allies. A decade later, however, President Johnson in his 1965 State of the Union Address expressed the hope that Khrushchev's successors could also visit the United States, in order to reduce the risks of personal misunderstandings:

> If we are to live together in peace, we must come to know each other better.
>
> I am sure that the American people would welcome a chance to listen to the Soviet leaders on our television — as I would like the Soviet people to hear our leaders on theirs.
>
> I hope the new Soviet leaders can visit America so they can learn about our country at firsthand.

In the face of the Soviet Union's ambiguous challenge, the West paralyzed itself, moreover, not only by excesses of conciliation but by excesses of truculence. In every decade the alternative to policies of sentimental conciliation was posed in terms of liturgical belligerence as if the emphatic trumpeting of anti-Communism would suffice to make the walls come tumbling down. Side by side with the idea that there had been a basic change in the Soviet system there existed the belief that Soviet purposes could never be modified, which would make the Soviet state the first in history to be immune to historical change. Those who denounced American intransigence were opposed by others who could not imagine that any agreement with the Soviet Union could possibly be in our interest; sometimes the very fact that the Soviets wanted an agreement was adduced as an argument against it. Both these attitudes sprang from the same fallacy that there was some terminal point to international tension, the reward either for goodwill or for toughness. They neglected the reality that we were dealing with a system too ideologically hostile for instant conciliation and militarily too powerful to destroy. We had to prevent its seizing of strategic opportunities; but we also had to have enough confidence in our own judgments to make arrangements with it that would gain time — time for the inherent stagnation of the Communist system to work its corrosion and to permit the necessity of coexistence based on restraint to be understood.

I had been a critic of both these schools — which had influenced all postwar administrations in the decade before I entered public service:

> The obsession with Soviet intentions causes the West to be smug during periods of détente and panicky during crises. A benign Soviet tone is equated with the achievement of peace; Soviet hostility is considered to be the signal for a new period of tension and usually evokes purely military countermeasures. The West is thus never ready for a Soviet change of course; it has been equally unprepared for détente and intransigence.[13]

* * *

> The heat of their argument sometimes obscured the fact that the advocates and the opponents of negotiation agreed in their fundamental assumptions. They were in accord that an effective settlement presupposed a change in the Soviet system. They were at one in thinking that Western diplomacy should seek to influence Soviet internal developments. Both groups gave the impression that the nature of a possible settlement with the Communist world was perfectly obvious. . . . They differed primarily about the issue of timing. The opponents of negotiation maintained that the Soviet change of heart was still in the future, while the advocates claimed that it had already taken place. . . .
>
> In the process, more attention was paid to whether we should negotiate than to what we should negotiate about. The dispute over Soviet domestic developments diverted energies from elaborating our own purposes. It caused us to make an issue of what should have been taken for granted: our willingness to negotiate. And it deflected us from elaborating a concrete program which alone would have made negotiations meaningful.[14]

By the time the Nixon Administration took office, the political balance sheet was hardly in credit. The Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia. It was supplying massive arms to North Vietnam; without its assistance to Hanoi, a successful negotiation could have been assured. It had shown no willingness to help bring a settlement in the Middle East. And the Soviet Union at this point was nearing equality in strategic weapons. The decisive American superiority, which had characterized the entire postwar period, had ended by 1967, halting at self-imposed ceilings of 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, 656 Polaris SLBMs, and 54 Titan ICBMs.[*] By 1969 it was clear that the number of Soviet missiles capable of reaching the United States would soon equal that of all American missiles available for retaliation against the Soviet Union, and, if Soviet building programs continued through the Seventies, would come to exceed them.

The new Administration had to attempt to resolve a series of contradictions. Whatever might be said about growing Soviet power, Communist ideology, Russian expansionism, and Soviet interventionism, anyone coming to office in the late Sixties could not fail to be awed by the unprecedented dimensions of the challenge of peace. No bellicose rhetoric could obscure the fact that existing nuclear stockpiles were enough to destroy mankind; no amount of distrust of the Soviet Union could endorse adoption of the traditional balance-of-power politics of resolving crisis by confrontation. There could be no higher duty than to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war. Yet mere sentimentality was treacherous. It would mislead our people and Communist leaders alike, exposing the first to shock and tempting the second to regard negotiation as a viable instrument of political warfare. We had to recognize that at home and among our allies we could gain support for firm action in crisis only if we could demonstrate it was not of our making. But in trying to construct a more peaceful world it would also be folly to lull people into ignoring the nature of an ideological and geopolitical challenge that would last for generations, or to shirk the unpopularity of spending for tactical and strategic defense. It was not going to be easy for a democracy, in the middle of a divisive war in Asia.

For those in positions of responsibility, devotion to peace and freedom is not tested by the emotion of their pronouncements. We had to express our commitment by the discipline with which we would defend our values and yet create conditions for long-term security. We had to teach our people to face their permanent responsibility, not to expect that either tension — or our adversary — would ever millennially disappear. Such a course might not be comfortable or easy, especially for a people as impatient as ours. But we would be judged by future generations by whether we had left a safer world than we found, a world that preserved the peace without abdication and strengthened the confidence and hopes of free peoples.

Reflections during the Transition Period

THE Kremlin tends to approach a new American Administration with acute wariness. Bureaucracies crave predictability, and the Soviet leaders operate in a Byzantine bureaucratic environment of uncompromising standards. They can adjust to steady firmness; they grow nervous in the face of rapid changes, which undermine the confidence of their colleagues in their judgment and their mastery of events. It was pointless, we concluded, to try to overcome this uneasiness at the start of a new Administration by appeals to a sense of moral community, for the Soviet leaders' entire training and ideology deny this possibility. Self-interest is a standard they understand better. It is no accident that in relations between the Soviet Union and other societies those Western leaders most bent on showing "understanding" for their Soviet counterparts have been least successful. A Soviet leadership proud of its superior understanding of the objective sources of political motivation cannot admit that it is swayed by transitory considerations. Thus the almost pleading efforts of the Kennedy Administration failed to make progress until a psychological balance was restored, first with the US military buildup after pressures on Berlin and then by the Cuban missile crisis. After these events some progress was made.

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[*] ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The Kremlin knew Nixon, by contrast, as a Communist-baiter; but it had never permitted personal antipathy to stand in the way of Soviet national interest. Stalin, after all, had made an overture to Hitler within weeks of the Nazis' advent to power. Despite the mutual distrust, relations between the Kremlin and the Nixon Administration were more businesslike than in most previous periods and generally free of the roller-coaster effect of first exalted and then disappointed hopes. That strange pair, Brezhnev and Nixon, ultimately developed a modus vivendi because each came to understand the other's perception of his self-interest. Nixon had visited the Soviet Union earlier in his career, when as Vice President he had had his famous "Kitchen Debate" with Khrushchev. Nixon had a far keener grasp of the characteristics of its leadership than any other recent Presidential contender. Moscow was concerned lest the new President begin a fresh round of weapons procurement, which would strain the Soviet economy. But it was prepared to inquire into the price for averting this prospect, even while it put up its time-tested pretense of imperviousness to threats and resorted to its traditional tactic of seeking to undermine American domestic support for the policy it feared.

It took some time for the relationship to prosper but when it did it was not by chance. No subject occupied more of the attention of the President-elect during the transition period; he and I spent hours together charting our course. Nixon had come to the problem by a more political route than I. Having made his reputation through a tough, occasionally strident anti-Communism, he was committed to maintaining his traditional conservative constituency. He considered his reputation as a hardliner a unique asset to the conduct of our policy. But he understood that as President he would need to stretch his political base toward the political center; indeed, he shrewdly saw in East-West relations a long-term opportunity to build his new majority. He tended to combine these keen instincts with extremely personal judgments. He had been afraid that the Glassboro summit might restore Johnson's fortunes — hence he considered that the Soviets had colluded with the Democrats to thwart him. But he had also seen how the inconclusive outcome caused Johnson's popularity to dissipate as rapidly as it had spurted — hence his determination not to have a summit unless success could be guaranteed.

My approach — as outlined above — was in essence quite similar, if, given my academic background, somewhat more theoretical. On December 12, 1968, the President-elect asked me to brief the new Cabinet on our approach to foreign policy. It seemed to me, I told my new colleagues, that Soviet foreign policy was being pulled in two directions. There were pressures for conciliation with the West, coming from a rising desire for consumer goods, from the fear of war, and perhaps from those who hoped for a relaxation in police-state controls. At the same time there were pressures for continued confrontation with the United States arising out of Communist ideology, the suspiciousness of the leaders, the Party apparatus, the military, and those who feared that any relaxation of tensions could only encourage the satellites to try once again to loosen Moscow's apron strings. Moscow's foreign policy since the August invasion of Czechoslovakia had focused on two problems: how to overcome the shock effect of the invasion on the rest of the Communist world, and how to cut its losses elsewhere, especially how to hold down damage to US–Soviet relations.

For the latter reason, the Soviets seemed particularly anxious to keep open the possibility of talks on strategic arms limitation. This had many motives: It could be a tactical device to regain respectability; it might be a maneuver to split the Alliance by playing up fears of a US–Soviet condominium; it could be that they believed a reasonably stable strategic balance was inevitable and had therefore decided to try to stablize the arms race at the present level. Our response depended on our conception of the problem. Our past policy had often been one of "confidence building" for its own sake, in the belief that as confidence grew tensions would lessen. But if one took the view that tensions arose as a result of differences over concrete issues, then the way to approach the problem was to begin working on those differences. A lasting peace depended on the settlement of the political issues that were dividing the two nuclear superpowers.

In fact, I spoke in almost the same vein to a key Soviet representative. When I saw Boris Sedov, the KGB operative masquerading as an Embassy counselor, on December 18 at the Pierre Hotel, I told him that the President-elect was serious when he spoke of an era of negotiation. The Soviet leadership would find the new Administration prepared to negotiate lasting settlements reflecting real interests. We believed that there had been too much concern with atmospherics and not enough with substance. In the view of the new Administration there were real differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and these differences must be narrowed if there was to be a genuine relaxation of tensions. We were, I said, prepared to talk about limiting strategic weapons. But we would not be stampeded into talks before we had analyzed the problem. We would also judge the Soviet Union's purposes by its willingness to move forward on a broad front, especially by its attitude on the Middle East and Vietnam. We expected Soviet restraint in trouble spots around the world. (This was the famous doctrine of "linkage.") I hoped he would convey these considerations to Moscow.

Moscow sent a soothing reply. Sedov brought me a message on

January 2, 1969, in which Soviet leaders dissociated themselves from the "pessimistic view" they claimed to have seen expressed "in many parts of the world" about the President-elect. The "key concern of Moscow" was not Nixon's past record but whether our leadership was animated by "a sense of reality." Disarmament was of preeminent importance. The Soviet leaders recognized that our relations would be favorably affected by a settlement of the Vietnam problem, a political solution in the Middle East, and "a realistic approach" in Europe as a whole and in Germany in particular. The Kremlin did not fail to note its own "special interests" in Eastern Europe.

Both sides had now stated their basic positions. The new Administration wanted to use the Soviet concern about its intentions to draw the Kremlin into discussions on Vietnam. We therefore insisted that negotiations on all issues proceed simultaneously. The Soviet leaders were especially worried about the impact of a new arms race on the Soviet economy; they therefore gave top priority to arms limitation. This had the additional advantage to them that the mere fact of talks, regardless of their results, would complicate new defense appropriations in the United States and — though we did not yet perceive this — would disquiet the Chinese.

Of course, nothing further could happen until the new Administration was in office. But in our deliberations at the Pierre Hotel the President-elect and I distilled a number of basic principles that were to characterize our approach to US–Soviet relations as long as we were in office:

The principle of concreteness. We would insist that any negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union deal with specific causes of tensions rather than general atmospherics. Summit meetings, if they were to be meaningful, had to be well prepared and reflect negotiations that had already made major progress in diplomatic channels. We would take seriously the ideological commitment of Soviet leaders; we would not delude ourselves about the incompatible interests between our two countries in many areas. We would not pretend that good personal relations or sentimental rhetoric would end the tensions of the postwar period. But we were prepared to explore areas of common concern and to make precise agreements based on strict reciprocity.

The principle of restraint. Reasonable relations between the superpowers could not survive the constant attempt to pursue unilateral advantages and exploit areas of crisis. We were determined to resist Soviet adventures; at the same time we were prepared to negotiate about a genuine easing of tensions. We would not hold still for a détente designed to lull potential victims; we were prepared for a détente based on mutual restraint. We would pursue a carrot-and-stick approach, ready to impose penalties for adventurism, willing to expand relations in the context of responsible behavior.

The principle of linkage. We insisted that progress in superpower relations, to be real, had to be made on a broad front. Events in different parts of the world, in our view, were related to each other; even more so, Soviet conduct in different parts of the world. We proceeded from the premise that to separate issues into distinct compartments would encourage the Soviet leaders to believe that they could use cooperation in one area as a safety valve while striving for unilateral advantages elsewhere. This was unacceptable. Nixon expressed this view at his very first press conference on January 27, 1969. Strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union would be more productive, he said, if they were conducted "in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time." In a briefing for reporters on February 6, I used the term "linkage" explicitly: "To take the question of the linkage between the political and the strategic environment . . . [the President] . . . would like to deal with the problem of peace on the entire front in which peace is challenged and not only on the military one."

So strong is the pragmatic tradition of American political thought that this concept of linkage was widely challenged in 1969. It was thought to be an idiosyncrasy, a gratuitous device to delay arms control negotiations. It has since been repudiated as if it reflected the policy preference of a particular administration. In our view, linkage existed in two forms: first, when a diplomat deliberately links two separate objectives in a negotiation, using one as leverage on the other; or by virtue of reality, because in an interdependent world the actions of a major power are inevitably related and have consequences beyond the issue or region immediately concerned.

The new Administration sometimes resorted to linkage in the first sense; for example, when we made progress in settling the Vietnam war something of a condition for advance in areas of interest to the Soviets, such as the Middle East, trade, or arms limitation. But in the far more important sense, linkage was a reality, not a decision. Displays of American impotence in one part of the world, such as Asia or Africa, would inevitably erode our credibility in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East. (This was why we were so determined that our withdrawal from Vietnam occur not as a collapse but as an American strategy.) Our posture in arms control negotiations could not be separated from the resulting military balance, nor from our responsibilities as the major military power of a global system of alliances. By the same token, arms limitation could almost certainly not survive a period of growing international tensions. We saw linkage, in short, as synonymous with an overall strategic and geopolitical view. To ignore the interconnection of events was to undermine the coherence of *all* policy.

Linkage, however, is not a natural concept for Americans, who have traditionally perceived foreign policy as an episodic enterprise. Our bureaucratic organizations, divided into regional and functional bureaus, and indeed our academic tradition of specialization compound the tendency to compartmentalize. American pragmatism produces a penchant for examining issues separately: to solve problems on their merits, without a sense of time or context or of the seamless web of reality. And the American legal tradition encourages rigid attention to the "facts of the case," a distrust of abstractions.

Yet in foreign policy there is no escaping the need for an integrating conceptual framework. In domestic affairs new departures are defined by the legislative process; dramatic initiatives may be the only way to launch a new program. In foreign policy the most important initiatives require painstaking preparation; results take months or years to emerge. Success requires a sense of history, an understanding of manifold forces not within our control, and a broad view of the fabric of events. The test of domestic policy is the merit of a law; that of foreign policy, nuances and interrelations.

The most difficult challenge for a policymaker in foreign affairs is to establish priorities. A conceptual framework — which "links" events — is an essential tool. The absence of linkage produces exactly the opposite of freedom of action; policymakers are forced to respond to parochial interests, buffeted by pressures without a fixed compass. The Secretary of State becomes the captive of his geographic bureaus; the President is driven excessively by his agencies. Both run the risk of becoming prisoners of events.

Linkage, therefore, was another of the attempts of the new Administration to free our foreign policy from oscillations between overextension and isolation and to ground it in a firm conception of the national interest.

Henry Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy" (1968), pp. 58-97

II. THE LIMITS OF BIPOLARITY: THE NATURE OF POWER IN THE MODERN PERIOD

THROUGHOUT history, military power was considered the final recourse. Statesmen treated the acquisition of additional power as an obvious and paramount objective. As recently as twenty-five years ago, it would have been inconceivable that a country could possess *too much* strength for effective political use; every increment of power was—at least theoretically—politically effective. The minimum aim was to assure the impermeability of the territory. Until the Second World War, a state's strength could be measured by its ability to protect its population from attack.

The nuclear age has destroyed this traditional measure. Increasing strength no longer necessarily confers the ability to protect the population. No foreseeable force level—not even full-scale ballistic missile defenses—can prevent levels of damage eclipsing those of the two world wars. In these conditions, the major problem is to discipline power so that it bears a rational relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute. The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a gargantuan increase in power has eroded its relationship to policy. The major nuclear powers are capable of devastating each other. But they have great difficulty translating this capability into policy except to prevent direct challenges to their own survival—and this condition is interpreted with increasing strictness. The capacity to destroy is difficult to translate into a plausible threat even against countries with no capacity for retaliation. The margin of superiority of the superpowers over the other states is widening; yet other nations have an unprecedented scope for autonomous action. In relations with many domestically weak countries, a radio transmitter can be a more effective form of pressure than a squadron of B-52s. In other words, power no longer translates automatically into influence. This does not mean that impotence increases influence, only that power does not automatically confer it.

This state of affairs has profound consequences for traditional notions of balance of power. In the past, stability has always presupposed the existence of an equilibrium of power which prevented one state from imposing its will on the others.

The traditional criteria for the balance of power were territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only by conquest; hence, as long as territorial expansion was foreclosed, or severely limited, the equilibrium was likely to be preserved. In the contemporary period, this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power are possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state. China gained more in real military power through the acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia. If the Soviet Union had occupied Western Europe but had remained without nuclear weapons, it would be less powerful than it is now with its existing nuclear arsenal within its present borders. In other words, the really fundamental changes in the balance of power have all occurred *within* the territorial limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an urgent need to analyze just what is understood by power—as well as by balance of power—in the nuclear age.

This would be difficult enough were technology stable. It becomes enormously complicated when a scientific revolution produces an upheaval in weapons technology at five-year intervals. Slogans like "superiority," "parity," "assured destruction," compete unencumbered by clear definitions of their operational military significance, much less a consensus on their political implications. The gap between experts and decision-makers is widening.

In short, as power has grown more awesome, it has also turned abstract, intangible, elusive. Deterrence has become the dominant military policy. But deterrence depends above all on psychological criteria. It seeks to keep an opponent from a given course by posing unacceptable risks. For purposes of deterrence, the opponent's calculations are decisive. A bluff taken seriously is more useful than a serious threat interpreted as a bluff. For political purposes, the meaningful measurement of military strength is the assessment of it by the other side. Psychological criteria vie in importance with strategic doctrine.

The abstract nature of modern power affects domestic disputes profoundly. Deterrence is tested negatively by things which do *not* happen. But it is never possible to demonstrate *why* something has not occurred. Is it because we are pursuing the best possible policy or only a marginally effective one? Bitter debate even among those who believe in the necessity of defense policy is inevitable and bound to be inconclusive. Moreover, the longer peace is maintained—or the more successful deterrence is—the more it furnishes arguments for those who are opposed to the very premises of defense policy. Perhaps there was no need for preparedness in the first place because the opponent never meant to attack. In the modern state, national security is likely to be a highly divisive domestic issue.

The enormity of modern power has destroyed its cumulative impact to a considerable extent. Throughout history the use of force set a precedent; it demonstrated a capacity to use power for national ends. In the twentieth century any use of force sets up inhibitions against resorting to it again. Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, it is clear that it has greatly diminished American willingness to become involved in this form of warfare elsewhere. Its utility as a precedent has therefore been importantly undermined.

The difficulty of forming a conception of power is paralleled by the problem of how to use it diplomatically. In the past, measures to increase readiness signaled the mounting seriousness with which an issue was viewed.[1] But such measures have become less obvious and more dangerous when weapons are always at a high state of readiness—solid-fuel missiles require less than ten minutes to be fired—and are hidden either under the ground or under the oceans. With respect to nuclear weapons, signaling increased readiness has to take place in a narrow range between the danger of failure and the risk of a preemptive strike.

Even when only conventional weapons are involved, the question of what constitutes a politically meaningful threat is increasingly complicated. After the capture of the *Pueblo,* the United States called up thirteen thousand reservists and moved an aircraft carrier into the waters off the shores of Korea. Did the fact that we had to call up reserves when challenged by a fifth-rate military power convey that we

meant to act or that we were overextended? Did the move of the aircraft carrier indicate a decision to retaliate or was it intended primarily to strike a pose?

The problem is illustrated dramatically by the war in Vietnam. A massive breakdown of communication occurred not only within the policy-making machinery in the United States but also between the United States and Hanoi. Over the past five years, the U.S. government has found it difficult, if not impossible, to define what it understood by victory. President Johnson extended an open-ended offer for unconditional negotiations. Yet our troops were deployed as if this offer had not been made. The deployment was based on purely military considerations; it did not take into account the possibility that our troops might have to support a negotiation—the timing of which we had, in effect, left to the opponent. Strategy divorced from foreign policy proved sterile.

These perplexities have spurred new interest in arms-control negotiations, especially those dealing with strategic missiles. These negotiations can be important for the peace and security of the world. But to be effective, they require an intellectual resolution of the issues which have bedeviled the formulation of military policy. Unless we are able to give an operational meaning to terms such as "superiority" or "stability," negotiations will lack criteria by which to judge progress.

Thus, whatever the course—a continuation of the arms race or arms control—a new look at American national security policy is essential. Over ten years have passed since the last comprehensive, bipartisan, high-level reevaluation of all aspects of national security: the Gaither Committee. A new administration should move quickly to bring about such a review. It should deal with some of the following problems: (a) a definition of the national interest and national security over the next decade; (b) the nature of military power in that period; (c) the relationship of military power to political influence; (d) implications and feasibility (both military and political) of various postures—superiority, parity, and so on; (e) the implications (both political and military) of new developments such as MIRV (multiple individually targeted reentry vehicles) and ballistic missile defenses; (f) the prospects for arms control, including specific measures to moderate the arms race.

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[1] Sometimes these measures got out of control; the mobilization schedules were one of the principal reasons for the outbreak of the First World War.

III. POLITICAL MULTIPOLARITY: THE CHANGED NATURE OF ALLIANCES

No AREA of policy illustrates more dramatically the tensions between political multipolarity and military bipolarity than the field of alliance policy. For a decade and a half after the Second World War, the United States identified security with alliances. A global network of relationships grew up based on the proposition that deterrence of aggression required the largest possible grouping of powers.

This system of alliances was always in difficulty outside the Atlantic area because it tried to apply principles drawn from the multipolar world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when several major powers of roughly equal strength existed. Then, indeed, it was impossible for one country to achieve dominance if several others combined to prevent it. But this was not the case in the era of the superpowers of the forties and fifties. Outside Europe, our allies added to our strength only marginally; they were in no position to reinforce each other's capabilities.

Alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions: (1) a common objective—usually defense against a common danger; (2) a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the *casus belli;* (3) some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon; (4) a penalty for noncooperation—that is, the possibility of being refused assistance must exist—otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down.

In the system of alliances developed by the United States after the Second World War, these conditions have never been met outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), to which we belong in all but name, there has been no consensus as to the danger. Pakistan's motive for obtaining U.S. arms was not security against a Communist attack but protection against India. The Arab members of CENTO armed not against the U.S.S.R. but against Israel. Lacking a conception of common interests, the members of these alliances have never been able to develop common policies with respect to issues of war and peace. Had they been able to do so, such policies might well have been stillborn anyway, because the technical means of cooperation have been lacking. Most allies have neither the resources nor the will to render mutual support. A state which finds it difficult to maintain order or coherence of policy at home does not increase its strength by combining with states suffering similar disabilities.

In these circumstances, SEATO and CENTO have grown moribund as instruments of collective action. Because the United States has often seemed more eager to engage in the defense of its SEATO and CENTO allies than they themselves, they have become convinced that noncooperation will have no cost. In fact, they have been able to give the impression that it would be worse for us than for them if they fell to Communism. SEATO and CENTO have become, in effect, unilateral American guarantees. At best, they provide a legal basis for bilateral U.S. aid.

The case is different with NATO. Here we are united with countries of similar traditions and domestic structures. At the start, there was a common conception of the threat. The technical means for cooperation existed. Mechanisms for developing common policies came into being—especially in the military field. Thus in its first decade and a half, NATO was a dynamic and creative institution.

Today, however, NATO is in disarray as well. Actions by the United States—above all, frequent unilateral changes of policy—are partially responsible. But the most important cause is the transformation of the international environment, specifically the decline in the preeminence of the superpowers and the emergence of political multipolarity. Where the alliances outside of Europe have never been vital because they failed to take into account the military bipolarity of the fifties, NATO is in difficulties because it has yet to adjust to the political multipolarity of the late sixties.

When NATO was founded in 1949, Europeans had a dual fear: the danger of an imminent Soviet attack and the prospect of eventual U.S. withdrawal. In the late 1960s, however, the fear of Soviet invasion has declined. Even the attack on Czechoslovakia is likely to restore anxiety about Soviet military aggression only temporarily. At the same time, two decades of American military presence in Europe coupled with American predominance in NATO planning have sharply reduced the fear that America might wash its hands of European concerns.

When NATO was formed, moreover, the principal threat to world peace seemed to lie in a Soviet attack on Europe. In recent years, the view has grown that equally grave risks are likely to arise in trouble spots outside Europe. To most Europeans, these do not appear as immediate threats to their independence or security. The irony here is striking. In the fifties, Europeans were asking for American assistance in Asia and the Middle East with the argument that they were defending the greater interests of freedom. The United States replied that these very interests required American aloofness. Today, the roles are precisely reversed. It is Europe that evades our entreaties to play a global role; that is to say, Europeans do not consider their interests at stake in America's extra-European involvement.

These are symptoms of deeper, structural problems, however. One problem, paradoxically, is the growth of European economic strength and political self-confidence. At the end of the Second World War, Europe was dependent on the United States for economic assistance, political stability, and military protection. As long as Europe needed the shelter of a superpower, American predominance was inevitable. In relations with the United States, European statesmen acted as lobbyists rather than as diplomats. Their influence depended less on the weight of their countries than on the impact of their personalities. A form of consultation evolved whereby Europeans sought to influence American actions by giving us a reputation to uphold or—to put it more crudely—by oscillating between flattery and almost plaintive appeals for reassurance. The United States, secure in its predominance, in turn concentrated on soothing occasional European outbreaks of insecurity rather than on analyzing their causes.

Tutelage is a comfortable relationship for the senior partner, but it is demoralizing in the long run. It breeds illusions of omniscience on one side and attitudes of impotent irresponsibility on the other. In any event, the United States could not expect to perpetuate the accident of Europe's postwar exhaustion into a permanent pattern of international relations. Europe's economic recovery inevitably led to a return to more traditional political pressures.

These changes in Europe were bound to lead to a difficult transitional period. They could have resulted in a new partnership between the United States and an economically resurgent and politically united Europe, as had been envisaged by many of the early advocates of Atlantic unity. However, the European situation has not resolved itself in that way. Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not make even approximately the defense effort of which it is capable. But European unity is stymied, and domestic politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses itself in special testiness toward the United States.

These strains have been complicated by the growth of Soviet nuclear power. The changed nature of power in the modern period has affected NATO profoundly. As the risks of nuclear war have become enormous, the credibility of traditional pledges of support has inevitably been reduced. In the past, a country would carry out a commitment because, it could plausibly be argued, the consequences of not doing so were worse than those of coming to the ally's assistance. This is no longer self-evident. In each of the last three annual statements by the Secretary of Defense on the U.S. defense posture, the estimate of *dead* in a general nuclear war ranged from 40 to 120 million. This figure will, if anything, increase. It will become more and more difficult to demonstrate that *anything* is worse than the elimination of over half of a society in a matter of days. The more NATO relies on strategic nuclear war as a counter to all forms of attack, the less credible its pledges will be.

The consciousness of nuclear threat by the two superpowers has undermined allied relationships in yet another way. For understandable reasons, the superpowers have sought to make the nuclear environment more predictable—witness the nuclear test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty. But the blind spot in our policy has been the failure to understand that, in the absence of full consultation, our allies see in these talks the possible forerunner of a more comprehensive arrangement affecting their vital interests negotiated without them. Strategic arms talks thus emphasize the need of political understanding in acute form. The pattern of negotiating an agreement first and then giving our allies an opportunity—even a full one—to comment is intolerable in the long run. It puts the onus of failure on them, and it prevents them from doing more than quibble about a framework with which they may disagree. Strains have been reinforced by the uncertain American response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—especially the reluctance to give up the prospect of a summit meeting. Atlantic relations, for all their seemingly normalcy, thus face a profound crisis.

This state of affairs has been especially difficult for those Americans who deserve most credit for forging existing Atlantic relations. Two decades of hegemony have produced the illusion that present Atlantic arrangements are "natural," that wise policy consists of making the existing framework more tolerable. "Leadership" and "partnership" are invoked, but the content given to these words is usually that which will support the existing pattern. European unity is advocated to enable Europeans to share burdens on a world-wide scale.

Such a view fails to take into account the realities of political multipolarity. The aim of returning to the "great days of the Marshall Plan" is impossible. Nothing would sunder Atlantic relationships so surely as the attempt to reassert the notions of leadership appropriate to the early days of NATO.

In the bipolar world of the forties and fifties, order could be equated with military security; integrated command arrangements sufficed as the principal bond of unity. In the sixties, security, while still important, has not been enough. Every crisis from Berlin to Czechoslovakia has seen the call for "strengthening NATO" confined to military dispositions. Within months a malaise has become obvious again because the overriding need for a common political conception has not been recognized. The challenge of the seventies will be to forge unity with political measures.

It is not "natural" that the major decisions about the defense of an area so potentially powerful as Western Europe should be made three thousand miles away. It is not "normal" that Atlantic policies should be geared to American conceptions. In the forties and fifties, practicing unity—through formal resolutions and periodic reassurances—was profoundly important as a symbol of the end of our isolationism. In the decade ahead, we cannot aim at unity as an end in itself; it must emerge from common conceptions and new structures.

"Burden-sharing" will not supply that impetus. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair, only because it is necessary. While there are strong arguments for Atlantic partnership and European unity, enabling Europe to play a global role is not one of them. A nation assumes responsibilities not only because it has resources but because it has a certain view of its own destiny. Through the greater part of its history—until the Second World War—the United States possessed the resources but not the philosophy for a global role. Today, the poorest Western European country—Portugal—has the widest commitments outside Europe because its historic image of itself has become bound up with its overseas possessions. This condition is unlikely to be met by any other European country—with the possible exception of Great

Britain—no matter what its increase in power. Partially as the result of decolonization, Europeans are unlikely to conduct a significant global policy whatever their resources or their degree of unity. Cooperation between the United States and Europe must concentrate on issues within the Atlantic area rather than global partnership.

Even within the Atlantic area, a more equitable distribution of responsibilities has two prerequisites: there must be some consensus in the analysis of the international situation, at least as it affects Europe; there must be a conviction that the United States cannot or will not carry all the burdens alone. Neither condition is met today. The traditional notion of American leadership tends to stifle European incentives for autonomy. Improved consultation—the remedy usually proposed—can only alleviate, not remove, the difficulty.

The problem of consultation is complex, of course. No doubt unilateral American action has compounded the uneasiness produced by American predominance and European weakness. The shift in emphasis of American policy, from the NATO multilateral force to the nonproliferation treaty, and frequent unilateral changes in strategic doctrine, have all tended to produce disquiet and to undermine the domestic position of ministers who had staked their futures on supporting the American viewpoint.

It is far from self-evident, however, that more extensive consultation within the existing framework can be more than a palliative. One problem concerns technical competence. In any large bureaucracy—and an international consultative process has many similarities to domestic administrative procedures—the weight given to advice bears some relation to the competence it reflects. If one partner possesses all the technical competence, the process of consultation is likely to remain barren. The minimum requirement for effective consultation

is that each ally have enough knowledge to give meaningful advice.

But there are even more important limits to the process of consultation. The losing party in a domestic dispute has three choices: (a) it can accept the setback with the expectation of winning another battle later on—this is the usual bureaucratic attitude and it is based on the assurance of another hearing; (b) if advice is consistently ignored, it can resign and go into opposition; (c) as the opposition party, it can have the purpose either of inducing the existing government to change its course or of replacing it. If all these avenues are closed, violence or mounting frustration are the consequences.

Only the first option is open to sovereign states bound together by an alliance, since they obviously cannot resign or go into opposition without wrecking the alliance. They cannot affect the process by which their partners' decisionmakers are chosen despite the fact that this may be crucial for their fate. Indeed, as long as the need to maintain the alliance overrides all other concerns, disagreement is likely to be stifled. Advice without responsibility and disagreement without an outlet can turn consultation into a frustrating exercise which compounds rather than alleviates discord.

Consultation is especially difficult when it lacks an integrating over-all framework. The consultation about the nonproliferation treaty concerned specific provisions but not the underlying general philosophy which was of the deepest concern to many of our allies, especially Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. During periods of détente, each ally makes its own approach to Eastern Europe or the U.S.S.R. without attempting to further a coherent Western enterprise. During periods of crisis, there is pressure for American reassurance but not for a clearly defined common philosophy. In these circumstances, consultation runs the risk of being irrelevant. The issues it "solves" are peripheral; the central issues are inadequately articulated. It deals haphazardly in answers to undefined questions.

Such a relationship is not healthy in the long run. Even with the best will, the present structure encourages American unilateralism and European irresponsibility. This is a serious problem for the United States. If the United States remains the trustee of every non-Communist area, it will exhaust its psychological resources. No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time. A more pluralistic world—especially in relationships with friends—is profoundly in our long-term interest. Political multipolarity, while difficult to get used to, is the precondition for a new period of creativity. Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight that would discipline our occasional impetuosity and, by supplying historical perspective, modify our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions.

All of this suggests that there is no alternative to European unity either for the United States or for Europe. In its absence, the malaise can only be alleviated, not ended. Ultimately, this is a problem primarily for the Europeans. In the recent past, the United States has often defeated its purposes by committing itself to one particular form of European unity—that of federalism. It has also complicated British membership in the Common Market by making it a direct objective of American policy.

In the next decade the architectonic approach to Atlantic policy will no longer be possible. The American contribution must be more philosophical; it will have to consist more of understanding and quiet, behind-the-scenes encouragement than of the propagation of formal institutional structures. Involved here is the American conception of how nations cooperate. A tradition of legalism and habits of predominance have produced a tendency to multiply formal arrangements.

But growing European autonomy forces us to learn that nations cooperate less because they have a legal obligation to do so than because they have common purposes. Command arrangements cannot substitute for common interests. Coordinated strategy will be empty unless it reflects shared political concepts. The chance of disagreements on peripheral issues may be the price for unity on issues that really matter. The memory of European impotence and American tutelage should not delude us into believing that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself. Third-force dangers are not avoided by legal formulas, and, more important, they have been overdrawn. It is hard to visualize a "deal" between the Soviet Union and Europe which would jeopardize our interests without jeopardizing European interests first. In any event, a sense of responsibility in Europe will be a much better counter to Soviet efforts to undermine unity than American tutelage.

In short, our relations with Europeans are better founded on developing a community of interests than on the elaboration of formal legal obligations. No precise blueprint for such an arrangement is possible because different fields of activity have different needs. In the military sphere, for example, modern technology will impose a greater degree of integration than is necessary in other areas. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is almost inconceivable that our allies would prefer to go to war without the support of the United States, given the relatively small nuclear forces in prospect for them. Close coordination between Europe and the United States in the military sphere is dictated by self-interest, and Europe has more to gain from it than the United States.

For this very reason, it is in our interest that Europeans should assume much greater responsibility for developing doctrine and force levels in NATO, perhaps by vitalizing such institutions as the West European Union (WEU), perhaps by alternative arrangements. The Supreme Allied Commander should in time be a European.

Military arrangements are not enough, however. Under current conditions, no statesman will risk a cataclysm simply to fulfill a legal obligation. He will do so only if a degree of *political* cooperation has been established which links the fate of each partner with the survival of all the others. This requires an entirely new order of political creativity.

Coordination is especially necessary in East-West relations. The conventional view is that NATO can be as useful an instrument for détente as for defense. This is doubtful—at least in NATO's present form. A military alliance, one of the chief cohesive links of which is its integrated command arrangement, is not the best instrument for flexible diplomacy. Turning NATO into an instrument of détente might reduce its security contribution without achieving a relaxation of tensions. A diplomatic confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have all the rigidities of the bipolar military world. It would raise fears in Western Europe of an American-Soviet condominium, and it would tend to legitimize the Soviet hegemonical position in Eastern Europe. Above all, it would fail to take advantage of the flexibility afforded by greater Western European unity and autonomy. As Europe gains structure, its attraction for Eastern Europe is bound to increase. The major initiatives to improve relations between Western and Eastern Europe should originate in Europe with the United States in a reserve position.

Such an approach can work only if there is a real consensus as to objectives. Philosophical agreement can make possible flexibility of method. This will require a form of consultation

much more substantial than that which now exists and a far more effective and coherent European contribution.

To be sure, events in Czechoslovakia demonstrate the limits of Eastern European autonomy that the Soviet Union is now prepared to tolerate. But the Soviet Union may not be willing indefinitely to use the Red Army primarily against allies as it has done three times in a decade and a half. In any event, no Western policy can guarantee a more favorable evolution in Central Europe; all it can do is to take advantage of an opportunity if it arises.

Policy outside Europe is likely to be divergent. Given the changed European perspective, an effort to bring about global burden-sharing might only produce stagnation. The allies would be able to agree primarily on doing nothing. Any crisis occurring anywhere would turn automatically and organically world-wide. American acceptance of European autonomy implies also European acceptance of a degree of American autonomy with respect to areas in which, for understandable reasons, European concern has lessened.

There may be opportunities for cooperation in hitherto purely national efforts—for example, our space program. European participation in it could help to remedy the "technological gap."

Finally, under present circumstances, an especially meaningful community of interests can be developed in the social sphere. All modern states face problems of bureaucratization, pollution, environmental control, urban growth. These problems know no national considerations. If the nations of the Atlantic work together on these issues—through either private or governmental channels or both—a new generation habituated to cooperative efforts could develop similar to that spawned in different circumstances by the Marshall Plan.

It is high time that the nations bordering the Atlantic deal

—formally, systematically, and at the highest level—with questions such as these: (a) What are the relative roles of Europe and the United States in East-West contacts? (b) Is a division of functions conceivable in which Western Europe plays the principal role in relation to Eastern Europe while the United States concentrates on relationships with the U.S.S.R.? (c) What forms of political consultation does this require? (d) In what areas of the world is common action possible? Where are divergent courses indicated? How are differences to be handled?

Thus, we face the root questions of a multipolar world. How much unity should we want? How much diversity can we stand? These questions never have a final answer within a pluralistic society. Adjusting the balance between integration and autonomy will be the key challenge of emerging Atlantic relations.

IV. BIPOLARITY AND MULTIPOLARITY: THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically. But a philosophical deepening will not come easily to those brought up in the American tradition of foreign policy.

Our political society was one of the few which was *consciously* created at a point in time. At least until the emergence of the race problem, we were blessed by the absence of conflicts between classes and over ultimate ends. These factors produced the characteristic aspects of American foreign policy: a certain manipulativeness and pragmatism, a conviction that the normal pattern of international relations was harmonious, a reluctance to think in structural terms, a belief in final answers—all qualities which reflect a sense of self-sufficiency not far removed from a sense of omnipotence. Yet the contemporary dilemma is that there are no total solutions; we live in a world gripped by revolutions in technology, values, and institutions. We are immersed in an unending process, not in a quest for a final destination. The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physical but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will depend ultimately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power.

The New Nations and Political Legitimacy. This challenge is especially crucial with respect to the new nations. Future historians are likely to class the confusion and torment in the emerging countries with the great movements of religious awakening. Continents which had been dormant for centuries suddenly develop political consciousness. Regions which for scores of years had considered foreign rule as natural struggle for independence. Yet it is a curious nationalism which defines itself not as in Europe by common language or culture but often primarily by the common experience of foreign rule. Boundaries—especially in Africa—have tended to follow the administrative convenience of the colonial powers rather than linguistic or tribal lines. The new nations have faced problems both of identity and of political authority. They often lack social cohesiveness entirely, or they are split into competing groups, each with a highly developed sense of identity.

It is no accident that between the Berlin crisis and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the principal threats to peace came from the emerging areas. Domestic weakness encourages foreign intervention. The temptation to deflect domestic dissatisfactions into foreign adventures is ever present. Leaders feel little sense of responsibility to an over-all international equilibrium; they are much more conscious of their local grievances. The rivalry of the superpowers offers many opportunities for blackmail.

Yet their relations with other countries are not the most significant aspect of the turmoil of the new countries. It is in the new countries that questions of the purpose of political

life and the meaning of political legitimacy—key issues also in the modern state—pose themselves in their most acute form. The new nations weigh little in the physical balance of power. But the forces unleashed in the emergence of so many new states may well affect the moral balance of the world—the convictions which form the structure for the world of tomorrow. This adds a new dimension to the problem of multipolarity.

Almost all of the new countries suffer from a revolutionary malaise: revolutions succeed through the coming together of all resentments. But the elimination of existing structures compounds the difficulty of establishing political consensus. A successful revolution leaves as its legacy a profound dislocation. In the new countries, contrary to all revolutionary expectations, the task of construction emerges as less glamorous and more complex than the struggle for freedom; the exaltation of the quest for independence cannot be perpetuated. Sooner or later, positive goals must replace resentment of the former colonial power as a motive force. In the absence of autonomous social forces, this unifying role tends to be performed by the state.

But the assumption of this role by the state does not produce stability. When social cohesiveness is slight, the struggle for control of authority is correspondingly more bitter. When government is the principal, sometimes the sole, expression of national identity, opposition comes to be considered treason. The profound social or religious schisms of many of the new nations turn the control of political authority quite literally into a matter of life and death. Where political obligation follows racial, religious, or tribal lines, self-restraint breaks down. Domestic conflicts assume the character of civil war. Such traditional authority as exists is personal or feudal. The problem is to make it "legitimate"—to develop a notion of political obligation which depends on legal norms rather than on coercive power or personal loyalty.

This process took centuries in Europe. It must be accomplished in decades in the new nations, where preconditions of success are less favorable than at comparable periods in Europe. The new countries are subject to outside pressures; there is a premium on foreign adventures to bring about domestic cohesiveness. Their lack of domestic structure compounds the already great international instabilities.

The American role in the new nations' efforts to build legitimate authority is in need of serious reexamination. The dominant American view about political structure has been that it will follow more or less automatically upon economic progress and that it will take the form of constitutional democracy.

Both assumptions are subject to serious questions. In every advanced country, political stability preceded rather than emerged from the process of industrialization. Where the rudiments of popular institutions did not exist at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, they did not receive their impetus from it. To be sure, representative institutions were broadened and elaborated as the countries prospered, but their significant features antedated economic development and are not attributable to it. In fact, the system of government which brought about industrialization—whether popular or authoritarian—has tended to be confirmed rather than radically changed by this achievement.

Nor is democracy a natural evolution of nationalism. In the last century, democracy was accepted by a ruling class whose estimate of itself was founded outside the political process. It was buttressed by a middle class, holding a political philosophy in which the state was considered to be a referee of the ultimately important social forces rather than the principal focus of national consciousness. Professional revolutionaries were rarely involved; their bias is seldom democratic.

The pluralism of the West had many causes which cannot be duplicated elsewhere. These included a church organization outside the control of the state and therefore symbolizing the limitation of government power; the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition of justice based on human dignity, reinforced later by the Christian ethic; an emerging bourgeoisie; a stalemate in religious wars imposing tolerance as a practical necessity and a multiplicity of states. Industrialization was by no means the most significant of these factors. Had any of the others been missing, the Western political evolution could have been quite different.

This is why Communism has never succeeded in the industrialized Western countries for which its theory was devised; its greatest successes have been in developing societies. This is no accident. Industrialization—in its early phases—multiplies dislocations. It smashes the traditional framework. It requires a system of values which makes the sacrifices involved in capital formation tolerable and which furnishes some integrating principles to contain psychological frustrations.

Communism is able to supply legitimacy for the sacrifices inseparably connected with capital formation in an age when the maxims of laissez faire are no longer acceptable. And Leninism has the attraction of providing a rationale for holding on to power. Many of the leaders of the new countries are revolutionaries who sustained themselves through the struggle for independence by visions of the transformations to be brought about after victory. They are not predisposed even to admit the possibility of giving up power in their hour of triumph. Since they usually began their struggle for independence while in a small minority and sustained it against heavy odds, they are not likely to be repelled by the notion that it is possible to "force men to be free."

The ironic feature of the current situation is that Marxism, professing a materialistic philosophy, is accepted only where it does not exist: in some new countries and among protest movements of the advanced democratic countries. Its appeal is its idealistic component and not its economic theory. It offers a doctrine of substantive change and an explanation of final purposes. Its philosophy has totally failed to inspire the younger generation in Communist countries, where its bureaucratic reality is obvious.

On the other hand, the United States, professing an idealistic philosophy, often fails to gain acceptance for democratic values because of its heavy reliance on economic factors. It has answers to technical dislocations but has not been able to contribute much to building a political and moral consensus. It offers a procedure for change but little content for it.

The problem of political legitimacy is the key to political stability in regions containing two-thirds of the world's population. A stable domestic system in the new countries will not automatically produce international order, but international order is impossible without it. An American agenda must include some conception of what we understand by political legitimacy. In an age of instantaneous communication, we cannot pretend that what happens to over two-thirds of humanity is of no concern or interest to the United States. This does not mean that our goal should be to transfer American institutions to the new nations—even less that we should impose them. Nor should we define the problem as how to prevent the spread of Communism. Our goal should be to build a moral consensus which can make a pluralistic world creative rather than destructive.

Irrelevance to one of the great revolutions of our time will mean that we will ultimately be engulfed by it—if not physically, then psychologically. Already some of the protest movements have made heroes of leaders in repressive new countries. The absurdity of founding a claim for freedom on protagonists of the totalitarian state—such as Guevara or Ho or Mao—underlines the impact of the travail of the new countries on older societies which share none of their technical but some of their spiritual problems, especially the problem of the nature of authority in the modern world. To a young generation in rebellion against bureaucracy and bored with material comfort, these societies offer at least the challenge of unlimited opportunity (and occasionally unlimited manipulativeness) in the quest for justice.

A world which is bipolar militarily and multipolar politically thus confronts an additional problem. Side by side with the physical balance of power, there exists a psychological balance based on intangibles of value and belief. The presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed drastically; those of the psychological balance remain to be discovered.

The Problem of Soviet Intentions. Nothing has been more difficult for Americans to assimilate in the nuclear age than the fact that even enmity is complex. In the Soviet Union, we confront an opponent whose public pronouncements are insistently hostile. Yet the nuclear age imposes a degree of cooperation and an absolute limit to conflicts.

The military relationship with the Soviet Union is difficult enough; the political one confronts us with a profound conceptual problem. A society which regards peace as the normal condition tends to ascribe tension not to structural causes but to wicked or shortsighted individuals. Peace is thought to result either from the automatic operation of economic forces or from the emergence of a more benign leadership abroad.

The debate about Soviet trends between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" illustrates this problem. Both sides tend to agree that the purpose of American policy is to encourage a more benign evolution of Soviet society—the original purpose of containment was, after all, to bring about the *domestic* transformation of the U.S.S.R. They are at one that a settlement presupposes a change in the Soviet system. Both groups imply that the nature of a possible settlement is perfectly obvious. But the apostles of containment have never specified the American negotiating program to be undertaken from the position of strength their policy was designed to achieve. The advocates of relaxation of tensions have been no more precise; they have been more concerned with atmosphere than with the substance of talks.

In fact, the difference between the "hawks" and "doves" has usually concerned timing: the hawks have maintained that a Soviet change of heart, while inevitable, was still in the future, whereas the doves have argued that it has already taken place. Many of the hawks tend to consider all negotiations as fruitless. Many of the doves argue—or did before Czechoslovakia—that the biggest step toward peace has already been accomplished by a Soviet change of heart about the cold war; negotiations need only remove some essentially technical obstacles.

The difference affects—and sometimes poisons—the entire American debate about foreign policy. Left-wing critics of American foreign policy seem incapable of attacking U.S. actions without elevating our opponent (whether it happens to be Mao or Castro or Ho) to a pedestal. If they discern some stupidity or self-interest on our side, they assume that the other side must be virtuous. They then criticize the United States for opposing the other side. The right follows the same logic in reverse: they presuppose *our* good intentions and conclude that the other side must be perverse in opposing us.

Both the left and the right judge largely in terms of intentions. In the process, whatever the issue—whether Berlin or Vietnam—more attention is paid to whether to get to the conference room than what to do once we arrive there. The dispute over Communist intentions has diverted attention from elaborating our own purposes. In some quarters, the test of dedication to peace has been whether one interprets Soviet intentions in the most favorable manner.

It should be obvious, however, that the Soviet domestic situation is complex and its relationship to foreign policy far from obvious. It is true that the risks of general nuclear war should be as unacceptable to Moscow as to Washington; but this truism does not automatically produce détente. It also seems to lessen the risks involved in local intervention. No doubt the current generation of Communist leaders lacks the ideological dynamism of their predecessors who made the revolution; at the same time, they have at their disposal a military machine of unprecedented strength, and they must deal with a bureaucracy of formidable vested interests. Unquestionably, Soviet consumers press their leaders to satisfy their demands; but it is equally true that an expanding modern economy is able to supply *both* guns and butter. Some Soviet leaders may have become more pragmatic; but in an elaborated Communist state, the results of pragmatism are complex. Once power is seized and industrialization is largely accomplished, the Communist Party faces a difficult situation. It is not needed to conduct the government, and it has no real function in running the economy (though it tries to do both). In order to justify its continued existence and command, it may develop a vested interest in vigilance against outside danger and thus in perpetuating a fairly high level of tension.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into detail on the issue of internal Communist evolution. But it may be appropriate to inquire why, in the past, every period of détente has proved stillborn. There have been at least five periods of peaceful coexistence since the Bolshevik seizure of power, one in each decade of the Soviet state. Each was hailed in the West as ushering in a new era of reconciliation and as signifying the long-awaited final change in Soviet purposes. Each ended abruptly with a new period of intransigence, which was generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet hard-liners rather than to the dynamics of the system. There were undoubtedly many reasons for this. But the tendency of many in the West to be content with changes of Soviet tone and to confuse atmosphere with substance surely did not help matters. It has enabled the Communist leaders to postpone the choice which they must make sooner or later: whether to use détente as a device to lull the West or whether to move toward a resolution of the outstanding differences. As long as this choice is postponed, the possibility exists that latent crises may run away with the principal protagonists, as happened in the Middle East and perhaps even in Czechoslovakia.

The eagerness of many in the West to emphasize the liberalizing implications of Soviet economic trends and to make favorable interpretation of Soviet intentions a test of good faith may have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the Soviet hard-liners. Soviet troops had hardly arrived in Prague when some Western leaders began to insist that the invasion would not affect the quest for détente while others continued to indicate a nostalgia for high-level meetings. Such an attitude hardly serves the cause of peace. The risk is great that if there is no penalty for intransigence there is no incentive for conciliation. The Kremlin may use negotiations —including arms control—as a safety valve to dissipate Western suspicions rather than as a serious endeavor to resolve concrete disputes or to remove the scourge of nuclear war.

If we focus our policy discussions on Soviet purposes, we confuse the debate in two ways: Soviet trends are too ambiguous to offer a reliable guide—it is possible that not even Soviet leaders fully understand the dynamics of their system; it deflects us from articulating the purposes we should pursue, whatever Soviet intentions. Peace will not, in any event, result from one grand settlement but from a long diplomatic process, and this process requires some clarity as to our destination. Confusing foreign policy with psychotherapy deprives us of criteria by which to judge the political foundations of international order.

The obsession with Soviet intentions causes the West to be smug during periods of détente and panicky during crises. A benign Soviet tone is equated with the achievement of peace; Soviet hostility is considered to be the signal for a new period of tension and usually evokes purely military countermeasures. The West is thus never ready for a Soviet change of course; it has been equally unprepared for détente and intransigence.

These lines are being written while outrage at the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is still strong. There is a tendency to focus on military implications or to speak of strengthening unity in the abstract. But if history is a guide, there will be a new Soviet peace offensive sooner or later. Thus, reflecting about the nature of détente seems most important while its achievement appears most problematical. If we are not to be doomed to repeat the past, it may be well to learn some of its lessons: we should not again confuse a change of tone with a change of heart. We should not pose false inconsistencies between allied unity and détente; indeed, a true relaxation of tensions presupposes Western unity. We should concentrate negotiations on the concrete issues that threaten peace, such as intervention in the third world. Moderating the arms race must also be high on the agenda. None of this is possible without a concrete idea of what we understand by peace and a creative world order.

V. AN INQUIRY INTO THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST

WHEREVER we turn, then, the central task of American foreign policy is to analyze anew the current international environment and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable order.

First, we must recognize the existence of profound structural problems that are to a considerable extent independent of the intentions of the principal protagonists and that cannot be solved merely by good will. The vacuum in Central Europe and the decline of the Western European countries would have disturbed the world equilibrium regardless of the domestic structure of the Soviet Union. A strong China has historically tended to establish suzerainty over its neighbors; in fact, one special problem of dealing with China—Communism apart—is that it has had no experience in conducting foreign policy with equals. China has been either dominant or subjected.

To understand the structural issue, it is necessary to undertake an inquiry, from which we have historically shied away, into the essence of our national interest and into the premises of our foreign policy. It is part of American folklore that, while other nations have interests, we have responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of peace. We have a tendency to offer our altruism as a guarantee of our reliability: "We have no quarrel with the Communists," Secretary of State Rusk said on one occasion; "all our quarrels are on behalf of other people."

Such an attitude makes it difficult to develop a conception of our role in the world. It inhibits other nations from gearing their policy to ours in a confident way—a "disinterested" policy is likely to be considered "unreliable." A mature conception of our interest in the world would obviously have to take into account the widespread interest in stability and peaceful change. It would deal with two fundamental questions: What is it in our interest to prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?

The answer to the first question is complicated by an often-repeated proposition that we must resist aggression anywhere it occurs since peace is indivisible. A corollary is the argument that we do not oppose the fact of particular changes but the method by which they are brought about. We find it hard to articulate a truly vital interest which we would defend however "legal" the challenge. This leads to an undifferentiated globalism and confusion about our purposes. The abstract concept of aggression causes us to multiply our commitments. But the denial that our interests are involved diminishes our staying power when we try to carry out these commitments.

Part of the reason for our difficulties is our reluctance to think in terms of power and equilibrium. In 1949, for example, a State Department memorandum justified NATO as follows: "[The treaty] obligates the parties to defend the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the parties and their free institutions based upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the role of law. It obligates them to act in defense of peace and security. It is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting balance of power but to strengthen a balance of principle."

But principle, however lofty, must at some point be related to practice; historically, stability has always coincided with an equilibrium that made physical domination difficult. Interest is not necessarily amoral; moral consequences can spring from interested acts. Britain did not contribute any the less to international order for having a clear-cut concept of its interest which required it to prevent the domination of the Continent by a single power (no matter in what way it was threatened) and the control of the seas by anybody (even if the immediate intentions were not hostile). A new American administration confronts the challenge of relating our commitments to our interests and our obligations to our purposes.

The task of defining positive goals is more difficult but even more important. The first two decades after the end of the Second World War posed problems well suited to the American approach to international relations. Wherever we turned, massive dislocations required attention. Our pragmatic, *ad hoc* tendency was an advantage in a world clamoring for technical remedies. Our legal bent contributed to the development of many instruments of stability.

In the late sixties, the situation is more complex. The United States is no longer in a position to operate programs globally; it has to encourage them. It can no longer impose its preferred solution; it must seek to evoke it. In the forties and fifties, we offered remedies; in the late sixties and in the seventies our role will have to be to contribute to a structure that will foster the initiative of others. We are a superpower physically, but our designs can be meaningful only if they generate willing cooperation. We can continue to contribute to defense and positive programs, but we must seek to encourage and not stifle a sense of local responsibility. Our contribution should not be the sole or principal effort, but it should make the difference between success and failure.

This task requires a different kind of creativity and another form of patience than we have displayed in the past. Enthusiasm, belief in progress, and the invincible conviction that American remedies can work everywhere must give way to an understanding of historical trends, an ordering of our preferences, and above all an understanding of the difference our preferences can in fact make.

The dilemma is that there can be no stability without equilibrium but, equally, equilibrium is not a purpose with which we can respond to the travail of our world. A sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history; to most Americans, America has always stood for something other than its own grandeur. But a clearer understanding of America's interests and of the requirements of equilibrium can give perspective to our idealism and lead to humane and moderate objectives, especially in relation to political and social change. Thus our conception of world order must have deeper purposes than stability but greater restraints on our behavior than would result if it were approached only in a fit of enthusiasm.

Whether such a leap of the imagination is possible in the modern bureaucratic state remains to be seen. New administrations come to power convinced of the need for goals and for comprehensive concepts. Sooner, rather than later, they find themselves subjected to the pressures of the immediate and the particular. Part of the reason is the pragmatic, issue-oriented bias of our decision-makers. But the fundamental reason may be the pervasiveness of modern bureaucracy.

What started out as an aid to decision-making has developed a momentum of its own. Increasingly, the policy-maker is more conscious of the pressures and the morale of his staff than of the purpose this staff is supposed to serve. The policy-maker becomes a referee among quasi-autonomous bureaucratic bodies. Success consists of moving the administrative machinery to the point of decision, leaving relatively little energy for analyzing the decision's merit. The modern bureaucratic state widens the range of technical choices while limiting the capacity to make them.

An even more serious problem is posed by the change of ethic of precisely the most idealistic element of American youth. The idealism of the fifties during the Kennedy era expressed itself in self-confident, often zealous, institution building. Today, however, many in the younger generation consider the management of power irrelevant, perhaps even immoral. While the idea of service retains a potent influence, it does so largely with respect to problems which are clearly *not* connected with the strategic aspects of American foreign policy; the Peace Corps is a good example. The new ethic of freedom is not "civic"; it is indifferent or even hostile to systems and notions of order. Management is equated with manipulation. Structural designs are perceived as systems of "domination"—not of order. The generation which has come of age after the fifties has had Vietnam as its introduction to world politics. It has no memory of occasions when American-supported structural innovations were successful or of the motivations which prompted these enterprises.

Partly as a result of the generation gap, the American mood oscillates dangerously between being ashamed of power and expecting too much of it. The former attitude deprecates the use or possession of force; the latter is overly receptive to the possibilities of absolute action and overly indifferent to the likely consequences. The danger of a rejection of power is that it may result in a nihilistic perfectionism which disdains the gradual and seeks to destroy what does not conform to its notion of utopia. The danger of an overconcern with force is that policy-makers may respond to clamor by a series of spasmodic gestures and stylistic maneuvers and then recoil before their implications.

These essentially psychological problems cannot be overemphasized. It is the essence of a satisfied, advanced society that it puts a premium on operating within familiar procedures and concepts. It draws its motivation from the present, and it defines excellence by the ability to manipulate an established framework. But for the major part of humanity, the present becomes endurable only through a vision of the future. To most Americans—including most American leaders—the significant reality is what they see around them. But for most of the world—including many of the leaders of the new nations—the significant reality is what they wish to bring about. If we remain nothing but the managers of our physical patrimony, we will grow increasingly irrelevant. And since there can be no stability without us, the prospects of world order will decline.

We require a new burst of creativity, however, not so much for the sake of other countries as for our own people, especially the youth. The contemporary unrest is no doubt exploited by some whose purposes are all too clear. But that it is there to exploit is proof of a profound dissatisfaction with the merely managerial and consumer-oriented qualities of the modern state and with a world which seems to generate crises by inertia. The modern bureaucratic state, for all its panoply of strength, often finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittleness and the world-wide revolution of youth—especially in advanced countries and among the relatively affluent—suggest a spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a political environment that increasingly emphasizes bureaucratic challenges and is dedicated to no deeper purpose than material comfort.

Our unrest has no easy remedy. Nor is the solution to be found primarily in the realm of foreign policy. Yet a deeper nontechnical challenge would surely help us regain a sense of direction. The best and most prideful expressions of American purposes in the world have been those in which we acted in concert with others. Our influence in these situations has depended on achieving a reputation as a member of such a concert. To act consistently abroad we must be able to generate coalitions of shared purposes. Regional groupings supported by the United States will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas, with the United States being concerned more with the over-all framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise.

In the best of circumstances, the next administration will be beset by crises. In almost every area of the world, we have been living off capital—warding off the immediate, rarely dealing with underlying problems. These difficulties are likely to multiply when it becomes apparent that one of the legacies of the war in Vietnam will be a strong American reluctance to risk overseas involvements.

A new administration has the right to ask for compassion and understanding from the American people. But it must found its claim not on pat technical answers to difficult issues; it must above all ask the right questions. It must recognize that, in the field of foreign policy, we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it.

Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (1979), "Conclusion" pp. 158-159

Conclusion

One of the innovations of the Nixon Presidency was the preparation of an annual report on foreign policy in the name of the President. I had proposed this in a memorandum to Nixon in the transition period. It was to serve as a conceptual outline of the President's foreign policy, as a status report, and as an agenda for action. It could simultaneously guide our bureaucracy and inform foreign governments about our thinking.

This idea, patterned after the annual Defense Posture Statement initiated by Robert McNamara, created a whole host of problems. To begin with, the State Department asserted a proprietary interest, in spite of the fact that in the entire history of the Republic the State Department had never thought of issuing such a report. This led to the now customary tug-of-war between Rogers and me of which the most charitable description is that neither of us conducted ourselves better with respect to the annual report than with respect to other matters. Both the NSC staff and the State Department started preparing drafts while seeking to conceal this fact from each other. I and my staffers had the advantage of propinquity to the President and much greater knowledge of his views. The State Department draft further handicapped itself by seeking to please every bureaucratic fiefdom in that unwieldy structure; with every desk officer insisting on a mention of his country or countries of responsibility, the State Department draft was not distinguished by conceptual thrust or the ability to make any particular point.

Nixon resolved this dispute by methods that were becoming typical. He waited until Rogers was out of the country on an African trip and

then ruled that both the NSC and the State Department could publish reports but that the Presidential one would appear at least a month before State's. This set off a frantic outburst of drafting on the Presidential report while my exhausted staff tried to deal with my revisions of their drafts and the objections of the bureaucracy. The high point of interagency wrangling was reached in 1971, when the State Department objected to a sentence about international protection of endangered species; our draft observed with some attempt at literary flair that such creatures were a fit topic for international cooperation since they moved without respect to national boundaries and could not totally be protected by national action. The State Department, ever careful, recommended changing the sentence to claim only that "some" of these creatures moved without respect to national boundaries. I did not accept the change, taking the risk of offending some patriotic bird.

Once the President's annual review became established, it produced some of the most thoughtful governmental statements of foreign policy. To our sorrow we never managed to get across its basic purpose of raising fundamental questions and expressing a philosophy. Try as we might, the media would cover only the section on Vietnam, probing for hot news or credibility gaps, ignoring the remainder as not newsworthy. In 1973 we ran into another problem. The report was issued in early May, after a year of Chinese and Soviet summits and climactic Vietnam negotiations; the date we had chosen weeks earlier for release of the report came four days after the resignation of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Nevertheless, the reports performed a useful function. They served as rough guides to the bureaucracy. They were unusually candid. They were invaluable in conveying nuances of change to foreign governments. As I will show in various chapters, changes in attitude toward China, in defense policy, in the Middle East and elsewhere were often foreshadowed in the President's annual reports.

Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (1982), pp. 159-160

The next symptom of what still seemed to us nearly inexplicable European reserve was the reaction to the President's annual Foreign Policy Report published on May 3. It was the fourth such document issued in Nixon's term of office — a unique attempt by a President to give a comprehensive yearly account of his stewardship in foreign affairs. It was deliberately conceptual in approach, with major events used as illustrations rather than listed in a bureaucratic catalogue. The purpose was to give the Congress, the public, the media, and foreign leaders an insight into our thinking, something our secretive procedures, which often excluded the bureaucracy, made essential. It was the most concise guidance available to officials eager to carry out established policy but not always privy to its formulation. On occasion we used the Foreign Policy Report to indicate or hint at important changes of policy. Every year key members of my staff — Winston Lord, Peter W. Rodman, William G. Hyland, Richard T. Kennedy, Marshall Wright, and others — spent weeks producing essays that we hoped would be at once thorough, illuminating, and readable. I was general editor. To this end I would free two weeks to do nothing else.

Try as we might, we never succeeded in our principal objective of using the Foreign Policy Reports to spark a thoughtful public discussion. Part of the reason was the media's insatiable hunger for the new; concepts and goals are too abstract to be newsworthy. Part of the reason was the burgeoning length of the product (the first was 160 printed pages, the fourth, 234), which made it difficult even for journalists with the best of intentions to do justice to it. Perhaps we never briefed the press on it properly — though as the principal briefer I would hate to think so. Whatever the reason, the only chapter that generally received attention by the American media — to the chagrin of the drafters and their families, who had been deprived of their company for weeks —was the one dealing with Indochina. In retrospect, this was inevitable, given the national obsession with Vietnam, though careful study would have picked up important clues to our unfolding policy toward China and the Soviet Union. But the rest of the report was read attentively in foreign chancelleries and by thoughtful journalists and columnists who understood that it provided an unusual insight into high-level thinking.

• Richard Nixon 1970

First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.

February 18, 1970

INTRODUCTION

"A nation needs many qualities, but it needs faith and confidence above all. Skeptics do not build societies; the idealists are the builders. Only societies that believe in themselves can rise to their challenges. Let us not, then, pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither."

The President's Remarks
at the Air Force Academy
Commencement, June 4, 1969.

When I took office, the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in Vietnam. No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies during this past year.

Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them. For all Americans must understand that because of its strength, its history and its concern for human dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace and progress are impossible without a major American role.

This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of international relations.

A NEW ERA

THE postwar period in international relations has ended.

Then, we were the only great power whose society and economy had escaped World War II's massive destruction. Today, the ravages of that war have been overcome. Western Europe and Japan have recovered their economic strength, their political vitality, and their national self-confidence. Once the recipients of American aid, they have now begun to share their growing resources with the developing world. Once almost totally dependent on American military power, our European allies now play a greater role in our common policies, commensurate with their growing strength.

Then, new nations were being born, often in turmoil and uncertainty. Today, these nations have a new spirit and a growing strength of independence. Once, many feared that they would become simply a battleground of cold-war rivalry and fertile ground for Communist penetration. But this fear misjudged their pride in their national identities and their determination to preserve their newly won sovereignty.

Then, we were confronted by a monolithic Communist world. Today, the nature of that world has changed–the power of individual Communist nations has grown, but international Communist unity has been shattered. Once a unified bloc, its solidarity has been broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and Communist China, once bound by an alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the mid-1960's. The only times the Soviet Union has used the Red Army since World War II have been against its own allies in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Marxist dream of international Communist unity has disintegrated.

Then, the United States had a monopoly or overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons. Today, a revolution in the technology of war has altered the nature of the military balance of power. New types of weapons present new dangers. Communist China has acquired thermonuclear weapons. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first. There can be no gain and certainly no victory for the power that provokes a thermonuclear exchange. Thus, both sides have recognized a vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race.

Then, the slogans formed in the past century were the ideological accessories of the intellectual debate. Today, the "isms" have lost their vitality--indeed the restlessness of youth on both sides of the dividing line testifies to the need for a new idealism and deeper purposes,

This is the challenge and the opportunity before America as it enters the 1970's.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR A DURABLE PEACE

In the first postwar decades, American energies were absorbed in coping with a cycle of recurrent crises, whose fundamental origins lay in the destruction of World War II and the tensions attending the emergence of scores of new nations. Our opportunity today–and challenge-is to get at the causes of crises, to take a longer view, and to help build the international relationships that will provide the framework of a durable peace.

I have often reflected on the meaning of "peace," and have reached one certain conclusion: Peace must be far more than the absence of war. Peace must provide a durable structure of international relationships which inhibits or removes the causes of war. Building a lasting peace requires a foreign policy guided by three basic principles:
–Peace requires partnership. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations.

–Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations. At the same time, our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of others. We--like others-must place high priority on enhancing our security through cooperative arms control.

--Peace requires a willingness to negotiate. All nations--and we are no exception-have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance.

Within such a structure, international disputes can be settled and clashes contained. The insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, will be eased, and the habits of moderation and compromise will be nurtured. Most important, a durable peace will give full opportunity to the powerful forces driving toward economic change and social justice.

This vision of a peace built on partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate is the unifying theme of this report. In the sections that follow, the first steps we have taken during this past year--the policies we have devised and the programs we have initiated to realize this vision--are placed in the context of these three principles.

1. Peace Through Partnership--The Nixon Doctrine

As I said in my address of November 3, "We Americans are a do-it-yourself people-an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has been carried over into our foreign policy."

The postwar era of American foreign policy began in this vein in 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, offering American economic and military assistance to countries threatened by aggression. Our policy held that democracy and prosperity, buttressed by American military strength and organized in a worldwide network of American-led alliances, would insure stability and peace. In the formative years of the postwar period, this great effort of international political and economic reconstruction was a triumph of American leadership and imagination, especially in Europe.

For two decades after the end of the Second World War, our foreign policy was guided by such a vision and inspired by its success. The vision was based on the fact that the United States was the richest and most stable country, without whose initiative and resources little security or progress was possible.

This impulse carried us through into the 1960's. The United States conceived programs and ran them. We devised strategies, and proposed them to our allies. We discerned dangers, and acted directly to combat them.

The world has dramatically changed since the days of the Marshall Plan. We deal now with a world of stronger allies, a community of independent developing nations, and a Communist world still hostile but now divided.

Others now have the ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes which once might have required our intervention. Our contribution and success will depend not on the frequency of our involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our policies. This is the approach which will best encourage other nations to do their part, and will most genuinely enlist the support of the American people.

This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam--the "Nixon Doctrine." Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.

America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace. We have no intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we can be most effective in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace.

A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress means a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek. Peace in the world will continue to require us to maintain our commitments--and we will. As I said at the United Nations, "It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies." But a more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are to be sustained over the long pull. In my State of the Union Address, I affirmed that "to insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility." This is not a way for America to withdraw from its indispensable role in the world. It is a way--the only way--we can carry out our responsibilities.

It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments. Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.

We will view new commitments in the light of a careful assessment of our own national interests and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to counter those threats at an acceptable risk and cost.

We have been guided by these concepts during the past year in our dealings with free nations throughout the world.
--In Europe, our policies embody precisely the three principles of a durable peace: partnership, continued strength to defend our common interests when challenged, and willingness to negotiate differences with adversaries.
--Here in the Western Hemisphere we seek to strengthen our special relationship with our sister republics through a new program of action for progress in which all voices are heard and none predominates.

--In Asia, where the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated, partnership will have special meaning for our policies--as evidenced by our strengthened ties with Japan. Our cooperation with Asian nations will be enhanced as they cooperate with one another and develop regional institutions.
--In Vietnam, we seek a just settlement which all parties to the conflict, and all Americans, can support. We are working closely with the South Vietnamese to strengthen their ability to defend themselves. As South Vietnam grows stronger, the other side will, we hope, soon realize that it becomes ever more in their interest to negotiate a just peace.

--In the Middle East, we shall continue to work with others to establish a possible framework within which the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict can negotiate the complicated and difficult questions at issue. Others must join us in recognizing that a settlement will require sacrifices and

restraints by all concerned.
–Africa, with its historic ties to so many of our own citizens, must always retain a significant place in our partnership with the new nations. Africans will play the major role in fulfilling their just aspirations–an end to racialism, the building of new nations, freedom from outside interference, and cooperative economic development. But we will add our efforts to theirs to help realize Africa's great potential.

In an ever more interdependent world economy, American foreign policy will emphasize the freer flow of capital and goods between nations. We are proud to have participated in the successful cooperative effort which created Special Drawing Rights, a form of international money which will help insure the stability of the monetary structure on which the continued expansion of trade depends.
–The great effort of economic development must engage the cooperation of all nations. We are carefully studying the specific goals of our economic assistance programs and how most effectively to reach them.

–Unprecedented scientific and technological advances as well as explosions in population, communications, and knowledge require new forms of international cooperation. The United Nations, the symbol of international partnership, will receive our continued strong support as it marks its 25th Anniversary.

2. America's Strength

The second element of a durable peace must be America's strength. Peace, we have learned, cannot be gained by good will alone.

In determining the strength of our defenses, we must make precise and crucial judgments. We should spend no more than is necessary. But there is an irreducible minimum of essential military security: for if we are less strong than necessary, and if the worst happens, there will be no domestic society to look after. The magnitude of such a catastrophe, and the reality of the opposing military power that could threaten it, present a risk which requires of any President the most searching and careful attention to the state of our defenses.

The changes in the world since 1945 have altered the context and requirements of our defense policy. In this area, perhaps more than in any other, the need to re-examine our approaches is urgent and constant.

The last 25 years have seen a revolution in the nature of military power. In fact, there has been a series of transformations–from the atomic to the thermonuclear weapon, from the strategic bomber to the intercontinental ballistic missile, from the surface missile to the hardened silo and the missile-carrying submarine, from the single to the multiple warhead, and from air defense to missile defense. We are now entering an era in which the sophistication and destructiveness of weapons present more formidable and complex issues affecting our strategic posture.

The last 25 years have also seen an important change in the relative balance of strategic power. From 1945 to 1949, we were the only nation in the world possessing an arsenal of atomic weapons. From 1950 to 1966, we possessed an overwhelming superiority in strategic weapons. From 1967 to 1969, we retained a significant superiority. Today, the Soviet Union possesses a powerful and sophisticated strategic force approaching our own. We must consider, too, that Communist China will deploy its own intercontinental missiles during the coming decade, introducing new and complicating factors for our strategic planning and diplomacy.

In the light of these fateful changes, the Administration undertook a comprehensive and far-reaching reconsideration of the premises and procedures for designing our forces. We sought–and I believe we have achieved–a rational and coherent formulation of our defense strategy and requirements for the 1970's.

The importance of comprehensive planning of policy and objective scrutiny of programs is clear:
–Because of the lead-time in building new strategic systems, the decisions we make today substantially determine our military posture–and thus our security–five years from now. This places a premium on foresight and planning.
–Because the allocation of national resources between defense programs and other national programs is itself an issue of policy, it must be considered on a systematic basis at the early stages of the national security planning process.

–Because we are a leader of the Atlantic Alliance, our doctrine and forces are crucial to the policy and planning of NATO. The mutual confidence that holds the allies together depends on understanding, agreement, and coordination among the 15 sovereign nations of the Treaty.
–Because our security depends not only on our own strategic strength, but also on cooperative efforts to provide greater security for everyone through arms control, planning weapons systems and planning for arms control negotiations must be closely integrated.

For these reasons, this Administration has established procedures for the intensive scrutiny of defense issues in the light of overall national priorities. We have re-examined our strategic forces; we have reassessed our general purpose forces; and we have engaged in the most painstaking preparation ever undertaken by the United States Government for arms control negotiations.

3. Willingness to Negotiate--An Era of Negotiation

Partnership and strength are two of the pillars of the structure of a durable peace. Negotiation is the third. For our commitment to peace is most convincingly demonstrated in our willingness to negotiate our points of difference in a fair and businesslike manner with the Communist countries.

We are under no illusions. We know that there are enduring ideological differences. We are aware of the difficulty in moderating tensions that arise from the clash of national interests. These differences will not be dissipated by changes of atmosphere or dissolved in cordial personal relations between statesmen. They involve strong convictions and contrary philosophies, necessities of national security, and the deep-seated differences of perspectives formed by geography and history.

The United States, like any other nation, has interests of its own, and will defend those interests. But any nation today must define its interests with special concern for the interests of others. If some nations define their security in a manner that means insecurity for other nations, then peace is threatened and the security of all is diminished. This obligation is particularly great for the nuclear superpowers on whose decisions the survival of mankind may well depend.

The United States is confident that tensions can be eased and the danger of war reduced by patient and precise efforts to reconcile conflicting interests on concrete issues. Coexistence demands more than a spirit of good will. It requires the definition of positive goals which can be sought and achieved cooperatively. It requires real progress toward resolution of specific differences. This is our objective.

As the Secretary of State said on December 6:

"We will continue to probe every available opening that offers a prospect for better East-West relations, for the resolution of problems large or small, for greater security for all.

"In this the United States will continue to play an active role in concert with our allies."

This is the spirit in which the United States ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and entered into negotiation with the Soviet Union on control of the military use of the seabeds, on the framework of a settlement in the Middle East, and on limitation of strategic arms. This is the basis on which we and our Atlantic allies have offered to negotiate on concrete issues affecting the security and future of Europe, and on which the United States took steps last year to improve our relations with nations of Eastern Europe. This is also the spirit in which we have resumed formal talks in Warsaw with Communist China. No nation need be our permanent enemy.

AMERICA'S PURPOSE

These policies were conceived as a result of change, and we know they will be tested by the change that lies ahead. The world of 1970 was not predicted a decade ago, and we can be certain that the world of 1980 will render many current views obsolete.

The source of America's historic greatness has been our ability to see what had to be done, and then to do it. I believe America now has the chance to move the world closer to a durable peace. And I know that Americans working with each other and with other nations can make our vision real.

PART IV: AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION

–The Soviet Union
–Eastern Europe
–Communist China
–Arms Control
–Issues for the Future

"We cannot expect to make every one our friend but we can try to make no one our enemy."
The President's Inaugural Address

Twenty years ago the United States and what was then the Communist bloc could be resigned to the mutual hostility that flowed from deep-seated differences of ideology and national purpose. Many of those differences remain today. But the changes of two decades have brought new conditions and magnified the risks of intractable hostility.

–For us as well as our adversaries, in the nuclear age the perils of using force are simply not in reasonable proportion to most of the objectives sought in many cases. The balance of nuclear power has placed a premium on negotiation rather than confrontation.
–We both have learned too that great powers may find their interests deeply involved in local conflict--risking confrontation--yet have precariously little influence over the direction taken by local forces.

–The nuclear age has also posed for the United States and the Communist countries the common dangers of accidents or miscalculation. Both sides are threatened, for example, when any power seeks tactical advantage from a crisis and risks provoking a strategic response.
–Reality has proved different from expectation for both sides. The Communist world in particular has had to learn that the spread of Communism may magnify international tensions rather than usher in a period of reconciliation as Marx taught.

Thus, in a changing world, building peace requires patient and continuing communication. Our first task in that dialogue is fundamental--to avert war. Beyond that, the United States and the Communist countries must negotiate on the issues that divide them if we are to build a durable peace. Since these issues were not caused by personal disagreements, they cannot be removed by mere atmospherics. We do not delude ourselves that a change of tone represents a change of policy. We are prepared to deal seriously, concretely and precisely with outstanding issues.

The lessons of the post-war period in negotiations with the Communist states-a record of some success, though much more of frustration--point to three clear principles which this Administration will observe in approaching negotiations in the 1970's.

First: We will deal with the Communist countries on the basis of a precise understanding of what they are about in the world, and thus of what we can reasonably expect of them and ourselves. Let us make no mistake about it leaders of the Communist nations are serious and determined. Because we do take them seriously, we will not underestimate the depth of ideological disagreement or the disparity between their interests and ours. Nor will we pretend that agreement is imminent by fostering the illusion that they have already given up their beliefs or are just about to do so in the process of negotiations.

It is precisely these differences which require creation of objective conditions-negotiation by negotiation---from which peace can develop despite a history of mistrust and rivalry. We may hope that the passage of time and the emergence of a new generation in the Communist countries will bring some change in Communist purposes. But failing that, we must seek in the most practical way to influence Communist actions.

It will be the policy of the United States, therefore, not to employ negotiations as a forum for cold-war invective, or ideological debate. We will regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations pursuing their own interests as they perceive these interests, just as we follow our own interests as we see them. We will judge them by their actions as we expect to be judged by our own. Specific agreements, and the structure of peace they help build, will come from a realistic accommodation of conflicting interests.

A second principle we shall observe in negotiating with the Communist countries relates to how these negotiations should be conducted--how they should be judged by peoples on both sides anxious for an easing of tensions. All too often in the past, whether at the summit or lower levels, we have come to the conference table with more attention to psychological effect than to substance. Naive enthusiasm and even exaltation about the fact that a negotiation will be held only tends to obscure the real issues on whose resolution the success of the talks depends. Then, since the results are almost always less dramatic than expected, the false euphoria gives way to equally false hopelessness.

Negotiations must be, above all, the result of careful preparation and an authentic give-and-take on the issues which have given rise to them. They are served by neither bluff abroad nor bluster at home.

We will not become psychologically dependent on rapid or extravagant progress. Nor will we be discouraged by frustration or seeming failure. The stakes are too high, and the task too great, to judge our effort in any temporary perspective. We shall match our purpose with perseverance.

The third essential in successful negotiations is an appreciation of the context in which issues are addressed. The central fact here is the inter-relationship of international events. We did not invent the inter-relationship; it is not a negotiating tactic. It is a fact of life. This Administration recognizes that international developments are entwined in many complex ways: political issues relate to strategic questions, political events in one area of the world may have a far-reaching effect on political developments in other parts of the globe.

These principles emphasize a realistic approach to seeking peace through negotiations. They are a guide to a gradual and practical process of building agreement on agreement. They rest uqon the basic reality which underlies this Administration's dealings with the Communist states. We will not trade principles for promises, or vital interests for atmosphere. We shall always be ready to talk seriously and purposefully about the building of a stable peace.

THE SOVIET UNION

The general principles outlined above apply fully to our approach to issues between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union shares with other countries the overwhelming temptation to continue to base its policies at home and abroad on old and familiar concepts. But perception framed in the Nineteenth Century are hardly relevant to the new era we are now entering.

If we have had to learn the limitations of our own power, the lessons of the last two decades must have left their imprint on the leadership in the Kremlin--in the recognition that Marxist ideology is not the surest guide to the problems of a changing industrial society, the worldwide decline in the appeal of ideology, and most of all in the foreign policy dilemmas repeatedly posed by the spread of Communism to states which refuse to endure permanent submission to Soviet authority--a development illustrated vividly by the Soviet schism with China.

The central problem of Soviet-American relations, then, is whether our two countries can transcend the past and work together to build a lasting peace.

In 1969, we made a good beginning. In this first year of my Administration we ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty; we made progress in negotiating arms control on the seabed; we took steps to further the prospects of agreement regarding chemical and biological methods of warfare; we engaged in talks on a Middle Eastern settlement; and we began negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms--the most important arms control negotiations this country has ever entered. In concert with our allies, we have also offered to negotiate on specific issues in Europe: history has taught us that if crises arise in Europe, the world at large cannot long expect to remain unaffected.

But while certain successes have been registered in negotiations and there is cause for cautious optimism that others will follow, our overall relationship with the USSR remains far from satisfactory. To the detriment of the cause of peace, the Soviet leadership has failed to exert a helpful influence on the North Vietnamese in Paris. The overwhelming majority of the war materiel that reaches North Vietnam comes from the USSR, which thereby bears a heavy responsibility for the continuation of the war. This cannot but cloud the rest of our relationship with the Soviet Union.

In the Middle East talks, too, we have not seen on the Soviet side that practical and constructive flexibility which is necessary for a successful outcome, and without which the responsibility of the great powers in the search for a settlement cannot be met. We see evidence, moreover, that the Soviet Union seeks a position in the area as a whole which would make great power rivalry more likely.

We hope that the coming year will bring evidence that the Soviets have decided to seek a durable peace rather than continue along the roads of the past.

It will not be the sincerity or purpose of the Soviet leadership that will be at issue. The tensions between us are not generated by personal misunderstandings, and neither side does anyone a service by so suggesting. Peace does not come simply with statesmen's smiles. At issue are basic questions of long conflicting purposes in a world where no one's interests are furthered by conflict. Only a straightforward recognition of that reality--and an equally direct effort to deal with it-will bring us to the genuine cooperation which we seek and which the peace of the world requires.

EASTERN EUROPE

The nations of Eastern Europe have a history with many tragic aspects. Astride the traditional invasion routes of the Continent, they have suffered long periods of foreign occupation and cultural suppression. And even when they gained independence--many of them following World War I--they remained the prey of powerful neighbors.

We are aware that the Soviet Union sees its own security as directly affected by developments in this region. Several times, over the centuries, Russia has been invaded through Central Europe; so this sensitivity is not novel, or purely the product of Communist dogma.

It is not the intention of the United States to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The time is certainly past, with the development of modem technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly no part of our policy. Our pursuit of negotiation and detente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones.

By the same token, the United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith. And we can accept no doctrine that abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others.

We are prepared to enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe, looking to a gradual nonrealization of relations. We will adjust ourselves to whatever pace and extent of normalization these countries are willing to sustain.

Progress in this direction has already been achieved in our relations with Romania. My visit to that country last summer--which will remain unforgettable for me in human terms--set in motion a series of cooperative programs in the economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields. We intend to pursue these with vigor. My talks with President Ceausescu also began the process of exchanging views on broader questions of mutual concern which, in our view, will contribute to a general improvement of the communication between West and East. A similar relationship is open to any Communist country that wishes to enter it.

Stability and peace in Europe will be enhanced once its division is healed. The United States, and the nations of Western Europe, have historic ties with the peoples and nations of Eastern Europe, which we wish to maintain and renew.

As I said in my toast to President Ceausescu during my visit to Romania last August:

"We seek, in sum, a peace not of hegemonies, and not of artificial uniformity, but a peace in which the legitimate interests of each are respected and all are safeguarded."

COMMUNIST CHINA

The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the international community. In the long run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more than 700 million people.

Chinese foreign policy reflects the complexity of China's historical relationships with the outside world. While China has the longest unbroken history of self-government in the world, it has had little experience in dealing with other nations on a basis of equal sovereignty. Predominant in Asia for many centuries, these gifted and cultured people saw their society as the center of the world. Their tradition of self-imposed cultural isolation ended abruptly in the Nineteenth Century, however, when an internally weak China fell prey to exploitation by technologically superior foreign powers.

The history inherited by the Chinese Communists, therefore, was a complicated mixture of isolation and incursion, of pride and humiliation. We must recall this unique past when we attempt to define a new relationship for the future.

Nor can we underestimate the gulf of ideology between us, or the apparent differences in interests and how we interpret world events. While America has historic ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and many of our basic interests are not in conflict, we must recognize the profound gulf of suspicion and ideology.

The principles underlying our relations with Communist China are similar to those governing our policies toward the USSR. United States policy is not likely soon to have much impact on China's behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking.

The key to our relations will be the actions each side takes regarding the other and its allies. We will not ignore hostile acts. We intend to maintain our treaty commitment to the defense of the Republic of China. But we will seek to promote understanding which can establish a new pattern of mutually beneficial actions.

I made these points to the leaders I met throughout my trip to Asia, and they were welcomed as constructive and realistic.

We have avoided dramatic gestures which might invite dramatic rebuffs. We have taken specific steps that did not require Chinese agreement but which underlined our willingness to have a more normal and constructive relationship. During the year, we have:
--made it possible for American tourists, museums, and others to make non-commercial purchases of Chinese goods without special authorization;

--broadened the categories of Americans whose passports may be automatically validated for travel in Communist China, to include members of Congress, journalists, teachers, post-graduate scholars and college students, scientists, medical doctors and representatives of the American Red Cross;
--permitted subsidiaries of American firms abroad to engage in commerce between Communist China and third countries.

The resumption of talks with the Chinese in Warsaw may indicate that our approach will prove useful. These first steps may not lead to major results at once, but sooner or later Communist China will be ready to reenter the international community.

Our desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of exploiting the clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no benefit to us in the intensification of that conflict, and we have no intention of taking sides. Nor is the United States interested in joining any condominium or hostile coalition of great powers against either of the large Communist countries. Our attitude is clear-cut--a lasting peace will be impossible so long as some nations consider themselves the permanent enemies of others.

CONCLUSION: A NEW DEFINITION OF PEACE

Few ideas have been so often or so loosely invoked as that of "Peace." But if peace is among the most overworked and often-abused staples of mankind's vocabulary, one of the reasons is that it is embedded so deeply in man's aspirations.

Skeptical and estranged, many of our young people today look out on a world they never made. They survey its conflicts with apprehension. Graduated into the impersonal routine of a bureaucratic, technological society, many of them see life as lonely conformity lacking the lift of a driving dream.

Yet there is no greater idealism, no higher adventure than taking a realistic road for peace. It is an adventure realized not in the exhilaration of a single moment, but in the lasting rewards of patient, detailed and specific efforts--a step at a time.

--Peace requires confidence--it needs the cement of trust among friends.
--Peace requires partnership--or else we will exhaust our resources, both physical and moral, in a futile effort to dominate our friends and forever isolate our enemies.
--Peace must be just. It must answer man's dream of human dignity.
--Peace requires strength. It cannot be based on good will alone.

--Peace must be generous. No issue can be truly settled unless the solution brings mutual advantage.
--Peace must be shared. Other nations must feel that it is their peace just as we must feel that it is ours.
--And peace must be practical. It can only be found when nations resolve real issues, and accommodate each other's real interests. This requires not high rhetoric, but hard work.

These principles apply to our opponents as well as to our allies, to the less developed as well as the economically advanced nations. The peace we seek must be the work of all nations.

For peace will endure only when every nation has a greater stake in preserving than in breaking it.

PART I: THE NIXON DOCTRINE

"**It is not my belief** that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies. On the contrary, our aim is to place America's international commitments on a sustainable, long-term basis, to encourage local and regional initiatives, to foster national independence and self-sufficiency, and by so doing to strengthen the total fabric of peace."
Address to the United Nations
General Assembly
September 18, 1969

This Administration began with the conviction that a global structure of peace requires a strong but redefined American role. In other countries there was growing strength and autonomy. In our own there was nascent isolationism in reaction to overextension. In the light of these changed conditions, we could not continue on the old path.

We need to replace the impulses of the previous era: both our instinct that we knew what was best for others and their temptation to lean on our prescriptions. We need to head off possible overreactions in the new era: a feeling on our part that we need not help others, and a conclusion on their part that they cannot count on America at all. We need to strengthen relations with allies and friends, and to evoke their commitment to their own future and to the international system.

Perception of the growing imbalance between the scope of America's role and the potential of America's partners thus prompted the Nixon Doctrine. It is the key to understanding what we have done during the past two years, why we have done it, and where we are going.

The Doctrine seeks to reflect these realities:
--that a major American role remains indispensable.
--that other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours.
--that the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines. --that the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.

TOWARD NEW FORMS OF PARTNERSHIP

The tangible expression of the new partnership is in greater material contributions by other countries. But we must first consider its primary purpose--to help make a peace that belongs to all.

For this venture we will look to others for a greater share in the definition of policy as well as in bearing the costs of programs. This psychological reorientation is more fundamental than the material redistribution; when countries feel responsible for the formulation of plans they are more apt to furnish the assets needed to make them work.

For America this could be the most critical aspect of the Doctrine. To continue our predominant contribution might not have been beyond our physical resources--though our own domestic problems summoned them. But it certainly would have exceeded our psychological resources. For no nation has the wisdom, and the understanding, and the energy required to act wisely on all problems, at all times, in every part of the world. And it asks too much of a people to understand --and therefore support--sweeping and seemingly permanent overseas involvement in local problems, particularly when other countries seem able to make greater efforts themselves.

The intellectual adjustment is a healthy development for other nations as well as for us. It requires them to think hard about some issues that had been removed, or had never appeared, on their national agendas. It is no more in their interest than in ours to place on the United States the onus for complicated decisions--the structure of an army, the outline of a development plan, the components of an economic policy, the framework of a regional alliance.

The Nixon Doctrine, then, should not be thought of primarily as the sharing of burdens or the lightening of our load. It has a more positive meaning for other nations and for ourselves.

In effect we are encouraging countries to participate fully in the creation of plans and the designing of programs. They must define the nature of their own security and determine the path of their own progress. For only in this manner will they think of their fate as truly their own.

This new sharing requires a new, more subtle form of leadership. Before, we often acted as if our role was primarily one of drawing up and selling American blueprints. Now, we must evoke the ideas of others and together consider programs that meet common needs. We will concentrate more on getting other countries engaged with us in the formulation of policies; they will be less involved in trying to influence American decisions and more involved in devising their own approaches.

More than ever before in the period since World War II, foreign policy must become the concern of many rather than few. There cannot be a structure of peace unless other nations help to fashion it. Indeed, in this central fact lie both its hope and its elusiveness: it cannot be built except by the willing hands--and minds--of all.

It was in this context that at Guam in the summer of 1969, and in my November 3, 1969 address to the Nation, I laid out the elements of new partnership.

"First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments." We will respect the commitments we inherited-both because of their intrinsic merit, and because of the impact of sudden shifts on regional or world stability. To desert those who have come to depend on us would cause disruption and invite aggression. It is in everyone's interest, however, including those with whom we have ties, to view undertakings as a dynamic process. Maintaining the integrity of commitments requires relating their tangible expression, such as troop deployments or financial contributions, to changing conditions.

The concrete results vary. In South Korea fewer U.S. troops are required, but Korean forces must receive more modern equipment. In NATO a continuing level of U.S. forces and greater European contributions are in order. The best way of maintaining stable relationships with our allies is jointly to reach common conclusions and jointly to act on them.

In contemplating new commitments we will apply rigorous yardsticks. What precisely is our national concern? What precisely is the threat? What would be the efficacy of our involvement? We do not rule out new commitments, but we will relate them to our interests. For as I said in last year's report:
"Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

"Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security." Nuclear power is the element of security that our friends either cannot provide or could provide only with great and disruptive efforts. Hence, we bear special obligations toward non-nuclear countries. Their concern would be magnified if we were to leave them defenseless against nuclear blackmail, or conventional aggression backed by nuclear power. Nations in a position to build their own nuclear weapons would be likely to do so. And the spread of nuclear capabilities would be inherently destabilizing, multiplying the chances that conflicts could escalate into catastrophic exchanges.

Accordingly, while we maintain our nuclear force, we have encouraged others to forego their own under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have assured those signing the NPT that they would not be subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear aggression. The Soviet Union has done so as well.

"Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." No President can guarantee that future conflicts will never involve American personnel--but in some theaters the threshold of involvement will be raised and in some instances involvement will be much more unlikely. This principle, first applied to security matters, applies as well to economic development. Our economic assistance will continue to be substantial. But we will expect countries receiving it to mobilize themselves and their resources; we will look to other developed nations to play their full role in furnishing help; and we will channel our aid increasingly through multilateral channels.

We will continue to provide elements of military strength and economic resources appropriate to our size and our interests. But it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defense and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility. Without the foundations of self-help and regional help, American help will not succeed. The United States can and will participate, where our interests dictate, but as a weight--not the weight-in the scale.

THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Policy becomes clearer only in the process of translation into programs and actions.

In this process the Nixon Doctrine seeks to reflect the need for continuity as well as the mandate for change. There are two concurrent challenges:
--to carry out our new policy so as to maintain confidence abroad.

--to define our new policy to the American people and to elicit their support.

This transition from bearing the principal burdens to invoking and supporting the efforts of others is difficult and delicate.

Some vestiges of the past consist of essentially sound relationships and valid practices. They should be preserved.

Others must be liquidated, but the method is crucial. Clearly, we could not have continued the inherited policy on Vietnam. Just as clearly, the way in which we set about to resolve this problem has a major impact on our credibility abroad and our cohesion at home. The same is true in other areas where our military presence remained too large, or our economic burden disproportionate, or our attitude paternalistic.

The challenge is not merely to reduce our presence, or redistribute our burden, or change our approach, but to do so in a way that does not call into question our very objectives.

Others judge us--and set their own course--by the steadiness of our performance as well as the merit of our ideas. Abrupt shifts in our policies--no matter how sound in concept--are unsettling, particularly for those who may have committed themselves to past practices at United States urging. For their own political future is involved. If we acquired a reputation for unsteadiness, we would isolate ourselves. We must avoid practicing either consistency or novelty for its own sake.

For the mood among many of our friends is ambivalent. They seek autonomy but still presume American initiative. They at once realize the need for their new independent role, welcome it, and are apprehensive about its responsibilities. The Nixon Doctrine recognizes that we cannot abandon friends, and must not transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and thus preventing self-reliance, and doing too little and thus undermining self-confidence.

This balance we seek abroad is crucial. We only compound insecurity if we modify our protective or development responsibilities without giving our friends the time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world.

Precipitate shrinking of the American role would not bring peace. It would not reduce America's stake in a turbulent world. It would not solve our problems, either abroad or at home.

The need for steadiness overseas has a domestic corollary. While striking a balance in the world it is also necessary, and in some ways even more difficult, to find the proper balance at home.

For the American people have grown somewhat weary of 25 years of international burdens. This weariness was coming in any event, but the anguish of the Vietnam war hastened it, or at least our awareness of it. Many Americans, frustrated by the conflict in Southeast Asia, have been tempted to draw the wrong conclusions. There are lessons to be learned from our Vietnam experience-about unconventional warfare and the role of outside countries, the nature of commitments, the balance of responsibilities, the need for public understanding and support. But there is also a lesson not to be drawn: that the only antidote for undifferentiated involvement is indiscriminate retreat.

Our experience in .the 1960's has underlined the fact that we should not do more abroad than domestic opinion can sustain. But we cannot let the pendulum swing in the other direction, sweeping us toward an isolationism which could be as disastrous as excessive zeal.

Thus, while lowering our overseas presence and direct military involvement, our new policy calls for a new form of leadership, not abdication of leadership. This policy must not only reflect a changed public will. It must shape a new consensus for a balanced and positive American role.

While cutting back overseas forces prudently, we must resist the automatic reduction of the American presence everywhere without regard to consequences. While trimming our defense budget where possible and adjusting defenses to modem realities, we must resist ritualistic voting against defense spending. Mere scaling down is not an end in itself. We need to determine the proper role for our forces abroad; the level of assistance for allied forces; and the shape of our respective budgets.

The Nixon Doctrine will enable us to remain committed in ways that we can sustain. The solidity of domestic support in turn will reverberate overseas with continued confidence in American performance.

1973

THIS ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH

We were determined to shape new policies to deal with each of these problems. But our first requirement was philosophic. We needed a fresh vision to inspire and to integrate our efforts.

We began with the conviction that a major American commitment to the world continued to be indispensable. The many changes in the postwar landscape did not alter this central fact. America's strength was so vast, our involvement so broad, and our concerns so deep, that to remove our influence would set off tremors around the globe. Friends would despair, adversaries would be tempted, and our own national security would soon be threatened. There was no escaping the reality of our enormous influence for peace.

But the new times demanded a new definition of our involvement. For more than a score of years our foreign policy had been driven by a global mission that only America could fulfill--to furnish political leadership, provide for the common defense, and promote economic development. Allies were weak and other nations were young, threats were palpable and American power was dominant.

By 1969, a mission of this scale was no longer valid abroad or supportable at home. Allies had grown stronger and young nations were maturing, threats were diversified and American power was offset. It was time to move from a paternal mission for others to a cooperative mission with others. Convinced as we were that a strong American role remained essential for world stability, we knew, too, that a peace that depends primarily on the exertions of one nation is inherently fragile.

So we saw the potential and the imperative of a pluralistic world. We believed we could move from an environment of emergencies to a more stable international system. We made our new purpose a global structure of peace-comprehensive because it would draw on the efforts of other countries; durable because if countries helped to build it, they would also help to maintain it.

To pursue this fundamental vision, we had to move across a wide and coordinated front, with mutually reinforcing policies for each challenge we faced.

Peace could not depend solely on the uneasy equilibrium between two nuclear giants. We had a responsibility to work for positive relations with the Soviet Union. But there was ample proof that assertions of good will or transitory changes in climate would not erase the hard realities of ideological opposition, geopolitical rivalry, competing alliances, or military competition. **We were determined** not to lurch along--with isolated agreements vulnerable to sudden shifts of course in political relations, with peaks and valleys based on atmosphere, with incessant tension and maneuvering. We saw as well that there were certain mutual interests that we could build upon. As the two powers capable of global destruction, we had a common stake in preserving peace.

Thus we decided to follow certain principles in our policy toward the Soviet Union. We would engage in concrete negotiations designed to produce specific agreements, both where differences existed and where cooperation was possible. We would work with Moscow across a broad front, believing that progress in one area would induce progress in others. Through the gathering momentum of individual accords we would seek to create vested interests on both sides in restraint and the strengthening of peace. But this process would require a reduction in tactical maneuvering at each other's expense in favor of our shared interest in avoiding calamitous collision, in profiting from cooperation, and in building a more stable world.

Peace could not exclude a fourth of humanity. The longer-term prospects for peace required a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. Only if China's weight was reflected in the international system would it have the incentive, and sense of shared responsibility, to maintain the peace. Furthermore, the time was past when one nation could claim to speak for a bloc of states; we would deal with countries on the basis of their actions, not abstract ideological formulas. Our own policies could be more flexible if we did not assume the permanent enmity of China. The United States had a traditional interest in an independent and peaceful China. We seemed to have no fundamental interests that need collide in the longer sweep of history. There was, indeed, rich potential benefit for our two peoples in a more normal relationship.

So we launched a careful process of private diplomacy and public steps to engage the People's Republic of China with us and involve it more fully in the world. We did so, confident that a strong, independent China was in our national interest; resolved that such a process need not--and would not--be aimed at any other country; and looking for a reciprocal attitude on the part of the Chinese.

Peace must draw upon the vitality of our friends. Our alliances with Western Europe and Japan would continue as major pillars of our foreign policy, but they had not kept pace with the changed international environment. We thus sought to forge more equal partnerships based on a more balanced contribution of both resources and plans.

America had been the automatic source of political leadership and economic power. Now we needed new modes of action that would accommodate our partners' new dynamism. The challenge was to reconcile traditional unity with new diversity. While complete integration of policy was impossible, pure unilateralism would be destructive.

Before, we were allied in containment of a unified Communist danger. Now Communism had taken various forms; our alliances had stabilized the European and Northeast Asian environments; and we had laid the foundations for negotiation. We had to decide together not only what we were against, but what we were for.

Peace required the ending of an ongoing war. Our approach to the Vietnam conflict and our shaping of a new foreign policy were inextricably linked. Naturally, our most urgent concern was to end the war. But we had to end it--or at least our involvement--in a way that would continue to make possible a responsible American role in the world.

We could not continue on the course we inherited, which promised neither an end to the conflict nor to our involvement. At the same time, we would not abandon our friends, for we wanted to shape a structure of peace based in large measure on American steadiness. So we sought peace with honor--through negotiation if possible, through Vietnamization if the enemy gave us no choice. The phased shifting of defense responsibilities to the South Vietnamese would give them the time and means to adjust. It would assure the American people that our own involvement was not open-ended. It would preserve our credibility abroad and our cohesion at home.

Given the enemy's attitude, peace was likely to take time, and other problems in the world could not wait. So we moved promptly to shape a new approach to allies and adversaries. And by painting on this larger canvas we sought both to put the Vietnam war in perspective and to speed its conclusion by demonstrating to Hanoi that continued conflict did not frustrate our global policies.

Peace needed America's strength. Modifications in our defense policy were required, but one central truth persisted-neither our nation nor peace in the world could be secure without our military power. If superiority was no longer practical, inferiority would be unthinkable.

We were determined to maintain a national defense second to none. This would be a force for stability in a world of evolving partnerships and changing doctrines. This was essential to maintain the confidence of our friends and the respect of our adversaries. At the same time, we would seek energetically to promote national and international security through arms control negotiations.

Peace involved a fresh dimension of international cooperation. A new form of multilateral diplomacy was prompted by a new set of issues. These challenges covered a wide range--the promise of exploration, the pollution of our planet, the perils of crime---but they were alike in going beyond the traditional considerations doctrine and geography. They required cooperation that reached not only across boundaries but often around the globe. So we resolved to work both with friends and adversaries, in the United Nations and other forums, to practice partnership on a global scale.

Above all, peace demanded the responsible participation of all nations. With great efforts during the postwar period we had promoted the revitalization of former powers and the growing assurance of new states. For this changed world we needed a new philosophy that would reflect and reconcile two basic principles: A structure of peace requires the greater participation of other nations, but it also requires the sustained participation of the United States.

To these ends, we developed the Nixon Doctrine of shared responsibilities. This Doctrine was central to our approach to major allies in the Atlantic and Pacific. But it also shaped our attitude toward those in Latin America, Asia, and Africa with whom we were working in formal alliances or friendship.

Our primary purpose was to invoke greater efforts by others--not so much to lighten our burdens as to increase their commitment to a new and peaceful structure. This would mean that increasingly they would man their own defenses and furnish more of the funds for their security and economic development. The corollary would be the reduction of the American share of defense or financial contributions.

More fundamental than this material redistribution, however, was a psychological reorientation. Nations had habitually relied on us for political leadership. Much time and energy went into influencing decisions in Washington. Our objective now was to encourage them to play a greater role in formulating plans and programs. For when others design their security and their development, they make their destiny truly their own. And when plans are their plans, they are more motivated to make them realities.

The lowering of our profile was not an end in itself. Other countries needed to do more, but they could not do so without a concerned America. Their role had to be increased, but this would prove empty unless we did what we must. We could not go from over-involvement to neglect. A changing world needed the continuity of America's strength.

Thus we made clear that the Nixon Doctrine represented a new definition of American leadership, not abandonment of that leadership. In my 1971 Report, I set forth the need for a responsible balance:

"The Nixon Doctrine recognizes that we cannot abandon friends, and must not transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and thus preventing self-reliance, and doing too little and thus undermining self-confidence.

"The balance we seek abroad is crucial. We only compound insecurity if we modify our protective or development responsibilities without giving our friends the time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world.

"Precipitate shrinking of the American role would not bring peace. It would not reduce America's stake in a turbulent world. It would not solve our problems, either abroad or at home."

Peace had a domestic dimension. Steadiness abroad required steadiness at home. America could continue to make its vital contribution in the world only if Americans understood the need and supported the effort to do so. But understanding and support for a responsible foreign policy were in serious jeopardy in 1969. Years of burdens, Cold War tensions, and a difficult war threatened to undermine our constancy.

While new policies were required to meet transformed conditions abroad, they were equally imperative because of the changing climate at home. Americans needed a new positive vision of the world and our place in it. In order to continue to do what only America could, we had to demonstrate that our friends were doing more. While maintaining strong defenses, we also had to seek national security through negotiations with adversaries. And where American families were most directly affected, we had to gain a peace with honor to win domestic support for our new foreign policy as well as to make it credible abroad.

We have thus paid great attention, as in these Reports, to the articulation, as well as the implementation, of our new role in the world.

CONCLUSION

In the past four years, there have been fundamental changes and signal successes. We have cleared away vestiges of the past. We have erased or moderated hostilities. And we are strengthening partnerships.

The specific events or policies, however important, reflect a more profound enterprise. We are seeking the philosophical, as well as the practical, reorientation of our foreign policy. This is the primary challenge of a radically different world. If America is to provide the leadership that only it can, Americans must identify with new visions and purposes.

As we look toward this nation's two hundredth birthday, we shall continue our efforts--with the people and the Congress-to create this new consensus.

In the transition from the bipolar world of American predominance to the multipolar world of shared responsibilities, certain themes need emphasis. They indicate not only what our approach is, but what it is not.

We seek a stable structure, not a classical balance of power. Undeniably, national security must rest upon a certain equilibrium between potential adversaries. The United States cannot entrust its destiny entirely, or even largely, to the goodwill of others. Neither can we expect other countries so to mortgage their future. Solid security involves external restraints on potential opponents as well as self-restraint.

Thus a certain balance of power is inherent in any international system and has its place in the one we envision. But it is not the overriding concept of our foreign policy. First of all, our approach reflects the realities of the nuclear age. The classical concept of balance of power included continual maneuvering for marginal advantages over others. In the nuclear era this is both unrealistic and dangerous. It is unrealistic because when both sides possess such enormous power, small additional increments cannot be translated into tangible advantage or even usable political strength. And it is dangerous because attempts to seek tactical gains might lead to confrontation which could be catastrophic.

Secondly, our approach includes the element of consensus. All nations, adversaries and friends alike, must have a stake in preserving the international system. They must feel that their principles are being respected and their national interests secured. They must, in short, see positive incentive for keeping the peace, not just the dangers of breaking it. If countries believe global arrangements threaten their vital concerns, they will challenge them. If the international environment meets their vital concerns, they will work to maintain it. Peace requires mutual accommodation as well as mutual restraint.

Negotiation with adversaries does not alter our more fundamental ties with friends. We have made a concerted effort to move from confrontation to negotiation. We have done well. At the same time, our determination to reduce divisions has not eroded distinctions between friends and adversaries. Our alliances remain the cornerstones of our foreign policy. They reflect shared values and purposes. They involve major economic interests. They provide the secure foundation on which to base negotiations.

Although their forms must be adapted to new conditions, these ties are enduring. We have no intention of sacrificing them in efforts to engage adversaries in the shaping of peace. Indeed such efforts cannot succeed, nor can they have lasting meaning, without the bonds of traditional friendships. There is no higher objective than the strengthening of our partnerships.

Detente does not mean the end of danger. Improvements in both the tone and substance of our relations have indeed reduced tensions and heightened the prospects for peace. But these processes are not automatic or easy. They require vigilance and firmness and exertion. Nothing would be more dangerous than to assume prematurely that dangers have disappeared.

Thus we maintain strong military power even as we seek mutual limitation and reduction of arms. We do not mistake climate for substance. We base our policies on the actions and capabilities of others, not just on estimates of their intentions.

Detente is not the same as lasting peace. And peace does not guarantee tranquility or mean the end of contention. The world will hold perils for as far ahead as we can see.

We intend to share responsibilities, not abdicate them. We have emphasized the need for other countries to take on more responsibilities for their security and development. The tangible result has often been a reduction in our overseas presence or our share of contributions. But our purpose is to continue our commitment to the world in ways we can sustain, not to camouflage a retreat. We took these steps only when our friends were prepared for them. They have been successfully carried out because American backing remained steady. They have helped to maintain support in this country for a responsible foreign policy.

I underlined the vital importance of the redefined American role two years ago:

"Our participation remains crucial. Because of the abundance of our resources and the stretch of our technology, America's impact on the world remains enormous, whether by our action or by our inaction. Our awareness of the world is too keen, and our concern for peace too deep for us to remove the measure of stability which we have provided for the past 25 years."

Measured against the challenges we faced and the goals we set, we can take satisfaction in the record of the past four years. Our progress has been more marked in reducing tensions than in restructuring partnerships. We have negotiated an end to a war and made future wars less likely by improving relations with major adversaries. Our bonds with old friends have proved durable during these years of profound change. But we are still searching for more balanced relationships. This will be our most immediate concern, even as we pursue our other goals.

Where peace is newly planted, we shall work to make it thrive.

Where bridges have been built, we shall work to make them stronger.

Where friendships have endured, we shall work to make them grow.

During the next four years--with the help of others--we shall continue building an international structure which could silence the sounds of war for the remainder of this century.

Ronald Reagan



First Inaugural Address

Tuesday, January 20, 1981

For the first time, an inauguration ceremony was held on the terrace of the West Front of the Capitol. Chief Justice Warren Burger administered the oath of office to the former broadcaster, screen actor, and Governor of California. In the election of 1980, the Republicans won the White House and a majority in the Senate. On inauguration day, American hostages held by the revolutionary government of Iran were released.

Senator Hatfield, Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. President, Vice President Bush, Vice President Mondale, Senator Baker, Speaker O'Neill, Reverend Moomaw, and my fellow citizens: To a few of us here today, this is a solemn and most momentous occasion; and yet, in the history of our Nation, it is a commonplace occurrence. The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution routinely takes place as it has for almost two centuries and few of us stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this every-4-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle. 1

Mr. President, I want our fellow citizens to know how much you did to carry on this tradition. By your gracious cooperation in the transition process, you have shown a watching world that we are a united people pledged to maintaining a political system which guarantees individual liberty to a greater degree than any other, and I thank you 2 and your people for all your help in maintaining the continuity which is the bulwark of our Republic.

The business of our nation goes forward. These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions. We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our national history. It distorts our economic decisions, penalizes thrift, and crushes the struggling young and the fixed-income elderly alike. It threatens to shatter the lives of millions of our people. 3

Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, causing human misery and personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps us from maintaining full productivity. 4

But great as our tax burden is, it has not kept pace with public spending. For decades, we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals. 5

You and I, as individuals, can, by borrowing, live beyond our means, but for only a limited period of time. Why, then, should we think that collectively, as a nation, we are not bound by that same limitation? 6

We must act today in order to preserve tomorrow. And let there be no misunderstanding—we are going to begin to act, beginning today. 7

The economic ills we suffer have come upon us over several decades. They will not go away in days, weeks, or months, but they will go away. They will go away because we, as Americans, have the capacity now, as we have had in the past, to do whatever needs to be done to preserve this last and greatest bastion of freedom. 8

In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem. 9

From time to time, we have been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, that government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. But if no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else? All of us together, in and out of government, must bear the burden. The solutions we seek must be equitable, with no one group singled out to pay a higher price. 10

We hear much of special interest groups. Our concern must be for a special interest group that has been too long neglected. It knows no sectional boundaries or ethnic and racial divisions, and it crosses political party lines. It is made up of men and women who raise our food, patrol our streets, man our mines and our factories, teach our children, keep our homes, and heal us when we are sick—professionals, industrialists, shopkeepers, clerks, cabbies, and truckdrivers. They are, in short, "We the people," this breed called Americans. 11

Well, this administration's objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy that provides equal opportunity for all Americans, with no barriers born of bigotry or discrimination. Putting America back to work means putting all Americans back to work. Ending inflation means freeing all Americans from the terror of runaway living costs. All must share in the productive work of this "new beginning" and all must share in the bounty of a revived economy. With the idealism and fair play which are the core of our system and our strength, we can have a strong and prosperous America at peace with itself and the world. 12

So, as we begin, let us take inventory. We are a nation that has a government—not the other way around. And this makes us special among the nations of the Earth. Our Government has no power except that granted it by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of government which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed. 13

It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal 14

Government and those reserved to the States or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal Government.

Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it is not my intention to do away with government. It is, rather, to make it work—work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it. 15

If we look to the answer as to why, for so many years, we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on Earth, it was because here, in this land, we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before. Freedom and the dignity of the individual have been more available and assured here than in any other place on Earth. The price for this freedom at times has been high, but we have never been unwilling to pay that price. 16

It is no coincidence that our present troubles parallel and are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of government. It is time for us to realize that we are too great a nation to limit ourselves to small dreams. We are not, as some would have us believe, doomed to an inevitable decline. I do not believe in a fate that will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing. So, with all the creative energy at our command, let us begin an era of national renewal. Let us renew our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let us renew our faith and our hope. 17

We have every right to dream heroic dreams. Those who say that we are in a time when there are no heroes just don't know where to look. You can see heroes every day going in and out of factory gates. Others, a handful in number, produce enough food to feed all of us and then the world beyond. You meet heroes across a counter—and they are on both sides of that counter. There are entrepreneurs with faith in themselves and faith in an idea who create new jobs, new wealth and opportunity. They are individuals and families whose taxes support the Government and whose voluntary gifts support church, charity, culture, art, and education. Their patriotism is quiet but deep. Their values sustain our national life. 18

I have used the words "they" and "their" in speaking of these heroes. I could say "you" and "your" because I am addressing the heroes of whom I speak—you, the citizens of this blessed land. Your dreams, your hopes, your goals are going to be the dreams, the hopes, and the goals of this administration, so help me God. 19

We shall reflect the compassion that is so much a part of your makeup. How can we love our country and not love our countrymen, and loving them, reach out a hand when they fall, heal them when they are sick, and provide opportunities to make them self-sufficient so they will be equal in fact and not just in theory? 20

Can we solve the problems confronting us? Well, the answer is an unequivocal and emphatic "yes." To paraphrase Winston Churchill, I did not take the oath I have just taken with the intention of presiding over the dissolution of the world's strongest economy. 21

In the days ahead I will propose removing the roadblocks that have slowed our economy and reduced productivity. Steps will be taken aimed at restoring the balance between the various levels of government. Progress may be slow—measured in inches and feet, not miles—but we will progress. Is it time to reawaken this industrial giant, to get government back within its means, and to lighten our punitive tax burden. And these will be our first priorities, and on these principles, there will be no compromise. 22

On the eve of our struggle for independence a man who might have been one of the greatest among the Founding Fathers, Dr. Joseph Warren, President of the Massachusetts Congress, said to his fellow Americans, "Our country is in danger, but not to be despaired of.... On you depend the fortunes of America. You are to decide the important questions upon which rests the happiness and the liberty of millions yet unborn. Act worthy of yourselves." 23

24 Well, I believe we, the Americans of today, are ready to act worthy of ourselves, ready

to do what must be done to ensure happiness and liberty for ourselves, our children and our children's children.

And as we renew ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom. 25

To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historic ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment. We will match loyalty with loyalty. We will strive for mutually beneficial relations. We will not use our friendship to impose on their sovereignty, for our own sovereignty is not for sale. 26

As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it—now or ever. 27

Our forbearance should never be misunderstood. Our reluctance for conflict should not be misjudged as a failure of will. When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength. 28

Above all, we must realize that no arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their neighbors. 29

I am told that tens of thousands of prayer meetings are being held on this day, and for that I am deeply grateful. We are a nation under God, and I believe God intended for us to be free. It would be fitting and good, I think, if on each Inauguration Day in future years it should be declared a day of prayer. 30

This is the first time in history that this ceremony has been held, as you have been told, on this West Front of the Capitol. Standing here, one faces a magnificent vista, opening up on this city's special beauty and history. At the end of this open mall are those shrines to the giants on whose shoulders we stand. 31

Directly in front of me, the monument to a monumental man: George Washington, Father of our country. A man of humility who came to greatness reluctantly. He led America out of revolutionary victory into infant nationhood. Off to one side, the stately memorial to Thomas Jefferson. The Declaration of Independence flames with his eloquence. 32

And then beyond the Reflecting Pool the dignified columns of the Lincoln Memorial. Whoever would understand in his heart the meaning of America will find it in the life of Abraham Lincoln. 33

Beyond those monuments to heroism is the Potomac River, and on the far shore the sloping hills of Arlington National Cemetery with its row on row of simple white markers bearing crosses or Stars of David. They add up to only a tiny fraction of the price that has been paid for our freedom. 34

Each one of those markers is a monument to the kinds of hero I spoke of earlier. Their lives ended in places called Belleau Wood, The Argonne, Omaha Beach, Salerno and halfway around the world on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin Reservoir, and in a hundred rice paddies and jungles of a place called Vietnam. 35

Under one such marker lies a young man—Martin Treptow—who left his job in a small town barber shop in 1917 to go to France with the famed Rainbow Division. There, on the western front, he was killed trying to carry a message between battalions under heavy artillery fire. 36

We are told that on his body was found a diary. On the flyleaf under the heading, "My Pledge," he had written these words: "America must win this war. Therefore, I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone." 37

The crisis we are facing today does not require of us the kind of sacrifice that Martin 38

Treptow and so many thousands of others were called upon to make. It does require, however, our best effort, and our willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds; to believe that together, with God's help, we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us.

And, after all, why shouldn't we believe that? We are Americans. God bless you, and thank you. 39

Ronald Reagan, An American Life (1990), pp. 266-268, 557-561, 564, 566-573

During the late seventies, I felt our country had begun to abdicate this historical role as the spiritual leader of the Free World and its foremost defender of democracy. Some of our resolve was gone, along with a part of our commitment to uphold the values we cherished.

Just as it had accepted the notion that America was past its prime economically and said our people would have to settle for a future with less, the previous administration for some reason had accepted the notion that America was no longer the world power it had once been, that it had become powerless to shape world events. Consciously or unconsciously, we had sent out a message to the world that Washington was no longer sure of itself, its ideals, or its commitments to our allies, and that it seemed to accept as inevitable the advance of Soviet expansionism, especially in the poor and underdeveloped countries of the world.

I'm not sure what was at the root of this sense of withdrawal; perhaps it was related to the Vietnam War, the energy crisis, and the inflation and other economic problems of the Carter years—or the frustrations endured by the Carter administration over the failure of its policies in Iran. Whatever the reasons, I believed it was senseless, ill-founded, and dangerous for America to withdraw from its role as superpower and leader of the Free World.

Predictably, the Soviets had interpreted our hesitation and reluctance to act and our reduced sense of national self-confidence as a weakness, and had tried to exploit it to the fullest, moving ahead with their agenda to achieve a Communist-dominated world. With the breathtaking events that have occurred in Eastern Europe since then, it can be easy to forget what the world was like in the spring of 1981: The Soviets were more dedicated than ever to achieving Lenin's goal of a Communist world. Under the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, they claimed the right to support "wars of national liberation" and to suppress, through armed intervention, any challenge to Communist governments anywhere in the world.

We saw the Brezhnev Doctrine in practice around the globe on a daily basis. In El Salvador, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and elsewhere, the Soviets and their surrogates, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, and Syria, were seeking to undermine and destroy non-Communist governments through violent campaigns of subversion and terrorism. In Afghanistan, they were brutally trying to suppress a revolt against Communist rule with tanks and rockets; in Poland, they were responding to the tentative stirrings of a democratic movement with ominous hints of an invasion, the same method they had used to crush brave freedom fighters who had sought to bring democracy to Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

As the foundation of my foreign policy, I decided we had to send as powerful a message as we could to the Russians that we weren't going to stand by anymore while they armed and financed terrorists and subverted democratic governments. Our policy was to be one based on strength and realism. I wanted peace through strength, not peace through a piece of paper.

In my speeches and press conferences, I deliberately set out to say some frank things about the Russians, to let them know there were some new fellows in Washington who had a realistic view of what they were up to and weren't going to let them keep it up. At my first press conference I was asked whether we could trust the Soviet Union, and I said that the answer to that question could be found in the writings of Soviet leaders: It had always been their philosophy that it was moral to lie or cheat for the purpose of advancing Communism. I said they had told us, without meaning to, that they couldn't be trusted. (Much of the press later got it wrong when it claimed I called the Soviets liars and cheaters, failing to point out that I was simply quoting what the Russians themselves had said.)

I wanted to let them know that in attempting to continue their policy of expansionism, they were prolonging the nuclear arms race and keeping the world on the precipice of disaster. I also wanted to send the signal that we weren't going to be deceived by words into thinking they'd changed their stripes: We wanted deeds, not words. And I intended to let them know that we were going to spend whatever it took to stay ahead of them in the arms race. We would never accept second place.

The great dynamic success of capitalism had given us a powerful weapon in our battle against Communism—*money*. The Russians could never win the arms race; we could outspend them forever. Moreover, incentives inherent in the capitalist system had given us an industrial base that meant we had the capacity to maintain a technological edge over them forever.

But in addition to sending out the word that the United States was dealing with the Soviet Union from a new basis of realism, I wanted to let them know that we realized the nuclear standoff was futile and dangerous for all of us and that we had no designs on their territories. They had nothing to fear from us if they behaved themselves. We wanted to reduce the tensions that had led us to the threshold of a nuclear standoff.

It was ridiculous for both nations to continue this costly, open-ended competition to build bigger and better offensive weapons able to annihilate the world. The money we were spending on weapons could be better spent on so many other things. Somewhere in the Kremlin, I thought, there had to be people who realized that the pair of us standing there like two cowboys with guns pointed at each other's heads posed a lethal risk to the survival of the Communist world as well as the Free World. Someone in the Kremlin had to realize that in arming themselves to the teeth, they were aggravating the desperate economic problems in the Soviet Union, which were the greatest evidence of the failure of Communism.

Yet, to be candid, I doubted I'd ever meet anybody like that.

71

ALTHOUGH I THINK I convinced many people on that trip to Europe that I wasn't a trigger-happy cowboy, the nuclear freeze movement marched along unfazed through the summer and fall of 1982, while the Democratic majority in Congress tried to kill many of the most important elements of our military modernization program, including the MX missile and B-1 bomber, and our efforts to improve the quality of our all-volunteer army. Attempts to slash the military budget continued even after we began seeing tangible evidence of success. After a briefing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff one day that summer, I wrote of the meeting: "It was inspiring. We've really turned the military around. Morale-wise and every other way." A much greater proportion of military personnel were high school graduates, use of marijuana among the troops was down from fifty percent to sixteen percent, reenlistment rates were soaring, and there was a renewed sense of honor among our military men and women that made them proud to wear a uniform again.

Congressional budget battles and Israel's invasion of Lebanon preoccupied us much of that summer. Meanwhile, the continuing Soviet crackdown on Poland, tensions caused by Brezhnev's effort to hold us responsible for Israel's actions in Lebanon, his refusal to concede that the Soviets were meddling in Third World countries, and other problems prevented any improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger urged me to consider imposing a blockade around Nicaragua to send a stronger signal to Moscow that we didn't like what the Soviets were doing in Central America, but a blockade would have been an official act of war. I didn't want a state of war existing between us and Nicaragua—and no one could tell where efforts to blockade Soviet ships bound for Central America might lead.

One afternoon, George Shultz and I invited Ambassador Dobrynin over to the White House. We met in our living quarters and engaged in a discussion about mutual problems. He brought up a Soviet desire to resume negotiations on a long-term grain agreement. I tried to explain to him a problem that we had with the American people and the importance of public opinion in our system:

Americans have a deep feeling for the countries of their ancestry; when people in other nations are persecuted, we can't make concessions to countries that mistreat them. But, I told the ambassador, some act on the part of the Soviets might make it easier for us to resume negotiations, but not as a trade or bargain. I reminded him that a Pentecostalist family had been living for four years in the basement of our embassy in Moscow. If they attempted to set foot off the embassy grounds, they would be arrested. Their crime: belief in their religion and belief in God. I said that in mentioning the Pentecostalists I wasn't trying to negotiate or strike a bargain—just pointing out that a kindness to those people would make it easier for us to do something for his government, and we'd never mention it as an exchange or concession. It wasn't long before the Pentecostalists were in America. A short time later we agreed to resume negotiations on the grain agreement.

Throughout most of 1982, I tried to persuade our European allies to restrict credit to the Soviets and join us in imposing other sanctions aimed at halting construction of the trans-Siberian natural-gas pipeline. I eventually had a little success. I was unable, however, to persuade them to apply as much economic pressure on the Soviet Union as I thought we should to accelerate the demise of Communism; many of our European allies cared more about their economic relationships in Eastern Europe than tightening a knot around the Soviets.

During the late summer and fall of that year, while the streets of U.S. and European cities were filled more and more often with nuclear freeze proponents, Soviet negotiators at Geneva sought to

exploit this public sentiment and dug in their heels against the zero-zero proposal, and, simply put, U.S.-Soviet relations remained in a deep freeze.

In September, Secretary of State Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who hinted that Brezhnev might be interested in a summit meeting with me. I told George to advise Gromyko that we agreed in principle with the idea but wanted some good deeds from Moscow first. I wasn't surprised when George got nowhere with Gromyko. Nevertheless, I wondered: How long can the Russians keep on being so belligerent and spending so much on arms when they can't even feed their own people?

At 3:30 A.M. on November 11, Nancy and I were awakened by a telephone call from my national security advisor, who told me Brezhnev had just died. I asked George Bush and George Shultz to attend the funeral along with our ambassador in Moscow, Arthur Hartman.

Before Brezhnev's death, I had decided I was going to announce in the middle of November a lifting of the sanctions on construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline; our major trading partners (those represented at the economic summit) had agreed to impose limited trade and credit restrictions on the Soviets, which meant none of us would subsidize the Soviet economy or the Soviet military expansion by offering preferential trading terms or easy credits, and to restrict the flow of products and technology that would increase Soviet military capabilities.

A portion of my diary entry for November 13, 1982:

> To the Soviet Embassy to sign the condolence book for Pres. Brezhnev. There's a strange feeling in that place—no one smiled, well, that is except Ambassador Dobrynin. Back to the oval office to do the Saturday broadcast. Then an emergency. With all seven nations agreed on a uniform policy on East West trade, something we've been after for a year and a half, we got word that Mitterrand had some objections. My script was written as an announcement of our agreement and that as a result I was lifting the pipeline sanctions. The State Dept. chickened and wanted me to go with a back up script on crime. I put in a call to Mitterrand. He was unavailable. I had in my hand Chancellor Kohl's and Margaret Thatcher's messages of joy about the agreement. I said to hell with changing and did the announcement. Maybe Francois Mitterrand will get the message, and maybe

> the striped pants types at State will too . . . now we're off to Chicago for the memorial service to Loyal [my father-in-law] by American College of Surgeons. . . .

On November 15, I wrote:

> More flak from Paris but we're not answering. We've told them if they are reneging for any reason about the east west trade agreement take it up with all of us, not just the U.S.
>
> Briefing for the [Helmut] Kohl visit. This will be my fifth meeting with him but now he is chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
>
> We had a full ceremonial on a raw windy day. Our meeting was good. He is entirely different than his predecessor, very warm and outgoing. Mrs. Kohl is the same and very charming.
>
> We did hit it off and I believe we'll have a fine relationship. No state dinner but a dinner for about 40 upstairs in our dining room. They felt very good about that and accepted it as something special.
>
> During the day [a meeting] with John Tower re the MX. No doubt we're going to have trouble—the Dems will try to cancel out the whole system. It will take a full court press to get it. If we don't, I shudder to think what it will do to our arms reduction negotiations in Geneva.

The following week, after reviewing a variety of options about where and how it should be based, I decided to order deployment of the still-under-development MX Peacekeeper long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in underground silos at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. I was convinced it was essential to deter a Soviet first strike by assuring that the U.S. retaliatory forces could survive an attack by the Soviets' latest super-ICBMs. On the same day, I sent a message to the new Soviet leadership proposing several confidence-building measures, including suggestions that our two nations agree to notify each other in advance of missile and space tests to remove the mutual surprise and uncertainty that can occur at the sudden appearance of a rocket on a warning screen; that we notify each other before major military exercises, again to reduce surprise and uncertainty in our relationship; and that we upgrade the Washington-Moscow hot line to make it more dependable and rapid. And I also made an address to the nation that day that I hoped would help the people understand why it was so important for us to proceed with the military modernization program—especially the MX, which had created an uproar among liberals and the nuclear freeze crowd—and to explain my hopes for success in Geneva.

Through a heavy volume of phone calls and letters to the White House and public opinion polls after the speech, I felt I had convinced millions of Americans that we were on the right track with the Peace through Strength policy, but there was one person I did not convince that night—my daughter Patti.

As president, I was devoting every effort I could to ending the threat of nuclear war. But Patti was convinced I was doing the opposite. She just didn't believe in me.

I suppose because we both knew where we stood, we generally avoided this topic when I was in the White House. But two weeks after I gave my speech about the MX missile and arms control, she asked me if I would meet with Helen Caldicott, one of the leaders of the nuclear freeze movement. I agreed to Patti's wish and the three of us spent more than an hour discussing the problems of nuclear war. "She seems like a nice, caring person," I wrote afterward in my diary of Dr. Caldicott, "but she is all steamed up and knows an awful lot of things that aren't true. I tried but couldn't get through her fixation. For that matter I couldn't get through to Patti. I'm afraid our daughter has been taken over by that whole gang. . . . "

Patti had told me Dr. Caldicott had promised that if I spoke to her she would say nothing publicly about the conversation. But almost immediately she went public with the details of our meeting.

I still dream and hope for a day when Patti and I will develop a close relationship again.

Nancy and I love her very much, as we do all the children. We've reached out to Patti since I left the White House, but so far she's made it plain to me that she thinks I am wrong and that she is against everything I stand for.

72

AFTER A LONG National Security Council meeting in early 1983 at which we considered possible ways to accelerate progress at the deadlocked arms control negotiations in Geneva, I wrote in my diary: "We'll stick with our zero option plan. Found I was wishing *I* could do the negotiating with the Soviets. . . . "

I felt that if I could ever get in a room alone with one of the top Soviet leaders, there was a chance the two of us could make some progress in easing tensions between our two countries. I have always placed a lot of faith in the simple power of human contact in solving problems.

I had made no progress with Brezhnev. Now there was a new leader in the Kremlin, Yuri Andropov, former head of the KGB. I didn't expect him to be any less of a doctrinaire Communist than Brezhnev, but at least there was a clean slate. I still believed the Soviets had done nothing to merit inviting them to a summit meeting—a lot of confidence-building was necessary first—but I decided to experiment with some personal diplomacy using back channels to the Kremlin, outside the spotlight of publicity, through which both sides could speak frankly without the posturing and attempts at diplomatic face-saving that usually accompanied formal dealings between the United States and the USSR.

For a while, my attempts at quiet diplomacy seemed to be working. Then there was a series of events that made U.S.-Soviet relations go from bad to worse. Meanwhile, I kept trying to win the support of our people and Congress for staying the course on the military modernization program. The Democrats were fighting tooth and nail to repeal virtually all the new programs we had started in 1981: They were fighting to cut defense spending by more than $163 billion over five years, increase social spending by $200 billion, and increase taxes $315 billion, and to win their case they were exploiting some of the public's understandable fears about nuclear war. When several prominent Senate Republicans joined in calling for the abandonment of the Pentagon modernization program partly because of the heavily publicized views of the minority of Americans who were demonstrating in favor of a nuclear freeze, I commented in my diary in early March:

> I'm going to take our case to the people, only this time we are declassifying some of our reports on the Soviets and can tell the people a few frightening facts: We are still dangerously behind the Soviets and getting farther behind.

Besides wanting to get my message across to the people, I wanted to get Andropov's attention.

On March 8, 1983, one day after I made the note above and two days after we bid good-bye to Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip following their visit to a nearly flooded Rancho del Cielo, I flew to Florida to make a pair of speeches. The first was an address at Walt Disney's EPCOT Center to a group of young people regarding the challenges facing their generation in the future. Next I spoke in Orlando to the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, an organization of ministers.

Clergymen were among those in America who were coming under the strongest pressure to support a nuclear freeze. I wanted to reach them, as well as other Americans who—like my daughter Patti—were being told the path to peace was via a freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons that, if implemented, would leave the Soviets in a position of nuclear superiority over us and amount to an act of unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States and NATO.

Although a lot of liberal pundits jumped on my speech at Orlando and said it showed I was a rhetorical hip-shooter who was recklessly and unconsciously provoking the Soviets into war, I made the "Evil Empire" speech and others like it with malice aforethought; I wanted to remind the Soviets we knew what they were up to.

Here are a few paragraphs from that speech:

> During my first press conference as president, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that's their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.
>
> Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates a historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today.
>
> This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes a fifty-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
>
> At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some. The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.
>
> I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve *their* objectives through the

> freeze. A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions. . . .
>
> Let us pray for the salvation of all those who live in [the] totalitarian darkness—pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world. . . .
>
> If history teaches anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom. So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. . . . In your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil. . . .
>
> I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that Communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in history whose last pages even now are being written. . . .

As I've said, I wanted to let Andropov know we recognized the Soviets for what they were. Frankly, I think it worked, even though some people—including Nancy—tried persuading me to lower the temperature of my rhetoric. I told Nancy I had a reason for saying those things: I wanted the Russians to know I understood their system and what it stood for.

As I was going around the country speaking about the realities of Soviet policy, the arms reduction negotiations in Geneva were getting nowhere fast. Paul Nitze, our brilliant chief negotiator, said he believed, as I did, that the Soviets wouldn't budge on removing the SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe unless and until we deployed our INF missiles.

Our policy in Geneva continued to be based firmly on this premise. Two weeks after the "Evil Empire" speech, after the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned to me with their collective judgment that development of a shield against nuclear missiles might be feasible, I decided to make public my dream and move ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative by laying down a challenge to our scientists to solve the formidable technological problems it posed. Here are excerpts from my diary that spring:

> *March 22*
>
> Another day that shouldn't happen. On my desk was a draft of the speech on defense to be delivered tomorrow night on TV. This was one hassled over by N.S.C., State and Defense. Finally I had a crack at it. I did a lot of rewriting. Much of it was to change bureaucratese into people talk. But all day there were meetings, with Congress with our volunteer leaders from the business world, unscheduled meetings having to do with problems and finally a trip to the Capitol Club. . . . During the day speaking to our Congressional Republican leadership and blasted the Dem. budget with the press in attendance. It was a good pitch exposing the ridiculous irresponsibility of the phony budget.
>
> *March 23*
>
> The big thing today was the 8 p.m. TV speech on all networks about national security. We've been working on the speech for about 72 hours and right down to the deadline. We had a group in for dinner at the W.H. I didn't join them except before dinner a few words of welcome. Nancy and I then dined early upstairs. The group included several former sectys. of state, national security advisors, distinguished nuclear scientists, the chiefs of staff, etc. I did the speech from the Oval Office at 8 and then joined the party for coffee. I guess it was okay, they all praised it to the sky and seemed to think it would be a source of debate for some time to come. I did the bulk of the speech on why our arms buildup was necessary and then finished with a call to the science community to join me in research starting now to develop defensive weapons that would render nuclear missiles obsolete. I made no optimistic forecasts—said it might take 20 years or more but we had to do it. I felt good.

> *March 24*
> . . . the reports are in on last night's speech. The biggest return—phone calls, wires, etc., on any speech so far and running heavily in my favor. . . .
>
> *March 25*
> Meeting with speech writers—gave them an idea for Saturday radio; it worked out pretty good. A poll taken before the speech shows I've gained on job approval with regard to the economy, but the drum beat of anti-defense propaganda has reduced my rating on foreign affairs. I'll be interested to see how that holds for a poll after the speech. Did a press availability in the press room. It went well, so the press on TV almost ignored it entirely. . . .
>
> *April 6*
> Learned George Shultz is upset. Thinks N.S.C. is undercutting him on plans he and I discussed for "quiet diplomacy" approach to the Soviets [which led to the release of the Pentecostalist families in Moscow, but] we had a meeting later in day with George and cleared things up I think. Some of the N.S.C. staff are too hard line and don't think any approach should be made to the Soviets. I think I'm hard line and will never appease. But I do want to try to let them see there is a better world if they'll show *by deed* they want to get along with the free world.

I suspect the Soviet leadership found it difficult to comprehend why an American president would be so concerned about public opinion when I sent word through Dobrynin that we might be amenable on the grain agreement if they allowed the Pentecostalists to emigrate: The last thing that leaders of a totalitarian country worry about is public opinion. But Dobrynin knew a great deal about Americans, and I suspect he must have told them that if an American president had said what I'd said, they could expect a positive response. I never told anyone about my conversation with Dobrynin—I didn't know when I might want to try the same approach through quiet diplomacy again.

Later that summer, a second group of Pentecostalists was permitted to leave the embassy and the Soviet Union. In the overall scheme of U.S.-Soviet relations, allowing a handful of Christian believers to leave the Soviet Union was a small event. But in the context of the times I thought it was a hope-giving development, the first time the Soviets had responded to us with a deed instead of words. As I'd learn, though, I was overly optimistic if I thought the Russians were going to change overnight.

• Ronald Reagan

Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida

March 8, 1983

Reverend clergy all, Senator Hawkins, distinguished members of the Florida congressional delegation, and all of you:

I can't tell you how you have warmed my heart with your welcome. I'm delighted to be here today.

Those of you in the National Association of Evangelicals are known for your spiritual and humanitarian work. And I would be especially remiss if I didn't discharge right now one personal debt of gratitude. Thank you for your prayers. Nancy and I have felt their presence many times in many ways. And believe me, for us they've made all the difference.

The other day in the East Room of the White House at a meeting there, someone asked me whether I was aware of all the people out there who were praying for the President. And I had to say, "Yes, I am. I've felt it. I believe in intercessionary prayer." But I couldn't help but say to that questioner after he'd asked the question that—or at least say to them that if sometimes when he was praying he got a busy signal, it was just me in there ahead of him. [Laughter] I think I understand how Abraham Lincoln felt when he said, "I have been driven many times to my knees by the overwhelming conviction that I had nowhere else to go."

From the joy and the good feeling of this conference, I go to a political reception. [Laughter] Now, I don't know why, but that bit of scheduling reminds me of a story— [laughter] —which I'll share with you.

An evangelical minister and a politician arrived at Heaven's gate one day together. And St. Peter, after doing all the necessary formalities, took them in hand to show them where their quarters would be. And he took them to a small, single room with a bed, a chair, and a table and said this was for the clergyman. And the politician was a little worried about what might be in store for him. And he couldn't believe it then when St. Peter stopped in front of a beautiful mansion with lovely grounds, many servants, and told him that these would be his quarters.

And he couldn't help but ask, he said, "But wait, how—there's something wrong-how do I get this mansion while that good and holy man only gets a single room?" And St. Peter said, "You have to understand how things are up here. We've got thousands and thousands of clergy. You're the first politician who ever made it." [Laughter]

But I don't want to contribute to a stereotype. [Laughter] So, I tell you there are a great many God-fearing, dedicated, noble men and women in public life, present company included. And, yes, we need your help to keep us ever mindful of the ideas and the principles that brought us into the public arena in the first place. The basis of those ideals and principles is a commitment to freedom and personal liberty that, itself, is grounded in the much deeper realization that freedom prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly sought and humbly accepted.

The American experiment in democracy rests on this insight. Its discovery was the great triumph of our Founding Fathers, voiced by William Penn when he said: "If we will not be governed by God, we must be governed by tyrants." Explaining the inalienable rights of men, Jefferson said, "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time." And it was George Washington who said that "of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports."

And finally, that shrewdest of all observers of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, put it eloquently after he had gone on a search for the secret of America's greatness and genius—and he said: "Not until I went into the churches of America and heard her pulpits aflame with righteousness did I understand the greatness and the genius of America .... America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great."

Well, I'm pleased to be here today with you who are keeping America great by keeping her good. Only through your work and prayers and those of millions of others can we hope to survive this perilous century and keep alive this experiment in liberty, this last, best hope of man.

I want you to know that this administration is motivated by a political philosophy that sees the greatness of America in you, her people, and in your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities—the institutions that foster and nourish values like concern for others and respect for the rule of law under God.

Now, I don't have to tell you that this puts us in opposition to, or at least out of step with, a prevailing attitude of many who have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values upon which our very civilization is based. No matter how well intentioned, their value system is radically different from that of most Americans. And while they proclaim that they're freeing us from superstitions of the past, they've taken upon themselves the job of superintending us by government rule and regulation. Sometimes their voices are louder than ours, but they are not yet a majority.

An example of that vocal superiority is evident in a controversy now going on in Washington. And since I'm involved, I've been waiting to hear from the parents of young America. How far are they willing to go in giving to government their prerogatives as parents?

Let me state the case as briefly and simply as I can. An organization of citizens, sincerely motivated and deeply concerned about the increase in illegitimate births and abortions involving girls well below the age of consent, sometime ago established a nationwide network of clinics to offer help to these girls and, hopefully, alleviate this situation. Now, again, let me say, I do not fault their intent. However, in their well-intentioned effort, these clinics have decided to provide advice and birth control drugs and devices to underage girls without the knowledge of their parents.

For some years now, the Federal Government has helped with funds to subsidize these clinics. In providing for this, the Congress decreed that every effort would be made to maximize parental participation. Nevertheless, the drugs and devices are prescribed without getting parental consent or giving notification after they've done so. Girls termed "sexually active"—and that has replaced the word "promiscuous"—are given this help in order to prevent illegitimate birth or abortion.

Well, we have ordered clinics receiving Federal funds to notify the parents such help has been given. One of the Nation's leading newspapers has created the term "squeal rule" in editorializing against us for doing this, and we're being criticized for violating the privacy of young people. A judge has recently granted an injunction against an enforcement of our rule. I've watched TV panel shows discuss this issue, seen columnists pontificating on our error, but no one seems to mention morality as playing a part in the subject of sex.

Is all of Judeo-Christian tradition wrong? Are we to believe that something so sacred can be looked upon as a purely physical thing with no potential for emotional and psychological harm? And isn't it the parents' right to give counsel and advice to keep their children from making mistakes that may affect their entire lives?

Many of us in government would like to know what parents think about this intrusion in their family by government. We're going to fight in the courts. The right of parents and the rights of family take precedence over those of Washington-based bureaucrats and social engineers.

But the fight against parental notification is really only one example of many attempts to water down traditional values and even abrogate the original terms of American democracy. Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged. When our Founding Fathers passed the first amendment, they sought to protect churches from government interference. They never intended to construct a wall of hostility between government and the concept of religious belief itself.

The evidence of this permeates our history and our government. The Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. "In God We Trust" is engraved on our coinage. The Supreme Court opens its proceedings with a religious invocation. And the Members of Congress open their sessions with a prayer. I just happen to believe the schoolchildren of the United States are entitled to the same privileges as Supreme Court Justices and Congressmen.

Last year, I sent the Congress a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools. Already this session, there's growing bipartisan support for the amendment, and I am calling on the Congress to act speedily to pass it and to let our children pray.

Perhaps some of you read recently about the Lubbock school case, where a judge actually ruled that it was unconstitutional for a school district to give equal treatment to religious and nonreligious student groups, even when the group meetings were being held during the students' own time. The first amendment never intended to require government to discriminate against religious speech.

Senators Denton and Hatfield have proposed legislation in the Congress on the whole question of prohibiting discrimination against religious forms of student speech. Such legislation could go far to restore freedom of religious speech for public school students. And I hope the Congress considers these bills quickly. And with your help, I think it's possible we could also get the constitutional amendment through the Congress this year.

More than a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of 50 States statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on demand now takes the lives of up to 1½ million unborn children a year. Human life legislation ending this tragedy will some day pass the Congress, and you and I must never rest until it does. Unless and until it can be proven that the unborn child is not a living entity, then its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness must be protected.

You may remember that when abortion on demand began, many, and, indeed, I'm sure many of you, warned that the practice would lead to a decline in respect for human life, that the philosophical premises used to justify abortion on demand would ultimately be used to justify other attacks on the sacredness of human life—infanticide or mercy killing.

Tragically enough, those warnings proved all too true. Only last year a court permitted the death by starvation of a handicapped infant.

I have directed the Health and Human Services Department to make clear to every health care facility in the United States that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects all handicapped persons against discrimination based on handicaps, including infants. And we have taken the further step of requiring that each and every recipient of Federal funds who provides health care services to infants must post and keep posted in a conspicuous place a notice stating that "discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is prohibited by Federal law." It also lists a 24-hour, toll-free number so that nurses and others may report violations in time to save the infant's life.

In addition, recent legislation introduced in the Congress by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois not only increases restrictions on publicly financed abortions, it also addresses this whole problem of infanticide. I urge the Congress to begin hearings and to adopt legislation that will protect the right of life to all children, including the disabled or handicapped.

Now, I'm sure that you must get discouraged at times, but you've done better than you know, perhaps. There's a great spiritual awakening in America, a renewal of the traditional values that have been the bedrock of America's goodness and greatness.

One recent survey by a Washington-based research council concluded that Americans were far more religious than the people of other nations; 95 percent of those surveyed expressed a belief in God and a huge majority believed the Ten Commandments had real meaning in their lives. And another study has found that an overwhelming majority of Americans disapprove of adultery, teenage sex, pornography, abortion, and hard drugs. And this same study showed a deep reverence for the importance of family ties and religious belief.

I think the items that we've discussed here today must be a key part of the Nation's political agenda. For the first time the Congress is openly and seriously debating and dealing with the prayer and abortion issues—and that's enormous progress right there. I repeat: America is in the midst of a spiritual awakening and a moral renewal. And with your Biblical keynote, I say today, "Yes, let justice roll on like a river, righteousness like a never-failing stream."

Now, obviously, much of this new political and social consensus I've talked about is based on a positive view of American history, one that takes pride in our country's accomplishments and record. But we must never forget that no government schemes are going to perfect man. We know that living in this world means dealing with what philosophers would call the phenomenology of evil or, as theologians would put it, the doctrine of sin.

There is sin and evil in the world, and we're enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. Our nation, too, has a legacy of evil with which it must deal. The glory of this land has been its capacity for transcending the moral evils of our past. For example, the long struggle of minority citizens for equal rights, once a source of disunity and civil war, is now a point of pride for all Americans. We must never go back. There is no room for racism, anti-Semitism, or other forms of ethnic and racial hatred in this country.

I know that you've been horrified, as have I, by the resurgence of some hate groups preaching bigotry and prejudice. Use the mighty voice of your pulpits and the powerful standing of your churches to denounce and isolate these hate groups in our midst. The commandment given us is clear and simple: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

But whatever sad episodes exist in our past, any objective observer must hold a positive view of American history, a history that has been the story of hopes fulfilled and dreams made into reality. Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world.

And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that's their name for religion-or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, "I love my little girls more than anything "And I said to myself, "Oh, no, don't. You can't—don't say that." But I had underestimated him. He went on: "I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God."

There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness-pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

It was C. S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable "Screwtape Letters," wrote: "The greatest evil is not done now in those sordid 'dens of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice."

Well, because these "quiet men" do not "raise their voices," because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they're always making "their final territorial demand," some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom.

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration's efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.

While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.

Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western World exists to the degree in which the West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism's attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marxism-Leninism is actually the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, "Ye shall be as gods."

The Western World can answer this challenge, he wrote, "but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in Man."

I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: "He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength ....But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary .... "

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, "We have it within our power to begin the world over again." We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself.
God bless you, and thank you very much.

Second Inaugural Address of Ronald Reagan

MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1985

Senator Mathias, Chief Justice Burger, Vice President Bush, Speaker O'Neill, Senator Dole, Reverend Clergy, members of my family and friends, and my fellow citizens:

This day has been made brighter with the presence here of one who, for a time, has been absent--Senator John Stennis.

God bless you and welcome back.

There is, however, one who is not with us today: Representative Gillis Long of Louisiana left us last night. I wonder if we could all join in a moment of silent prayer. (Moment of silent prayer.) Amen.

There are no words adequate to express my thanks for the great honor that you have bestowed on me. I will do my utmost to be deserving of your trust.

This is, as Senator Mathias told us, the 50th time that we the people have celebrated this historic occasion. When the first President, George Washington, placed his hand upon the Bible, he stood less than a single day's journey by horseback from raw, untamed wilderness. There were 4 million Americans in a union of 13 States. Today we are 60 times as many in a union of 50 States. We have lighted the world with our inventions, gone to the aid of mankind wherever in the world there was a cry for help, journeyed to the Moon and safely returned. So much has changed. And yet we stand together as we did two centuries ago.

When I took this oath four years ago, I did so in a time of economic stress. Voices were raised saying we had to look to our past for the greatness and glory. But we, the present-day Americans, are not given to looking backward. In this blessed land, there is always a better tomorrow.

Four years ago, I spoke to you of a new beginning and we have accomplished that. But in another sense, our new beginning is a continuation of that beginning created two centuries ago when, for the first time in history, government, the people said, was not our master, it is our servant; its only power that which we the people allow it to have.

That system has never failed us, but, for a time, we failed the system. We asked things of government that government was not equipped to give. We yielded authority to the National Government that properly belonged to States or to local governments or to the people themselves. We allowed taxes and inflation to rob us of our earnings and savings and watched the great industrial machine that had made us the most productive people on Earth slow down and the number of unemployed increase.

By 1980, we knew it was time to renew our faith, to strive with all our strength toward the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with an orderly society.

We believed then and now there are no limits to growth and human progress when men and women are free to follow their dreams.

And we were right to believe that. Tax rates have been reduced, inflation cut dramatically, and more people are employed than ever before in our history.

We are creating a nation once again vibrant, robust, and alive. But there are many mountains yet to climb. We will not rest until every American enjoys the fullness of freedom, dignity, and opportunity as our birthright. It is our birthright as citizens of this great Republic, and we'll meet this challenge.

These will be years when Americans have restored their confidence and tradition of progress; when our values of faith, family, work, and neighborhood were restated for a modern age; when our economy was finally freed from government's grip; when we made sincere efforts at meaningful arms reduction, rebuilding our defenses, our economy, and developing new technologies, and helped preserve peace in a troubled world; when Americans courageously supported the struggle for liberty, self-government, and free enterprise throughout the world, and turned the tide of history away from totalitarian darkness and into the warm sunlight of human freedom.

My fellow citizens, our Nation is poised for greatness. We must do what we know is right and do it with all our might. Let history say of us, "These were golden years--when the American Revolution was reborn, when freedom gained new life, when America reached for her best."

Our two-party system has served us well over the years, but never better than in those times of great challenge when we came together not as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans united in a common cause.

Two of our Founding Fathers, a Boston lawyer named Adams and a Virginia planter named Jefferson, members of that remarkable group who met in Independence Hall and dared to think they could start the world over again, left us an important lesson. They had become political rivals in the Presidential election of 1800. Then years later, when both were retired, and age had softened their anger, they began to speak to each other again through letters. A bond was reestablished between those two who had helped create this government of ours.

In 1826, the 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, they both died. They died on the same day, within a few hours of each other, and that day was the Fourth of July.

In one of those letters exchanged in the sunset of their lives, Jefferson wrote: "It carries me back to the times when, beset with difficulties and dangers, we were fellow laborers in the same cause, struggling for what is most valuable to man, his right to self-government. Laboring always at the same oar, with some wave ever ahead threatening to overwhelm us, and yet passing harmless ... we rode through the storm with heart and hand."

Well, with heart and hand, let us stand as one today: One people under God determined that our future shall be worthy of our past. As we do, we must not repeat the well-intentioned errors of our past. We must never again abuse the trust of working men and women, by sending their earnings on a futile chase after the spiraling demands of a bloated Federal Establishment. You elected us in 1980 to end this prescription for disaster, and I don't believe you reelected us in 1984 to reverse course.

At the heart of our efforts is one idea vindicated by 25 straight months of economic growth: Freedom and incentives unleash the drive and entrepreneurial genius that are the core of human progress. We have begun to increase the rewards for work, savings, and investment; reduce the increase in the cost and size of government and its interference in people's lives.

We must simplify our tax system, make it more fair, and bring the rates down for all who work and earn. We must think anew and move with a new boldness, so every American who seeks work can find work; so the least among us shall have an equal chance to achieve the greatest things--to be heroes who heal our sick, feed the hungry, protect peace among nations, and leave this world a better place.

The time has come for a new American emancipation--a great national drive to tear down economic barriers and liberate the spirit of enterprise in the most distressed areas of our country. My friends, together we can do this, and do it we must, so help me God.-- From new freedom will spring new opportunities for growth, a more productive, fulfilled and united people, and a stronger America--an America that will lead the technological revolution, and also open its mind and heart and soul to the treasures of literature, music, and poetry, and the values of faith, courage, and love.

A dynamic economy, with more citizens working and paying taxes, will be our strongest tool to bring down budget deficits. But an almost unbroken 50 years of deficit spending has finally brought us to a time of reckoning. We have come to a turning point, a moment for hard decisions. I have asked the Cabinet and my staff a question, and now I put the same question to all of you: If not us, who? And if not now, when? It must be done by all of us going forward with a program aimed at reaching a balanced budget. We can then begin reducing the national debt.

I will shortly submit a budget to the Congress aimed at freezing government program spending for the next year. Beyond that, we must take further steps to permanently control Government's power to tax and spend. We must act now to protect future generations from Government's desire to spend its citizens' money and tax them into servitude when the bills come due. Let us make it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to spend more than the Federal Government takes in.

We have already started returning to the people and to State and local governments responsibilities better handled by them. Now, there is a place for the Federal Government in matters of social compassion. But our fundamental goals must be to reduce dependency and upgrade the dignity of those who are infirm or disadvantaged. And here a growing economy and support from family and community offer our best chance for a society where compassion is a way of life, where the old and infirm are cared for, the young and, yes, the unborn protected, and the unfortunate looked after and made self

And there is another area where the Federal Government can play a part. As an older American, I remember a time when people of different race, creed, or ethnic origin in our land found hatred and prejudice installed in social custom and, yes, in law. There is no story more heartening in our history than the progress that we have made toward the "brotherhood of man" that God intended for us. Let us resolve there will be no turning back or hesitation on the road to an America rich in dignity and abundant with opportunity for all our citizens.

Let us resolve that we the people will build an American opportunity society in which all of us--white and black, rich and poor, young and old--will go forward together arm in arm. Again, let us remember that though our heritage is one of blood lines from every corner of the Earth, we are all Americans pledged to carry on this last, best hope of man on Earth.

I have spoken of our domestic goals and the limitations which we should put on our National Government. Now let me turn to a task which is the primary responsibility of National Government-the safety and security of our people.

Today, we utter no prayer more fervently than the ancient prayer for peace on Earth. Yet history has shown that peace will not come, nor will our freedom be preserved, by good will alone. There are those in the world who scorn our vision of human dignity and freedom. One nation, the Soviet Union, has conducted the greatest military buildup in the history of man, building arsenals of awesome offensive weapons.

We have made progress in restoring our defense capability. But much remains to be done. There must be no wavering by us, nor any doubts by others, that America will meet her responsibilities to remain free, secure, and at peace.

There is only one way safely and legitimately to reduce the cost of national security, and that is to reduce the need for it. And this we are trying to do in negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not just discussing limits on a further increase of nuclear weapons. We seek, instead, to reduce their number. We seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.

Now, for decades, we and the Soviets have lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction; if either resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the other could retaliate and destroy the one who had started it. Is there either logic or morality in believing that if one side threatens to kill tens of millions of our people, our only recourse is to threaten killing tens of millions of theirs?

I have approved a research program to find, if we can, a security shield that would destroy nuclear missiles before they reach their target. It wouldn't kill people, it would destroy weapons. It wouldn't militarize space, it would help demilitarize the arsenals of Earth. It would render nuclear weapons obsolete. We will meet with the Soviets, hoping that we can agree on a way to rid the world of the threat of nuclear destruction.

We strive for peace and security, heartened by the changes all around us. Since the turn of the century, the number of democracies in the world has grown fourfold. Human freedom is on the march, and nowhere more so than our own hemisphere. Freedom is one of the deepest and noblest aspirations of the human spirit. People, worldwide, hunger for the right of self-determination, for those inalienable rights that make for human dignity and progress.

America must remain freedom's staunchest friend, for freedom is our best ally.

And it is the world's only hope, to conquer poverty and preserve peace. Every blow we inflict against poverty will be a blow against its dark allies of oppression and war. Every victory for human freedom will be a victory for world peace.

So we go forward today, a nation still mighty in its youth and powerful in its purpose. With our alliances strengthened, with our economy leading the world to a new age of economic expansion, we look forward to a world rich in possibilities. And all this because we have worked and acted together, not as members of political parties, but as Americans.

My friends, we live in a world that is lit by lightning. So much is changing and will change, but so much endures, and transcends time.

History is a ribbon, always unfurling; history is a journey. And as we continue our journey, we think of those who traveled before us. We stand together again at the steps of this symbol of our democracy--or we would have been standing at the steps if it hadn't gotten so cold. Now we are standing inside this symbol of our democracy. Now we hear again the echoes of our past: a general falls to his knees in the hard snow of Valley Forge; a lonely President paces the darkened halls, and ponders his struggle to preserve the Union; the men of the Alamo call out encouragement to each other; a settler pushes west and sings a song, and the song echoes out forever and fills the unknowing air.

It is the American sound. It is hopeful, big-hearted, idealistic, daring, decent, and fair. That's our heritage; that is our song. We sing it still. For all our problems, our differences, we are together as of old, as we raise our voices to the God who is the Author of this most tender music. And may He continue to hold us close as we fill the world with our sound--sound in unity, affection, and love--one people under God, dedicated to the dream of freedom that He has placed in the human heart, called upon now to pass that dream on to a waiting and hopeful world.

God bless you and may God bless America.

• Ronald Reagan

Farewell Address to the Nation

January 11, 1989

My fellow Americans:

This is the 34th time I'll speak to you from the Oval Office and the last. We've been together 8 years now, and soon it'll be time for me to go. But before I do, I wanted to share some thoughts, some of which I've been saving for a long time.

It's been the honor of my life to be your President. So many of you have written the past few weeks to say thanks, but I could say as much to you. Nancy and I are grateful for the opportunity you gave us to serve.

One of the things about the Presidency is that you're always somewhat apart. You spend a lot of time going by too fast in a car someone else is driving, and seeing the people through tinted glass—the parents holding up a child, and the wave you saw too late and couldn't return. And so many times I wanted to stop and reach out from behind the glass, and connect. Well, maybe I can do a little of that tonight.

People ask how I feel about leaving. And the fact is, "parting is such sweet sorrow." The sweet part is California and the ranch and freedom. The sorrow—the goodbyes, of course, and leaving this beautiful place.

You know, down the hall and up the stairs from this office is the part of the White House where the President and his family live. There are a few favorite windows I have up there that I like to stand and look out of early in the morning. The view is over the grounds here to the Washington Monument, and then the Mali and the Jefferson Memorial. But on mornings when the humidity is low, you can see past the Jefferson to the river, the Potomac, and the Virginia shore. Someone said that's the view Lincoln had when he saw the smoke rising from the Battle of Bull Run. I see more prosaic things: the grass on the banks, the morning traffic as people make their way to work, now and then a sailboat on the river.

I've been thinking a bit at that window. I've been reflecting on what the past 8 years have meant and mean. And the image that comes to mind like a refrain is a nautical one—a small story about a big ship, and a refugee, and a sailor. It was back in the early eighties, at the height of the boat people. And the sailor was hard at work on the carrier Midway, which was patrolling the South China Sea. The sailor, like most American servicemen, was young, smart, and fiercely observant. The crew spied on the horizon a leaky little boat. And crammed inside were refugees from Indochina hoping to get to America. The Midway sent a small launch to bring them to the ship and safety. As the refugees made their way through the choppy seas, one spied the sailor on deck, and stood up, and called out to him. He yelled, "Hello, American sailor. Hello, freedom man."

A small moment with a big meaning, a moment the sailor, who wrote it in a letter, couldn't get out of his mind. And, when I saw it, neither could I. Because that's what it was to be an American in the 1980's. We stood, again, for freedom. I know we always have, but in the past few years the world again—and in a way, we ourselves—rediscovered it.

It's been quite a journey this decade, and we held together through some stormy seas. And at the end, together, we are reaching our destination.

The fact is, from Grenada to the Washington and Moscow summits, from the recession of '81 to '82, to the expansion that began in late '82 and continues to this day, we've made a difference. The way I see it, there were two great triumphs, two things that I'm proudest of. One is the economic recovery, in which the people of America created—and filled—19 million new jobs. The other is the recovery of our morale. America is respected again in the world and looked to for leadership.

Something that happened to me a few years ago reflects some of this. It was back in 1981, and I was attending my first big economic summit, which was held that year in Canada. The meeting place rotates among the member countries. The opening meeting was a formal dinner for the heads of government of the seven industrialized nations. Now, I sat there like the new kid in school and listened, and it was all Francois this and Helmut that. They dropped titles and spoke to one another on a first-name basis. Well, at one point I sort of leaned in and said, "My name's Ron." Well, in that same year, we began the actions we felt would ignite an economic comeback—cut taxes and regulation, started to cut spending. And soon the recovery began.

Two years later, another economic summit with pretty much the same cast. At the big opening meeting we all got together, and all of a sudden, just for a moment, I saw that everyone was just sitting there looking at me. And then one of them broke the silence. "Tell us about the American miracle," he said.

Well, back in 1980, when I was running for President, it was all so different. Some pundits said our programs would result in catastrophe. Our views on foreign affairs would cause war. Our plans for the economy would cause inflation to soar and bring about economic collapse. I even remember one highly respected economist saying, back in 1982, that "The engines of economic growth have shut down here, and they're likely to stay that way for years to come." Well, he and the other opinion leaders were wrong. The fact is, what they called "radical" was really "right." What they called "dangerous" was just "desperately needed."

And in all of that time I won a nickname, "The Great Communicator." But I never thought it was my style or the words I used that made a difference: it was the content. I wasn't a great communicator, but I communicated great things, and they didn't spring full bloom from my brow, they came from the heart of a great nation—from our experience, our wisdom, and our belief in the principles that have guided us for two centuries. They called it the Reagan revolution. Well, I'll accept that, but for me it always seemed more like the great rediscovery, a rediscovery of our values and our common sense.

Common sense told us that when you put a big tax on something, the people will produce less of it. So, we cut the people's tax rates, and the people produced more than ever before. The economy bloomed like a plant that had been cut back and could now grow quicker and stronger. Our economic program brought about the longest peacetime expansion in our history: real family income up, the poverty rate down, entrepreneurship booming, and an explosion in research and new technology. We're exporting more than ever because American industry became more competitive and at the same time, we summoned the national will to knock down protectionist walls abroad instead of erecting them at home.

Common sense also told us that to preserve the peace, we'd have to become strong again after years of weakness and confusion. So, we rebuilt our defenses, and this New Year we toasted the new peacefulness around the globe. Not only have the superpowers actually begun to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons—and hope for even more progress is bright—but the regional conflicts that rack the globe are also beginning to cease. The Persian Gulf is no longer a war zone. The Soviets are leaving Afghanistan. The Vietnamese are preparing to pull out of Cambodia, and an American-mediated accord will soon send 50,000 Cuban troops home from Angola.

The lesson of all this was, of course, that because we're a great nation, our challenges seem complex. It will always be this way. But as long as we remember our first principles and believe in ourselves, the future will always be ours. And something else we learned: Once you begin a great movement, there's no telling where it will end. We meant to change a nation, and instead, we changed a world.

Countries across the globe are turning to free markets and free speech and turning away from the ideologies of the past. For them, the great rediscovery of the 1980's has been that, lo and behold, the moral way of government is the practical way of government: Democracy, the profoundly good, is also the profoundly productive.

When you've got to the point when you can celebrate the anniversaries of your 39th birthday you can sit back sometimes, review your life, and see it flowing before you. For me there was a fork in the river, and it was right in the middle of my life. I never meant to go into politics. It wasn't my intention when I was young. But I was raised to believe you had to pay your way for the blessings bestowed on you. I was happy with my career in the entertainment world, but I ultimately went into politics because I wanted to protect something precious.

Ours was the first revolution in the history of mankind that truly reversed the course of government, and with three little words: "We the People." "We the People" tell the government what to do; it doesn't tell us. "We the People" are the driver; the government is the car. And we decide where it should go, and by what route, and how fast. Almost all the world's constitutions are documents in which governments tell the people what their privileges are. Our Constitution is a document in which "We the People" tell the government what it is allowed to do. "We the People" are free. This belief has been the underlying basis for everything I've tried to do these past 8 years.

But back in the 1960's, when I began, it seemed to me that we'd begun reversing the order of things—that through more and more rules and regulations and confiscatory taxes, the government was taking more of our money, more of our options, and more of our freedom. I went into politics in part to put up my hand and say, "Stop." I was a citizen politician, and it seemed the right thing for a citizen to do.

I think we have stopped a lot of what needed stopping. And I hope we have once again reminded people that man is not free unless government is limited. There's a clear cause and effect here that is as neat and predictable as a law of physics: As government expands, liberty contracts.

Nothing is less free than pure communism-and yet we have, the past few years, forged a satisfying new closeness with the Soviet Union. I've been asked if this isn't a gamble, and my answer is no because we're basing our actions not on words but deeds. The detente of the 1970's was based not on actions but promises. They'd promise to treat their own people and the people of the world better. But the gulag was still the gulag, and the state was still expansionist, and they still waged proxy wars in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Well, this time, so far, it's different. President Gorbachev has brought about some internal democratic reforms and begun the withdrawal from Afghanistan. He has also freed prisoners whose names I've given him every time we've met.

But life has a way of reminding you of big things through small incidents. Once, during the heady days of the Moscow summit, Nancy and I decided to break off from the entourage one afternoon to visit the shops on Arbat Street—that's a little street just off Moscow's main shopping area. Even though our visit was a surprise, every Russian there immediately recognized us and called out our names and reached for our hands. We were just about swept away by the warmth. You could almost feel the possibilities in all that joy. But within seconds, a KGB detail pushed their way toward us and began pushing and shoving the people in the crowd. It was an interesting moment. It reminded me that while the man on the street in the Soviet Union yearns for peace, the government is Communist. And those who run it are Communists, and that means we and they view such issues as freedom and human rights very differently.

We must keep up our guard, but we must also continue to work together to lessen and eliminate tension and mistrust. My view is that President Gorbachev is different from previous Soviet leaders. I think he knows some of the things wrong with his society and is trying to fix them. We wish him well. And we'll continue to work to make sure that the Soviet Union that eventually emerges from this process is a less threatening one. What it all boils down to is this: I want the new closeness to continue. And it will, as long as we make it clear that we will continue to act in a certain way as long as they continue to act in a helpful manner. If and when they don't, at first pull your punches. If they persist, pull the plug. It's still trust but verify. It's still play, but cut the cards. It's still watch closely. And don't be afraid to see what you see.

I've been asked if I have any regrets. Well, I do. The deficit is one. I've been talking a great deal about that lately, but tonight isn't for arguments, and I'm going to hold my tongue. But an observation: I've had my share of victories in the Congress, but what few people noticed is that I never won anything you didn't win for me. They never saw my troops, they never saw Reagan's regiments, the American people. You won every battle with every call you made and letter you wrote demanding action. Well, action is still needed. If we're to finish the job, Reagan's regiments will have to become the Bush brigades. Soon he'll be the chief, and he'll need you every bit as much as I did.

Finally, there is a great tradition of warnings in Presidential farewells, and I've got one that's been on my mind for some time. But oddly enough it starts with one of the things I'm proudest of in the past 8 years: the resurgence of national pride that I called the new patriotism. This national feeling is good, but it won't count for much, and it won't last unless it's grounded in thoughtfulness and knowledge.

An informed patriotism is what we want. And are we doing a good enough job teaching our children what America is and what she represents in the long history of the world? Those of us who are over 35 or so years of age grew up in a different America. We were taught, very directly, what it means to be an American. And we absorbed, almost in the air, a love of country and an appreciation of its institutions. If you didn't get these things from your family you got them from the neighborhood, from the father down the street who fought in Korea or the family who lost someone at Anzio. Or you could get a sense of patriotism from school. And if all else failed you could get a sense of patriotism from the popular culture. The movies celebrated democratic values and implicitly reinforced the idea that America was special. TV was like that, too, through the mid-sixties.

But now, we're about to enter the nineties, and some things have changed. Younger parents aren't sure that an unambivalent appreciation of America is the right thing to teach modern children. And as for those who create the popular culture, well-grounded patriotism is no longer the style. Our spirit is back, but we haven't reinstitutionalized it. We've got to do a better job of getting across that America is freedom-freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of enterprise. And freedom is special and rare. It's fragile; it needs production [protection].

So, we've got to teach history based not on what's in fashion but what's important-why the Pilgrims came here, who Jimmy Doolittle was, and what those 30 seconds over Tokyo meant. You know, 4 years ago on the 40th anniversary of D-day, I read a letter from a young woman writing to her late father, who'd fought on Omaha Beach. Her name was Lisa Zanatta Henn, and she said, "we will always remember, we will never forget what the boys of Normandy did." Well, let's help her keep her word. If we forget what we did, we won't know who we are. I'm warning of an eradication of the American memory that could result, ultimately, in an erosion of the American spirit. Let's start with some basics: more attention to American history and a greater emphasis on civic ritual.

And let me offer lesson number one about America: All great change in America begins at the dinner table. So, tomorrow night in the kitchen I hope the talking begins. And children, if your parents haven't been teaching you what it means to be an American, let 'em know and nail 'em on it. That would be a very American thing to do.

And that's about all I have to say tonight, except for one thing. The past few days when I've been at that window upstairs, I've thought a bit of the "shining city upon a hill." The phrase comes from John Winthrop, who wrote it to describe the America he imagined. What he imagined was important because he was an early Pilgrim, an early freedom man. He journeyed here on what today we'd call a little wooden boat; and like the other Pilgrims, he was looking for a home that would be free.

I've spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I don't know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here. That's how I saw it, and see it still.

And how stands the city on this winter night? More prosperous, more secure, and happier than it was 8 years ago. But more than that: After 200 years, two centuries, she still stands strong and true on the granite ridge, and her glow has held steady no matter what storm. And she's still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home.

We've done our part. And as I walk off into the city streets, a final word to the men and women of the Reagan revolution, the men and women across America who for 8 years did the work that brought America back. My friends: We did it. We weren't just marking time. We made a difference. We made the city stronger, we made the city freer, and we left her in good hands. All in all, not bad, not bad at all.

And so, goodbye, God bless you, and God bless the United States of America.